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The Rejection of the Child Labor Amendment

The promotion of children's welfare, through compulsory school attendance laws, restrictions on child labor, and related legislation, was a concern of American social reformers dating well back into the nineteenth century. During the progressive era significant advances were made at the state level, and the federal regulation of child labor was begun. But a conservative Supreme Court brought this phase to a close with adverse rulings on both of the federal statutes, and with the rejection in 1924 and 1925 of the proposed child labor Constitutional amendment, Americans turned away from further reform in this area. This failure is of interest in what it demonstrated about the confusions and limitations of progressivism in the 1920's.

Although Congressional support for the child labor amendment was considerable, Congress proved to be more progressive than much of the country. The collapse of the ratification drive revealed a far deeper distrust of the federal government and its efficacy as an instrument of reform than supporters of the amendment had anticipated. Furthermore it proved another example of the inability of former progressive groups to work together in the 1920's. As Professor Link has noted, the success of nationwide reform had required the support of a coalition of organized labor, western and southern farmers, social reformers and independent radicals.[1] These diverse elements had cooperated to reelect Wilson in 1916, but thereafter they were increasingly unable to agree on common objectives. The battle over the child labor amendment showed the continuing tensions within the old coalition, tensions that

[1] Arthur L. Link, "What Happened to the Progressive Movement?" *American Historical Review*, LXIV (July, 1959), 838.

opponents exacerbated by skillful and at times demagogic techniques, but which nevertheless greatly lessened the prospects for an effective revival of the reform movement.

The drive for a Constitutional amendment to permit the federal regulation of child labor began immediately after the Supreme Court's decision in May, 1922, which for the second time ruled against Congress's efforts to limit child labor.[2] For many people the next step obviously was Constitutional reform. As early as May 17, Representative Roy G. Fitzgerald of Ohio, introduced a resolution for an amendment that would empower Congress to regulate the employment of persons under eighteen years, and two days later Senator Hiram Johnson of California presented a similar resolution to the Senate.[3] Congress adjourned before action could be taken in 1922, but in the meantime outside pressure grew. At the request of Samuel Gompers, representatives of several national organizations met at the American Federation of Labor headquarters in Washington, D. C., on June 1, 1922. Besides Gompers others present included Reverend E. O. Watson, Executive Secretary of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, Florence Kelley, General Secretary of the National Consumers' League, and Matilda Lindsay of the National Women's Trade Union League. Out of this gathering emerged the Permanent Conference for the Abolition of Child Labor, which had, by the fall of 1923, representatives from some twenty-five national organizations encompassing a variety of political, social and religious affiliations. This group carefully prepared an original draft of the amendment and was an important force in promoting its adoption by Congress.[4]

Interest in the child labor problem was shown in diverse quarters. The position of Senator Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin suggested the possibility of broadly based farmer-labor support for an amendment. In an address on June 14, 1922, before a special child labor protest session of the A. F. of L.'s annual convention, LaFollette soundly condemned the Supreme Court for its recent decisions. He demanded not only a child labor amendment, but also one to prevent lower courts from passing on the constitution-

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[2] *Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.*, 259 U. S. 20.

[3] *New York Times*, May 18, 1922, p. 20 and May 20, 1922, p. 18.

[4] United States Congress, Senate, *Child Labor Amendment to the Constitution, Hearings Before A Subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary*, 67 Cong., 4 Sess. (1923), pp. 21, 49; *New York Times*, June 2, 1922, p. 19 and November 21, 1923, p. 21; Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, *Report: 1920–1924*, New York, 1925, 119–120; National Child Labor Committee, *Handbook On The Federal Child Labor Amendment*, Pub. No. 368, New York, 1937, 12-13,

ality of acts of Congress and to allow Congress to nullify a Supreme Court decision by reenactment of the law in question. La Follette carried these ideas over into his 1924 presidential campaign, which coincided with the early part of the battle to ratify the child labor amendment. However, he failed to build a progressive farmer-labor coalition that was strong enough to elect himself or guarantee the success of the child labor amendment.[5] But support was not confined to traditionally progressive elements. For example, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, as head of the American Child Health Association, had shown concern with problems of child health and labor. Shortly after the decision in the Bailey Case he declared that if a final effort failed to bring all states in line to end child labor then the only alternative would be amendment to end "a blight that in its measure is more deplorable than war." Although Hoover later felt that the proposed eighteen year age restriction was too high and a tactical error, he still urged the amendment's adoption.[6] Other prominent supporters included Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and President Harding.[7] Clearly the idea of turning to Constitutional reform in order to deal with the evil of child labor was accepted in many parts of the political spectrum.

A number of other factors were favorable. For example, the purpose of the amendment was certainly no innovation. Federal regulation of child labor had twice been practiced. Hence that idea in itself was no great shock, even for some fairly conservative Congressmen. In addition the need for federal regulation could still be demonstrated. Grace Abbott, chief of the Children's Bureau, reported in January, 1923, that only thirteen states had laws measuring up in every particular to the standards of the previous federal statutes, while a few more states came up approximately to these levels. As some states had actually retrogressed in certain aspects, she was not optimistic about the prospects for greater uniformity as a result of state action alone.[8] Opponents of federal regulation

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5 *New York Times*, June 15, 1922, p. 1; Bela Case La Follette and Fola La Follette, *Robert M. La Follette*, New York, 1953, 1055–1057, 1128; Kenneth C. Mac Kay, *The Progressive Movement of 1924*, New York, 1947, 141, 151; Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson, *National Party Platforms*, Urbana, Illinois, 1956, 254.

6 *New York Times*, June 28, 1922, p. 26; Herbert Hoover, *Memoirs: Cabinet and Presidency*, New York, 1952, 31–32, 97–99, 102–103.

7 *New York Times*, October 11, 1922, p. 40 and December 9, 1922, p. 6.

8 Senate, *Hearings*, 24–25, 116; United States Congress, House of Representatives, *Proposed Child Labor Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary*, 68 Cong., 2 Sess. (1924), 20.

were quick to point out the significant decline (from 1,990,225 or 18.4 percent to 1,060,858 or 8.5 percent) of gainfully employed children between the ages of ten and fifteen years reported in the 1920 census compared to 1910.[9] But in 1920 the second federal child labor law was in operation and was a factor in lowering the amount of non-agricultural employment. Furthermore since the Bailey case reports received by the Children's Bureau showed increases in child labor, particularly in the more backward states.[10] The extent of this increase was debated, but the National Child Labor Committee estimated in June, 1924, that 2,000,000 children age fifteen or under were gainfully employed. The 1920 census also reported 1,712,648 children ages sixteen and seventeen gainfully employed. Moreover it did not enumerate those under ten years, or those in the street trades, messenger work and similar activities, although other studies stated that very young children were frequently employed in sugar beet fields or shrimp and oyster canneries.[11] While such evidence did not convince everyone, a strong case was still presented in the mid-1920's for the necessity of federal regulation of child labor.

When Congress reconvened in the late fall of 1922 the Senate acted first. A subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee held hearings in January, 1923, on a number of variant resolutions for a child labor amendment. A parade of witnesses brought forth by the Permanent Conference for the Abolition of Child Labor testified on behalf of an amendment, while the statements of the few opponents who appeared at this time were restrained. On February 19, 1923, the Judiciary Committee reported favorably on an amendment to grant Congress power "concurrent with the several States, to limit or prohibit the labor of persons under the age of 18 years."[12] Although Congress adjourned before action could be completed

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[9] House, *Hearings*, 32–33; United States, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, *Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930, Population*: Vol. V, Washington, 1933, 345. Of these children employed in 1920, there were 647,309 in agricultural and 413,549 in non-agricultural pursuits.

[10] House, *Hearings*, 38–39; *New York Times*, August 2, 1923, p. 24 and September 2, 1923, Sec. 7, p. 3; Raymond G. Fuller "Child Labor: Problem in American Government," *American Review of Reviews*, LXXI (January, 1925), 66; Owen R. Lovejoy, "Why A Child Labor Amendment?" *Forum* LXXIII (January, 1925), 13–15.

[11] Benjamin P. Chass, "American Children in Bondage," *Current History*, XXI (March, 1925), 855; *Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930, Population*: Vol. IV, 40; Raymond G. Fuller, *Child Labor and the Constitution*, New York, 1923, 4; *New York Times*, March 11, 1923, p. 18 and September 2, 1923, Sec. 7, p. 3.

[12] *New York Times*, February 20, 1923, p. 16.

during the winter of 1923, the prospects for passage in the near future were favorable.

The new 68th Congress convened on December 3, 1923, and fourteen resolutions for a child labor amendment were promptly introduced in the House, and four in the Senate.[13] From February 7 to March 8, 1924, the House held hearings during which the opposition began to assume a more determined and alarmist tone. Yet such tactics failed to prevent a favorable vote on a resolution for an amendment, which was approved on April 26 by the comfortable margin of 297 to 69. The Senate debated the matter briefly at the end of May and approved the resolution on June 2 by a vote of 61 to 23.[14] The proposed amendment granted Congress power "to limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of age." In addition it specified that state power would be unimpaired except that state laws would be "suspended to the extent necessary to give effect to legislation enacted by the Congress." The battle now shifted from Congress to the states.

Encouraged by the size of the Congressional majorities, proponents of the amendment were generally confident about the prospects for ratification. Arkansas' favorable vote at the end of June was an encouraging sign. The optimism was short lived. During the summer of 1924 the ratification campaign suffered a number of reverses, and thereafter the momentum was never really recovered. Prospects for Southern support rapidly faded with the unanimous or nearly unanimous rejection by the Louisiana House in late June, the Georgia legislature in early July, and the North Carolina Senate in August.[15] In these states emotional distrust of outside reformers was coupled at times with extravagant charges against the amendment. For example Representative McCorsey of the Georgia House denounced it as the work of a bunch of "long-haired agitatists." "I don't want any more monkeying with the buzz-saw by that bunch in Washington," he said. "We don't mix nohow. We weren't born under the same régime and don't drink out of the same bottle. We don't want them interfering with our affairs."[16] The language of the formal resolution of the Georgia legislature was only some-

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13 *New York Times*, December 24, 1923, p. 21.

14 *Congressional Record*, 68 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 65, Part 7, 7295 and Part 10, 10142.

15 *New York Times*, June 28, 1924, p. 13; June 29, 1924, Sec. 2, p. 2; June 30, 1924, p. 16; July 3, 1924, p. 1; July 4, 1924, p. 7 and August 23, 1924, p. 3; *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, November 1, 1924, pp. 2025–2026.

16 *New York Times*, July 3, 1924, p. 1.

what less extreme. The amendment, it declared, "would give irrevocable support to a rebellion of childhood which menaces our civilization. . . . It would place Congress in control in every home in the land between parent and child."[17] Unfortunately for the advocates of the amendment some of the reasoning used in the South during the summer of 1924 was repeated throughout much of the country in succeeding months.

A detailed analysis of all the arguments brought forth to discredit the child labor amendment is beyond the purpose of this discussion.[18] Briefly stated the most commonly made charges were as follows: (1) The amendment was unnecessary. Critics insisted that state regulations were generally adequate and noted the decline in child labor reported in the 1920 census. (2) The wording of the amendment was too broad. Opponents attacked particularly the use of the word "labor" rather than "employment," and the eighteen year age limit. Futhermore they asserted that Congress could never be trusted to use such a general grant of authority wisely, but would pass many varieties of extreme laws.[19] (3) Federal regulation endangered states' rights, local government and the sense of local responsibility. (4) The amendment would mean an ominous increase of federal power, and an extensive bureaucracy would arise to enforce the laws that would be enacted. (5) Parental control of children would be surrendered to the bureaucracy. (6) The amendment was a communist-inspired plot to subvert American institutions.

Wholly aside from the intrinsic merits of any of these charges— and an honest case could certainly be made for some of them— they were particularly effective weapons in the political-social climate of the mid-1920's. Since the end of the World War disillusionment about the efficacy of government, especially federal government, had grown. Certainly prohibition had altered peoples' notions about the value of sumptuary laws. But the accusation about communism was particularly insidious. The promoters of this distortion deliberately aroused the passions of the recent red scare, and in so doing

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17 Quoted in *Nation*, Vol. 119 (November 12, 1924), 509.

18 The arguments noted can be found in the Senate and House hearings and in innumerable articles, pamphlets and editorials. No attempt will be made to cite all of the sources consulted. For a good summary of the charges against the amendment see Don D. Lescohier and Elizabeth Brandeis, *History of Labor in the United States, 1896–1932*, Vol. III of *History of Labor in the United States* by John R. Commons, et al., New York, 1935, 446–50.

19 On this point see Lester B. Orfield, *The Amending of the Federal Constitution*, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1942, 122–123.

added a new dimension to all the arguments used against the amendment.

The communist charge was first brought forth in detail at the House hearings on March 1, 1924, by Mary G. Kilbreth, the president of the Woman Patriot Publishing Company, an organization devoted to the championing of conservative causes. Federal child labor regulation, she asserted, was basically a socialist and communist idea to acquire state control of the children. In giving any encouragement to the movement the Democratic and Republican parties acted as "dupes of the Socialists." She concluded by damning the advocates of the amendment, particularly Florence Kelley, as reds.[20] The House paid little attention to such accusations, but some Senators picked up the idea. Thus Senator T. F. Bayard of Delaware introduced a petition from the Woman Patriot Publishing Company containing a scurrilous attack upon the amendment's backers. "This benign-looking amendment," read the petition, "drawn and promoted principally by an American Socialist leader (Mrs. Florence Kelley, translator of Karl Marx and friend of Frederick Engels, who instructed her how to introduce socialism 'into the flesh and blood' of Americans), is a straight Socialist measure. It is also promoted under direct orders from Moscow."[21] A few other Senators delivered variations on this theme, but they failed to prevent most of their colleagues from acting favorably on the amendment.

During the summer and the fall of 1924, however, red-scare tactics were widely used to condemn the child labor amendment as un-American, and there is no doubt that this approach was an important factor in its defeat. While not all opponents were as ready as Mary G. Kilbreth to see the reform's origins in Moscow, the efforts to play upon fears of communism were obvious. Even presumably sober and responsible citizens criticized the amendment in terms that somewhat more subtly suggested the red menace. For example, President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia University asserted that it would make possible "a more far-reaching series of changes in our family, social, economic and political life than have heretofore been dreamed of by the most ardent revolu-

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[20] House, *Hearings*, 171–172, 176.

[21] *Congressional Record*, 68 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 65, Part 10, 9963. Mrs. Kelley was indeed a socialist, had translated a treatise of Engels in 1887, and had been married to a Polish-Russian physician named Wishnieweski. Although she had clearly rejected communism, the other facts damned her beyond redemption in the eyes of patriots like Mary Kilbreth. See Josephine Goldmark, *Impatient Crusader: Florence Kelley's Life Story*, Urbana, Illinois, 1953, 16–20.

tionary."[22] In short, such reasoning implied that the child labor amendment was not only unneeded and unwise, but that it was also subversive.

As the campaign against the amendment developed momentum it became obvious that interested industrialists were in the forefront of the opposition. The National Association of Manufacturers made defeat of the amendment a major item of business in 1924. Its influence was considerable. For example, numerous articles and editorials followed very closely the anti-ratification arguments prepared and distributed by N. A. M. general counsel James A. Emery.[23] The N. A. M. organized a National Committee for Rejection of the 20th Amendment which distributed pamphlets and appealed to state legislatures. With headquarters in the same building in Washington occupied by Emery, this committee was composed entirely of industrialists. Its chairman, Millard D. Brown, president of Continental Mills in Philadelphia, could hardly claim to speak on behalf of a disinterested group of citizens.[24]

The leader of the N. A. M.'s anti-ratification drive in the South was David Clark, editor of the *Southern Textile Bulletin*. Clark had a long and impressive record as an opponent of federal child labor legislation, having been instrumental in instigating the suits that led to the overturn of the 1916 and 1919 laws.[25] He appeared at both the Senate and House hearings to argue that existing state

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[22] "The New American Revolution," American Bar Association, *Journal*, X (December, 1924), 849. See also J. W. Crabtree, "Dr. Pritchett, Dr. Butler and Child Labor," *School and Society*, XX (November 8, 1924), 581–585; "Opposition to the Child Labor Constitutional Amendment," *Elementary School Journal* XXV (November, 1924), 161–163.

Among business journals the *Manufacturers Record*, a Baltimore publication of Southern industrial interests, was particularly notable for the amount of red-scare articles and editorials during the summer and fall of 1924. The N. A. M.'s Journal, *American Industries* was more restrained. But see the article by Noel Sargent, the head of the Employment Relations Department of the N. A. M., "Employers and the Child Labor Bill," *American Industries*, XXV (February, 1925), 19–23, 26–28, esp. 22.

[23] See testimony of James A. Emery in House, *Hearings*, 201–216; *American Industries*, XXV (September, 1924), 24–25; *New York Times*, August 18, 1924, p. 16; *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, November 1, 1924, p. 2026; Albion G. Taylor, *Labor Policies of the National Association of Manufacturers*, Urbana, Illinois, 1927, 130–131.

[24] In a speech before the Senate on January 8, 1925, Senator Walsh of Montana attacked the role of the N. A. M. in the opposition to the child labor amendment. *Congressional Record*, 68 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. 66, Part 2, 1438–1447. See also William L. Chenery, "Child Labor Fight Shifts to Legislatures," in *New York Times*, December 7, 1924, Sec. 4, p. 6; Taylor, *Labor Policies of the N. A. M.*, 132–133.

[25] "Opposition Propaganda At Work: Behind the Scenes," *American Labor Legislation Review*, XV, (June, 1925), 122.

laws in the South adequately protected the children. While the hostility of Southern cotton manufacturing interests was of course expected, Clark's role was interesting because of his efforts to stimulate agrarian opposition to the amendment. Thus he circulated propaganda among farmers and travelled extensively in western states to confer with agricultural spokesmen.[26] Furthermore in July, 1924, he organized the Farmers' States' Rights League of North Carolina, which flooded western papers with anti-amendment advertisements. Early in 1925 this alleged agrarian organization was exposed as a tool of the Southern cotton mill interests, but this revelation had no apparent effect in stemming the tide of rejections.[27]

Despite the spurious credentials of the Farmers' States' Rights League, agrarian hostility to the child labor amendment was substantial. A large proportion of the working children ages ten to fifteen were engaged in agricultural pursuits. Although statutory regulation of such labor was not then proposed by the supporters of the amendment,[28] many farmers were certainly apprehensive that such interference would be forthcoming. At the House hearings in March, 1924, Gray Silver of the American Farm Bureau Federation strongly asserted that members of the Federation were against the amendment, which they believed should only be directed against industrial labor.[29] The Grange did not oppose the amendment during its Congressional stages, but subsequently several state Granges went on record against ratification, as did the national organization at its convention in November, 1924.[30] Certainly some farmers were influenced by the deliberate misrepresentations of the opponents who played upon fear of federal control. Hence charges were circulated that even household chores would be forbidden if

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[26] *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, November 1, 1924, 2025; Taylor, *Labor Policies of the N. A. M.*, 131.

[27] The exposé of the League first appeared in January, 1925, in *Labor*, a publication of the railroad labor organizations. In a speech before the House on February 17, 1925, Representative Foster of Ohio quoted the article extensively. Senator Walsh of Montana also had the article reprinted in the *Congressional Record* on March 5, 1925. See *Congressional Record*, 68 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. 66, Part 4, 3992-3993 and Part 5, 5507-5509.

[28] Testimony of Grace Abbott and Owen R. Lovejoy, House, *Hearings*, 34, 76-77.

[29] House, *Hearings*, 252-254. For other farmers' opposition see *ibid.*, 77-78. At its annual convention in 1935 the Farm Bureau Federation reversed its position and voted to support the amendment. National Child Labor Committee, *Handbook on the Federal Child Labor Amendment*, 40.

[30] *New York Times*, November 22, 1924, p. 20. Among the state Granges expressing opposition to the amendment were those in Ohio in July, 1924, Maine in December, 1924 and Connecticut in January, 1925. See *New York Times*, December 12, 1924, p. 40 and January 16, 1925, p. 29; *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, November 1, 1924, 2026.

the amendment were ratified.[31] For whatever reasons few farm journals supported the amendment. A third agrarian organization, the Farmers' Educational and Co-operative Union, which had distinctly less influence and was composed of poorer farmers than the Farm Bureau Federation or the Grange, apparently did not oppose the ratification. But the hostility of the two largest farm groups was a distinct blow to the amendment's prospects.

Probably the most crippling setback of the ratification campaign was the unexpected rejection by Massachusetts voters of a referendum on the amendment in November, 1924. As the only direct test of popular sentiment on the issue, this defeat undermined the reformers' assumption that most of the people favored federal child labor legislation. Certainly this result was generally unforeseen. Massachusetts child labor laws were among the most advanced in the United States. Presumably her textile manufactures had everything to gain by federal regulations that would tend to equalize her competitive position.[32] Republican Senator Lodge and Democratic Congressman Connery both introduced resolutions for a child labor amendment, and several of the other Massachusetts Congressmen testified in favor of the idea at the House hearings. In addition the Massachusetts General Court adopted a resolution in February, 1924, petitioning Congress to propose a child labor amendment.[33]

Yet the apparent strength of the reformers in Massachusetts collapsed in the face of an intensive anti-ratification campaign that was, according to one observer, "distinguished by misrepresentation, ignorance, and deceit."[34] The decision of the General Court in the last hours of its 1924 session to hold an advisory referendum on the amendment in the fall showed growing doubts about the idea. As a result the opposition was given several months to educate the electorate on the alleged dangers of the amendment. The center of the

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[31] E. C. Lindeman, "Child Labor Amendment and the Farmers," *American Review of Reviews* LXX (July, 1924), 63; Elizabeth Christman, "Interlocking Machinery Spreads Misrepresentations," *American Labor Legislation Review*, XV (June, 1925), 121; *Manufacturers Record*, November 6, 1924, 79.

[32] Senator Walsh of Montana noted, however, that many Massachusetts textile firms owned mills in the South, a fact that helped explain the position of the Massachusetts industries. *Congressional Record*, 68 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. 66, Part 2, 1447. For summary of child labor conditions and legislation in Massachusetts, see Raymond G. Fuller, *Child Labor in Massachusetts*, Boston, 1926.

[33] *New York Times*, December 5, 1923, p. 2 and December 24, 1923, p. 21; House, *Hearings*, 1–6, 12–14, 66–69; *Congressional Record*, 68 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 65, Part 4, 3939.

[34] "Child Labor Must End!" *Nation*, Vol. 119 (December 3, 1924), 590.

anti-ratification forces was the Associated Industries of Massachusetts, which was headed by Clifford S. Anderson of the Norton Company in Worcester and a member of the N. A. M.'s National Committee for Rejection of the 20th Amendment.[35] The Associated Industries formed an *ad hoc* group, the Citizens' Committee to Protect Our Homes and Children. This organization disseminated most of the anti-amendment propaganda, which concentrated on the threat to the family and the menace of communism.[36] Also active was the Sentinels of the Republic, a group led by Louis A. Coolidge of Boston, the Treasurer of the United Shoe Machinery Company. The Sentinels opposed social and labor reforms generally, however, and did not limit its activities to Massachusetts and the child labor issue.[37] In short, industrialists formed the hard core of the opposition in Massachusetts. But they were joined by other prominent citizens, like the lawyer Moorfield Story, Harvard President A. Lawrence Lowell, and most significantly Cardinal O'Connell. In early October the Boston prelate instructed every pastor in his archdiocese to warn his parishioners of the dangers hidden in the child labor amendment. The *Boston Pilot,* official organ of the archdiocese, declared on October 4, 1924, that "for parental control over children it would substitute the will of Congress and the dictate of a centralized bureaucracy, more in keeping with Soviet Russia, than with the fundamental principles of American Government."[38] The opposition of the Catholic Church at the end of the campaign was a telling blow.

On November 4, 1924, Massachusetts voters rejected the amendment by a margin of nearly three to one. This stunning defeat suggested that the reformers had badly misjudged popular sentiment on the issue. At any rate Massachusetts legislators were in no mood to

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35 *Congressional Record,* 68 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. 66, Part 2, p. 1447; *Industry,* September 6, 1924, 4. *Industry* was a publication of the Associated Industries of Massachusetts.

36 W. A. Robinson, "Advisory Referendum in Massachusetts on the Child Labor Amendment," *American Political Science Review,* XIX (February, 1925), 71; *New York Times,* November 17, 1924, p. 8; "Child Labor Must End!" *Nation,* Vol. 119 (December 3, 1924), 590; Hubert C. Herring, "The Shame of Massachusetts," *Christian Century,* XLI (December 11, 1924), 1594; Lescohier and Brandeis, *History of Labor,* 446–447.

37 See Coolidge's testimony in House, *Hearings,* 216–219; Thomas F. Cadwalader, "The Defeat of the Twentieth Amendment," American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, *Annals,* CXXIX (January, 1927), 66; *New York Times,* July 19, 1924, p. 20 and December 1, 1924, p. 2.

38 *Quoted in Congressional Record,* 68 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. 66, Part 2, p. 1442. See also *New Republic,* XL (October 29, 1924), 210; "Catholics and Child Labor," *Nation,* Vol. 120 (January 21, 1925), 59; William L. Chenery, "Child Labor—The New Alignment," *Survey,* LIII (January 1, 1925), 425.

ignore such a referendum. In complete reversal of their previous stand, all but a few members of the General Court voted against ratification in mid-February, 1925.[39] In the meantime the failure of the referendum had been noted with interest elsewhere. Only three states, Arkansas, Arizona, and California, had ratified the amendment by the end of January, 1925. But during the first few months of 1925 one state after another voted against it. By the end of January failure of the amendment seemed certain, although its supporters refused to admit defeat. Representatives of the National Child Labor Committee, the League of Women Voters and the American Federation of Labor all pledged to continue their efforts, and indeed the indomitable Florence Kelley carried on until her death in 1932.[40] However, after the winter of 1925 the chance of adoption was remote. During the depression years, it is true, a number of states reversed their previous stands and voted for ratification, but, with the enactment in 1938 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and its subsequent acceptance by the Supreme Court, there was relatively little need for the amendment.

The conservative tendencies of the 1920's have been so well emphasized that in retrospect the failure of the child labor amendment hardly seems a surprise. Yet at the time of its submission to the states there was good reason to expect ratification. Why were the supporters proved wrong? A number of factors can be noted. The anti-ratification forces were well organized and heavily financed. They were able to blanket key areas with effective, if often crudely false, propaganda. Furthermore their tactics cleverly played up sensitive issues for many Americans in the 1920's, such as fear of communism or distaste for further federal interference similar to prohibition. Certainly the amendment was presented and indeed seen by many as a threat to a generally prosperous *status quo*.[41] This is not to imply that all people who were against the amendment were deceived by the propaganda. No doubt some thoughtful opponents were sincerely concerned about the potential danger of such a broad grant of power to the federal government. Even the *Nation,* a staunch supporter of the amendment, admitted to an increasing

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[39] *New York Times,* February 17, 1925, p. 31 and February 20, 1925, p. 10.

[40] *New York Times,* January 29, 1925, p. 3; Goldmark, *Impatient Crusader,* 118–119.

[41] Cf. MacKay, *Progressive Movement of 1924,* 174; Arthur M. Schlesinger and Erik M. Eriksson, "The Vanishing Voters," *New Republic,* XL (October 15, 1924), 166.

awareness "that there are many men of highest ideals and sound humanitarianism who differ with us on this issue."[42] Nevertheless, the nature of the anti-ratification campaign suggests that not cold logic, but highly charged emotional appeals, carried the day.

The fact remains that the leaders of the opposition played their cards cleverly, while the reformers misjudged the sentiment of much of the country. Thus defeat came at the state and popular level after initial success in Congress. Even the size of the Congressional vote may have been misleading, as it may have reflected a response to what some Congressmen assumed was an overwhelming popular demand for the child labor amendment, rather than a strong commitment to it on principle. At any rate the fight for the amendment scattered rather than consolidated many elements within the old progressive coalition. Thus the Senators voting against the amendment represented not only a block of eight southern states, but also three border, two western and four northern ones, and included a former progressive, Borah of Idaho, as well as staunch conservatives. Outside of Congress, of course, the divisions within progressive elements were more serious. Organized labor, through the A. F. of L., strongly supported the amendment from start to finish.[43] Agrarian opposition, on the other hand, was substantial and effective, as was shown by the hostile position of the Farm Bureau Federation and the Grange, and the rejection of the amendment in many western and midwestern states. Professional social justice elements, represented by reformers like Grace Abbott of the Children's Bureau, Florence Kelley of the National Consumers' League, the National Child Labor Committee and others made up the hard core of the amendment's supporters. They were aided by several national women's organizations, and the deans of a number of the country's top law schools.[44] But the vote potential of these elements was limited, and seems to have struck no fear in the hearts of most state legislators.

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42 "Catholics and Child Labor," *Nation*, Vol. 120 (January 21, 1925), 59.

43 In some cases rank and file union members might well have been torn by conflicting allegiances to the position of the union and that of the Catholic Church. Thus as early as May, 1922, the Boston Central Labor Union urged the adoption of a child labor amendment. (See *New York Times*, May 22, 1922, p. 4.) But the overwhelming rejection of the Massachusetts referendum in November, 1924, suggested many workers must have followed the advice of the Church rather than the union.

44 *New York Times*, December 15, 1924, p. 19. Disagreeing with the distinguished deans, the American Bar Association opposed the amendment. Albion G. Taylor, *Labor Problems and Labor Law*, New York, 1944, 399.

Churches and clergymen were divided. The Federal Council of Churches favored the amendment, as did a number of individual Protestant denominations. But others, particularly those in the South such as the Southern Baptist Convention, took an opposite position.[45] And in at least one key industrial area employing many children, Gaston County, North Carolina, ministers bowed to the wishes of the dominant industrialists and were almost completely silent on the issue of child labor.[46] Futhermore a few individually prominent Protestants, like Bishop William Lawrence of Massachusetts, spoke out against the amendment. Some Roman Catholic groups, such as the National Catholic Welfare Council and the National Council of Catholic Women, supported the reform, as did the prominent Catholic social worker Father John A. Ryan of Catholic University of America.[47] But in Massachusetts the stand of the Catholic Church was certainly a major factor in defeating the referendum. Indeed, quite probably most Catholics opposed the amendment.[48] The position of the Roman Catholic Church very likely helped to offset the stand taken by labor leaders among the rank and file in the Northern urban areas. Ironically, the division between the Southern-rural-Protestant and the Northern-urban-Catholic that characterized much of the politics of the 1920's and left the Democratic Party impotent nationally was in part bridged by common hostility to a progressive reform.

Finally, organized business was vehemently opposed to the child labor amendment. While the position of the N. A. M. and similar organizations was hardly unusual, the particularly disturbing feature from the point of view of the continuance of progressivism was the conspicuous absence of support from middle-class businessmen. During the progressive era such men played significant roles in attaining reforms on the national, state and local levels.[49] However, few indeed cared to join the crusade in 1924.

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45 Robert M. Miller, *American Protestantism and Social Issues, 1919–1939,* Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1958, 217–219.

46 Liston Pope, *Millhands and Preachers. A Study of Gastonia,* New Haven, 1942, 195.

47 Senate, *Hearings,* 57–58; 66; House, *Hearings,* 71–72; John A. Ryan, "The Proposed Child Labor Amendment," *Journal of the National Education Association,* XIV (March, 1925), 87–88.

48 Aaron I. Abell, *American Catholicism and Social Action,* New York, 1960, 227–228.

49 See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Origins of Progressive Leadership," in Elting E. Morison, editor, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt,* Cambridge, 1954, VIII, App. III, 1462–1465. Cf. Link, "What Happened to the Progressive Movement?" *loc. cit.,* 836.

The prominent position of interested industrialists in the fight against the child labor amendment makes it all too easy to place the blame for the defeat squarely in their laps. But such an explanation alone will not do. If their propaganda was effective, it was because it raised issues that rightly or wrongly concerned many Americans. If it was false, as certainly some of it was, then progressives had to come to terms with, not evade, the embarrassing fact that many people could be readily deluded, for the successful reformer must have a realistic understanding of popular limitations. Furthermore, the manufacturers were joined, partly as a result of their own efforts, by farmers and churchmen. Surely many Americans would have found the naked opposition of industrialists to child labor reform rather hard to take, but adorned with the blessings of the church or the myths of the agrarian past, it proved irresistible. In getting Congressional backing for the amendment the reformers won the first round, but in the second stage they were clearly outmaneuvered by the opponents of ratification. Possibly no other outcome was likely in the mid-1920's. Certainly a new and vigorous reform movement could not begin at a time when so many Americans could reject as unwise or revolutionary such an ancient progressive issue as child labor regulation.

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The Breakup of the Wilson Coalition of 1916

Woodrow Wilson revitalized the Democratic Party in 1916 when he created a political coalition strong enough to keep him in office. Winning a consecutive second term also heightened Wilson's personal stature, for no Democratic President since Andrew Jackson had so distinguished himself. The successful coalition included progressives of both parties who favored Wilson's reform legislation; followers of Bryan intrigued by the peace slogan of the campaign; many immigrants anxious to remain out of the European war; farmers and laborers responding to the administration's growing concern for them; and Southerners long loyal to the Democratic Party. Sectionally, the alliance united the rural South and the rural West—conspicuously absent from the Democratic tally in 1916 were the industrial states of Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts.[1]

A swift and dramatic reversal of political sentiment shattered the Wilson Coalition only four years after its initial success. Warren Harding, the herald of normalcy, won the election of 1920 by an almost two-to-one margin, collecting 60.35 percent of the total vote against 34.12 percent for the Democratic candidate, James M. Cox.[2] Historians, conceiving of Harding and Coolidge as an insipid team, have generally interpreted this lopsided vote as a repudiation of President Wilson.[3] The time, extent, and reasons for the breakup of the Wilson Coalition of 1916 constitute the subject of this essay.

The debacle of 1920 appeared to have been foreshadowed in the Congressional election of 1918 when control of the House of Representatives slipped to the Republicans after they picked up twenty-six seats in the central states. The loss of many votes in these states was indeed a serious breach in the Wilson Coalition. But contrary to a widespread view, the nation as a whole repudiated neither Wilson nor the Democratic Party in 1918. The Democrats

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1 The voters in the ten largest cities, taken together, gave the Republican candidate a substantial majority in 1916. Edgar E. Robinson, *The Presidential Vote, 1896–1932*, Stanford, 1934, *passim*.

2 *Ibid.*, 20.

3 For example, "The crippled Wilson, not the dynamic Cox, was running in 1920," Thomas A. Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal*, New York, 1945, 342.

did surprisingly well outside the central states, gaining three more seats than they lost.[4] Even the net Republican gain of twenty-three seats from the Democrats was by no means extraordinary, since the average off-year loss by the party-in-power in this century has been forty-one seats.[5] Only Wilson's appeal for a vote of confidence had made it *seem* like a Republican triumph.[6]

The coming of war in 1917 had shifted only one bloc of voters hitherto loyal to Wilson decisively away from him. From the outset of hostilities, Middle Westerners had substituted a winter of discontent for the warmer season of moral dedication present in the rest of the nation. The isolationists and pacifists among them, remembering the President's silent acquiescence in the slogan, "He kept us out of war," voted against Wilson by voting Republican in 1918. Supported though it was by a large German population, isolationism alone cannot account for the regional Republican resurgence of that year. The Democrats could conceivably have retained control of the House, had they not committed a series of errors in agricultural policy. Their biggest mistake was to favor the cotton growers of the South over the wheat farmers of the central states.[7]

Much of the resentment in the wheat states in 1918 centered on the Lever Act of August, 1917, which allowed the Food Admin-

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[4] These figures are based on an official House tally of its membership as of October, 1918; this document assigned 212 seats to the Republicans, only 209 to the Democrats, and 14 to Independents and vacancies. The net Republican gain of 23 from the Democrats, 2 from Independents, and 3 of the vacancies gives the standard count of the new House, 190D and 240R. The tally of the earlier Congress, which is used because of its date, is in the Burleson Papers, October, 1918, Library of Congress; the count of the new Congress is in United States Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957*, Washington, 1960, 691.

[5] *Historical Statistics*, 691.

[6] Wilson on October 25 issued this appeal to the voters, "If you have approved of my leadership and wish me to continue to be your un-embarrassed spokesman in affairs at home and abroad, I earnestly beg that you will express yourselves unmistakably to that effect by returning a Democratic majority to both the Senate and the House of Representatives . . . ," *Public Papers*, Volume V, 286–288.

[7] The wheat issue in the campaign is explored by Seward Livermore in "The Sectional Issue in the 1918 Congressional Election," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXXV (June, 1948), 29–60. Figure (1) below gives quantitative support to the Livermore argument. I differ with him on whether the election of 1918 was a "Democratic disaster," as he names it (p. 34). Of course, the Democrats did lose their tenuous control of the House and Senate, but the nature of the returns, as I will try to show, did not indicate widespread dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party. See also Senator Thomas P. Gore, "The Wheat Farmer's Dilemma," *The Forum*, LX (September, 1918), 289–293. Gore points out that the cost of producing wheat rose sharply between 1917 and 1918, while the ceiling remained at $2.20 per bushel.

istration to fix the cost of wheat at $2.20 per bushel. Triple the prewar price, this figure was high enough to maximize production and low enough to minimize inflation. In contrast to their willingness to control wheat prices, Southern Democrats had kept raw cotton off the list of price-controlled items. This unequal treatment of the two sections antagonized the wheat areas; and, as cotton prices spiraled upward, increasing about sixfold between 1914 and 1918, old sectional jealousies revived.

The failure of the administration to heed the farm protest benefited the Republicans. Impatient with political maneuver in wartime, Wilson replied to practical politicians in his party by vetoing a $2.40 per bushel wheat ceiling on June 7, 1918. Many farmers had been encouraged by the administration to sow wheat on land normally devoted to other crops;[8] in the decade 1910-1919, the census bureau had recorded a sixty-five percent rise in wheat acreage.[9] Wilson's veto registered with many of these new farmers as an economic double-cross. Will Hays, the new Republican National Chairman, planned his campaign with the wheat situation in mind. Conceding the labor vote in the prosperous East, he wisely laid seige to the central states; Hays spent most of his national campaign fund in states between the Appalachians and the Rockies.[10]

In ten states that led in the production of wheat the Democrats gained two new House seats, whereas the Republicans picked up twenty-two. The Republican gains came in Kansas (4), Indiana (4), Ohio (4), Missouri (3), Washington (3), Nebraska (3), and Illinois (1).[11] There are ninety-six Congressional districts in these seven states, and in Figure 1 these districts are arranged in three groups of equal wheat acreage.

Before the election, each group had balanced representation. The Republicans won eleven seats in districts of highest acreage; eight in the middle group; and three in the lowest group. One can

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[8] *New York Tribune*, February 19, 1918, p. 4.

[9] United States Bureau of the Census, *Fourteenth Census of the United States: 1920. Agriculture*, Volume V, 741.

[10] *The New York Times*, October 21, 1918, p. 2. Also John M. Blum, *Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era*, Boston, 1951, 158.

[11] Shifts were determined by comparing the last *Congressional Directory* of the 65th Congress (3rd Session, Jan., 1919) with the first of the 66th Congress (1st Session, July, 1919). Vance McCormick, Democratic National Chairman in 1916, years later confirmed the importance of the farm issue in a letter to Josephus Daniels, "As I remember, we lost most of the agricultural districts in that [1918] election." McCormick to Daniels, March 21, 1941, McCormick Papers, Yale University.



Figure 1 *Correlation between Wheat Acreage in the ten leading wheat states and Republican House Gains in 1918*

scarcely deny that Livermore's periodical citations (Footnote 7) are indicative, for the relationship is practically linear. Scattered wheat districts in other parts of the country also rejected Democratic Congressmen; these include the seventh district in California (333,-000 acres), the seventeenth in Pennsylvania (244, 000), and the third in Colorado (210, 000).

Although the most costly Democratic error in 1918 was its rigid wheat ceiling, the administration also antagonized sheep owners.[13] In the case of wool, government intervention meant that the Department of Agriculture bought up virtually the entire supply. Perhaps

[12] County figures on wheat acreage are found in the *Fourteenth Census: Agriculture*, Vols. V, VI_i, VI_{ii}, VI_{iii}. Maps of Congressional districts, indicating what counties they include, are found in most issues of the *Congressional Directory*.

[13] Katharine Snodgrass, "Price Fluctuations in the Woolen Industry," *Annals of the American Academy*, 89 (May, 1920), 55–60 (especially 57–58). See also William Leuchtenburg, *The Perils of Prosperity*, Chicago, 1958, 51.

the wool "crisis" was more imagined than real, for the government purchased this commodity at only slightly less than its market price. The government's interference, however, introduced further uncertainty in an already precarious market and helped to precipitate a serious wool depression lasting from October, 1918 to March, 1919. In several congressional districts with significantly high wool production, Democratic Congressmen lost their incumbencies; these districts include the twenty-third in Pennsylvania, the eighth in Kentucky, the first in New Mexico, and the second in Washington (also one of the low wheat districts in Figure 1).[14]

Judging from correspondence of the period one other distinctly sectional issue probably weakened the Democrats in the central states. Under pressure from local loan companies, the Kansas City branch of the Cattle Loan Agency refused to give relief to Middle Western cattlemen by lending them adequate money. The cattle loan program took on political overtones when former Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo on October 25, 1918 suggested that the managing director of the War Finance Corporation go at once to Kansas City and try to reform malpractices there.[15] But the proposed reform was not enacted before the election. As herd owners continued to look in vain for administration support, Republicans called attention to the contrast between the government's neglect of the Middle Western plight and its apparent concern for Southern ranchers. Federal officials demonstrated this concern in the Cattle Loan Agency in Dallas, where they helped ranchers from Texas and Oklahoma to negotiate generous loans in the summer and fall of 1918.[16]

The issues of wheat, wool, and cattle loans generally led to antagonism between the Middle West and the South.[17] The Republican gain in 1918, then, was a sectional victory, recalling historic sectional rivalries and animosities. It did not turn on national issues, nor

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[14] Figures for wool were computed just as they were for wheat, athough no attempt was made to correlate the distribution of the shifts with wool production.

[15] William Gibbs McAdoo to Governor W. T. G. Harding, October 25, 1918, Box 212, McAdoo Papers, Library of Congress.

[16] *Ibid.* Corroborative evidence may be found in the *Second Annual Report*, Federal Farm Loan Board, November 30, 1918, 19: District 6, Missouri, number of National Farm Loan Association, 113; number of loans, 1,577; total amount loaned, $3,855,230. District 10, Texas, number of National Farm Loan Associations, 288; number of loans, 5,250; total amount loaned, $13,568,461.

[17] In 1919 the Treasurer of the United States wrote to Joe Tumulty, "During the campaign in the last election the argument we had to meet everywhere was 'the south is in the saddle; it has the legislative and the executive....'" John W. Burke to Joe Tumulty, November 17, 1919, Wilson Papers, Library of Congress.

was it a rejection of the Fourteen Points by ethnic minorities in the cities. Since the Democrats lost only on sectional issues, the election probably had little or nothing to do with Wilson's plea for a vote of confidence. And in no sense was it a national repudiation of Wilson in spite of the unfortunate manner in which he had called for a Democratic Congress.

The 1918 House returns show Democratic strength, not weakness; they show that wartime prosperity probably benefited the party-in-power. They show a continuing trust in the Democratic Party and demonstrate a nation's gratitude to Wilson for leading it to victory. Since scant loss of faith in Wilson was exhibited outside the central states, an explanation of the national defeat of 1920 must be restricted to the period between the autumn of 1918 and November, 1920.

Having dated the major shift in sentiment, it can be specified more precisely. What exactly happened in these two years that turned the American people so strongly against the Democrats? Wilson's son-in-law, William Gibbs McAdoo, in a characteristic refusal to be analytical, observed in August of 1920 that "there is a strange poison in the air and it seems to be operating against us."[18] He could have been more precise, for the militant mood that followed the war was short-lived as well as elusive. A more tangible theme that can better explain the breakup of the coalition of 1916 is the fact that after 1918 Wilson could not satisfactorily direct his own administration.

A look at the calendar explains Wilson's inability to provide the domestic leadership so sorely needed. He spent the month after the Congressional elections of 1918 preparing for the Paris peace conference. On December 2 he left for Paris, and, except for a brief visit to New York and Washington from February 24 to March 5, 1919, his work kept him abroad until July 8, a period of about seven months. Away from his country, Wilson could not exert strong domestic or party leadership.

Upon Wilson's return, the fight over the League of Nations consumed most of his time, and his concern with domestic affairs continued fitful and inconsistent. On September 3, 1919, he left on a tour to urge the Americans to support his League.[19]

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[18] William Gibbs McAdoo to Jouett Shouse, September 17, 1920, McAdoo Papers.

[19] Wilson's tour in 1919, which amounted to a collection of one-night stands, could not be expected to alter the course of mass opinion. See for possible supporting evidence Carl I. Hovland, *et al, Experiments on Mass Communication,* Princeton, 1949, 249–279.

On September 25 he had a breakdown in Pueblo, Colorado, and that evening he suffered a paralyzing cerebral hemorrhage. The stroke prevented him from effectively performing the work of a President, for afterward Wilson was rarely able to work more than an hour or two a day.[20] In the middle of the next year, Doctor Grayson, his physician, spoke of Wilson's "gradual mental deterioration."[21] Without his illness Wilson might have continued as the strong party leader described in his *Congressional Government;* soon, however, his party foundered, for he had earlier accustomed it to the vigorous leadership of a Prime Minister.[22]

Wilson's loss of political flexibility and the rapidly deteriorating relations within his own party are clearly revealed in his handling of executive patronage.[23] Along with several cabinet members, former Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo privately resented many of Wilson's new appointments, motivated as they were by a strange mixture of non-partisanship and spite. On February 10, 1919, McAdoo wrote to Carter Glass about "universal complaints" then being directed against Wilson's delegations of power to prominent Republicans.[24] In another letter to Glass, he concluded that Wilson's cavalier handling of patronage had "enormously weakened the Democratic Party."[25] The appointment of Bainbridge Colby, a one-time Bull Mooser, as Secretary of State early in 1920 further alienated Democrats.

Wilson's own lack of partisanship in giving out jobs rubbed off on Postmaster General Albert Burleson, who dispensed more patronage than the rest of the cabinet added together. When Wilson exercised his wartime power by ordering postmasters to take competitive examinations, Burleson, a faithful subordinate with a gift for antagonizing people, executed the order with impartiality unbecoming a party man. Although the post office chief once had been a stabilizing influence in the administration, Robert Woolley of the Interstate Commerce Commission told Colonel House that Burleson

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[20] John Garraty, *Woodrow Wilson,* New York, 1956, 182.

[21] Arthur Walworth, *Woodrow Wilson: World Prophet,* New York, 1958, 400. See also the excellent bibliographical note in Blum's *Tumulty,* 312.

[22] Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: the New Freedom,* Princeton, 1956, 145–147.

[23] Complaints about the distribution of patronage are a characteristic of American politics in any era. Some of the recriminations of Wilson's second term are collected in Raymond Hanks, "The Election of 1920: the Rupture of the Wilsonian Synthesis," Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1960.

[24] McAdoo Papers.

[25] December 13, 1919, McAdoo Papers.

"must resign—or be forced to—if there is to be a shred of the Democratic Party left to go into the campaign of 1920."[26]

After Wilson's illness, the more unscrupulous cabinet members seized on the opportunity to direct government policy themselves. The most famous example of postwar cabinet leadership was that of Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, whose policies thrived on the country's anti-Bolshevik temper in 1919. After the Red Revolution of 1918, many Americans called on the Justice Department to prosecute all radicals. Although Palmer at first adopted a judicious manner in keeping with his earlier career, lifelong xenophobia and opportunism eventually overcame the sobriety of his judgement.[27] He assumed the characteristics for which he later became notorious only after alarmist reports from the Bureau of Investigation had convinced him that the country faced a revolution. The explosion of a bomb in front of his house spurred him to an almost persecutory fanaticism; red propaganda, he explained, gave him "the creeps," and he reiterated that the Reds were not going to "get him."[28]

In the spring of 1919 and after, Palmer, ignoring the most fundamental canons of civil and human rights, caused the unlawful imprisonment of thousands of aliens. Appearing to believe that the presence of any foreigners endangered the nation, he attempted summarily to deport as many as he could. The deportations were momentous for the Democratic Party, since they served as an important step in alienating immigrant voters and those who believed in civil rights.

The deportations delirium ended abruptly early in the election year of 1920 when Palmer met his match in Acting Secretary of Labor Louis Post. The authority to deport radicals lay only with the Secretary of Labor, who repeatedly reversed Justice Department decisions. To remove this obstacle, a House committee started impeachment hearings against Post. The Acting Secretary, despite his

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[26] Quoted in Hanks, "The Election of 1920," 43.

[27] Excellent on Palmer is Stanley Coben, "The Political Career of A. Mitchell Palmer," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1961. But see also Lincoln Colcord, "The Administration Adrift," *The Nation*, CIX (November 15, 1919), 635–636, and Donald Johnson, "American Civil Liberties Union: Origins, 1914–1924," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1960, *passim*.

[28] Quoted in Ellen B. Seghal, "The Social Outlook of Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer," unpublished master's essay, Columbia University, 1956, 84. Palmer must have recovered his balance by 1921, for he then suggested to President Wilson that Eugene Debs be freed from jail, *New York Times*, February 1, 1921, 1.

seventy-one years, stymied the committee with a storehouse of irrefutable facts about deportations cases.[29] Curious citizens who came to scoff at Post remained to applaud when he reminded the committee members of the Bill of Rights. The last word was the Attorney General's; Palmer, who called Post a Bolshevik, insisted on reading a long defensive statement into the committee's records.[30] In its larger significance, the skirmish was symptomatic of the political vacuum within the Democratic Party. The conflict between Palmer and Post over the rights of man was one of many within an administration that had been set adrift.

Palmer's most apparent accomplishment lay in intensifying the postwar reaction, for along with the debris of radicalism the Attorney General swept away much of the tolerance toward liberal ideas that survived in 1919. The Red Scare acted indirectly, like the radicalism of the postwar strikes, to blacken the name of reform. Ironically, the victim of "Wilson's" Red Scare was the New Freedom, reform as practiced and extolled by the President himself. Spearheaded by Wilson during his first term, domestic reform lagged after the war.[31] The handful of progressive measures adopted in the previous year prompted Walter Lippmann in November, 1919 to ask, "Can anyone name a single piece of constructive legislation or administration carried through since the armistice?"[32] The same question occurred to other liberals who proceeded to revise their estimate of the Democrats.

The Palmer deportations also maimed the labor movement, which was a mainstay of Democratic support.[33] But more important

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[29] Post's version of what happened is in Louis Post, *The Deportation's Delirium of Nineteen-Twenty*, Chicago, 1923. Why Post and Secretary of Labor William Wilson did not stop Palmer earlier is a matter for conjecture. See also *The New York Times*, May 9, 1920, p. 12 and Robert K. Murray, *Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919–1920*, Minneapolis, 1955, 247–249.

[30] For the virtual intimidation of Palmer and his defense, see Johnson, "American Civil Liberties Union," 246–254. Also *The New York Times*, August 9, 1919, p. 2, and United States Congress, House, Committee on Rules, *A. Mitchell Palmer on Charges Made Against Department of Justice by Louis F. Post and Others, Hearings*, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, 1920. The quoted epithet is in Secretary of State Robert Lansing's Private Memoranda, April 14, 1920, Library of Congress.

[31] Wilson sent three messages to Congress on the subject of political and social reform. Perhaps he would have sent more had he returned to America sooner or had his health not given out. For the messages, see *The New York Times*, December 2, 1918, p. 1, May 21, 1919, pp. 1–4 (cabled from Paris), and August 9, 1919, pp. 1–2.

[32] *New Republic*, XX (November 12, 1919), 315. Actually, some major progressive legislation gained final approval in 1919-1920; little, however, was passed that got its start in the 66th Congress.

[33] Murray, *Red Scare*, 267–269.

than the Palmer raids in forming the administration's attitude toward labor was its demobilization policy.[34] With the war visibly won, orders to cut back production went into force to meet 3,000,000 soldiers about to rejoin the labor force.[35] Reconversion had already put many defense employees out of work, and job-hunting servicemen further swelled the ranks of the unemployed. The high unemployment rate in 1919-1920 foreshadowed a depression that began in mid-1920. With Wilson unwilling or unable to interfere with the ailing economy, decisions lay increasingly with his conservative subordinates. Carter Glass and David F. Houston, successors to McAdoo as Secretary of the Treasury, expected the economy to mend itself.[36]

In order to retain and extend their wartime gains, labor unions organized several strikes, to which the administration usually responded with hostility. Earlier Wilson had opposed using the injunction as a weapon against strikers; after the President's illness, however, Palmer antagonized Samuel Gompers by using it during the great coal strike of 1919.[37] Also in that year Wilson and his administration estranged the Railway Brotherhoods by refusing to support the Plumb Plan for nationalizing the railroads.[38]

The successive removals of government controls on food and consumer items further increased the price of goods for the already hard-pressed workers. The cost of living had almost doubled between 1914 and 1920, and in New York City it rose 28 percent between 1919 and 1920 alone.[39] The privations brought about by high prices could be combatted on election day with a vote for change in administration.

Although the 1918 Congressional elections indicated that many farmers had already left the Democratic Party, the Department of Agriculture made no attempt to forestall further desertions. On the contrary, David Houston, Secretary of Agriculture in 1919, along

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[34] On Wilson and labor, there is Dallas Lee Jones, "The Wilson Administration and Organized Labor, 1912–1919," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 1954.

[35] Before he left for Europe, Wilson recommended increased public works spending to provide jobs for former servicemen. Congress did not comply. Address to Congress, December 2, 1918, *Public Papers, War and Peace*, Volume I, 315–316.

[36] George Soule, *Economic Forces in American History*, New York, 1952, 416–417 and 468. Walworth comments on Glass and Houston's handling of the depression in *Woodrow Wilson: World Prophet*, 397.

[37] William B. Wilson to James Duncan, April 22, 1920, William B. Wilson Papers, Library of Congress.

[38] *The New York Times*, February 24, 1920, pp. 1–2.

[39] *Historical Statistics*, 127; *The New York Times*, May 3, 1920, p. 1.

with his successor, Edward T. Meredith, ignored the postwar dip in farm prices. And in the spring of 1920, the administration withdrew farm price-supports altogether, refusing to restore them even after a farm depression struck that summer. The Federal Reserve Board also refused to give the farmers all the help they needed.[40]

Quite prominent in breaking up the Wilson Coalition was controversy over the League of Nations. Wartime idealism had waned by 1920, after eighteen months of partisan and fruitless debate on the League. Warren Harding, by leaving the door ajar to an "association of nations," further muddied the issue of the League. It was the unlucky fate of the Democratic Party to become a political scapegoat in the League struggle, wherein the issues appeared unclear and distorted. One reporter, who had watched the treaty fight degenerate into a stalemate, wrote to the Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate, Franklin D. Roosevelt, "I fear . . . that the Wilson League of Nations is about the most effective millstone that any party, bent on suicide, has tied about its neck to date."[41]

The President himself wrote a speech for the Jackson Day Dinner of January 8, 1920, in which he again helped to destroy chances of Democratic success; for, in failing to endorse a candidate, he intentionally signaled his own burdensome availability.[42] He made a second contribution to Democratic defeat on the same occasion when he requested that the election be a "solemn referendum" on his League of Nations. Political bosses, such as Charles Murphy of New York, Thomas Taggert of Indiana, and Charles Brennan of Illinois, pleaded against a referendum on the League. To them, making the League a central issue in the campaign meant shattering immigrant blocs in Boston, New York, Chicago, and other large cities. They rightly feared the increasing political consciousness

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40 Senator Furnifold Simmons of North Carolina to William Gibbs McAdoo, September 11, 1920. Also W. E. Chilton to McAdoo, September 11, 1920; Chilton refers to David Houston's "money squeeze." Both letters are in Box 241, McAdoo Papers. Arthur Link, however, has shown that the Federal Reserve Board followed a more than equitable policy toward farmers. "The Federal Reserve Board and the Agricultural Depression of 1920–1921," *Agricultural History*, XX (July, 1946), 166–175.

41 Barbara Leahy to Franklin Roosevelt, June 9, 1920, Roosevelt Papers, Hyde Park, New York.

42 Nothing in Wilson's own Anglophile constitutional theory precluded his running for a third term; continuance of leadership was, in fact, central to that theory. However, whatever his inclinations, Wilson's illness had severed his support. Bailey treats the third term issue in *Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal*, 409–411. See also Kurt Wimer, "Woodrow Wilson and a Third Term," *Pennsylvania History*, XXIX (April, 1962), 193–211, and Wesley Bagby, "Woodrow Wilson, a Third Term, and the Solemn Referendum," *American Historical Review*, LX (April, 1955), 567–575.

of immigrants whose homelands appeared to be suffering at the peace negotiations; these ethnic groups after World War One became carriers of attitudes toward foreign policy as never before.[43]

The times were out of joint, then, for the three leading Democrats who made themselves available for the presidential nomination. Of James Cox, William Gibbs McAdoo, and A. Mitchell Palmer, the Attorney General was the weakest candidate. Palmer timed his campaign badly, incurring ridicule when, contrary to his grave predictions, May Day, 1920, passed uneventfully. In contrast to Palmer, the name of William Gibbs McAdoo recalled the liberalism of Wilson's first term. But like several administration men before him, McAdoo lost touch with Wilson during the League dispute. His correspondence and planning throughout 1919 and 1920 indicate that he was waiting for some paternal word, but Wilson never endorsed him.[44] McAdoo was willing to wait until 1924; he sent a bronze medal bearing a likeness of himself, together with a list of his accomplishments, to all his convention supporters.

In contrast to the two other candidates, Cox was not identified with the Wilson Administration and he was not a prohibitionist. These two negative virtues captivated city bosses, particularly Charles Murphy of New York, whose hostility to Wilson dated back to the President's days as Governor of New Jersey. With support from the Tammany-Taggert-Brennan alliance of machine bosses, Cox finally won the nomination on the forty-fourth ballot. Even at the outset, the mood of the delegates had not been buoyant, since they believed with virtual unanimity that no Democrat could win in November. The long balloting that it took to pick a nominee made the final selection a pretty dismal affair.

The worst problem that Cox faced was a party organization that had been nearly dormant since the Congressional elections of 1918. After the election of 1920, Claude Bowers, who was working on his *Party Battles of the Jackson Period*, summed up the situation Cox faced by comparing the Democratic Party organization of his own day with that of Jackson's time. "The Wilsonian period," wrote Bowers, "had not behind it the fighting, sleepless

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[43] Samuel Lubell, Oral History *Memoir*, Columbia University, 43.

[44] Colonel House wrote in his diary that "McAdoo remarked that he and the other Cabinet Members were nothing but clerks. This is not true of McAdoo, and that is why the President gets along with him less well." House Diary, September 24, 1918, Yale University, Josephus Daniels, sometimes an unreliable source, quotes Wilson on McAdoo's unfitness for the Presidency in *The Wilson Era: Years of War and After, 1917–1923*, Chapel Hill, 1946, 553.

organization, nor has it the brilliant propogandists [*sic*] like Kendall and Blair. . . . The organization men of those days worked ceaselessly, day by day, year by year. . . ."[45] Bowers, a lifelong Democrat, wrote regretfully of "the miserably weak publicity that has been sent out—occasionally—between races or drinks—from our National Committee."[46]

The argument that dissatisfaction with Wilson and his policies contributed to the defeat of Cox is supported by a pre-election poll of the *Literary Digest*. Introducing one of its customary biases, the *Digest* asked businessmen to list in order of their relative importance which of seven conditions would influence the voters. The issues chosen as most important were: (1) Dissatisfaction with the Present Administration; (2) Foreign Relations; and (3) High Cost of Living.[47]

The news of Cox's defeat in the November election brought cautious observers to cite such general explanations as the "backwash of war." Franklin Roosevelt ascribed the defeat to "the frame of mind that people have got in after the strenuous efforts of the war."[48] Some less prudent commentators, overlooking the records in states where women had already won the right to vote, asserted that the Republicans owed their great pluralities to the Nineteenth Amendment. The opposition probably had treated women better during the campaign. While the Democratic headquarters until the last moment kept women on the doorstep as an *ad hoc* committee, Republicans put them in influential positions. Most Southern Democrats abhorred the thought of women voting, a view that showed up in the congressional vote on the suffrage amendment.[49]

The twelve western states in which women voted in 1916 furnish a baseline for studying the effect of nationwide female suffrage.

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[45] Claude Bowers to McAdoo, January 18, 1921, McAdoo Papers. McAdoo himself detected a similar weakness, McAdoo to Daniel Roper, January 29, 1919, McAdoo Papers.

[46] Bowers to McAdoo, January 18, 1921, McAdoo Papers. For the text of a telegram sent by Joe Tumulty to James Cox, see Professor John Blum's notes on *Joe Tumulty*, notes on the 1920 campaign, September 23, 1920, Yale University. Another complaint is recorded in Josephine O'Keane, *Thomas J. Walsh*, Francestown, New Hampshire, 1955, 103.

[47] *Literary Digest*, LXVII (October 2, 1920), 41.

[48] Franklin Roosevelt to J. E. Townsend, November 9, 1920, Roosevelt Papers.

[49] In the House 90 percent of the Republicans favored the Nineteenth Amendment, while 59 percent of the Democrats approved it; in the Senate 86 percent of the Republicans favored it, as did 55 percent of the Democrats, *The New York Times*, May 22, 1919, p. 1 and June 5, 1919, p. 1. On the treatment women received, *Ibid.*, January 6, 1920, p. 1 and February 5, 1920, p. 8.

The suspicion that sectional issues may have introduced significant variables is allayed by a record of the vote in ten other western states contiguous to those where women voted in both elections. Table (1) suggests that, in contrast to their voting behavior in 1916, women in 1920 did not vote so preponderantly against Wilson as did men. If they had the decrease in the Democratic vote would have been sharper in the states where women first voted in 1920. By the same token, the table indicates that the Democratic debacle can not be attributed to woman suffrage.

	The Democratic vote in:	1916	1920	Decrease
1.	12 western states with women voting in 1916.	51.8	33.1	18.7
2.	The 36 states without women voting in 1916.	52.4	36.4	16.1
3.	10 western states contiguous to those in which women voted in 1916.	48.8	34.3	14.5

Table (1) *Democratic Percentages of the Female Vote, 1916 and 1920*[50]

An area of unusual defection from 1916 was once again the wheat districts. In the districts studied for the 1918 election (Figure 1), those with the greatest wheat acreage abandoned the Democrats more consistently than the others. In the top one-third of the districts, 21 percent of the voters left the Democratic Party between 1916 and 1920, whereas the loss was only 13 percent in each of the remaining districts.

Unlike the losses of 1918, however, the Democratic losses in 1920 were nationwide. The Party lost heavily in every part of the country, even the South where Democratic loyalties traditionally ran deep. Defeat was greatest in the Far West where that section's radicalism was submerged in antipathy toward Japan and its favored treatment at Versailles.[51] Key Pittman, Cox's campaign manager

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50 Robinson, *The Presidential Vote, passim.*

51 John Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1955. Page 265 he says that "in California anti-Japanese hysteria, quiescent during the war, broke out again in the latter part of 1919 and rose to unprecedented heights during the election of 1920." In addition, the popular California Republican, Hiram Johnson, invariably made his party the exponent of immigration restriction. When Johnson ran for Congress in 1922, the Los Angeles County Anti-Asiastic Association supported him "in view of your record on opposition to the menace of Japanese colonization." *San Francisco Examiner*, October 18 and 23, 1922. Also, Hays in 1920 made the West the battleground of the campaign, *The New York Times*, June 15, 1920, pp. 1–2.

in the West, realized the fight there was hopeless and let it go almost by default.[52]

Perhaps the most important feature of the 1920 election is the voting behavior of immigrants clustered in the Eastern cities. Frank Freidel refers his readers to an unpublished study on immigrant voting which argues that immigrants voted about like everyone else in 1920.[53] Other interpretations tell of unusual defections among immigrant Democrats.[54] Table (2), based on five assembly districts at each pole of immigrant distribution, shows voter choice in three major cities. The loss of votes in the immigrant districts is striking. In New York, for example, the immigrant vote for Cox dropped off 29.4 percent from Wilson's total, compared to a nationwide shift of 15.2 percent. These figures, however indicate only how largely unassimilated immigrants voted in three cities. Elsewhere, even in smaller cities, they may have voted differently.

	Immigrant Districts		Native-Born		City-wide	
	1916	1920	1916	1920	1916	1920
New York	D49.3	D19.9	D42.4	D23.7	D52.9	D27.3
	R45.2	R50.0	R57.6	R69.8	R47.1	R60.9
	S 5.5	S28.6		S 4.5		S11.5
Chicago	D60.4	D36.2	D37.7	D22.0	D47.5	D26.3
	R39.6	R63.8	R62.3	R78.0	R52.5	R73.7
	(Two-party vote)					
Boston	D71.7	D45.8	D51.2	D33.0	D60.1	D40.3
	R28.3	R54.2	R48.8	R67.0	R39.9	R59.7
	(Two-party vote)					

Table (2) *Voting of Immigrants in New York, Boston, and Chicago*[55]

A closer inspection of bloc voting is possible in New York County. For all of New York City the census count in 1920 included questions about religion, race, and country of origin. This data was

[52] Fred Israel, "Nevada's Key Pittman," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1960, 69.

[53] Frank Freidel, *Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Ordeal*, Boston, 1954, 88.

[54] Bailey, for example, states emphatically that "thousands of Democratic Irishmen . . . were flocking over to Harding's banner. . . ." *Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal*, p. 333. See also J. Joseph Huthmacher, *Massachusetts People and Politics, 1919–1933*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1959, 42ff.

[55] Robinson, *The Presidential Vote; The New York Times*, November 9, 1916, p. 4 and November 4, 1920, p. 4; *Chicago Daily Tribune*, November 9, 1916, p. 3 and November 4, 1920, p. 3; *Boston Municipal Register*, 1917, p. 293 and 1921, p. 271; *Fourteenth Census: Population*, Vol. 3. Note that in New York City the Democratic dissidents turned more often to Debs than to Harding.

collected by sanitary districts, an area much smaller in size than an assembly district but larger than an election district. Using sanitary districts where 70 percent or more of the residents have like backgrounds, it is possible to assess voting behavior with high accuracy.[56] Table (3) shows that more Jewish, German, and Negro voters left the Democratic Party in 1920 than did Irish or Italian.

	1916		1920		
	D	R	D	R	S
German	57	43	28	61	11
Irish	64	36	47	50	3
Italian	63	37	47	50	3
Negro	26	74	6	91	3
Jewish	55	45	19	43	38

Table (3) *Bloc Voting in New York County Expressed in Percentages*[57]

The Jewish defection may have resulted from persecution of radicals with East European ancestry or sympathy with the Russian Revolution; the German from a "politics of revenge" aimed at the wartime administration; the Negro possibly from the widely publicized stories that Harding had some Negro ancestry or Cox's cruel injunction that this was "a white man's country." The Irish and Italians apparently matched concern with events abroad against their allegiances to Tammany.

The foreign-born losses, while substantial, were not so numerically large as they might have been because of the reluctance of immigrant women to vote. Native-born women showed no corresponding timidity. In the twenty-six wards of Boston, registration was tallied by sex. Figure 2 is a scatter diagram illustrating the correlation between foreign-born districts and low female registration.

A summary view of the election can be provided by comparing it to that of 1916; the coalition of that earlier year, the "fusion of the peace cause with the idea of progressive democracy," had not held together. Similarly, the alliance between the rural South and West had split apart as early as 1918 on sectional antagonism over fixing the price of wheat but not cotton. By the election of 1920, the progressives deplored the lack of significant reform legislation since the

56 The German and Irish areas are not so readily distinguishable in the Laidlaw figures; voter registration lists were ancillary tools in finding high concentrations of these national groups, Registry of Voters, *The City Record*, New York, 1916 and 1920.

57 Walter Laidlaw, *Statistical Sources for Demographic Studies of Greater New York, 1920*, New York, 1923; *Maps Showing the Assembly Districts of New York City*, New York Public Library, 1916 and 1920.

Figure 2

Relationships between national origins and female voting in Boston in 1928[58]



war, the illiberalism of the Red Scare, the radicalism of labor, and even the internationalism of the League—all of which were tangled up in the Wilson-Cox skein. Further, the socially minded business philosophy of the postwar era, not nearly so crass as earlier business ethics, appealed to many progressives.[59] The government paid

58 *Boston City Document Number Ten,* Election Department, City of Boston; *Fourteenth Census, Population,* Volume 3.

59 Arthur Link, "What Happened to the Progressive Movement?" *American Historical Review,* LXIV (July, 1959), 843.

scant attention to the postwar farm depression, and union labor evoked no greater consideration. The pacifist Bryanites could understand neither Wilson's willingness to wage war nor his seeming unwillingness to compromise on peace, and the President's veto of the prohibitionist Volstead Act in 1919 had added a gratuitous insult.[60]

The Wilson coalition has been called unstable because it appeared in the middle of a period of Republican ascendancy. But a resumption of normal voting patterns only partly explains the reaction against Wilson. The coalition carried with it instability because it was a somewhat jerrybuilt affair; in addition, the election of 1916 had put the President into his second and weaker term of office. One might even have predicted that a war would shatter it in 1916. The war weakened the coalition in that voters generally appear to vent their frustrations on a wartime administration in a postwar period: one can recall Clemenceau's defeat, the eclipse of Lloyd George after his khaki victory of 1918, the defeat of Hughes of Australia—all men of Wilson's time—and, of course, Churchill's downfall in 1945 or the Republican victory in the American elections of 1946.

The Republican triumph of 1920 was impressive but shortlived. In just two years, even before the scandals of the Harding Administration were disclosed, the Democrats gained seventy-four seats in the House, and came within less than a dozen seats of controlling that body. But social conflict within the party prevented the Democrats from mobilizing in a presidential year the strength they showed in the Congressional elections of 1922 and 1926. The divisive issues of the Ku Klux Klan, prohibition, and Roman Catholicism led to friction between rural and urban Democrats, increasing the self-consciousness of each faction. Not until the personalities who symbolized conflict within the party passed from the political scene could the more stable parts of the Wilson Coalition be resurrected. Some members of that earlier group took part in the retaliation Franklin Roosevelt dealt the Republicans in 1932.

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60 Bryan did not participate in the campaign, although he finally voted for Cox. His heart "was in the grave with the dry plank" that failed of adoption at the Convention. Foreshadowing the internecine strife that was to plague his party, he called the Democratic platform "a plagarisn [*sic*] from the Brewers' Blue Book." William Jennings Bryan to Pat Harrison, 1920, Bryan Papers, Library of Congress.

Anglo-American Relations, 1861-1865, Reconsidered

"Your mark wuz on the guns, The neutral guns, thet shot, John, Our brothers and our sons." Contrary to James Russell Lowell's biting indictment, Great Britain endeavored to follow a neutral policy during the American Civil War. For a century, Americans, misled by emotionalism such as Lowell's, as well as Federal propaganda, have tried to read sinister implications into Britain's aloof stand. In fact, there was little likelihood of British intervention to stop the brutal fighting, to recognize Southern independence, or to break the blockade to obtain cotton. Uncle Sam had very little to do with John Bull's neutrality, for Sam neither supported nor believed in it. Great Britain chose neutrality in spite of Federal opinion, and sustained it in spite of foreign and domestic pressures.

As early as July,1860, W. Douglas Irvine, Secretary of the British legation in the United States, prepared the Foreign Office for the possible circumstance of secession by quite accurately summing up "the feeling of antagonism that has long existed between North and South."[1] In November, 1860, Her Majesty's Ambassador to the United States, Lord Lyons (Richard Bickerton Pemmell) promptly reported the election of Abraham Lincoln as President of the United States, and its effect on the country.[2] Lord John Russell, in reply, trusted "the prudence and good sense of the new President . . . will preserve that Union."[3] In December, the tempo of Lyon's communications quickened as South Carolina took steps toward secession. Bland but correct, Russell instructed Lyons to "avoid giving opinions that events might contradict," and to refrain from action that might seem to favor one party or the other.[4]

In January, 1861, Russell warned Lyons not to offer advice to the outgoing or incoming governments. In February, Russell hoped compromise might restore the Union or make possible peaceful sep-

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[1] *British Sessional Papers*, 1861, volume LXIII, Command Paper No. [2838], volume pages, 158–159. Form hereafter used: *BSP*, 1861, LXIII, [2838], 158–159.

This research is a part of that made possible by a Kent State University Faculty Research Grant.

[2] *BSP*, 1862, LXII, [2909], (Item number) No. 1, 9–10.

[3] *Ibid.*, No. 2, 10.

[4] *Ibid.*, No. 6, 12–13.

aration. In March, when George M. Dallas, American minister to Great Britain, visited Russell to inform him secession was illegal and unconstitutional, Russell wrote Lyons:

> I replied . . . that, even if the Government of the United States had been willing to acknowledge the separation . . . Her Majesty's Government would have seen with great concern the dissolution of the Union. . . . That the opposition of the Government of the United States to any such separation, and the denial by them of its legality, would make Her Majesty's Government very reluctant to take any step which might encourage or sanction the separation.

But, he added, he could not bind his government to future events he could not foresee.[5] Then, in April, Russell instructed Lyons to recommend conciliation if asked, but not to proffer advice unasked. Shortly thereafter Russell advised Dallas that American troubles did not directly concern Great Britain and were not for the British to decide, since they were "in no hurry to recognize the separation as complete and final." Still, he would not be bound by a future he could not predict. On May 1, Russell directed the Admiralty to strengthen its American squadrons but to do nothing to indicate partiality.[6]

Russell quite plainly put forth the government's position in an address to Parliament, May 3, 1861:

> Her Majesty's Government has felt that it was its duty to use every possible means to avoid taking any part in the lamentable contest now raging in the American States. (Hear, hear.) And nothing but the imperative duty of protecting British interests, in case they should be attacked, justifies the Government in at all interfering. We have not been involved in any way in that contest by any act or by giving any advice in the matter, and, for God's sake, let us, if possible, keep out of it! (Cheers.)[7]

This was both a review of consistent policy and a forecast of continuity. In another week, Russell reported the visit of Confederate emissaries William L. Yancey, Pierre A. Rost, and A. Dudley Mann, but refused to deal with them officially. Two days later, May 13, the Queen logically extended Russell's policy by issuing her Proclamation of Neutrality.[8] The proclamation invoked the act of 59 Geo. III, "An Act to Prevent the Enlisting or Engagement of His Majesty's Subjects to Serve in a Foreign Service. . . ." It became a misdemeanor for "any person, within any part of the United King-

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5 *Ibid.*, No. 9, 15; No. 15, 20; No. 21, 22.
6 *Ibid.*, No. 24, 25; No. 26, 27; No. 28, 28–29.
7 *Ibid.*, [2910], 210–11.
8 *Ibid.*, [2909], No. 33, 34; No. 35, 35.

dom," to "equip, furnish, fit out, or arm," or cause or attempt to do so, "any ship or vessel, with intent . . . that such . . . shall be employed in the service of any foreign . . . state . . . or province, or any part of any province or people" as a transport or store-ship or cruiser, or to enlist in any foreign service "with whom His Majesty shall not then be at war."[9]

Once the direction was firmly fixed, it was not altered. Neutrality was not only the policy of the coalition Liberal ministry presided over by Viscount Henry Palmerston and Russell, but also the policy of the Conservative opposition led by Lord Derby (Edward G. G. S. Stanley) and Benjamin Disraeli.[10] As the policy of both parties, it is not politically surprising that neutrality went unviolated. The Union strenuously objected to the proclamation because it conferred belligerent status on not only the Union but also the Confederacy. The United States government hoped to keep the difficulties a domestic affair, an insurgency, in order to head off foreign interference. The proclamation naturally disturbed the Lincoln government, even though in international as well as American law, the Union's blockade proclamation already had conferred belligerent status on the Confederacy.

Federal leaders quite correctly asserted the proclamation gave spiritual assistance and hope of recognition to the Confederacy. Such had not been the intent of the proclamation, and Russell hastened to explain his government's position. In response to American Minister Charles Francis Adams's protest, Russell replied that Britain did not intend to assist the South, "that the sympathies of this country were rather with the North than with the South, but we wished to live on amicable terms with both parties." On June 1, further to clarify the British position, Russell notified the Admiralty, Colonial, War, and India Offices that

> Her Majesty's Government . . . desirous of observing the strictest neutrality . . . propose to interdict the armed ships, and also the privateers of both parties, from carrying prizes made by them into the Ports, Harbors, Roadsteads, or Waters of the United Kingdom, or any of Her Majesty's Colonies or Possessions abroad.[11]

Obviously, the directive would hurt Southern interests more than Northern, but Adams and Secretary of State William H. Seward con-

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[9] *Ibid.*, No. 35, 35. See also Ephraim Douglas Adams, *Great Britain and the American Civil War*, 2 vols., New York, c.1958, I, 53–54, who sees "no clear policy."

[10] William D. Jones, "The British Conservatives and the American Civil War," *American Historical Review*, LVIII (April, 1953), 529ff.

[11] *BSP*, 1862, LXII [2909], No. 41, 42; No. 45, 46.

tinued to protest. On June 21, Russell observed "the question of belligerent rights is one, not of principle, but of fact." On July 19 he discussed a decision of District of Columbia Court Judge James Dunlop, who, in the case of *U.S. vs. Schooner Tropic Wind and cargo,* had decided on the basis of American law that civil war existed with the same belligerent rights for civil, as well as public, war. Russell, in complete agreement, sent a copy of the decision to Lyons. Russell later remarked, "Mr. Seward never chooses to understand the position of Her Majesty's Government," and on August 8 reminded Seward that Great Britain accorded all rights of a belligerent to the United States, too. On August 24 Russell bluntly told Yancey, Rost, and Mann that Great Britain would continue to observe her neutrality, and again in December reiterated his refusal to communicate officially with them. Seward continued to call the war an insurrection, and Russell instructed Lyons, January 24, 1862, to tell the Secretary of State once more "that an insurrection extending over nine states in space and ten months in duration, can only be considered as a civil war. . . ." Finally, February 1, 1862, Russell sent a supplementary directive to the Admiralty, designed to interdict belligerent warships or privateers or both from the Bahamas, or anywhere else in the United Kingdom. If any did enter, they had twenty-four hours to depart and were not to be provisioned.[12] If by this time the policy of neutrality had not been well explained and firmly fixed, it was not any fault of Russell's.

Peace, prosperity, and neutrality were synonyms to many Englishmen,[13] therefore advantages of the neutrality policy were far more compelling and numerous than those of intervention, recognition, or any non-neutral position. In the first place, American troubles did not attract as much of the government's attention as did European. "The dominant anxiety in Palmerston's mind during the whole period" was Britain's fear of a European war; so of course it would not do to risk war with the Union through pro-Southernism or non-neutrality.[14] The position was even more difficult than it seemed, because as far as the British government was concerned, Canada was indefensible should there be a collision with the United States.[15]

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[12] *Ibid.,* No. 52, 50–1; No. 61, 57; No. 70, 69; No. 78, 78; No.112, 111; No. 152, 145; No. 156, 146.

[13] Martin P. Claussen, "Peace Factors in Anglo-American Relations," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* XXVI (1940), 516. Claussen develops this idea logically and well.

[14] Max Beloff, "Great Britain and the American Civil War," *History,* XXXVII (February, 1952), 42; Claussen, 518; W. D. Jones, 527.

[15] Beloff, 42.

It also was obvious that a war to obtain cotton would be far more expensive than poor relief in distressed areas.[16] As neutrals the British could watch the Federal merchant marine suffer while she returned as the principal sea carrier,[17] which would add to the mid-Victorian prosperity she then enjoyed. Many Englishmen believed the South would successfully separate eventually,[18] but this did not devalue the economic advantages. If the South did succeed, neutrality was still the better policy, for then Great Britain could deal with both nations without either having a claim to injury or advantage. The economic arguments for non-intervention were also advanced as the Liberal party platform for Denmark and Poland, as well as America.[19] If these arguments were strong enough to maintain British neutrality close to home in Europe, they would seem more persuasive applied to a remote America.

The stereotype of pro-Northern English working classes holding in check pro-Southern sympathies of the aristocrats also breaks down. In mid-Victorian Britain the working classes sent no members to Parliament, had only embryonic labor organizations, and therefore had little chance to influence national policy. Conservatives certainly could desire democracy discredited by successful Southern separation, but they did not actively advocate the breakup of the American union. Conservative leaders set the policy for their party, and outside of Lord Robert Cecil's and Seymour Fitzgerald's pro-Southernism, the lesser members of that party were divided. As the opposition, they worked to discredit the Liberals, but their opposition ended short of any violation of neutrality. As a result, "the South received only the most illusory solace from British aristocrats . . . which was quickly lost amid practical concerns."[20]

The toxic effect of slavery, the desire for law and order, and, among officials closely connected with American affairs, a belief that the North had the power to succeed, added up to a rather cool, negative reason for tinting neutrality with a delicate Yankee shade. Irvine, in July, 1860, believed in the event of disunion "the people of the North . . . would probably gain the upper hand." In December, 1860, Lyons, the Union's best friend, remarked how it would be "repugnant to our feelings to be in intimate relations with

16 *Ibid.*, 45; Claussen, 517–518.
17 *Beloff*, 45.
18 *Ibid.*, 46; E. D. Adams, I, 53.
19 Claussen, 518.
20 *Ibid.*, 521–522; Beloff, 43, 44; W. D. Jones, 527–528, 543.

a confederation formed on the avowed principle of perpetuating, if not extending, slavery." If the South attempted to reopen the slave trade, he supposed the effort "would . . . be at once put down by the unified force of the Northern States, of Great Britain, and of civilized Europe." Furthermore, the South could not enter into any treaty on the subject, or they would have to admit they were wrong in their argument with the North. He feared "that we shall have very considerable difficulty in placing our relations, commercial or political, on a satisfactory footing with a people imbued with such sentiments." In April, 1861, after reporting the firing on Sumter, and after his express disapproval of Lincoln's policy, he nevertheless observed, "the taint of slavery will render the cause of the south repugnant to the feelings of the civilized world." In May he struck a balance, finding "abhorrence of slavery; respect for law; more complete community of race and language," enlisted the Englishman's sympathies on the side of the North. The war "must tend to the utter devastation of the South." This was no expression of real affection for the Union, but rather a negative attraction, based on a greater distaste for slavery and forcible separation. Russell, in answer to accusations of pro-Southernism, summed up in 1863: "it was my belief that if all the assistance given to the Federals by British subjects, and British munitions of war, were weighed against similar aid given to the Confederates, the balance would be greatly in favor of the Federals."[21]

Nevertheless, no human policy, however logical or resolute, is ever free from challenge. An irresponsible U.S. Navy captain, Charles Wilkes, nearly swamped the lifeboat of neutrality in the *Trent* affair. It did not arouse Confederate sympathy in the English, but rather injured their sensitive seapower pride. The dying Prince Albert and the temperate Russell intervened to avert damage, and once the crisis passed, British relief was indication enough they did not want war. Prior to the *Trent* episode, the crown's law officers opined that the British could do little if such a case arose.[22] But when Wilkes removed James M. Mason and John Slidell, together with their secretaries and baggage from the British mail packet *Trent,* Britain exploded in instant indignation. The cab-

[21] *BSP*, 1861, LXIII, [2838], 158–159; *ibid.*, 1862, LXII, [2909], 21, 27–28, 45–46; *ibid.*, 1864, LXII, [3241], 4–5.

[22] E. D. Adams, I, 207–208. A thorough discussion of the law officers opinions both before and after the seizure is included. See also Allan Nevins, *The War for the Union: The Improvised War, 1861–1862*, New York, 1959, 391.

inet, in a moment of anger, drafted a strong note to the United States, which Prince Albert subsequently tempered. The Royal Consort, by accepting the explanation that the American captain acted without instructions, would leave the United States an honorable way out of the situation.[23] Even so, the cabinet directed Russell to transmit two sets of instructions to Lyons. The first asked the liberation of the four and their delivery to Lyons, along with a "suitable apology for the aggression." In the much misunderstood second instruction (not a private note), Russell told Lyons to get a satisfactory reply from Seward within seven days or break off diplomatic relations with the United States. Russell followed up with a private letter to Lyons that clearly indicated the "seven days ultimatum" was the cabinet's idea. The private communication read:

> The despatches *which were agreed to at the cabinet yesterday,* and which I have signed this morning, impose upon you a disagreeable task. My wish would be that at your first interview with Mr. Seward you should not take any despatch with you, but should prepare him for it, and ask him to settle with the President and the Cabinet what course they would propose.
>
> The next time you should bring him my despatch and read it to him fully.
>
> If he asks what will be the consequence of his refusing compliance, I think that you should say that you wish to leave him and the President quite free to take their own course, and that you desire to abstain from anything like menace.[24]

Lyons put the matter to Seward as instructed. Seward replied exactly seven days later. He explained that Wilkes had no orders to stop the *Trent;* that the men taken were contraband of war; that Wilkes should have taken the vessel as a prize, and therein was the trouble, "for this error the British Government has a right to expect the same reparation that we . . . should expect from Great Britain . . . in a similar case." Seward added that he was glad the British

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[23] Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, "The Trent Affair: How the Prince Consort Saved the United States," *History Today,* XI (December, 1961), 813; Nevins, *The Improvised War,* 391.

[24] *BSP,* 1862, LXII, [2913], No. 2, 614–615; No. 4, 615; No. 29, 641. Italics supplied. The first reference to "despatches" (plural), and then to "despatch" (singular), is misleading. The two cabinet-approved notes are dated November 30, Russell's private note was written the following morning. Since Russell cautions Lyons to proceed with care, December 1, it is clear the "ultimatum" was not his, but a part of the cabinet's instructions. Lyons did not transmit the seven days condition to Seward, as he was instructed by Russell not to. In a sense this is not in fact an ultimatum, since officially Seward did not know of it. But Adams did. See No. 14, p. 623–624.

accepted a principle the United States had long argued, because it removed difficulties which for over fifty years "alienated the two countries from each other." He asked for instructions about turning over the captives. Lyons considered the answer adequate; on January 10, 1862, Russell indicated his acceptance although he expressed a desire to debate some of Seward's points, and in a subsequent note, did so.[25] Once this serious challenge to Anglo-American relations passed, no other crisis of similar magnitude occurred.

The apparent inability of the Union to subdue the South in the first year of the war prompted the cabinet to discuss the possibility of mediation. Such consideration did not arise from desire to aid the Confederacy, but because the war seemed useless, and further bloodshed inhumane. After giving the matter some thought, Palmerston and Derby applied the brakes, and neutrality remained unscathed.

The published diplomatic documents give little hint as to the seriousness with which the British government considered mediation between July and October, 1862. Until the news of Antietam reached Britain, the Union military situation looked desperate. During August, both Russell and Palmerston toyed with the idea of mediating the American affair and recognizing the Confederacy. Within the Cabinet Sir George Cornewall Lewis opposed intervention as did the leader of the opposition, Lord Derby. By October 2, Palmerston agreed and urged delay, but five days later at Newcastle, William E. Gladstone spoke of a Confederate "nation," and thus inferred a cabinet policy not adopted. Russell, in a cabinet memorandum then advocated an armistice. Lewis and Palmerston immediately circulated counter-memorandums. Palmerston would not act unless there was evidence the North contemplated giving up the struggle. Russell, who personally continued to favor mediation, finally came around to Palmerston's opinion that Britain must remain only an on-looker, and by November 13 even advised postponement of an overture for a renewable six-month's truce. On November 17, Lyons summed up the situation from his vantage point in Washington: the Democrats, who had talked with him about foreign intervention after their success in the elections, had come to believe General George B. McClellan's dismissal indicated Lincoln had gone over to the Radicals, so mediation then would be premature. Lyons believed the political climate would be more favorable after Congress met in March, 1863. To the proposition that

[25] *Ibid.*, No. 19, 628; No. 24, 631; No. 27, 639–640; No. 35, 645–649.

British mediation ought to preface recognition of the South, Lyons replied, "I do not clearly understand what advantage is expected to result from a simple recognition . . . and I presume that the European Powers do not contemplate breaking up the blockade by force . . . or engaging in hostilities with the United States in support of the independence of the South. . . ."[26] After this abortive fling at mediation, and the settlement of the *Trent* affair, there was no real danger of any British violation of Anglo-American neutrality.[27] The only other challenge came in the summer of 1863 with the Roebuck motion in Parliament, but it never really had a chance to succeed.[28]

Englishmen disputed the South's King Cotton theory even before the war came. As early as July, 1860, Irvine, Secretary of the British Legation in Washington, implied the cotton planters would experience "difficulty" because they would have to adopt "a totally new commercial system," and did not realize their creditors would not let them do so. A year later, Southerners, "so filled with exaggerated notions of their capabilities," so exasperated Irvine that he could not comment on their commercial prospects. On December 18, 1860, Lyons, also irritated by the King Cotton argument, wrote Russell:

> Great as is the real importance of their staple, their own notions of the influence it will secure to them have become so much exaggerated as to be preposterous. They seem to think that the [need for cotton] . . . will oblige all Europe, and especially Great Britain, to treat with them on any terms they may dictate. They talk of withholding their cotton . . . forgetting that their own prosperity depends much more upon selling it than that of the Northern States and Europe can ever depend upon buying it. They do not choose to remember the lesson so often taught by experience, that stopping the supply . . . results in stimulating . . . [the production of] it elsewhere. . . . In answer to all arguments they are apt to repeat their senseless cry that "Cotton is King."[29]

The South's cotton never presented an important challenge to neutrality.[30] At the onset of the war in America, Britain was over-

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[26] E. D. Adams, II, 22–74, has by far the best treatment of this situation. But see also Beloff, 47; W. D. Jones, 535; and Nevins, *The War for the Union: War Becomes Revolution, 1862–1863*, New York, 1960, 273; *BSP*, 1863, LXXII, [3075]; *ibid.*, [3107] No. 47, 51–53.

[27] E. D. Adams, II, 74; Beloff, 47.

[28] E. D. Adams, II, 178; Nevins, *War Becomes Revolution*, 273.

[29] *BSP*, 1861, LXIII, [2838], 159; *ibid.*, 1862, LVII, [2960], 11; *ibid.*, 1862, LXII, [2909], No. 7, 13.

[30] E. D. Adams, II, 4, 17; Frank L. Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy*, Chicago, 1931, ch. XIX, *passim;* Nevins, *War Becomes Revolution*, ch. 10, *passim;* Claussen, 511–522. On the King Cotton-King Corn controversy

supplied with both raw cotton, which she had imported in tremendous quantities from America, and with manufactured cotton products. The war in the United States provided a way out of glutted markets. When her tremendous raw material stocks were used up by mid-1862, a portion of her labor force suffered temporarily, but Egyptians and Indians planted more cotton than ever before to supply the deficiency. In their 1862 report, the Commissioners of Customs summed up the situation. They were not overjoyed at the interruption of the cotton trade brought on by the American civil war, but "while we deplore the widely-spread distress . . . and recollect with pride the uncomplaining constancy with which that distress has been endured, we shall at the same time contemplate . . . the fortunate position of our country." Fortunate, because they found other sources. Turning specifically to America,

> We find to our surprise that . . . she has increased [her] supply of British produce and manufactures, as compared with 1861. . . . Our exports to America, which fell . . . in 1861, has again advanced . . . upwards. . . . This represents the trade of the Northern and Pacific Ports alone. . . . The energy and commercial vitality of the Northern States appears, under the circumstances, indeed to be surprising.

The fact was that even without the South, the United States continued to be Britain's best customer. In the summer of 1863 a special commissioner advised the Poor Law Board:

> It may now be safely assumed . . . that Lancashire is undoubtedly mastering her difficulties: and when I remember the predictions of disaster and the cry of distress which accompanied the first alarm of the cotton famine, it is a satisfaction to me . . . to state that the manufacturers have passed the climax . . . without much difficulty. . . . Fully 60,000 operatives [in one Lancashire district] . . . who were paupers in December, 1862, have found other employment. . . .

His impression is that conditions were not so bad as predicted. Also, high cotton prices produced good profits from a smaller output.[31] In addition, the Union promised it would soon reopen the cotton trade, although it never did.[32] Wheat did not prevent inter-

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see Louis B. Schmidt, "The Influence of Wheat and Cotton on Anglo-American Relations During the Civil War," *Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, XVI (July, 1918), 401–439; and Eli Ginzberg, "The Economics of British Neutrality During the American Civil War," *Agricultural History*, X (October, 1936), 147–156.

[31] *BSP*, 1862, XXVI, [3157], 113, 115, 116, 119; *ibid.*, 1864, LII, (Parliamentary Paper No.) 60, 2, 3; Beloff, 45.

[32] *Ibid.*, 1863, LXXII, [3107], 11, 13–14, 15, 17, 18, 19–20, 21–22, 27–29, 30, 32, 41, 54–55.

vention either; although in the early years of the war Yankee wheat was cheaper than the many other sources available to the British.[33]

If Great Britain did not intend to fight for Confederate cotton, or to intervene in American affairs to stop an inhumane war, then any discussion of the blockade is academic. They had no reason to break the blockade, and every reason to recognize it. The British government considered it effective, and nothing occurred to change its mind. At first, Britain put out feelers to see if the Union might grant them a liberal interpretation of the blockade; failing that, the interest of future British seapower dictated the blockade should be officially observed.[34] Under the circumstances, the United Kingdom was willing to accept an effective blockade of Southern ports, but not an artificial one. Lyons knew Federal officials discussed so-called "paper blockades." In July, 1861, Congress passed a customs bill which empowered the president to close ports of entry. Alarmed, Lyons had tried to convince congressmen of its dangers, but they had not listened to him. He deplored the "haste with which it was passed . . . an alarming symptom of the temper of the Legislature and of the country at this moment." In mid-August, together with the French ambassador, Lyons protested to Seward that closing ports not in hand violated international law, and furthermore, Great Britain would consider it an unfriendly act. Lyons inquired if Seward would like this protest in writing. To avoid the air of a threat, Seward thought not. Seward explained the President had no intention of using this power.[35]

Seward did not mention the President's intention to issue a proclamation authorized by another section of the Customs act, which simply prohibited commercial intercourse with the South. While this did not sit well with the British either, the crown's law officers believed it to be quite legal.[36] However, Russell angrily denounced a plan to seal Southern harbors by sinking hulks laden with stones in their approaches as a "plot against the commerce of nations. . . . It is a project . . . of barbarism." When Lyons first objected to this scheme in November, 1861, Seward put him off. But when

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[33] *Ibid.*, 1866, LXVIII, [3723], 17, 21; *ibid.*, 1871, LXIX, [c.395], 30–33; E. D. Adams, II, 13, note 2; Ginzberg, 147–156, *passim.*

[34] *BSP*, 1861, LXV, [2836], 586; James P. Baxter III, "The British Government and Neutral Rights," *American Historical Review*, XXXIV (October, 1928), 9–29. Baxter bases his conclusions on an examination of the Admiralty Papers.

[35] *BSP*, 1862, LXII, [2909], No. 65, 66; No. 70, 69; No. 71, 70; No. 81, 80; No. 82, 81.

[36] *Ibid.*, No. 83, 81; No. 93, 92.

a Union fleet endeavored to shut Charleston harbor in this manner, it aroused England, and Lyons was instructed to remonstrate again. In a comic-opera scene, Lyons stalked indignantly into the State Department and delivered a stormy protest to Seward. Calmly, Seward promised the obstructions would be removed after the war. He pointed out how the Confederates tried this themselves to keep the Union navy out of their ports. He vowed the Union would open better ports than it closed, if any had yet been closed. Lyons than produced an article from the *National Intelligencer* that reported the Union navy had barricaded Charleston harbor with a "stone fleet." While Seward did not deny the attempt, he replied the harbor was not sealed, for "a British steamer laden with contraband of war had just succeeded in getting in."[37]

Although the blockade continued to be a major topic of diplomatic correspondence, with frequent American complaints of violations and British counter-complaints of irregularities, Her Majesty's Government continued steadfast in official recognition of it. Lord Russell was quite clear on this point through it all. In the House of Lords, February 10, 1862, he remarked:

> It was an evil on the one hand if the blockade was ineffective, and therefore invalid; and on the other hand if we were to run the risk of a dispute with the United States without having strong ground for it, it would be a great[er] evil.[38]

The British had grounds on which to declare the blockade ineffective, if they chose, for Confederate representatives sent Russell list after list of vessels that entered Southern ports. In addition, the British North American squadron, in its patrols along the Confederacy's Atlantic shore, frequently reported no Union vessels in sight. Nevertheless, the blockade was not so ineffective as to make contact with British consuls in the Confederacy easy. The commander of the West Indian station had to be instructed to send communications to these consuls "on under cover . . . as may be most convenient," that is through the blockade, if necessary. Often on the spot to justify its effectiveness, Russell became especially impatient with Mason's continued references to it as a "paper blockade." To quiet Mason, Russell on February 10, 1863, curtly replied:

> The Declaration of Paris [which set down rules for blockades] could not be intended to mean that a port must be so blockaded as to really

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[37] *Ibid.*, No. 125, 120; No. 126, 121; No. 127, 122; No. 139, 134; No. 141, 136; No. 142, 136; No. 143, 137; No. 145, 137; No. 153, 145.

[38] *Ibid.*, 1863, LXXII, [3119], 183.

prevent access in all winds . . . in a dark night . . . by means of low steamers or coasting craft creeping along the shore. . . . Certainly the manner in which it [the blockade] has since been enforced gives to neutral governments no excuse for asserting that the blockade has not been efficiently maintained.[39]

Even though the British officially upheld the blockade, sympathetic or enterprising Englishmen ran through it on occasion. Naturally, Northerners saw this as a violation of neutrality, just as they did the building of Confederate commerce destroyers in British ports. From the first, the Union threatened to issue letters of marque if the British did not enforce their own policy. Since Englishmen did not wish to see a flood of Yankee privateers on the oceans, they emphatically opposed the move. Russell often announced the United Kingdom's determination to enforce her law, but in the case of the *Alabama, Florida,* and others, he was obviously embarrassed at the ineffectiveness of municipal law for the enforcement of the Foreign Enlistment Act. This, together with the privateer threat and the *Alabama* situation served to put the Palmerston-Russell government on the defensive, as Russell himself indicated. On March 27, 1863, Russell recounted a conversation with Adams in which he disclaimed responsibility for the *Alabama,* but "admitted that the cases of the *Alabama* and *Oreto* were a scandal, and in some degree a reproach to our laws."[40] Thirty-one shipowners of Liverpool recognized the danger implicit in the situation, and on June 9, 1863, asked amendment of the Foreign Enlistment Act to forestall effectively British construction of ships destined for belligerents. There is little wonder the government exercised greater care in the case of the Laird rams.[41]

The many other ripples in the sea of Anglo-American diplomacy, such as the arbitrary arrest of British nationals, in certain cases, by the Union government, or alleged Federal recruiting in Ireland (which charge the Emigration Commissioners did not believe), and the like, never became serious enough in themselves to breach the dike of neutrality. But by 1863 the Confederate diplomatic ship sank, as Mason was withdrawn from England and British consuls were expelled from the Confederacy.[42]

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[39] Ibid., [3108], 65–84; [3107], 15, 16; *ibid.*, 1862, LXII, [2909], No. 115, 113; No. 121, 118.

[40] *Ibid.* 1864, LXII, [3241], 4–5.

[41] *Ibid.*, 1863, LXXII, [3200], 565, 566; *ibid.*, 1864, LXII, [3825], 137–172, *passim.*

[42] *Ibid.*, 1862, LXII, [2909], 89, 97, 101–102, 105, 107, 111; *Ibid.*, 1863, XV, [3199], 305–306; *ibid.*, 1864, LXII, [3299], 223–240; [3385],

Neutrality, even with its grant of belligerent rights could not be of use to the South: here was a great tragedy of the war, for after the Queen's Proclamation the Confederacy believed that recognition was just around the corner. To compound the irony, the Southern giant, King Cotton, was counted out before the first round. It was not King Corn who substituted for him, but a number of British economic, political, and social contenders.

Devoid of emotionalism, propaganda, and prejudice, the customary picture of Anglo-American relations changes. The main outline is one of unrelieved neutrality, challenged twice by the British, but neither time successfully or because of Southern sympathy. The importance of the policy was its continuity. With neutrality firmly established, recognition of the Confederacy as an independent nation or of the blockade as ineffective, could not follow. For better or for worse, with its imperfections and attendant misunderstandings, neutrality benefited not only the English, but also the North. So far as the Union was concerned, only a pro-Northern, non-neutral policy could have been of greater theoretical assistance. Given the political and economic situation of both England and Europe, such a policy would have been as dangerous as it was impossible. Although loopholes in the practice of neutrality and the temper of the North made the policy seem sterile, its impartiality was in the Union's favor. The Confederacy had privateers, but nowhere to take prizes or to provision, while the Yankee shippers could find shelter under the English flag. The North could freely import from Great Britain, but the South only deviously and lightly. Also, the South's peculiar institution aroused British distrust. On the diplomatic level, after the storms of 1861 and 1862 blew past, John Bull and Uncle Sam drew closer together. "Finality John" Russell, who never revealed much animosity toward the United States, in 1863 could admit his friendship for his protagonist Adams and the Union. "Mr. Adams . . . [has] always laboured for peace between our two nations, nor, I trust, will his efforts and those of the two Governments fail of success."[43]

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489–550;[3395], 561–67; [3330], 381–418; [3331], 454. Beloff, 47, observes that the *Alabama* question and the Laird rams problem nearly ruptured relations, "but the real danger of Anglo-Amercian war had disappeared" by 1863.

[43] *BSP*, 1864, LXII, [3241], 4–5.

30, 287

Friends Divided: Debate on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1853

The need for a revision of the Massachusetts constitution was a real one by the early 1850's, particularly in regard to the outmoded system of representation then in existence. But the move for a convention to affect the necessary changes, while widespread, was not free of partisan considerations. The idea had first been submitted to the people (and ratified by them) by a legislature controlled by the "Coalition," an alliance between portions of the Democratic and Free Soil parties, which had successfully wrested control of the state from the Whigs in 1850 and 1851. The Coalitionists were anxious to end the system of representation which had previously allowed the Whigs to dominate the state government out of proportion to their numerical strength. The urgency of the matter had been heightened when the Coalition again lost control of the state to the Whigs in the 1852 election.

When, early in 1853, a choice for delegates to the new constitutional convention was made, the Whigs suffered a heavy defeat.[1] This new burst of strength for the Coalitionists was used by them to maximum effect in the subsequent deliberations in the convention, with the result that the finished product provided, in the eyes of some, as much for partisan fortunes as for state reforms.

John Gorham Palfrey, one of those old Free Soil leaders who had refused to "bargain away principles" by cooperating with the Coalition movement, early entered the lists against the proposed

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[1] Wilson to Sumner, March 10, 1853, Sumner Papers, Houghton; Charles Francis Adams (CFA) Diary, March 8, 1853, Microfilm Edition of the Adams Papers; unless otherwise specified all quotations from Adams' diary and letters are from this source; R. H. Dana, Jr., Journal, May 4, 1853, Massachusetts Historical Society.

J. G. Palfrey, *Remarks on the Proposed State Constitution*, 1853, 27, laid stress on the recent repeal by the Whig legislature of the secret ballot for the choice of delegates as the cause of their defeat. See also G. F. Hoar, *Autobiography of Seventy Years*, 2 vols., New York, 1903, I, 174. A number of other factors were also responsible for this result, particularly the fact that the rural areas were heavily overrepresented in the convention elections due to a provision that every town, no matter how small, could elect a delegate. The city workers' discontent contributed further to Whig defections; see Samuel Shapiro, *Richard Henry Dana: 1815–1882*, East Lansing, 1961, 68–69, for a full discussion.

constitutional changes. He published a pamphlet soon after the convention adjourned, setting forth a detailed and able indictment.[2]

Palfrey's major objections centered on the proposed system of representation and on the alterations in tenure for the Judiciary branch. He approved the new arrangements for electing the state Senate, which provided for redistricting on the basis of population and plurality vote, but he argued that since state sentiment all but unanimously favored these changes, their separate passage was guaranteed in the near future. It was not necessary to embrace a host of poor provisions in order to make them law—especially the unfortunate new system proposed for election to the House. Here, Palfrey argued, inequalities of representation were not so much corrected as rearranged. More frequent representation was provided for many of the towns, but simultaneously, the smaller towns were given an unfair preponderance of power. Since these were also the poorer areas of the state, it meant that legislative disposal of the public wealth would be in the hands of those who had contributed the least share of that wealth in taxes.[3]

The changes proposed in the Judicial system constituted the single worst feature of the new constitution in Palfrey's eyes. Judges of the Supreme Court and the Court of Common Pleas were to hold their offices for only ten years, at which time the Governor could re-appoint or replace them. Judges of Probate, sheriffs, district attorneys, commissioners of insolvency and other trial and police justices were no longer to be appointive, but were to be elected every three years by the people.[4] This would lead in the first instance, Palfrey felt, to an encroachment of the executive department of government on the judicial, and in the second, to the destruction of the non-political, impartial nature of the courts.[5]

Palfrey's pamphlet caused a statewide sensation. Previously the Coalitionists had been confident that the new constitution would be ratified by the people, for opposition had been scattered among the "languid and divided" Whigs and the "old line" Democrats.[6] Palfrey's hard-hitting attack awakened new hope in the opposition

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2 Palfrey, *Remarks on the Proposed State Constitution*, 1853.
3 *Ibid.*, 9–17.
4 "The Constitutional Propositions adopted by the Convention of Delegates . . . ," 23–24.
5 "Remarks on the Proposed State Constitution," 17–22.
6 CFA Diary, Oct. 6, 1853.

of defeating the constitution—with the result that both sides reacted to his pamphlet vigorously.

The *Commonwealth,* the leading Coalitionist organ, at first refused to believe that Palfrey had authorized the pamphlet. The *Lowell American,* another Coalitionist paper, accepted its authorship, but stigmatized the pamphlet as a mere electioneering document against Henry Wilson, the Free Soil leader who had been instrumental in devising the Coalition. Palfrey opposed the new constitution, the *American* claimed, "because the Free Soil Party, which supports the Constitution, has nominated Henry Wilson, a shoemaker, for Governor . . . because John G. Palfrey was not chosen a delegate to the Constitutional Convention . . . because the Free Soil party will not, like the Whig party, be led by *Fogies.*"[7]

Charles Francis Adams, who, like Palfrey, was a leader of the anti-Coalition Free Soilers, had earlier viewed the new constitution with mixed feelings, but after his friend's pamphlet appeared, he came out openly on Palfrey's side of the controversy, realizing that in any case, he would be included in the pending embroilment. On November 5th, Adams delivered a speech at Quincy in which he reiterated Palfrey's objections to the new constitution and announced that although he recognized the constitution was not without merit, its bad features so overbalanced the good, that he had decided to vote against it.[8]

The opponents of the constitution—particularly the Whigs—greeted this unexpected support with delight. Edward Everett, a prominent Whig, intimated to Adams that "the doors of Faneuil Hall would be thrown open" to him if he wished to address the people. But Adams had no desire unnecessarily to "throw down the glove" to men who had recently worked beside him in the Free Soil party, however misguided they might currently be in their allegiance to the Coalition. He disliked being found on the side of the Whigs, whose power in the state he had fought for a decade, and he wished to give them as little comfort as possible, even though he felt he could not remain completely mute at this latest Free Soil "deviation from principle."[9] The Coalition press refused to credit Adams with any but the lowest motives. "Unable to see that it was his own bad, envious, malicious temper that caused his repeated defeats," the *Boston Times* wrote, "he attributes them to some members of

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[7] *Lowell American,* (Mass.) Nov. 1, 1853.
[8] Report of Adams' speech is printed in the *Boston Atlas,* Nov. 7, 1853.
[9] CFA Diary, Nov. 2, 1853.

his own party, and is doing what he can to injure that party's chief [Wilson], whom he, too, hates as the mean, unpopular man hates the generous, popular leader."[10]

Adams and Palfrey found themselves not only opposed to the official Free Soil position but in conflict with some of their closest friends.[11] One of them, Richard Henry Dana, Jr., though an anti-Coalitionist Free Soiler, had been a prominent member of the constitutional convention. He agreed with Palfrey that the judicial changes were unfortunate, but he argued that the new constitution should be supported, since its defeat would mean the loss of many good provisions, and no better document could be expected in the future.[12]

With Charles Sumner, who had been sent to the United States Senate by a Coalition legislature, the disagreement took a personal turn. In a speech at Quincy, Adams gratuitiously impugned Sumner's motives for supporting the constitutional changes. Sumner, he stated, had "listened to the Siren song of expediency," and had "bowed his neck to the iron rod of party."[13] The Whig papers played up these comments and gave them a force—so Adams later claimed—which he had never meant them to have. But even Palfrey agreed that Adams' remarks, though "well deserved," had borne down rather hard on Sumner.[14]

The Coalitionists, of course, rushed to their Senator's defense, and denounced Adams' accusations as "not fit to be made."[15] Dana, who believed Sumner had good reason to feel maligned, informed Adams of the depth of the injury, and Adams wrote to Sumner what he probably considered a "conciliatory" letter. Actually it only repeated the charge of inconsistency, and included, as well, the sardonic observation that the rush of sympathy to Sumner's

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[10] *Boston Daily Times*, Nov. 4, 1853; See also *Lowell American*, Nov. 17, 1853; CFA to G. Bailey, Dec. 18, 1853.

[11] Samuel Hoar and Marcus Morton seem to have been the only prominent Free Soilers, or ex-Free Soilers, who stood with Palfrey and Adams. Keyes, Bird and Phillips favored the Constitution.

[12] R. H. Dana, Jr., to J. G. Palfrey, Nov. 2, 1853, Palfrey Papers, Houghton; J. G. Palfrey to R. H. Dana, Jr., Nov. 5, 1853, Dana Papers, MHS. For Dana's disapproval of the judicial reforms see his Journal, Aug. 2, 1853, MHS. Adams wrote in his Diary, Sept. 29, 1853, that in his opinion Dana had been "softened in the Convention by Wilson's defertial manners, and perhaps, though entirely unconscious of it, by the serpent's whisper of the Attorney Generalship."

[13] CFA speech reported in *Boston Atlas*, Nov. 7, 1853.

[14] CFA Diary, Nov. 8, 1853.

[15] *Commonwealth*, Nov. 9, 1853.

side would profit the advancement of his political career.[16] Adams felt that his initial remarks had been both necessary and just, but he claimed that he regretted any personal discomfort he might have caused Sumner, and in a further effort to dispel ill-feeling, he gave a dinner for Sumner, Palfrey and Dana. This too, however, failed to produce better relations.[17] Adams' fear that he had been unnecessarily harsh was subsequently lessened when it appeared that Sumner's displeasure also extended to Palfrey, who had given no personal cause for anger. This convinced Adams that Sumner's ill feelings stemmed from a deeper source—perhaps a more generalized irritation at their continuing opposition to the Coalition. Adams decided to make no further gestures towards conciliation.[18] The coolness between the two men continued into the following year, when the necessity of unity against the Kansas-Nebraska Act finally restored more amicable relations.[19]

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The November elections resulted in a Whig triumph generally, and specifically, in the defeat of the constitution by over 5000 votes. The *Atlas,* a leading Whig paper, gave the major credit for the outcome to the "noble" and "independent" Free Soilers and Democrats who had rallied to the opposition[20]—which patronization Adams found not a little irksome.[21] The Coalition-supporting *Commonwealth,* on the other hand, assigned the largest role in the defeat to the Catholics, who had objected to the political power given the rural districts in the new constitution and particularly to a clause withholding funds from sectarian schools.[22]

The so-called "Cushing ukase" should be added to the list of factors causing defeat. In a letter written to Richard Frothingham, editor of the *Morning Post*, Caleb Cushing, who was Attorney General in President Pierce's Democratic administration, had openly declared against further cooperation with the Free Soilers and had threatened Democratic fusionists with loss of all national patronage. Though

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16 CFA to Sumner, Nov. 21, 1853.
17 CFA Diary, Nov. 28, 1853.
18 CFA Diary, Dec. 5, 1853.
19 Sumner to J. G. Palfrey, June 6, 1854, Palfrey Papers, Houghton; J. G. Palfrey to Sumner, June 22, 1854, Palfrey Papers, Houghton; CFA Diary, June 13, 1854.
20 *Boston Atlas,* Nov. 15, 17, 1853.
21 CFA Diary, Nov. 18, 1853.
22 *Commonwealth,* Nov. 22, 1853; R. H. Dana, Jr., Journal, Nov. 20, 1853.

the letter was deeply resented, it did prevent many Democrats, especially aspiring office seekers, from supporting either the Coalition or the new constitution which it had inspired.[23]

The Free Soilers of the Adams-Palfrey stamp considered the defeat of the constitution fortunate, and were especially pleased over the blow this defeat dealt the Coalition. The opposition of this group to the constitution, in fact, had from the beginning been partly based on the hope of breaking up the Free Soil-Democratic combination—though not in the gross terms attributed to them by their enemies, nor to the exclusion of genuine disapproval of certain clauses in the document. At any rate, the Adams-Palfrey group was content with the outcome of the struggle—even though intimate friends had been alienated or angered in the process. The important point was that the Coalition had been prostrated, and this gave hope that it would now be possible to develop "some new forms of action of a more beneficial kind."[24] The explosive events of the following year were to give form and substance to these hopes.

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[23] Claude M. Fuess, *The Life of Caleb Cushing*, 2 vols., New York, 1923, II, 143; E. L. Pierce, *Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner*, 4 vols., Boston, 1893, III, 339; Allan Nevins, *Ordeal of the Union*, 2 vols., New York, 1947, II, 73–74.

[24] CFA Diary, Nov. 15, 18, 1853.

Book Reviews

Insull. By Forrest McDonald. University of Chicago Press. Pp. xvi, 350. Illustrated. $4.95.

In 1927, Mr. Samuel Insull, sixty-seven years of age, was worth about $5,000,000. In 1929, he was worth $150,000,000. In July, 1932, he was not only worth nothing, but owed about $16,000,000. Those are a few of the more significant facts in the life of this great English born American financier. Hundreds more less startling but very important developments in Insull's life are given in the biography by Forrest McDonald, based on the Insull Papers, the records of the Commonwealth Edison Company, the Peoples Gas, Light and Coke Company and many other pertinent primary sources. Mr. Samuel Insull, Jr., aided the author in many ways but, according to Mr. McDonald, expressly refused to comment on any interpretations of the Insulls made by Mr. McDonald. The result is the first detailed and objective treatment of Mr. Samuel Insull. It is not likely that it will be replaced by any later biography of Mr. Insull for many reasons.

Among these reasons may be mentioned the careful winnowing of fact from fiction, evident from the first chapter onward, from our first encounter with Samuel Insull on November 11, 1859, when he was born in London, until our last glimpse of him, dying alone in a Paris subway on July 16, 1938, at the age of seventy-nine.

Starting to work at the age of fifteen, for $1.25 per week, the young Sam taught himself shorthand and bookkeeping. Four years later he was hired by Colonel Gourand, the European representative of Thomas A. Edison. Mr. Johnson, an Edison engineer, came to London and was much impressed by young Insull. Johnson recommended Insull to Edison as a secretary, with the result that Insull went to New York in February, 1880, to work for Edison. His salary was to be one hundred dollars a month, about half what he had been making in London. At the end of his first year, Edison gave him stock worth about $15,000. Insull's efforts to introduce business-like arrangements into the Edison organization make fascinating reading. Edison created; Insull made the creation profitable.

The next chapter in Insull's life began on July 1, 1892, when he came to Chicago to become head of the small Chicago Edison Company, to be developed by him into the great Commonwealth Edison Company of today. Although only thirty-two years old, he solved problems no one else had been able to solve, such as how to produce electricity cheaply and how to induce more and more people and industries to use it. Then his other utility companies began to grow, in addition to Commonwealth Edison. By 1918 the Middle West Utilities Company he had created had 6,000 stockholders; in 1930 it had over 1,000,000. Halsey, Stuart and Company sometimes sold $200,000,000 worth of Insull bonds in one year.

By 1925, Mr. Insull was earning in salaries over $500,000 per year, and was giving away more than that, mostly to charity. He stood firm in

the stock crash of 1929. However, the general financial condition of the country grew worse. Money became difficult to borrow. His business and political enemies closed in on Insull in June, 1932, and forced him to resign from the sixty-odd corporations with which he was associated. He went to France, Italy, Greece, and then to Turkey. Brought back by the federal government during the Roosevelt era to stand trial for mail fraud, he was declared innocent of all charges by a jury on November 24, 1934.

Like many other business men of the period, he had not counted on the devastating effects of a long depression. He lost his entire fortune in the economic collapse of the 1930's but there was no evidence that he had done anything dishonest. He lived quietly in his declining years, after having done perhaps more to bring about the general use of electricity in the nation than any other person. This book will enable you to understand the Insull era as well as Insull the man.

PAUL KINIERY

Loyola University, Chicago

Boss Cermak of Chicago, A Study of Political Leadership. By Alex Gottfried, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1962. P. 459. Illustrated. $6.50

Professor Gottfried, by examining the reasons for the rise of Boss Cermak, has furnished us with a valuable study of political leadership as well as a detailed description of big city politics. The most important themes in the book relate to Cermak's motivation in entering politics, the role of the Czech community in facilitating his rise, and the series of maneuvers by which he took over the leadership of the Democratic party in Chicago. Also of importance is Gottfried's keen analysis of Cermak's mayoralty campaign and term as mayor.

Anton Joseph Cermak emerged from the impoverished background common to many urban bosses. Important experiences in his youth that forecast and contributed to his political rise were his leadership of several "gangs" and his ability to get along with members of other ethnic groups. Even more important, however, was his attachment, both by reason of birth and self-identification, to the Czech community in Chicago. It was among the Czechs that the roots of Cermak's political power developed, and he was to become both their spokesman and hero.

According to Professor Gottfried, Cermak entered politics because he was a "power seeker," and for a poor immigrant boy politics offered the best if not the only way to achieve power. Drawing upon the literature of psychoanalysis and psychosomatic medicine, Gottfried explains that Cermak sought power in an attempt to compensate for feelings of inferiority generated during his childhood. Cermak's colitis condition, a psychosomatic disease resulting from a psychic condition, and his overly aggressive, dominant, and active behavior, form the evidence for this conclusion by the author. These latter traits, as well as Cermak's skillful distribution of patronage,

bipartisan deals, and effective use of issues such as patriotism during the World War and a "dripping wet" stand during prohibition, made possible his rise to power.

In 1931, after having won control of the organization by defeating the Irish wing of the party, Cermak chose to run for mayor. In the campaign he countered the racial slurs of "Big Bill" Thompson ("Tony, Tony, where's your pushcart at?") by picturing himself as a "Master Executive" who would cure the city's ills. And as mayor, Cermak did prove to be a capable administrator in spite of the problems of the depression. Unfortunately, his term ended prematurely when he was cut down by the assassin's bullet meant for President Roosevelt, although death resulted from complications in his colitis condition rather than from the gunshot wound.

One shortcoming in this otherwise well developed study is the tendency of the author to present material, such as that on Czech attitudes and living conditions, without attempting to interpret it or show its relation to Cermak's political career. In addition, the documentation throughout the book tends to be spotty. When Gottfried does document, he depends mainly upon newspapers and interviews, neglecting available manuscript collections. Those of William E. Dever in the Chicago Historical Society, Victor Lawson and Carter H. Harrison in the Newberry Library, and Julius Rosenwald at the University of Chicago would seem to be particularly pertinent.

JOEL A. TARR

Long Beach State College

A General of the Revolution John Sullivan of New Hampshire. By Charles P. Whittemore. Columbia University Press, 1961. Pp. viii, 319. $6.00.

While General Sullivan of New Hampshire was not a major figure in the American Revolution he was far from negligible. He took part, more or less creditably, in the battles of Long Island, Trenton, Princeton and Brandywine, and he shared the hardships of Valley Forge. But his chief military contribution was his command of the expedition against the Six Nations which, through the devastation of the homeland of the Indians, put an end to their raids on the Pennsylvania and New York frontiers and eliminated them as a factor in the war. In this expedition Sullivan reached the zenith of his military career.

This volume is very largely military history, and those who favor this type of history will revel in the profusion of details of topography, marches, battles, campaigns and strategy; and several clear maps will make it easy for them to follow the narrative. But the average reader, we fear, will be wearied by this recital, and disappointed by the practical exclusion of consideration of the family life of the man. Indeed this neglect of an important phase of his life and over-insistence on his military and political career on a state and national life constitute a serious defect.

In these pages Sullivan's character is revealed. While a man of no little ability as a soldier and politician, and a brave but impetuous man he

was obsessed by an overwhelming ambition and a fear of failure. He was, moreover, arrogant and overbearing, indiscreet, undiplomatic and neglectful of protocol, and given to chronic complaining, in short a difficult character and a problem to his superiors. And yet, despite rebukes administered to him, he was unswerving in his loyalty and devotion to Washington. At the same time the narrative brings out the petty jealousies among officers in the army and members of Congress, and the lack of harmony between military and civil leaders.

While his forbears were Catholics until his father lapsed from the faith after coming to America and locating in New Hampshire where no Catholic church was to be found, John Sullivan ran the gamut of atheism, deism, and believer in a Supreme Being. But, as the author says, he became "violently antagonistic to Roman Catholicism," and therefore he was a bitter foe of the Quebec Act because of its enactments on religion. For a brief period he was Grand Master of the New Hampshire Lodge of Freemasons. His declining years were pathetic inasmuch as excessive drinking brought on premature senility. He died on January 23, 1795, in his fifty-fifth year.

While the author is perhaps not unduly partisan he nevertheless rises invariably to the defense of Sullivan, and always gives the most favorable interpretation and explanation of his words, conduct and controversies. Sixty pages of notes at the end of the book substantiate the text, and twelve pages of bibliography reveal the sources relied upon by the author in portraying the man as lawyer, soldier, governor of his state, judge, member of Congress, and federal judge for the district of New Hampshire.

CHARLES H. METZGER, S.J.

West Baden College, Indiana

Clerc, Garibaldien, Prédicant des Deux Mondes, Alessandra Gavazzi, (1809-1889). By Robert Sylvain. 2 Tomes, Le Centre Pedagogique, Quebec, 1962. Pp. Tome I, 280, Tome II, 287-587. Illustrated. Paper, $

In the preface to his present work, the author of *La Vie et l'Oeuvre de Henry de Courcy, premier historien de l'Église catholique aux États-Unis,* writes that his purpose is to fill a gap in Canadian and American historical writing by placing the American visit of Alessandro Gavazzi in the political and religious context of the times. The study of Gavazzi's life also involved an examination of his role in the *Risorgimento* and of the attitudes of Italian catholics towards the national movement.

Volume I concentrates on the activities of the Barnabite priest, professor of rhetoric, itinerant preacher, and prison chaplain as he became increasingly engaged in the cause of Italian unity. More politically than religiously oriented throughout his life, Gavazzi made himself the "Panegyrist of Pius IX," the "Peter the Hermit" and chaplain—apparently self-appointed if his own insistence on papal approbation is disregarded as evi-

dence—of the Italian crusade against Austria. When the allocution of April 29, 1848, and subsequent papal policy made it clear that Pius IX was not the pope of Gioberti, Gavazzi turned violently against Pius and became the chaplain of the republican army, a supporter of the Roman Republic, and a Garibaldian. It may be, as asserted, that Gavazzi like many others lost his faith over the Roman Question but in the Barnabite's case his resultant words and actions were out of proportion to the cause. Unsuccessful attempts to discipline him culminated in his expulsion from the order. In exile in England, he left the Church, and henceforth, his orations, characterized by the same excesses, were consecrated to his reverse crusade of annihilating the papacy and establishing what he called the true church of Christ. Volume II deals with the American sojourn which the ex-Barnabite undertook on an invitation from the *American and Foreign Christian Union* in 1853. In conference in the United States and in Toronto, Quebec, and Montreal, his preaching against papism aggravated existing religious and national antagonisms to the point of violence and his calumnies helped to ruin the ill-timed mission of the papal representative, Monsignor Bedini, to the United States. Several more years battling Roman tendencies in England preceded Gavazzi's return to his native land in 1859. There he associated himself with Garibaldi's exploits and devoted himself to setting up his Free Christian Church in an Italy and Rome which, he argued, belonged not to Peter who had never seen the city but to Paul who founded the Roman Church.

The figure emerging from the extensive quotations of Gavazzi's speeches and writings is not an attractive one nor one with whom, despite such extenuating circumstances as a questionable vocation, deficient education, personal temperament, and patriotic fervor, it is easy to feel any sympathy. The author stresses that his subject's message was a partisan polemic of negation and rage against the papacy and the Catholic Church repeated endlessly and vehemently in a tone of sarcasm and venom. Driven by hate, with a seeming compulsion to speak, leaving bigotry and violence in his wake, and unoriginal in so far as any doctrine on which he sought to found his national church is concerned, his work was either sterile or destructive. On the positive side, the only relief is his work in the hospitals and with the wounded and prisoners. That Gavazzi is to be credited with any real influence on the outcome of the 1860 plebiscite joining the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies to Sardinia, a conclusion presented here, is to be questioned. With the author, one asks "si Gavazzi était tout simplement sensé" (p. 514) and would not refuse the request Gavazzi made in one of his speeches to call him a destroyer.

Yet his message found enthusiastic audiences and was accepted by some. Sylvain makes this response understandable, if not less frightening, by recreating the milieu where it was delivered in Italy, the British Isles, and America. He is most informative on the Canadian setting describing the post-1848 antipapal sentiment and the existing religious and racial tensions thrust to the fore in the 1850's by controversy over such issues as the question of confessional schools. Here, in the reviewer's opinion, he accomplishes his purpose best. While nativism and Gavazzi's connection with the Know-Nothings are cited, one might wish that the background of his visit to the United States had been presented in greater depth.

There is an extensive bibliography of manuscript and published sources as well as secondary works. Falsehoods in the Italian's speeches and writings are pointed out and his *Autobiografia* is rightly approached critically. With reference to the latter's validity as a source, the author verified the recital as far as possible and found that the biographical and historical facts were not altered or untrue. It might be mentioned that fewer geographical details and biographical items on subordinate figures would have resulted in more conciseness. But the thirty appropriate illustrations add to the volumes.

MARGARET M. O'DWYER

Loyola University, Chicago

Catholics and The American Revolution. By Charles H. Metzger, S.J. Chicago, Loyola University Press, 1962. Pp. xii, 306. $5.00.

In this, the fifteenth volume of Jesuit Studies published by the Loyola University Press, Father Metzger, Professor of History at West Baden College, attempts to bring together the fragmentary story of the role of Catholics in the Revolution. His research has been exhaustive and the final product clearly surpasses all previous efforts.

The story had its origins in the climate of opinion that crystalized during the colonial period of the country's history, and Father Metzger carefully traces the prevailng attitudes toward Catholics during these years. The picture is one of almost total rejection coupled with a sincere if unrealistic distrust of this small and powerless minority group. Only in Pennsylvania does the story vary, and even here the record is devoid of any evidence of a warm acceptance. The Revolution, as the author points out, confronted the country's political leaders with what for them were unpleasant alternatives. Either they actively courted the support of Catholics or took the risk of alienating a group which, in two states at least, could become a dangerous minority. The evidence, and Father Metzger amasses every shred of it, is that the Catholics with little more than perfunctory encouragement, took the side of the revolutionists and made a credible if not crucial contribution to the cause of Independence. In tracing their role in this struggle he prudently avoids the extreme claims of the many Catholic historians who preceded him yet lays to rest once and for all the Bancroft "legend" that the majority of Catholics were pro-British in their sympathies. Not that Catholics failed to join the ranks of the Loyalists. This, Father Metzger shows, was far from being the case. In a carefully documented chapter he meticulously evaluates both the number and prestige of those who supported the British.

In tracing the role of Catholics during this period the author had only fragmentary source material with which to work. Since Catholics were seldom considered worthy of anything more than a passing derogatory comment, historians have inherited little more than a litany of invectives which tells very little about the Catholics and a great deal about those who vented their feelings. Father Metzger, sensitive of this fact, has succeeded admirably in collecting and carefully scrutinizing all the evidence, however biased or fragmentary it might be. In this connection he rejects the ancient tribal

custom of placing all Irish names indiscriminately in the ranks of both the Church and the American cause. In fact, if any criticism can be leveled against this monograph, it is that the author belabors us with his objectivity.

One wonders, however, whether the author's careful and judicious study required so many pages to be told. Admitting that there are many areas that have long needed a full and careful treatment and that certain aspects of the question have been continually subject to misrepresentation and conjecture, the topic must still be judged a fairly limited one. While nothing that was said could be considered superfluous, much of it could well have been placed in the footnotes without doing violence to the organization or conclusions of the author. Prescinding from this Father Metzger has made a significant contribution to the literature of the Revolutionary period.

JOHN J. REARDON

Loyola University, Chicago

Our Amish Neighbors. By William I. Schreiber. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962. Pp. 226, illustrated. $5.95.

Here is a highly enlightening description of the Old Order Amish of Wayne County, Ohio. Professor Schreiber of Wooster College, neighbor of the Amish, speaks with an intimate understanding of this branch of Mennonites secluded from all modern worldly foibles and perpetuating seventeenth century German and Swiss communal peasant life in this era of the space man. A student of Mennonitism, Schreiber singles out the Old Order Amish from the dozen Mennonite sects in Ohio for special study. Sympathetically, he goes through the daily life of the Amish in detail, then patiently demolishes their reasons for so living. The Word of God as written in the Bible is the Amish law, but, Schreiber points out, the Old Order Amish choose only such Bible texts as are necessary to perpetuate their sect. He can find no biblical justification for their superstitions and taboos, which he itemizes, nor can he excuse their inconsistencies because of a naive or peasant mentality. For the Amish rulers are shrewd for their own purposes. "One doubts whether Scripture can be held to account for ostracizing, shunning, or boycotting a neighbor or community of neighbors who digress from a group pattern, such as, for example, the permissible length for the bobbing of hair." (p. 87). It might be added that no Scripture condones the prevalent Amish practice of bundling and production of illigitimate children. Equally destructive of the Amish un-American ways of life are Schreiber's accounts of instances of their opposition to federal and state laws as social security, income tax, education, and the boycott case of 1947, when the Amish rulers were found guilty of violating the United States Constitution and that of Ohio. Beyond Schreiber's readable contribution to folkways literature, the format of the book is a master work in printers' art. The hundred artistic pencil drawings by Sybil Gould are prize-worthy, some larger Amish scenes, some smaller gems that appear to be doodled on the pages.

JEROME V. JACOBSEN

Loyola University, Chicago

Notes and Comments

To the impressive list of some seventy paperbound editions of notable books in various catagories of learning, Yale University Press is now adding the publication of a special series named Yale Western Americana Paperbounds. Since the books in this series were all published in 1962, we list them here with earlier date of publication by the Press: *Trail to California, The Overland Journal of Vincent Geiger and Wakeman Bryarly,* 1945, edited with an Introduction and new Preface by David M. Potter, (the Journal of the Charleston Mining Company to the California diggings in 1849), $1.45; *By Cheyenne Campfires,* 1926, by George Bird Grinnell, (well known study of the Cheyenne, illustrated), $1.75; *Down the Santa Fe Trail and into Mexico, Diary of Suzan Shelby Magoffin 1846-1847,* 1926, edited by Stella M. Drumm, (merchant's caravan and wife during Mexican War, illustrated); *A Canyon Voyage,* by Frederick S. Dellenbaugh, 1926, new Foreword by William H. Goetzmann, (Powell's celebrated Colorado River exploration, illustrated); *An Introduction to the Study of Southwestern Archaeology,* 1924, by Alfred Vincent Kidder, new Introduction by Irving Rouse, (well known handbook, illustrated); *The Fur Trade in Canada,* 1930, 1956, by Harold A. Innis, new Foreword by Robert W. Winks, (Canadian economic history). This is a praiseworthy project to make important books more available to the growing number of readers. The paperbounds are well printed with attractive covers at a reasonable price, $1.95 for each of the last four mentioned.

In addition to the above, Western University Press has brought out a new, excellently printed, hard cover volume: *Edward Kern and American Expansion,* by Robert V. Hine, listed at $6. This is a biography of the restless Ned Kern who was artist, topographer and cartographer for John C. Frémont's third expedition to California and for the Navy's Ringgold-Rodgers expeditions to Japan, Siberia, and China in the era of Manifest Destiny. The story of the highly exciting pioneer travels of the unfortunate Ned is told with graphic succintness by Professor Hine from diaries, journals, and correspondence. The book further recommends itself for its fine Bibliographical Essay and for the collection of illustrations of the pen and brush artistry of Ned and his brother Richard,

which have been gathered from libraries, museums, and individual owners of the originals.

* * * *

The Progressive Years: The Spirit and Achievement of American Reform, Selected and Edited with Introduction and Notes by Otis Pease, was published by George Braziller, New York, 1962, 496 pages, $8.50. This book will prove very useful to those who wish to have samples of the reform spirit from the original writings of the Progressives in the dawning years of this century, namely, Frederic C. Howe, Jane Addams, Robert De Forest and Lawrence Veiller, Lincoln Steffens, Basil M. Manly, Eugene V. Debs, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Walter Lippmann, William James, and, more prominently, Finley Peter Dunne, the Mr. Dooley of Archey Road, Chicago. The selections, each with an introduction, are grouped under five general headings: The Fight against Poverty and Privilege, Labor in a Middle-Class Society, The National Progressive Vision, The Outward Reach of Power, and American Society: Possibilities.

* * * *

Two years ago the William P. Lyons Master's Essay Award was established by the Department of History of Loyola University, Chicago, and the Loyola University Press for the purpose of encouraging significant scholarly production in history at the Master's level. Each year the prize essay will be published by the Press in book form. The winning paper for 1961 appeared in book form in 1962 as *Anti-Federalism in Dutchess County, New York,* with the sub-title, A study of democracy and class conflict in the Revolutionary era, by Staughton Lynd, of Columbia University. The study reveals in detail the clash between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists over the ratification of the Constitution in one important county. Mr. Lynd offers new aspects of the economic interpretation of the Constitution and of the voting process and he does so from documentary sources and from a wide reading of the secondary literature. His book is a credit to the Columbia history department and takes a long stride toward raising the requirements for the Master's degree in history. In format it is exceptional in the printer's art. It is listed by Loyola University Press at $3.00.

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The Spanish War Scare of 1816

The year 1816 is customarily associated in United States diplomatic history with the quietness of peace, the calm after the storm. It fits chronologically into the period of general relaxation of tension in relations with most of the states of Europe, when the United States was "turning its back on Europe and facing the West." But in doing so, the nation found itself again confronting Europe, for between the United States and its manifest destiny stood Spain, with whatever allies she might entice. Against Spain was directed the surge of nationalism that developed in the United States after the war, with seriously strained relations the result. The peak of tension occurred during 1816, which began with an acrimonious exchange of diplomatic correspondence, involved the issuance of a war alert to the army and navy of the United States, included an attack on a United States warship by a Spanish naval squadron, witnessed an outburst of extreme public hostility toward Spain, and ended with a Presidential message to Congress that mentioned the possibility of war.

Behind these hostilities lay a background of grievance that each nation held for the other. United States areas bordering on Spain's empire sheltered adventurers who organized expeditions to revolutionize Spanish provinces. Rebel privateers sailed from the United States ports to prey upon Spanish commerce. The United States occupied a good part of the Floridas, to which Spain stubbornly maintained her title. On the other hand, Spain's refusal to settle the question of the Louisiana boundaries antagonized the United States, as did her delay in settling claims arising from maritime spoliations and from the suppression of deposit at New Orleans. Spain had not prevented the British from using the Floridas as a base for activities during the war, nor was she preventing the

accumulation there of outlaws who terrorized United States settlers across the borders. Additionally, many American citizens sympathized with the colonial groups fighting for independence and resented Spain's efforts to suppress them.

Further complicating relations between the nations was Spain's disorderly internal condition. She was in the midst of reconstruction after a grueling civil and foreign war, ruled by a sovereign whose severity toward liberals contrasted with indulgence of himself and his favorites. The Spanish government was disorganized, especially in the higher echelons, where lack of system and change without reason reflected the sudden fancies and suspicions of Ferdinard VII. The ordinary machinery of government was subordinated to an inner circle of royal favorites unqualified to exercise authority. This impaired the conduct of foreign relations, which were subject to Ferdinand's frequent vacillations. Moreover, the foreign ministry was engrossed during most of this period in complex postwar settlements with European powers and could give to United States affairs only limited attention.

During the greater part of 1816 the United States had no official spokesman to present its views to the Court of Madrid. Not until August did the Spanish government consent to receive the credentials of George W. Erving, whom President James Madison had appointed as minister two years before. The long wait embittered Erving's attitude toward the Court, including the foreign minister, Pedro Cevallos, whom he considered "a cunning, selfish, pusillanimous, weak man," and with whom he soon became involved in angry dispute.[1] Not until Cevallos was replaced on October 30 by José García de León y Pizarro, of whom Erving had a higher opinion, did friendly communication exist between the United States minister and the Court of Madrid.

Neither was friendly communication available to Spain during 1816 through her representative in Washington. Luis de Onís, the Spanish minister, had come to the United States in 1809, but had remained unrecognized because of European political exigencies. Under ordinary circumstances the nonrecognition would have been considered an insult; in any event, Onís was unhappy about his uncertain position. He developed a distrust for the Republican party of Madison and Monroe and a personal dislike for the two

[1] Erving to Monroe, Aug. 31, 1816, State Department (hereinafter SD), Dispatches, Spain, XIII, as quoted in P. C. Brooks, *Diplomacy and the Borderlands: The Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819*, Berkeley, 1939, 58.

men. One of his private letters containing criticism of the administration fell into the hands of Spanish American revolutionary agents who sent it to Washington, where Madison revealed it to the Congress. Although the question of recognition rested more on policy than on objection to Onís, he was *persona non grata* to the administration and it was with reluctance that Madison received him officially as Spanish minister on December 10, 1815.

Onís' first communication to the United States government stated Spain's grievances and her demands in language so abrupt that the administration believed Spain must have the support of a great power to dare to speak in such terms. Monroe wrote to United States ministers in England, the Netherlands, and Russia to determine if any of these powers was backing Spain in the strong attitude she was apparently assuming.[2] Meanwhile, he replied to Onís in such vigorous rebuttal of the Spanish contentions that when, coincidentally, Onís left Washington to reside in Philadelphia because of his wife's illness, rumors spread abroad of a split between the United States and Spain. Minister John Quincy Adams in London, when questioned about the possibility of war resulting from this exchange of correspondence, replied that this would depend upon Spain. He believed that Spain must have known her demands would be refused and that "in ordinary cases the very making of such demands would imply a settled determination of the Power advancing them to follow up the refusal of them by immediate War."[3] But the United States, he added, had no desire for war with Spain.

Onís had been for some time convinced that the United States contemplated aggressive action against Spain. "This government will not lose an occasion to do all possible harm," he wrote to Cevallos, "I do not except the chiefs of the party nor the ministers nor the President."[4] He was aware of the feeling in the United States regarding the Floridas and of the possibility that all of this area might be seized if Spain delayed negotiation concerning it. Even so, he was amazed by the violence of the reaction that developed when a rumor spread that Spain intended to cede the Floridas to

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[2] Monroe to Adams, Eustis, Harris, Feb. 2, 1816, SD, Instructions to U.S. Ministers, VIII, 23, 24, 25 in W. R. Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin American Nations*, 3 vols., New York and London, 1925, I, 21–23.

[3] Adams to Monroe, Mar. 30, 1816, SD, Dispatches, Great Britain, XX in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, III, 1437.

[4] Onís to Cevallos, Apr. 25, 1815, Archivo Historico Nacional, Madrid, leg. 5554, exp. 12, Library of Congress, Division of Manuscripts photocopy.

Britain. Moreover, reports came to him steadily from Spanish consuls and agents in the United States indicating the rapid growth of trade with and aid to the Spanish American insurgent cause and of animosity toward Spain. Several times in 1816 and 1817 Onís was convinced that the United States was on the verge of war with Spain. He reported to Madrid:

> You cannot realize the ambition and pride of this government, nor can you believe that it might be so foolish that, without provocation, it would declare war which might be very unfortunate for it; but you must believe that the people all want war with Spain, and that only the tact and prudence with which I have conducted myself have been able to prevent it on three distinct occasions.[5]

The three men most important in guiding the foreign affairs of the United States shared with Onís an uneasy awareness of the possibility of war. Madison thought that differences with Spain offered the single threat to the United States of a collision with a foreign power.[6] Monroe considered Spain's conduct unfriendly and relations with her delicate.[7] Adams wrote from London that the popular feeling against the United States in Spain was almost as keen as in England, with whom we had been at war only a year before. Moreover, should we become involved in war with Spain, it was his opinion that Britain would come to her assistance. He described the situation in this manner:

> There is already in all the governments of Europe a strong prejudice against us as Republicans and as the primary causes of the propagation of those political principles, which still make the throne of every European monarch rock under him.... With Spain we are and have been on the verge of war. Nothing but the impotence of the Spanish government has hitherto prevented the explosion, and we have so many collisions of interest as well as of principle with Spain, that it is not only the Court but the nation which hates and fears us.[8]

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[5] Onís to Pizarro (private), Apr. 6, 1817, in José Gárcia de León y Pizarro, *Memorias de la Vida del Excmo. Senor... escritos por el mismo*, 3 vols., Madrid, 1894–97, III, 346–354, as quoted in Brooks, *Borderlands*, 78.

[6] Madison to Eustis, May 12, 1816, in *Letters and Other Writings of James Madison*, 4 vols., Philadelphia, 1865, III, 4.

[7] Monroe to Madison, June 27, 1816, in S. M. Hamilton, ed., *The Writings of James Monroe*, 7 vols., New York, 1893–1903, V, 337. Monroe reported to Gallatin on Jan. 27, 1816, that "the temper of the Spanish government and the state of affairs with Spain still excite feeling. England will profit of circumstances, and we know not enough of the councils of the Emperor of Russia to infer that he will check any measures of other powers unfavorable to the United States." H. Adams, ed., *The Writings of Albert Gallatin*, 3 vols., Philadelphia, 1879, I, 683.

[8] J. Q. Adams to J. Adams, Aug. 1, 1816, in W. C. Ford, ed., *Writings of John Quincy Adams*, 7 vols., New York, 1913–1917, V, 552.

The nightmare of a bargain between Britain and Spain involving transfer of the Floridas, a rumor current in the postwar years, haunted the administration. In December, 1815, Madison instructed Adams to discuss the matter with Castlereagh and obtain a statement of British intention. Castlereagh strongly disavowed any such arrangement. He assured Adams that Britain had no intention of enlarging her territory, adding the advice: "Do you only observe the same moderation. If we should find you hereafter pursuing a system of encroachment upon your neighbors, what we might do, defensively, is another consideration."[9] This statement, when applied to United States intentions concerning the Floridas, was not calculated to add to the composure of the administration. Adams' earlier report that Britain was assisting Spain at least with money, making possible the reinforcement of her garrisons in America, contributed to its fears.

The reinforcement of Spain's garrison was part of a policy that created an issue with the United States during the early months of 1816. Spain attempted to reapply the restrictions upon trade with her colonies that the Napoleonic wars had forced her to relax. The first application occurred when the captain general at Caracas, General Pablo Morillo, proclaimed the ports of Venezuela to be in blockade and declared his intention to make prize of every neutral vessel found in the ports or on the coast. Spanish privateers began to apprehend vessels violating the terms of the proclamation. When Morillo captured the rebel stronghold of Cartagena, early in 1816, he seized United States vessels and imprisoned American citizens found there. The United States protested and Madison dispatched Christopher Hughes on the U.S. frigate *Macedonian* to Cartagena to obtain the release of the citizens and their property. Hughs was only partially successful, obtaining the release of the prisoners but not of the vessels.[10] Spanish efforts to restrict trade

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[9] Adams reported in his diary this conversation with Castlereagh:

A: The United States has received strong and confident intimations from various quarters that there has been a cession of Florida from Spain to Great Britain.

C: There is no foundation to it.

A: The fact has been positively and circumstantially asserted in your own public journals.

C: Yes, but our public Journals are *so* addicted to *lying!* Adams Papers, J. Q. Adams Diary, Jan. 29, 1816 (microfilm roll 32).

[10] Monroe to Onís, Feb. 21, Mar. 13, 1816, SD, Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 131, 132; Monroe to Hughes, Mar. 25, 1816, SD, Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 40, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* I, 23–25, 27, 28. Also Onís to Monroe, Mar. 25, 1816, Erving to Cevallos, Sept. 26, 1816, in *American State Papers,* 38 vols., Washington, 1832–1861, *Foreign Relations,* IV, 157, 158.

with the colonies continued to be a source of indignation and concern to the United States.

Another source of concern involved a situation that arose along the Georgia-Florida frontier. During the War of 1812, the British had built a fort in East Florida on a branch of the Apalachicola River and stocked it with arms and munitions. After the war the fort became the rendezvous of runaway slaves, who used it as a base for raids across the frontier. In March, 1816, Madison instructed General Andrew Jackson, the military commander of the southern district, to request the Spanish governor at Pensacola to suppress the activities; if he did not, the United States would be forced to take measures for its own defense. Jackson meanwhile ordered Fort Scott to be built near Negro Fort, as the slave rendezvous was called, to prevent further raids into Georgia. Fort Scott was to be supplied by water from New Orleans. When the outlaws massacred a boat's crew of the first supply convoy, troops from Fort Scott and vessels from the convoy attacked Negro Fort in a joint military-naval operation. A heated shot from one of the naval vessels exploded the gunpowder stored in the fort, destroying it instantly, with many casualties among its defenders.[11]

Apalachicola and Cartagena were merely two of the items that prompted Monroe to write in March to Erving, "our relations with Spain . . . are, from many causes, becoming daily more and more interesting."[12] Another concerned possible British intervention in Spanish America, about which rumors continued to circulate. The President had shown him a letter forwarded by Jackson that described a British-Spanish plan to occupy the Floridas. Colonel T. H. Jessup, commanding the military forces at New Orleans, wrote that he had positive information that Spain contemplated an attack upon the city.[13] During the last week of September, 1816,

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[11] The account of this incident which checks most closely with the documents published in the *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* IV, 556–557, is in F. E. Chadwick, *The Relations of the United States and Spain,* New York, 1909, 118–119.

[12] Monroe to Erving, Mar. 11, 1816, in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* IV, 433.

[13] SD, Miscellaneous Letters, Jackson, Feb. 21, 1816, Jessup, Aug. 21, Sept. 3, 1816. Monroe retained his suspicion that Britain and Spain intended to pursue some kind of joint action. He wrote to Jackson on June 2, 1817: "Affairs are unsettled with Spain, and by recent intelligence from England, it appears that the British government, is equipping two large squadrons for the Spanish provinces, with a view, as it is professed, to accommodate the differences between the parties. It is inferred that the government has entered into an agreement with Spain, in consideration of a commercial monopoly, to aid her to reduce the Colonies, or that she intends after getting the favor there, to dictate such conditions, as best suit her

the President and his cabinet considered what credibility should be attached to Jessup's information and what should be done about it. Madison's opinion was that

> an invasion by a Spanish force at this present period might be pronounced a mere chimera, if a less degree of folly reigned at Madrid; unless, indeed, the Councils of Spain should be supported by a power whose councils may reasonably be more confided in. It is probable, however, that Onís is intriguing at New Orleans, and the extent to which he may mislead an ignorant, proud, and vindictive government, cannot be calculated. It is incumbent on us, therefore, to have an eye to our Southern frontier, proportioning our precautions to our means, and to a fair estimate of danger.[14]

Madison decided to communicate the contents of Jessup's letter to the governors of Georgia, Kentucky, and Louisiana, thus anticipating the danger and guarding against it without rousing unnecessary public excitement. He decided also, following a request by Secretary of War William H. Crawford, to send a naval force into the Gulf of Mexico to cooperate with the land forces in any emergency that might arise. This action, in the light of interpretations that might be given it at home and in Europe, was looked upon as the more delicate part of the precautionary arrangements. If information were received that put to rest fears of hostilities, the orders for the naval force were to be cancelled.[15]

The administration had cause at home to feel concern about its relations with Spain. As the Secretary of War stated it,

> the predisposition to a war with Spain is so strong in this nation, especially in the section adjoining that which is menaced, that a slight excitement might be provocative of consequences which the power of the government would not be able to control.[16]

Even as Crawford wrote, more than a slight excitement was brewing in New Orleans. Four weeks before, a rumor had circulated that a Spanish naval squadron in the Gulf had attacked a U.S. naval vessel, the schooner *Firebrand.* Another rumor had it that the

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interest, to either, or both parties. It seems probable, that this movement, of the British government, may produce very serious consequences, among which, war, with other powers, may reasonably be presumed. It is certainly, a measure, fraught, with importance to the United States." Monroe to Jackson, in J. S. Bassett, ed., *Correspondence of Andrew Jackson,* 7 vols., Washington, 1926–1935, II, 296.

[14] Madison to Crawford, Sept. 23, 1816, in Madison, *Writings,* III, 22–23.

[15] Madison to Crawford, Sept. 30, 1816, in Madison, *Writings,* III, 24–25.

[16] Crawford to Gallatin, Oct. 9, 1816, in Adams, *The Writings of Albert Gallatin,* II, 13.

commander of the U.S. naval forces in New Orleans had taken reprisal for the attack. Excitement mounted in the city as newspapers published further accounts of the incident. "We are on the verge of war," stated an editorial in the *New Orleans Gazette* of September 13. The agitation reached its peak with the publication five days later of an eyewitness account of the attack which stated that:

> The Spaniards had attacked the *Firebrand* without warning or provocation; they had insulted and mistreated the officers and crew; one of the Spanish officers had asserted that the vessel had no right to navigate in the Gulf of Mexico, over which Spain claimed exclusive sovereignty.[17]

Maspero's Coffee House was the scene on the next evening of an indignation meeting attended by approximately two hundred citizens. The assemblage adopted resolutions expressing hostility to Spain and pledging support of war if expiation for the attack were not obtained. Commenting on these developments, the editor of the *Louisiana Gazette* wrote:

> We deprecate sincerely the idea of war, but if it must take place, we know of no nation with which it would be more to our interest to go to war, and none more consistent with the feelings of the people, than with Spain.[18]

Newspapers throughout the nation published verbatim the accounts appearing in the New Orleans papers, often with comment matching that of the New Orleans editors. In Kentucky the editor of the *Lexington Gazette* wrote:

> Our affairs with Spain [before the attack] were considered as leading to an inevitable war. Now, reparations will be difficult to be made. To stifle our resentment and indignation will be impossible. Read, read—and then say if the people of Kentucky do not stand ready to make the same pledge which the people of New Orleans have made?[19]

The editor of the *Richmond Enquirer* (Virginia) wrote: "The American nation will not sleep over so bitter an insult from so contemptible a *power.* What! Have we vanquished the Leviathan of the deep, to be insulted by a minnow?"[20] Overseas, examination

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17 *New Orleans Gazette*, Sept. 18, 1816.

18 Sept. 20, 1816. In the same vein Hezekiah Niles commented in his *Weekly Register* (Oct. 19, 1816), "We are not among those that would recommend passiveness under *Spanish* aggressions. We believe that if it can be the true interest of one nation to be at war with another, that our interest would be promoted by a quarrel with Spain."

19 Oct. 7, 1816.

20 Oct. 12, 1816.

of the American journals prompted the editor of the *London Courier* to comment, "Each time that we receive the news, the bad relations that exist between the United States and Spain take on more and more the appearance of approaching hostilities."[21]

Meanwhile, Commodore Daniel T. Patterson, commander of the naval forces at New Orleans, forwarded to Washington a preliminary report of the *Firebrand* incident. He indicated that he shared Colonel Jessup's suspicion that Spain was about to launch an attack on Mobile or some other port along that section of the Gulf coast. Jessup had informed Patterson that if such an event occurred, he intended to carry the war to the enemy by attacking Havana. He had requested the cooperation of the naval force at New Orleans. Patterson supported the request and forwarded the letter containing it to the Secretary of the Navy. He remarked that he supposed that war with Spain was not far distant and asked that he be continued in command of the New Orleans station after the commencement of hostilities. He requested permission to assemble the vessels under his command and "take a run along our Western Coasts into the Bay of Mexico, when should the slightest insult be offered I shall immediately resent it, and dismantle of her military armament and equipment whatever vessel may offer it."[22]

The administration reacted calmly to the news of the *Firebrand* incident. The President discounted any connection between it and the suspected Spanish invasion plans. He found it difficult to believe that the Spanish naval squadron had acted under orders from Madrid. The Spanish minister assured him this was not so; and although Madison was distrustful of Onís, in this case he was inclined to agree with him that responsibility rested with the Spanish naval commander.[23] Nevertheless, the President decided to take precautionary measures. He instructed the Secretary of the Navy that "the present state of our relations with Spain, and the uncer-

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21 Quoted by *Le Moniteur Universal* (Paris), Nov. 27, 1816.

22 Navy Department (hereinafter ND), Captains' Letters, Sept. 23, 1816. Patterson's correspondence reflects the receptiveness of New Orleans to rumors concerning European developments. He reported in November to the Secretary of the Navy that he had received information about a meeting of Spaniards in the city, which Spanish priests had attended, where it was stated that Spain was "meditating" an attack upon the city and that she was to be aided in the recovery of Louisiana by Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia. The attack on the *Firebrand* convinced him that the information was correct and he believed that the destruction of the fort and stores at Apalachicola and their being unable to provide other means alone prevented "the long meditated attempts on this country." ND, Captains' Letters, Nov. 16, 1816.

23 Madison to Dallas, Oct. 15, 1816, in Madison, *Writings*, III, 29.

tainty of events in the Mediterranean, will . . . require all our ships to be prepared for active service, and the necessary arrangements consequently to be made to place all the United States Ships of War in commission."[24] The President requested the immediate equipment of the *Congress* Frigate in which Captain Charles Morris was ordered to proceed to the Gulf. Commodore Patterson was cautioned not to take any retaliatory action against the Spaniards without direct orders from Madison, except in case of attack or invasion. General Jackson was instructed not to permit any actions by his subordinates that might provoke war with Spain.[25] Jackson's troops already were deployed in such a way as to be ready for hostilities with Spain.

When the first newspaper accounts of the *Firebrand* incident reached Onís, his immediate reaction was that the published reports were intended to agitate public opinion and that the United States wanted war with Spain. His report to Madrid, which included two accounts of the incident clipped from New Orleans newspapers, conveyed this opinion.[26] The report arrived in Madrid at a time when the government was at a critical stage of disorganization and was receptive to the note of excitement that Onís communicated. The orders issued by the Court indicated that it shared Onís' fear of war. Spanish officers in America were instructed to conduct themselves in a manner likely to avoid war, but to prepare quietly for it. Measures were taken to strengthen the military expedition that was being prepared to reinforce Spanish garrisons in Mexico.[27] To the United States minister went a letter informing him that the conduct of the Spanish naval commanders involved in the *Firebrand* incident, if like that described in the New Orleans newspapers, "was entirely opposite to the intentions of His Majesty."[28] An immediate investigation of the facts was ordered and appropriate reparations, should the facts warrant them, were promised.

However, no investigation really was needed, for the facts of the *Firebrand* affair were emerging in the press of the United States

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[24] ND, Private Letters, Chief Clerk to Secretary of Navy, Oct. 16, 1816.

[25] ND, Letters to Officers of Ships of War, Patterson, Oct. 19, 1816; Jackson to Secretary of War *ad Interim*, Dec. 11, 1816, Crawford to Jackson, Mar. 8, 1816, in Jackson, *Correspondence*, II, 265, 235.

[26] Onís to Cevallos, Oct. 16, 1816, AHN, leg. 5561, exp. 7, LC photocopy.

[27] Vásquez Figueroa to Pizarro, Dec. 21, 1816, AHN, leg. 5561, exp. 7, LC photocopy.

[28] SD, Notes Spain, Vol. IIIA, Onís, Mar. 15, 1817, enclosing Pizarro to Erving, Dec. 22, 1816.

and the facts removed the causes for complaint. It developed that the Spanish squadron had caught the *Firebrand* standing off a rebel port in company with a vessel that was notorious for supplying arms to the Mexican insurgents. The morning mists at the time of the attack made identification difficult and it was probable that the Spanish warships mistook the *Firebrand* for an arms smuggler. There were, as the *Washington National Intelligencer* phrased it, "circumstances attending this transaction which served to palliate its apparent atrocity."[29]

The circumstances were embarassing to the United States, for they revealed the imperfect nature of the nation's neutrality respecting the struggle between Spain and the Spanish American insurgents. New Orleans was conspicuously sympathetic and helpful to the Mexican insurgent cause, and investigation of the *Firebrand* incident indicated that the United States naval personnel stationed there were also sympathetic and helpful. The administration could not, however, acknowledge this, for it would lend substance to Spain's complaints and claims against the United States. Monroe had this in mind when he wrote several months before to Madison: "If we quarrel with Spain, the more guarded we are in every step we take, the worse we put her in the wrong, the better the effect here and in Europe."[30]

But the *Firebrand* affair threatened to produce the reverse effect. The administration, therefore, merely went through the motions of righteous indignation at the attack on the vessel. It instructed Erving to demand reparations from the Spanish government.[31] In his annual message to Congress the President indicated that, although the United States remained at peace with foreign powers, an occurrence had taken place which, if sanctioned by Spain, might make an exception of that nation.[32] Thereafter the administration avoided making an issue of the incident. Before the end of the year the excitement caused by the *Firebrand* affair had disappeared. With it disappeared the war scare of 1816.

Relations between the United States and Spain remained strained, however. The United States persisted in pressing Spain toward

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[29] *Washington National Intelligencer*, Oct. 17, 1816. A good account of the incident, based mainly on Spanish sources, is in Harris G. Warren, "The Firebrand Affair; A Forgotten Incident of the Mexican Revolution," *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, XXL (1938), 203–212.

[30] Monroe to Madison, June 27, 1816, in Monroe, *Writings*, V, 337.

[31] SD, Instructions, U.S. Ministers, VIII, Erving, Nov. 23, 1816.

[32] J. D. Richardson, ed., *Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1797*, 10 vols., Washington, 1896–1899, I, 575.

settlement of the issues between them, with one eye on the Floridas and the other alert to signs of possible European intervention. The administration successfully pursued this objective within a difficult atmosphere of suspicion, hostility, and imperfect diplomatic communication. It might be said that the difficulties provided opportunity, for Spanish uncertainty and fear concerning public attitudes in the United States and the possibility of forceful occupation of the borderlands significantly influenced the negotiations that brought settlement of the issues between the nations. The war scare of 1816, which contributed to Spanish anxiety, aided in establishing an environment that favored United States success in the negotiations.

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Radicals and Moderates on the Joint Committee on Reconstruction

The last days of November and the early days of December, 1865, witnessed the gathering of the Republican clan in Washington prior to the convening of the first session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress. On December 1 and 2 the members-elect of the Republican Party caucused. According to a fledgling representative-elect from Ohio,

> The general caucus [was] a pleasant thing . . . Thad Stevens made the important motions. A committee . . . reported resolutions to be submitted to the Senate and House, providing for the appointment of a Joint Committee of Fifteen, . . . to report as to the status of the Rebel States and whether they were in a condition to be represented; and in the meantime all members from those states to be kept out.[1]

On the following day, Gideon Welles commented in his diary that the action of the caucus was revolutionary. Wrote Welles: "The President agreed with me, but said they would be knocked in the head at the start."[2] Johnson proved a poor prophet, for the House, with the aid of the Clerk, organized without recognizing the members-elect of the southern states. Stevens then introduced, without waiting for the reception of the President's message, a joint resolution for the creation of a joint committee of fifteen on reconstruction. Under a suspension of the rules, the resolution was driven through and adopted by a strict party vote.[3]

The Senate took up the House resolution on December 12 and amended it to read as a concurrent resolution.[4] Senators Henry B. Anthony of Rhode Island and William Pitt Fessenden of Maine led a move in the Senate to strike out the words prohibiting the ad-

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[1] Charles R. Williams, ed., *Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes*, 5 vols., The Ohio State Archeological and Historical Society, 1924, III, 7.

[2] Gideon Welles, *Diary of Gideon Welles. Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson*, 3 vols., Boston and New York, 1911, II, 438.

[3] *Congressional Globe*, 39 Congress, 1 Session, 1865–1866, 5–6. *New York Herald*, December 5, 1865, predicted "the practical reduction of the excluded states to the status of territories conquered from a foreign enemy and still in a state of revolt."

[4] According to the *New York World*, December 12, 1865, this change had been agreed upon in a caucus of Senate Republican members held on December 11.

mission of southern representatives until the Committee reported, as well as the clause stating that all papers relating to representation should be referred to the Committee without debate. Fessenden claimed that restricting debate was alien to the Senate, as was putting into the hands of the House the power to control Senate action regarding representation. He vigorously defended the motivation behind the resolution, asserting that Congressional prerogatives must not be abandoned to anyone "however eminent in position."[5] The resolution, as amended, was adopted by the Senate; and the House concurred on the following day. The House appointments were announced on December 14.[6]

The personnel of the Joint Committee has generally been described as consisting of three distinct groups. Two groups were composed of Republicans: the radicals, including Stevens, Washburne, Morrill, and Conkling from the House; and Harris, Howard, and Williams from the Senate; and secondly the moderate Republicans, including Senators Fessenden and Grimes and Representatives Bingham and Blow. The Democratic members formed the third group. According to this analysis, the radicals controlled an eight to seven working majority in the Committee.[7]

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[5] *Congressional Globe*, 39 Congress, 1 Session, 24–27.

[6] James G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress from Lincoln to Garfield*, 2 vols., Norwich, Connecticut, 1866, II, 127, records that "It was foreseen that in an especial degree the fortunes of the Republican party would be in the keeping of the fifteen men who might be chosen . . . and when the names were announced they gave universal satisfaction to the Republicans." Republicans representing the Senate were Fessenden, James W. Grimes of Iowa, Ira Harris of New York, Jacob M. Howard of Michigan, and George H. Williams of Oregon. The lone Democrat was Reverdy Johnson of Maryland. Republicans representing the House were Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, Elihu B. Washburne of Illinois, Justin S. Morrill of Vermont, John A. Bingham of Ohio, Roscoe Conkling of New York, George S. Boutwell of Massachusetts, and Henry T. Blow of Missouri. Democrats were Andrew J. Rogers of New Jersey and Henry Grider of Kentucky. The same committee was reappointed for the second session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress with the exception of Grider who was replaced by Elijah Hise, Democrat from Kentucky, and Washburne who was replaced by John F. Farnsworth, Republican from Illinois.

[7] Benjamin B. Kendrick, *The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction. Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1865–1867*, Columbia University, *Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law*, LXII, New York, 1924, 155–197; Howard K. Beale, *The Critical Year. A Study of Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction*, New York, 1930, 74; Robert S. Henry, *The Story of Reconstruction*, Indianapolis, New York, 1938, 135; Walter L. Fleming, *The Sequel of Appomattox*, Allen Johnson, ed., The Chronicles of America Series, 56 vols., New Haven, 1918–1951, XXXII, 125–126; Hodding Carter, *The Angry Scar. A Story of Reconstruction*, Garden City, 1959, 115. The latter characterizes the Committee as "one of the strangest . . . ever . . . created . . . composed of six senators and nine representatives, all Republicans, with Stevens as chairman." The Committee, although controversial, was neither strange nor lacking in Democratic members. Furthermore, Fessenden was chairman.

To Benjamin B. Kendrick the term "radical" signified "a person who desired the reconstruction of the southern states in such a manner, and by such methods as would perpetuate the Republican Party in control of the national government."[8] More recently this has been embellished by adding, as a radical goal in establishing Republican political ascendancy, the strengthening of Northeastern capitalistic power *vis-à-vis* the agrarian South and West.[9]

This effort to classify a group of fifteen individuals is rooted in several assumptions: first, that the proposed definition of a radical is valid; secondly, granting the validity of the definition, eight members must meet its requirements and four must not; and third, that those who are finally defined as radical must be described as mere political and/or economic self-seekers, veritable charlatans. Conversely, those fortunate few who fail to meet the requirements of radicalism may be portrayed in terms of approbation. An investigation of the attitudes and opinions of the various committeemen, particularly the Republicans, and the relative harmony or discord existing towards ideas relating to particular and concrete issues, is imperative if the definition and its supporting assumptions is to be tested.

The question of the relationship of the Southern states to the federal government is a convenient springboard, for it poses several questions. Were the Southern States in the Union or out? and, if out, what was their condition and how were they to be readmitted? should they be readmitted immediately or only upon the fulfillment of certain prerequisites? what should these conditions precedent consist of?[10]

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[8] Kendrick, *Journal of the Joint Committee*, 137, footnote 3.

[9] Beale, *The Critical Year*. Beale's interpretation connected the radicals inextricably with the monolithic, capitalistic, exploitive goals of Northeastern business circles. William B. Hesseltine, "Economic Factors in the Abandonment of Reconstruction," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXII (September, 1935), 191–210, and T. Harry Williams, "An Analysis of Some Reconstruction Attitudes," *Journal of Southern History*, XII (November, 1946), 469–486, accept this thesis. Recently it has been challenged in Irwin Unger, "Business Men and Specie Resumption," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXIV (March, 1959), 46–70, and Stanley Coben, "Northeastern Business and Radical Reconstruction: A Re-examination," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLVI (June, 1959), 67–90. These studies indicate that Northeastern business groups had no collective economic program to promote.

[10] Contemporary historians have denied the importance of these questions as issues in the Reconstruction controversy. Beale, *The Critical Year*, 147, contends that arguments concerning "the rights of the Negroes, the status of Southern states, the legal position of ex-rebels, and the powers of Congress and president determined nothing. They were pure shams."

Several members of the Committee began developing their theories as to the status of the rebellious states prior to Appomattox. Both Boutwell and Howard consistently referred to the rebel states as territories or simply conquered communities. Thaddeus Stevens was an ardent exponent of the conquest theory. This the Democrats unequivocally rejected maintaining that the functions of the states had merely been suspended for the duration of the war. The Democrats charged that the conquest theory virtually legalized secession by admitting that the South did, in fact, leave the Union. Williams answered this contention by arguing that while the ordinances of secession were void and illegal, they did serve to dissolve the legal relations between the South and the national government. Although at all times illegal, the secession ordinances were operative in the rebel states.[11] Stevens savagely ridiculed the Democratic viewpoint, denying the absurd idea:

> that during the existence of the confederate government the eleven States were in any sense in the Union or have since got in, and [expressed] inability to comprehend the idea of a State partly in the Union and partly out of it—a kind of Egyptian mummy with 'suspended animation,' close wrapped in cerements, stiff and motionless, but ready to leap into action when some kind diety shall open the sarcophagus.[12]

Fessenden, too, based his conception of the status of the South on the consequences of the Civil War which were in all respects similar to those of international war. The Southern states were swept out of existence; they had voluntarily forfeited their status and thus the conqueror could impose such punishment, or exact such security, as it chose before allowing the defeated to resume their original position. Fessenden, then, in point of view stood not far removed from Stevens concerning the status of the rebel states.[13]

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[11] *Congressional Globe*, 39 Congress, 1 Session, Appendix, 92.

[12] *Ibid.*, 3627.

[13] *Ibid.*, 988. Kendrick, *Journal of the Joint Committee*, 184, classes Bingham with Fessenden rather than Stevens in his attitude on reconstruction. In this case, however, Bingham's denial of the conquest theory placed him in opposition to Fessenden. According to Kendrick, *ibid.*, 194, Henry T. Blow followed Bingham in opposing Stevens' attempt to reduce the rebel states to the position of territories. This seems doubtful as Blow was violently opposed to Lincoln's Reconstruction policy and was a staunch advocate of the proscriptive Missouri Constitution of 1865; see Thomas S. Barclay, "The Liberal Republican Movement in Missouri," *Missouri Historical Review*, XX (October, 1925), 3–79; (January, 1926), 262–333; (April, 1926), 406–438; (July, 1926), 515–565; XXI (October, 1926), 59–109; and William Frank Zornow, "The Missouri Radicals and the Election of 1864," *ibid.*, XLV–XLVI (1950–1952), 354–370.

Much of the reconstruction legislation was based upon the belief, or alleged belief, that the South remained basically disloyal, evincing an undying hatred towards the national government. Thus, security for the future safety of the Union was proclaimed a fundamental requirement before the Southern states would be considered fit for readmission. Senator Grimes, generally considered a moderate, illustrated the position of most Republicans. In a letter to an Iowa friend Grimes expressed the fear that should the Democrats succeed in coalescing with the returned rebels, they would control the government. Then, he continued, "will follow the assumption of the rebel debt, the restoration of slavery under a less odious name, and the return of the leaders of the rebellion to power." Fessenden although cognizant of the fact that it was unnatural to expect the people of the South to feel kindly towards the victorious North agreed with Grimes.[14]

In general, historians have discounted the sincerity of this fear and have viewed it as an example of political trickery, "waving the bloody shirt," a highly useful but vulgar and unethical method of garnering Republican votes. This is probably correct when applied to the decade of the 1870's or 1880's, but seems less satisfactory when projected upon the framework of the immediate postwar years. During the course of four long and dreadful years of violence, the Northern people had been indoctrinated and schooled in the perfidy, barbarism, and treason of the Confederacy.[15] Fort Pillow and Andersonville were not yet forgotten when Lincoln was assassinated and the Memphis and New Orleans riots occurred. Thus Fessenden could write in the *Report of the Joint Committee* that "evidence of an intense hostility to the federal Union, and an equally intense love of the late confederacy, nurtured by the war, is decisive."[16] To this propaganda, based on a potpourri of truths, half-truths, and fabrications, Northern politicians were no more immune

[14] Grimes to E. H. Stiles, Burlington, Iowa, September 14, 1865, in William Salter, *The Life of James W. Grimes, Governor of Iowa, 1854–1858; A Senator of the United States, 1859–1869*, New York, 1876, 281; Fessenden's remarks, *Congressional Globe*, 39 Congress, 1 Session, 367.

[15] The leading agency of "hate" propaganda was the Congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, chaired by Senator Benjamin F. Wade of Ohio. Witnesses before the Committee described in vivid detail such incidents as rebel soldiers fashioning rings of Yankee shinbones or drinking punch from a Yankee skull; *Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War*, 8 vols., Washington, D. C., 1863–1866, III, 450–457. See Harry Williams, "Benjamin F. Wade and the Atrocity Propaganda of the Civil War," *Ohio State Archeological and Historical Quarterly*, XLVIII (January, 1939), 33–43.

[16] Kendrick, *Journal of the Joint Committee*, XVII.

than their constituents. If it was unnatural and illogical to expect the South to lay down its arms with one hand and sincerely salute the Union flag with the other, it was also naive to expect the North to cast aside hatreds and animosities which were at least four years in the making. The North may have been "waving the bloody shirt" in 1866, but they did not recognize it as such. In the 1870's and 1880's it was not only recognized for what it was, but exploited for purely political purposes.[17]

Congressional assertion of its power over the question of Reconstruction was evident at least as early as the Wade-Davis bill of 1864. Many Republicans in Congress resented and feared the vast expansion of executive power during the war. This threat to legislative prerogatives was accentuated, to a dangerous degree, by President Johnson's recognition of Lincoln governments at the South and his organization of provisional governments in the remaining seven southern states.

Prior to the issuance of the May proclamations, Stevens had written President Johnson advising him that Congress looked upon reconstruction as an exclusively legislative function.[18] Boutwell and Senator Lot Morrill of Vermont called upon Johnson after the proclamations had been made public. Boutwell reported that it was his purpose to "arrest the step which seemed . . . a dangerous step towards the reorganization of the government upon an unsound basis."[19] Jacob M. Howard foresaw "an open rupture with Mr. Johnson if he persists in this unconstitutional policy."[20] Another

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[17] See E. D. Morgan, J. J. Astor, Hamilton Fish, Robert Lennox Kennedy, J. Pierpont Morgan, E. P. Fabri, Chas. H. Russell, John A. Stewart, J. D. Vermilye, Henry F. Vail, Benjamin B. Sherman, David Dows, William H. Macy, Sam Sloan, Levi P. Morton, George Bliss, Jesse Seligman, George T. Adee, Cyrus W. Field, John W. Ellis, Isaac Sherman, I. N. Phelps, "The Political Situation from a Financial Standpoint," *North American Review*, CXXXI (November, 1880), 464–474. One can accurately describe this article as "waving the bloody shirt." In attacking the financial policy of the Democratic party the writers accused the Democrats of a conspiracy with their southern colleagues aiming at the repudiation of the federal war debt.

[18] Stevens to Johnson, May 16, 1865, in Alphonse B. Miller, *Thaddeus Stevens*, New York and London, 1939, 220. Stevens had written General Butler, Lancaster, November 18, 1865, that the rebel states must be placed under territorial government immediately or they would work into Congress "one by one through Executive influence"; *Private and Official Correspondence of General Benjamin F. Butler During the Period of the Civil War*, 5 vols., Privately Issued, 1917, V, 679.

[19] George S. Boutwell, *Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs*, 2 vols., New York, 1902, II, 103–104.

[20] Howard, June, 1865, in George Fort Milton, *Age of Hate. Andrew Johnson and the Radicals*, New York, 1930, 216–217.

committee member watched Johnson's inauguration of Reconstruction with extreme solicitude. Fessenden wrote a cabinet member that Johnson, as President, had no power to create civil government in the rebellious states. Fessenden hoped that those proceedings were experimental, but his hopes were dispelled by Johnson's message to Congress in December.[21] Senator Grimes, too, believed Johnson wrong in assuming functions which were properly legislative.[22] Fessenden and Grimes, anxious to avoid a rupture with President Johnson, nonetheless considered his actions as a usurpation of legislative powers. Howard looked forward with anxiety "to the time when the will of the Executive . . . shall become the law of the land, and the authority of Congress dwindle in feebleness, and finally become lost in desuetude and contempt."[23]

Other committeemen foresaw worse disasters. Boutwell indulged in a bit of unbalanced histrionics by charging that Johnson was planning a *coup d'état* by refusing to recognize Congress when it next assembled or by using force to pack it with Southern representatives.[24] This apprehension had been voiced in July, 1866, during a discussion on adjournment in a series of Republican caucuses. Morrill of Vermont was satisfied "that the rebels would be brought in by fair means or foul," in March, 1867. Washburne was slightly more rational and remarked that "as to the rather wild idea of sitting all summer to prevent the President from ruining the country, he hoped the caucus would not act upon any such motive."[25] Conkling, making effective use of this fantastic danger during the

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[21] Fessenden to [no name, no place, no date], in Francis Fessenden, *Life and Public Services of William Pitt Fessenden*, 2 vols., Boston and New York, 1907, II, 12–13.

[22] Fred B. Lewellen, "Political Ideas of James W. Grimes," *The Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, XLII (October, 1944), 361. Grimes had consistently opposed the executive assumption of powers usually considered the function of Congress since 1861. He believed that all executive departments should be subject to Congressional direction and supervision in order to limit the widening scope of presidential prerogative.

[23] *Congressional Globe*, 39 Congress, 1 Session, 2551.

[24] Boutwell, "The Usurpation," *Atlantic Monthly*, XVIII (October, 1866), 511–512. For articles of similar tenor, see E. P. Whipple's "The Johnson Party," *ibid.* (September, 1866), 374–381; "The President and His Accomplices," *ibid.* (November, 1866), 634–643; and [James Russell Lowell], "The Seward-Johnson Reaction," *North American Review*, CIII (October, 1866), 520–549.

[25] John A. Krout, "Henry J. Raymond on the Republican Caucuses of July, 1866," *American Historical Review*, XXXIII (July, 1928), 840–841. Washburne was soon accused of going over to Johnson when it was announced that Grant, a close friend of Washburne's, would accompany Johnson to Chicago in August-September, 1866—the famous "Swing 'round the Circle."

campaign of 1866, warned that "already a revolution and a dictatorship loom in the distance."[26]

One of the more temperate and balanced statements of legislative authority was Fessenden's speech in the Senate on February 23, 1866. The Committee chairman dismissed as fallacious Johnson's doctrine that Reconstruction was an executive task. He denied the truth of Johnson's denouncement of the Joint Committee as "an irresponsible tribunal'; some power created to take legislation out of its proper channels." In interpreting Johnson's veto of the Freedmen's Bureau bill, Fessenden discovered one argument indicating that the President would not approve of any Reconstruction legislation while the South remained unrepresented in Congress and another to the effect that all the consideration that the Senate could give to the subject was to investigate the legality of the credentials presented by Southern members-elect to the Senate. The right of the states themselves to representation was to be decided "at the other end of the avenue." In reply, Fessenden stated that Congress "means to exercise the most full and plenary jurisdiction" regarding Reconstruction.[27] To counter the charge that the Republicans were thwarting the wishes of the martyred Lincoln by opposing Johnson's policy, Howard asserted that "My Policy" was sternly rebuked by his predecessor. In fact, said Howard, Lincoln's last speech of April 11, 1865, was a "full, solemn, plump disclaimer on the part of President Lincoln of the excerise of that assumed power . . . asserted at present by President Johnson of the right of the rebel states to readmission into Congress."[28]

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[26] Alfred R. Conkling, *The Life and Letters of Roscoe Conkling, Orator, Statesman, Advocate* (New York, 1889), 278. The *New York Tribune,* October 5, 1866, reported the existence of secret rebel societies throughout the nation, armed and ready at a moment's notice to renew the struggle for the lost cause. Such a highly respected senator as Lyman Trumbull, Illinois Republican, played upon this theme during the campaign: Speech, Trumbull, Evanston, Illinois, August 31, 1866, in *Chicago Tribune,* September 1, 1866.

[27] *Congressional Globe,* 39 Congress, 1 Session, 986–990. Fessenden spoke in defense of a House resolution to deny the South readmission until Congress declared them entitled to representation which he had opposed in December, 1865. He was also reacting to Johnson's Washington's Birthday Speech of the previous evening and the latter's message vetoing the Freedmen's Bureau bill. As he later wrote in the *Report of the Joint Committee,* it was not the duty of the President "to decide upon the nature or effect of any system of government which the people of [the southern states] might see fit to adopt." That power was constitutionally lodged with Congress, Kendrick, *Journal of the Joint Committee,* IX.

[28] *Congressional Globe,* 39 Congress, 1 Session, 2552. Howard quoted Lincoln as distinctly protesting "that the Executive claimed no right to say when or whether members should be admitted to seats in Congress from such States"; Washington, D. C. *National Intelligencer,* April 12, 1865.

But, as with the question concerning the status of Southern states, most contemporary historians are pleased to dismiss this concern over legislative authority as so much "clap-trap."[29] To the extent that some, such as Conkling, ventured to accuse Johnson of contemplating the subversion of Congress by force, the above attitude is probably correct. In this case any reference to a future *coup* was merely partisan politicking. However, to dismiss as politicking the entire problem of the executive versus the legislative is unjustifiable. If attention is directed upon the vast extension of executive power under Lincoln, and Johnson's apparent design, consciously or unconsciously, to perpetuate and consolidate this authority, and concomitantly the various expressions of Congressional disapproval of this tendency, it is difficult to comprehend the relegation of the problem to some historical limbo. Rather it appears that it was a legitimate and significant issue to Congressmen jealous of the prerogatives and authority of the legislative body to which they belonged.

Furthermore, there was no radical or moderate attitude towards this question. Stevens, in the House, denied the right of the South to representation in spite of the assertions of "an official whose station is more exalted than that of kings . . . who fancies himself the depository of all the legislative and executive power of the Government."[30] If the rhetoric and vituperation are gleaned from this speech, the remainder is little different in essence than Fessenden's speech of February 23. Both men accused Johnson of usurping strictly legislative functions. Both asserted the right of Congress to determine the how and the when of Reconstruction. All of the Republican members of the Committee agreed to this proposition. The Democrats, of course, while not denying that Reconstruction was a Congressional function, maintained that Johnson was correct in demanding the immediate seating of Southern members-elect. Since Johnson was following a course which the Democratic party favored, they were wisely silent on the issue itself. Their reticence, then, should not be interpreted as silent agreement to the assertion of excutive power. This is also true of Johnson Republicans such as Senators Doolittle of Wisconsin and Cowan of Pennsyl-

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29 Beale, *The Critical Year*, 139–149, attempts to distinguish between "claptrap and issues."

30 *Congressional Globe*, 39 Congress, 1 Session, 3627. Stevens was referring to President Johnson's message to Congress of June 22, 1866, expressing grave doubts as to the propriety of amending the Constitution while eleven states remained unrepresented; J. D. Richardson, ed., *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents* (10 vols., Washington, D. C., 1896–1897), VI, 391–392.

vania. Although merely a speculation, it is not unlikely that both Democratic and Administration Republican Congressmen were opposed to the further extension of executive authority.

The question of further amendment of the Constitution proved to be a point of considerable controversy within the Committee, Congress, and the nation at large. Early in the session Congressmen began offering proposals to amend the Constitution. Stevens and Boutwell suggested joint resolutions repudiating the rebel debt and empowering Congress to secure civil rights within the states. On April 30, 1866, Stevens in the House and Fessenden in the Senate introduced the Joint Committee's version of what became the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Republican members of the Joint Committee were in basic agreement as to the necessity of the Amendment. A particularly crucial factor to be considered was the newly-freed Negro. Fessenden, at first, favored a more radical measure forbidding any distinction in civil or political rights, which in effect meant Negro suffrage. Bingham, although favoring the eventual extension of suffrage to Negroes, was less disappointed in the resolution than Fessenden or in other words, was willing to accomplish by indirection, through the second section, what could not be accomplished directly.[31] Bingham was much more concerned over the first section on civil rights which he felt was the decisive issue involved. Boutwell and Stevens in the House and Howard in the Senate favored an explicit statement enfranchising the freedmen but thought it impolitic to press the matter at that moment. Justin Morrill, classified as a radical, dissented from the Boutwell-Stevens position by moving in committee the insertion of a literacy qualification in the second section.[32] Fessenden, too, came to Stevens' view and defended the resolution in the Senate as the maximum that could be obtained in the North. The question had become for Fessenden: what could pass? The temper of public opinion told the Committee majority that a proposition legalizing Negro suffrage would be defeated in the Northern states.[33]

Conkling defended the second section of the Amendment by pointing to the emancipated slaves. The freedmen had not a vestige of political status. In a political sense they were not "persons."

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[31] Fessenden's remarks, *Congressional Globe*, 39 Congress, 1 Session, 508; Bingham's remarks, *ibid.*, 432.

[32] Kendrick, *Journal of the Joint Committee*, 41.

[33] *Congressional Globe*, 39 Congress, 1 Session, 704. According to Boutwell the Fifteenth Amendment was made necessary because of the incompleteness of the Fourteenth; *Reminiscences*, II, 47–48.

If Negroes, then, were deemed unfit to wield political power, that power, reasoned Conkling, did not exist and could not be transferred to the southern white. Thus the class should be excluded from the basis of representation until such time as the South recognized the Negro as a political "person." Williams believed it more important to limit Southern representation than to endanger the Amendment by adding a universal suffrage clause. And the irrepressible Stevens, taking an eminently practical position, maintained that the Negroes required land more than an illusory right to vote. Liberty could not be secured, in Stevens' mind, on a foundation lacking economic security.[34] His demand for the confiscation of Southern property, admittedly extreme and probably illegal as well as unjust, has been interpreted by one of his biographers as motivated solely for party purposes. Confiscation, according to this view, "was the order of the day if Pennsylvania iron men and manufacturers were to keep the advantages they had gained during the war."[35]

This statement is illustrative of the position taken by contemporary students of Reconstruction regarding those who were articulate advocates of immediate Negro suffrage, as well as those like Grimes, Bingham, and Williams who favored eventual enfranchisement.[36] The myth of Republican ascendancy as the all-embracing goal of its more "radical" members denies the possibility of a sincere effort to achieve a measure of security for the Negro. Partisan or economic motivations are not, after all, the sole forces to which man responds. Nor, on the other hand, can it be assumed that altruism alone can satisfactorily explain the demands of the Republican politicians. It is suggested that in cases such as Boutwell and Stevens, particularly the latter, the exigencies of partisan politics blended imperceptibly with an earnest and sincere concern over the future of the freedmen—a future fraught with peril according to Stevens' conception of the South. The result was an unshakeable and undeniable belief that the future of the Union depended entirely upon the continued supremacy of the Republican party.

When Fessenden and Stevens reported to Congress the joint resolution to amend the Constitution, they also reported two accom-

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[34] Conkling's remarks, *Congressional Globe*, 39 Congress, 1 Session, 356. Williams' remarks, *ibid.*, 94; Stevens' interview, *New York Tribune*, September 11, 1865.

[35] Richard N. Current, *Old Thad Stevens. A Story of Ambition*, Madison, 1942, 217.

[36] Grimes was guilty of hedging when he cautioned an Iowa acquaintance against inserting the issue of Negro suffrage into state politics due to the likelihood of its repelling former Union party supporters; Grimes to E. H. Stiles, Burlington, September 14, 1865, in Salter, *Life of Grimes*, 280–282.

panying bills, one declaring certain classes of persons ineligible to hold office in the federal government, and the second providing for the restoration of the Southern states which ratified the Amendment when the amendment became operative. In committee Bingham sought to amend the latter bill so as to secure the admission of Tennessee and Arkansas upon ratification.[37] The restoration bill, in spite of Bingham's efforts, was gently but firmly brushed aside and ignored.[38]

Tennessee ratified the amendment on July 19, 1866, and five days later was restored to the Union. Several Committee members considered this action as offering to the South specific terms of admission, although Boutwell at this time objected to the terms granted Tennessee.[39] Fessenden and Bingham viewed the admission of Tennessee as a valuable and explicit condition precedent, the former expressing this opinion as early as February, 1866.[40] Bingham stated categorically in the House on July 20 that "inasmuch as Tennessee has conformed to all our requirements . . . Tennessee is as much entitled to be represented here as any State in the Union."[41]

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[37] Kendrick, *Journal of the Joint Committee*, 108. Boutwell proposed the insertion of a clause providing for equal suffrage as a condition precedent to restoration.

[38] Bingham maintained that the "three . . . measures . . . must be considered together as an entirety" but the House considered the Committee's proposals separately; *Congressional Globe*, 39 Congress, 1 Session, 2541. Introduced on April 30 the restoration bill was postponed until May 9, but did not come up until May 15. Stevens asked, over Bingham's strenuous objections, postponement for another two weeks. The House accepted Stevens' date of May 29. Desultory debate on that day was followed by a motion to postpone until June 4 and then until June 14. It was then debated through June 20 and tabled. Stevens called the bill up on July 20 and it was again tabled. Democrats consistently opposed the restoration bill and deserve credit for defeating it. The Democrats feared that if terms were made distinct by an act of law the South might surrender its objections to the amendment to gain representation and escape the rigours inherent in Stevens' reconstruction bill, introduced on May 28.

[39] Boutwell opposed the resolution readmitting Tennessee and demanded impartial suffrage maintaining that Congress could not deny admission to other states which followed in the steps of Tennessee; *Congressional Globe*, 39 Congress, 1 Session, 3977. By October Boutwell was describing the Amendment as a "just, wise, reasonable, and magnanimous" condition precedent to admission; Boutwell, "The Usurpation," *Atlantic Monthly*, XVIII (October, 1866), 508.

[40] Fessenden to [no name, no place] February 17, 1866, in Fessenden, *Life of Fessenden*, II, 26. The Senator wrote: "I think we will conclude to admit Tennessee in some shape." It will be noted that this was penned two days prior to Johnson's veto of the Freedmen's Bureau bill, which act changed the complexion of the political horizon considerably for Fessenden.

[41] *Congressional Globe*, 39 Congress, 1 Session, 3980. In an August speech he declared that the Union party demanded that the South ". . . accept the constitutional amendment as a fair and just basis of the restoration of the Union"; speech, Cambridge, Ohio, August 8, 1866, in *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*, August 10, 1866.

Others deemed "radical" accepted this interpretation of Tennessee's admission. Williams maintained that the important point was the assertion by Congress of Congressional authority over the entire question of Reconstruction. Washburne, in his native Galena, Illinois, remarked that the Amendment presented the only "safe and feasible plan of Reconstruction," and should be insisted upon.[42]

The Democrats recognized the Amendment as the Congressional terms of readmission.[43] Republicans, individually and collectively, referred to it as such. These included such "moderates" as Senators John Sherman of Ohio and Lyman Trumbull of Illinois. Various Republican groups, both state and national, asserted that the Amendment was the Congressional plan of Reconstruction. In an address, the National Union Republican Committee stated that "the door thus passed [by Tennessee] standing invitingly open to all who still linger without."[44] Republican state conventions in Ohio, Michigan, Vermont, Maine, Iowa, and New York endorsed the proposed amendment as the plan of Reconstruction.[45] Most Republican journals and newspapers considered the Amendment as specific terms offered the South. While realizing as the *Nation* did that "no State convention [or] national committee have authority to bind the whole party to any particular course or action . . . a sufficient number of candidates for Congress are committing themselves to this policy to make it certain that it will be carried out."[46] Stevens thought this whole

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[42] Williams' remarks, *Congressional Globe*, 39 Congress, 1 Session, 3995. Washburne speech, Galena, Illinois, September 15, 1866, in *Chicago Tribune*, September 16, 1866.

[43] Speech, George H. Pendleton, Reading, Pennsylvania, July 17, 1866, in *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*, July 23, 1866. See *New York World* and *Cincinnati Enquirer*, September, 1866.

[44] Speeches, John Sherman, Cincinnati, September 28, 1866, in *New York Tribune*, October 4, 1866; Lyman Trumbull, Evanston, Illinois, August 31, 1866, in *Chicago Tribune*, September 1, 1866; Address of the National Union Republican Committee in *ibid.*, September 22, 1866.

[45] *Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia*, 1866, reported Michigan, 507, and Ohio, 604. See *Racine Weekly Advocate* (Wis.), July 4, 1866, for other state resolutions. New York action is recorded in *New York Tribune*, September 6, 1866. Rutherford Hayes recorded that the Ohio delegation to the House voted 7 to 2 for admitting the states upon ratification; and 8 to 1 against Negro suffrage as a condition, Williams, ed., *Diary and Letters of Hayes*, III, 27.

[46] *Nation*, October 4, 1866. See *Harpers Weekly*, October 13, 1866. Recent historians have denied the existence of a Congressional plan of Reconstruction; Kendrick, *Journal of the Joint Committee*, 348–350, asserts that the admission of Tennessee was used simply as a campaign device; Beale, *The Critical Year*, 209–210, follows this interpretation contending that the election really decided nothing in regard to the Amendment; Henry, *Story of Reconstruction*, 168, Milton, *Age of Hate*, 315, and Matthew Josephson, *The Politicos, 1865–1896*, New York, 1938, 32, agree with Beale and Kendrick.

scheme an absurdity. He scorned the idea that the rebel states were to be counted or consulted in adopting the Amendment. In view of his introduction on May 28, 1866, of a substitute for the restoration bill which in principle and purpose was similar to the Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867, it seems apparent that Stevens did not look upon the Amendment as the final condition to be imposed upon the South, nor did he expect the South to ratify it.[47]

The South was in an unenviable position. While many Republicans, such as Rutherford B. Hayes, urged acceptance of *"this plan . . .* [as] *the best terms you will ever get,"*[48] Southerners incorrectly assessed the Northern temperament in terms of Stevens' pronouncements. More sure than not that restoration would not follow ratification, the Southern states rejected the Amendment.[49]

In spite of opinions to the contrary the fall election of 1866 did decide something in regard to the Amendment. Politicians as individuals and in local and state groups, joined by the press of both parties, persistently fought the campaign in terms of the Amend-

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[47] The Democrats agreed with Stevens. Reverdy Johnson predicted correctly that the South would never agree to the Amendment. He did, however, recognize it as the prerequisite of readmission; *Congressional Globe*, 39 Congress, 1 Session, 3030; James G. Randall, ed., *The Diary of Orville Hickman Browning*, Springfield, *Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library*, XX, XXII, 1927–1933, XXII, 73.

[48] Hayes to George M. Bryan, *Texas*, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 1, 1866, in Williams, ed., *Diary and Letters of Hayes*, III, 32. James A. Garfield, speaking of Tennessee's admission in Warren, Ohio, told his constituents that "whenever any other of the sinful ten comply . . . it can come in as did Tennessee," September 1, 1866, in *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*, September 4, 1866. James G. Blaine at a Maine political rally made the same point, James G. Blaine, *Political Discussions, Legislative, Diplomatic, and Popular, 1856–1886*, Norwich, 1887, 68.

[49] Beale, *The Critical Year*, 199, maintains that section three was the real obstacle to Southern ratification, even as the price of admission. Section four was generally acceptable to Southerners, Northern Democrats, and Administration Republicans. That section three was objectionable to these groups is true. But, while Northern Democrats and Johnson Republicans may have acquiesced in section one even though it probably meant federal interference at the expense of states rights, it is doubtful that the South would have accepted it for the same reason that the South was opposed to section two. The Arkansas Senate Committee on Federal Relations objected to section two as "an effort to force Negro suffrage upon the States." The Arkansans were "of the opinion that every State Legislature should shrink from ever permitting . . . such a calamity"; *Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia*, 1866, 27. Their advice was adhered to. While section three did make ineligible for office nearly the whole class of men to whom the South looked for leadership, this could have been stomached as the price of admission. Section two, and to a lesser degree section one, expressed racial aims which were completely antithetical to those of the South—aims which allowed no compromise. Section three involved questions of honor and loyalty which the South could have subtly ignored if admission were hanging in the balance. Sections one and two meant the eventual restructuring of southern society. This was unthinkable.

ment.[50] All contestants used as a common denominator the oft-expressed opinion that the South would be restored upon ratification of the Amendment.

That there were other issues in 1866 is undeniable but it is also true that these issues were not as immediately critical as the restoration of the Union. Ten states, inhabited by over eleven million people, remained without political status. As *Harper's Weekly* phrased it:

> Questions of tariff and finance however radical and important must, in the nature of things, yield to a question of the national existence. For nothing less than that is the exact central point of the present situation.[51]

In terms of abstract importance, questions of tariff, national banks, or contraction were crucial and demanded settlement. Certain sections or interest groups were as concerned with these issues as with restoration. Had the ten states been represented in Congress, these issues would have assumed pivotal importance in the campaign. In fact, however, neither party could campaign effectively on issues not directly related to restoration. The electorate, as final judge, considered restoration of transcending importance although both parties realized that additional support could be secured by coupling Reconstruction with other questions, depending upon the sectional interest of the group addressed. But each party would stand or fall on its advocacy or rejection of the terms offered in the Fourteenth Amendment, "the real issue in this fall's election."[52] The elections

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[50] See John G. Clark, "Historians and the Joint Committee of Reconstruction," *The Historian*, XXIII (May, 1961), 348–361, for a discussion of the Beale thesis which regards the election of 1866 as furnishing a mandate in favor of Northeastern business interests.

[51] *Harper's Weekly*, October 27, 1866. Such opinion is explained by Beale, *The Critical Year*, 139, as a purposeful effort to cloud the real issues, such as the tariff and finance, which the "Radicals regarded . . . as dangerous to their cause."

[52] *Racine Weekly Advocate* (Wis.), October 24, 1866. For the relative significance of the Amendment in the state elections of 1866, see Harris L. Dante, "Western Attitudes and Reconstruction Politics in Illinois, 1865–1872," *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society*, XLIX (Summer, 1956), 149–162; Abner J. Gaines, "New Jersey and the Fourteenth Amendment," *Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society*, new series, LXX (January, 1952), 37–55; Clifford H. Moore, "Ohio in National Politics, 1865–1896," *Ohio Archeological and Historical Publications*, XXXVII (April-July, 1928), 220–427; Leland S. Sage, "William B. Allison and Iowa Senatorial Politics, 1865–1870," *Iowa Journal of History*, LII (April, 1954), 97–128, states that although the struggle for power between "Radical and Conservative" was crucial, "the primary struggle was a contest of pure factionalism," 115; Homer A. Stebbins, *Political History of New York, 1865–1869*, Columbia University, *Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law*, LV, New York, 1913, 1–448.

of October and November, 1866, with sweeping Republican victories throughout the nation, were indicative of the public acceptance of the proposed Amendment as the express terms of readmission. Before the elections had been completed, Texas, on October 13, 1866, had rejected the Amendment. Before the second session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress assembled on December 3, Georgia and Florida had followed Texas' example. Within the next two months the remaining seven states had taken identical action.[53] Fessenden believed that the South should be held under military rule until they accepted it and applied for admission with satisfactory constitutions. He thought it a mistake at that point to hurry them back into the Union.[54] The Fortieth Congress proved insusceptible to this display of patience.

Issues not directly connected with the Reconstruction or restoration of the South, such as the tariff, the currency, railroad grants, or monopolistic charters to various enterprises, furnish valuable examples which may be cited as suggesting that there existed no single Republican attitude towards the economic question of the immediate post-war years.

Justin Morrill, Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, took charge of the tariff debate in June, 1866. In his speech opening the debate, Morrill set forth what can be considered the conventional justification for continuing the high wartime duties. He maintained that the tariff was necessary if the United States was to compete on equal terms with Europe, but described the bill not as a protective tariff but a revenue bill. Stevens decried the measure as a "free-trade bill from beginning to end" and noticed that "all those free-trade doctrines that are now located along the Mississippi were some years ago located down South."[55] Senator Morgan of New York and Roscoe Conkling presented to Congress a remonstrance from the New York State Chamber of Commerce describing the tariff bill as prohibitive and thus serving to decrease the gold revenue of the government by diminishing the revenue from imports. Boutwell, although favoring the principle of the bill, attacked the duty on coal.[56]

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[53] Edward McPherson, *The Political History of the United States of America During the Period of Reconstruction From April 15, 1865 to July 15, 1870* . . . , Washington, 1880, 194.

[54] Fessenden to [no name, no place, no date], in Fessenden, *Life of Fessenden*, II, 65.

[55] Morrill's speech, *Congressional Globe*, 39 Congress, 1 Session, 3466–3468; Stevens' reply, *ibid.*, 3468, 3517.

[56] *Ibid.*, 3645–3646. Boutwell remarked ". . . there is nothing in the whole range of possible taxation which ought not to be taxed for the purpose of revenue before you tax coal," *ibid.*, 3569.

An enlightening debate occurred over a proposition in the bill to allow a Florida railroad, destroyed by the Confederates during the war, a credit upon rails which had been ordered from abroad to reconstruct the road. The credit on the duty was to be repaid within five years. Bingham, Morrill, and Boutwell were favorable to this proposal which passed the House in spite of Stevens' bitter opposition. In the Senate, Grimes, on sectional grounds, led the Republican opposition to the tariff. The Iowan pointed out that it was a purely New England measure with forty of the fifty-two votes cast against it coming from the Northwest.[57]

Fessenden and Grimes united forces in the Senate to oppose a number of railroad land grants, arguing that the roads should be built by the national government rather than a monopolistic corporation. In this they were joined in the House by Washburne, an unyielding foe of railroad monopolies. In opposing the Northern Pacific Railway bill as a "giveaway," Washburne charged that the passage of the bill would place the nation "at the mercy of this corporation, and utterly powerless in their hands." Blow, Conkling, Grider, and Morrill joined Washburne in opposing the bill.[58]

Specie resumption and the contraction of greenbacks were issues cutting across party lines, and in regard to which the Kendrick-Beale definition of radical is inapplicable. During the war the total amount of greenbacks issued was $450 millions. Secretary of the Treasury Hugh McCulloch, a leading contractionist, desired to reduce the volume of paper money in circulation by retiring from $100 to $200 millions of greenbacks. Congress concurred in December, 1865, but drastically limited the Secretary's power by restricting contraction to not more than $10 million within the six months following the act's passage; and after that, to not more than $4 million in any single month. Morrill desired unlimited power of contraction for McCulloch but opposition forced him to compromise. Stevens un-

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[57] House action, *ibid.*, 3685–3688. The tariff bill passed the House with Washburne, Grider, and Rogers opposing it, while Bingham and Boutwell supported it. Neither Blow, Conkling, nor Stevens voted, Grimes' remarks, *ibid.*, 3751. The Senate postponed the tariff bill until the second session with Harris, Grimes, Johnson, and Williams voting for postponement. Fessenden and Howard, both protective tariff adherents, voted against postponement.

[58] *Ibid.*, 2212, 2237. Washburne spoke frequently in attacking monopolies of all types, maintaining that the numerous railroad bills would lead, not to the Pacific, but to the bottom of an empty treasury, *ibid.*, 2213–2214. He joined Grimes and Fessenden in opposing the Niagara Ship Canal bill which granted monopolistic powers to a private corporation and would, according to Grimes, "put the agricultural interests of the [West] into the keeping of [the] corporation," *ibid.*, 3457.

alterably fought contraction and demanded an increase in circulation arguing that available currency did not adequately meet business requirements.[59] In general the West led the fight against deflation with the aid of various northeastern groups such as the iron and steel interests and large eastern merchants.[60] The stand taken on contraction by Morrill, Washburne, and Stevens indicates that there was no Republican party line but rather that the position taken by Congressmen was determined by the specific industrial or agrarian character of the areas which they represented.

From the above survey several conclusions may be drawn. For one, the question of radicalism cannot be defined in terms of Republican party ascendancy and Northeastern capitalistic hegemony, at least not in 1865-1866. Northern capital did not flow south. The thesis that Northern investors required the continuing military rule of the South in order to protect their exploitive financial and industrial ventures is not substantiated, since it appears that Northern capital avoided the South until the late 1870's and 1880's. Apart from the railroads, post-war industrial development in the South depended upon Southern capital. In the 1880's political stability and the relative certainty of profits motivated Northern investors to show an active interest in the area.[61] In numerous instances those

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[59] *Ibid.*, 4153. See Don Carlos Barrett, *The Greenbacks and Resumption of Specie Payments, 1862–1879, Harvard Economic Studies,* Cambridge, XXXVII, 1931.

[60] George L. Anderson, "The South and Problems of Post-Civil War Finance," *Journal of Southern History,* IX (May, 1943), 181–195, explains the Southern need for an expanded currency. One interpretation of the business split over contraction explains it in terms of dynamic new industries versus old established industrial plants. In areas where industries such as New England textile interests were predominant, hard money sentiment flourished for their expansion period was over, thus making them relatively immune to the credit shortage resulting from a scarcity of money; Unger, "Business Men and Specie Resumption," *Political Science Quarterly,* LXXIV (March, 1959), 57.

[61] A. M. Schlesinger and D. R. Fox, eds., *A History of American Life,* 13 vols., New York, 1927–1948, Vol. X, Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Rise of the City, 1878–1898,* 14 ff. A comparison of census reports on manufacturers in 1860 and 1870 is revealing. In the South the number of manufacturing establishments rose 40% from 1860–1870. In the same period the New England states had a 34% increase and the Middle Atlantic area (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Washington, D. C.) experienced a 39% rise. Within these three sections, Southern capital investment in manufactures represented in 1860, 12% of the total. In 1870, Southern investment represented only 6.5% with the South showing only a 3% increase from 1860–1870 while New England investments increased 47% and Middle Atlantic states 54%. The great increase of Southern manufacturing establishments and the relative stagnation of capital investment resulted in the fragmentation of Southern industry into smaller units. Further disparity is indicated in the fact that the annual value of Southern manufactured products represented 11% of

labeled radical supported moderate or conservative measures regarding both the South and economic questions. Then, too, moderates on the Committee were often, in point of position, as radical as the radicals. Fessenden's desires regarding the freedmen out-radicaled the position of Morrill or Washburne.

In dealing with the question of Negro suffrage, it is not sufficient to stamp its advocacy as a manifestation of political maneuvering. Nor is the position of President Johnson and his adherents towards Negro suffrage above criticism. Maintaining, as ex-Governor Seymour of New York did, that the solution of the problem must be left to the South and the development of southern friendship towards the race, clashed with a century of southern racism and Negro degradation.[62] What kind of friendship could be expected? Men such as Boutwell, Stevens, and Fessenden placed little faith in the extension of southern friendship to the recently emancipated Negro. And although their opinion may have been ill-conceived, they did meet the question head-on by demanding first class citizenship for the freedmen. The crux of the matter lies in a value judgment: did the Negro deserve the ballot any less than the illiterate and uneducated frontiersman or alien? Was he, because of his race, any less a free man?[63]

The position of certain Committeemen touching the vital eco-

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the three area total in 1860 but only 7% in 1870; Bureau of the Census, *Eighth Census of the United States*, Washington, D. C., 1860, *Manufactures*, II, 686, 701, 718; *Ninth Census of the United States*, Washington, D. C., 1870, *Wealth and Industry*, III, 388–389.

[62] Speech, Cooper Institute, *New York Herald*, October 31, 1866.

[63] Recent historians tend to reject the Boutwell-Stevens-Fessenden view of the South as distorted but fail to subject the opposing view to rigid investigation while accepting it as a more exact representation of prevailing conditions. Paul H. Buck, *The Road to Reunion, 1865–1900*, Boston, 1937, 15, summarizes the legacy of the Civil War as "[enthroning] prejudice in the place of reason." The radicals are diagnosed as "only the sickest of the nerve-shot age" who could never have triumphed "had it not been for the emotional conflicts that prevented a normal reaction among the mass of the people." The neurotic North, then, and its equally distracted representatives in Congress were, by implication, completely out of touch with reality, dealing with symbols and ideas that had no counterparts in fact. This rather sweeping indictment does furnish historical precedent for our own rather traumatic experiences. A similar instance of rationalization and justification of the Southern position concerns the "black codes" which proved so harmful in the formation of Northern opinion concerning the South. These are accepted as honest efforts on the part of the South to deal with the economic situation by forcing the Negro to work. See William A. Dunning, *Reconstruction, Political and Economic, 1865–1877*, New York and London, 1907, 57–59; Beale, *The Critical Year*, 193–194; Ellis Merton Coulter, *The South During Reconstruction, 1865–1877*, Baton Rouge, 1947, 38–39. On the testimony of southerners alone the reasonableness of the "black codes" has been accepted and condemnation of them by a segment of the North rejected.

nomic questions of the day reveals the insufficiency of the Kendrick-Beale interpretation. Fessenden, Grimes, Washburne, and Conkling were often antagonistic towards the creation of uncontrolled monopolies within the fields of transportation and communication. Even Howard, who opposed Fessenden's and Grimes' contention that the Niagara Ship Canal project should be a federal work, joined them in opposing a bill to aid in the construction of new telegraph lines, on the ground that the existing "telegraph monopoly" could easily buy out newly established corporations. Williams of Oregon joined this group in demanding adequate government control over the project to insure competition in the field.[64]

In a sense, the position of Fessenden and Grimes was radical. However, they should have been propounding a conservative position for, as the sectional-class interpretation explains it, the radicals, while radical on Reconstruction issues, were conservative on industrial or economic questions. The assertion of Congressional or national authority to supervise or construct public works vitally affecting the national interest was not a conservative position but one analogous to later Granger-Populist demands. Similarly, the arch-radical, Thad Stevens, caused considerable chagrin in eastern banking circles by denouncing contraction while advocating an increased supply of greenbacks.

The tendency towards rigid classification reveals critical inadequacies. To say, for instance, that Washburne was radical is hardly true in terms of the Kendrick-Beale thesis, if his attitude towards railway monopolies is considered. Nor in 1865-1866 can Fessenden be catagorized on all points as a moderate in regard to Reconstruction, unless Stevens is used as the norm of radicalism; and even then their views on specific, definable issues must be compared. Moreover, Stevens cannot be considered as typical of radicalism. Nor is it accurate or just to accuse those defined as radicals of purposefully distorting the issues of the day in an effort to do no more than maintain themselves and their party in power; the latter goal in any event was above criticism for those accepting the traditional role of parties in the American political system.

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64 *Congressional Globe*, 39 Congress, 1 Session, 3460, 3484–3485. Fessenden, while requiring Congressional supervision, proved an accurate prophet in remarking that once a privilege was granted, Congress, having the right, could seldom interfere successfully; Fessenden, *Life of Fessenden*, II, 108.

Taft, Roosevelt, and New Mexico Statehood

In 1909 Taft vigorously defended Theodore Roosevelt, "... for whom I have the highest respect, and whose administration we are trying to follow, and whom it would be very deplorable for us in any way to criticize or hold up to public ridicule."[1] In 1912 the two former friends were engaged in bitter criticism as each fought desperately for the presidency. The years from 1909 to 1912 have provided students of American history with one of the most significant, yet thoroughly personal, episodes of our national heritage. Although New Mexico statehood was just one of a number of questions which involved the two men, an understanding of the issue can sharpen one's insight into the divergences that eventually led to a complete break.

New Mexico's effort to achieve statehood had long plagued Washington. Acquired in 1848 by the United States in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, New Mexico had unsuccessfully sought admission for years. Numerous bills were introduced and favorable action occasionally taken, usually by the House of Representatives. But each bill was sooner or later defeated, or died in the Committee on Territories of one of the two houses. Once, in 1876, a bill passed both houses only to fail because the two bodies were unable to agree upon particulars. Presidential attitudes varied, but few gave much encouragement. Taylor pushed for admission; there were reports that Cleveland was in favor, but efforts to win statehood came to naught.

Reasons for failure were several. Prejudice against the largely Catholic, Spanish-speaking population of the territory was one. The sparse population and aridity of the area, another. New Mexico's odd facility for being on the opposite end of the political spectrum as the party in control at Washington was a third. The result was that while other, younger western territories were admitted during the latter half of the nineteenth century, New Mexico, along with her sister territory Arizona, remained on the outside.[2]

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[1] Taft to Charles Nagel, September 1, 1909, William Howard Taft Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Taft was defending Roosevelt against the alleged derogatory remarks of a resigning employee in the Department of Commerce and Labor.

[2] For details on the statehood movement see Robert W. Larson, "Statehood for New Mexico, 1888–1912," Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Mexico, 1961.

In Theodore Roosevelt the Southwest seemed to have found a friend. More than half of the Colonel's famed Rough Riders had enlisted from the territories of New Mexico and Arizona[3] and Roosevelt's regard and affection for these men was profound. While attending the first reunion of the Rough Riders at Las Vegas, New Mexico, in June, 1899, Roosevelt, then governor of New York, promised his full and enthusiastic support if New Mexico wanted to become a state.[4] Consequently, with McKinley's assassination and Roosevelt's accession to the presidency the territory's hopes for statehood soared high.

When the new president failed to mention statehood in his message to Congress on December 3, 1901, there was discouragement, but the people did not lose faith. New Mexico's delegate to Congress justified the omission on the grounds that Roosevelt could not mention one territory without mentioning them all.[5] But real disappointment was to come as soon as the result of Congressional consideration of an omnibus statehood bill which included New Mexico, Arizona, and Oklahoma. This bill reached the Senate Committee on Territories headed by Albert J. Beveridge on May 12, 1902.[6]

Beveridge was a colorful and powerful figure in Washington. Elected as a Republican to Congress' upper chamber in 1898 at the age of thirty-six, the Indianan soon established a national reputation for his oratorical ability. As an advocate of American imperialism Beveridge acquired considerable influence as a result of his close association with Roosevelt and other expansionists. This influence was enhanced by his appointment as Chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories in December, 1901.[7]

Beveridge's attitude toward statehood, however, was alarming. He was quite sincere in his belief that the creation of a new state was of paramount concern to the entire nation because once admitted the act could not by constitutional arrangement be rescinded.[8] Moreover, his suspicions were aroused by the unusual concern certain

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[3] *Albuquerque Citizen*, September 18, 1901, Marion Dargan Papers, Special Collections Division, University of New Mexico Library; Theodore Roosevelt, *The Rough Riders*, New York, 1926, 238–269. A muster-out roll is contained in these pages.

[4] *Las Vegas Daily Optic*, June 26, 1899.

[5] *Hustler* (Farmington), December 15, 1901, Dargan Papers.

[6] *Cong. Record*, 57 Cong., 1 Sess., 5284 (May 12, 1902).

[7] *Ibid.*, 388 (December 18, 1901).

[8] Charles Edgar Maddox, "The Statehood Policy of Albert J. Beveridge: 1901–1911," M. A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1938, 117.

corporate interests were taking in New Mexico and Arizona statehood. An early progressive, Beveridge especially wondered why one of his committee members, Matthew S. Quay, was so deeply interested.

Quay was a shrewd, unscrupulous politician who dominated politics in Pennsylvania as if the state were his personal bailiwick. During Cleveland's second administration he had admittedly speculated in sugar stocks while manipulating the sugar schedules of the Wilson-Gorman tariff.[9] Although a power in the upper house, he was a free lancer, not belonging to the recognized oligarchy of the Old Guard but preferring rather to look after his own interests in his own way.[10]

Beveridge's suspicions regarding Quay's motives coupled with his feeling that statemaking was serious business inspired him to make a brief but controversial investigation of New Mexico, Arizona, and Oklahoma in November, 1902.[11] Beveridge discovered, among other things, that Quay's former lieutenant in Pennsylvania politics, William H. Andrews, was representing a group of Pennsylvania capitalists in a New Mexico railroad venture.[12] The road was the Santa Fe Central Railway which was to stretch from Santa Fe south to Torrance for a distance of approximately 116 miles.[13] *The Chicago Tribune* pictured the railroad's construction as part of the scheme of a large syndicate engaged in building railroads in Arizona and New Mexico. The syndicate wanted statehood for both territories because it believed that in the event of success it would be assisted by the two new states "to the amount of $15,000,000."[14] Quay's interest in New Mexico was considered by Beveridge to be largely due to a desire to help Andrews secure one of New Mexico's

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9 Louis H. Hacker and Benjamin B. Kendrick, *The United States Since 1865*, New York, 1936, 96.

10 Claude G. Bowers, *Beveridge and the Progressive Era*, Cambridge, 1932, 196.

11 Larson, "Statehood for New Mexico, 1888–1912," 139–147.

12 *George Curry, 1861–1949: An Autobiography*, ed., H. B. Hening, Albuquerque, 1958, 189–190. Andrews first came to New Mexico because of an interest in gold mining, but later brought together Willard S. Hopewell, a cattleman from Sierra County, and W. H. Torrance, the head of a group of Pennsylvania capitalists, in the railroad project; see notes on an interview with Billy Bayer, private secretary to Andrews, Dargan Papers.

13 Interstate Commerce Commission, *Decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission of the United States: Valuation Reports, October, 1925–February, 1926*, CVI, 445. The railroad was incorporated on December 7, 1900, under the original name of Santa Fe, Albuquerque, and Pacific Railroad Company.

14 Quoted in *Literary Digest*, December 20, 1902, 829.

seats in the United States Senate and sell bonds for the new railroad.[15]

Formal objections to New Mexico statehood were contained in the majority report of the Committee on Territories issued December 10, 1902, following Beveridge's investigation. The report, called the Beveridge Report, recommended that statehood for New Mexico and Arizona be withheld indefinitely, although it did recommend that Oklahoma and Indian Territory be admitted as one state. The major objection to the two southwestern territories was that they lacked sufficient population to become states. The report also objected to the majority of people in New Mexico being Spanish, claiming that a large percentage of them could only speak their native tongue. Moreover, illiteracy was high, and the arid conditions of the Southwest imposed serious limitations on agriculture.[16]

More significant than the report, however, was its apparent impact on President Roosevelt. Roosevelt had not only failed to mention statehood in his message to Congress in 1902, but now, in a letter to Quay he revealed his change in feeling:

> I have been talking with Senator Beveridge . . . about the territories which are to be admitted as States, and I am very seriously concerned by the facts presented to me in reference to New Mexico and Arizona. I should like to have a chance of talking the matter over with you, for the facts as laid before me do certainly make a strong case against the admission of these 2 territories.[17]

Despite the switch in presidential views Quay pressed for immediate admission. In a minority report he maintained that it was unfair to say that New Mexico's population was insufficient and he attacked the accuracy of the census. Moreover, he complimented the territory on the educational strides it had made.[18] But Beveridge was determined to block action on statehood. For three months he led a filibuster which tied up much of the business in the upper house and prevented the bill from coming to a vote before Congress adjourned.

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15 Beveridge to Albert Shaw, November 29, 1902, Albert J. Beveridge Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). Shaw, one of Beveridge's more influential friends of the press, was editor of *The American Monthly Review of Reviews.*

16 Senate, 57 Cong., 2 Sess., *New Statehood Bill,* Committee on Territories, S. Rept. 2206 to accompany H. R. 12543, Part 1, Washington, 1902, 1–31.

17 Roosevelt to Quay, December 4, 1902, Matthew S. Quay Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

18 Senate, 57 Cong., 2 Sess., *New Statehood Bill,* S. Rept. 2206, Part 2, 1–21.

The sparse population of the southwestern territories proved to be a real liability for statehood boosters. According to the 1900 census New Mexico had 195,310 inhabitants, while Arizona had only 122,931.[19] It was forcefully argued that if statehood were granted the two territories would be overrepresented in Congress, especially in the upper house. Beveridge seemed quite sensitive to this argument. "The idea of [*sic*] ten thousand votes in Nevada should be represented by two Senators in the Senate where Indiana with three million has only the same voting power is something awful."[20] It was probably because of this attitude that the Senator decided to support joint statehood for New Mexico and Arizona. This would entitle the territories to only two senators.

The idea of jointure was not a new one. It had been suggested as early as 1893 when the *Washington Post* commented favorably upon it.[21] It had won the temporary approval of Roosevelt in 1903, but possibly because of advice from Beveridge the President withdrew support for such a plan.[22] It later became evident that Roosevelt was edging toward jointure with Beveridge's approval and support. Near the end of 1903 several territorial leaders including Governor Miguel A. Otero of New Mexico visited Roosevelt to try to convince him that jointure would be unfair to both New Mexico and Arizona. Otero later remarked that their arguments did not impress Roosevelt "in the slightest degree."[23] In October of 1905 Beveridge wrote Shaw quoting a letter from the President in which assurances were given that the joint statehood business would be incorporated into his message to Congress.[24]

True to his word the President on December 5, 1905, recommended jointure in his presidential message to Congress. Calling for the admission of New Mexico and Arizona as one state and Oklahoma and Indian Territory as another he expressed profound regret that so much time already had been spent on the question.[25]

Roosevelt's call for statehood was attributed by many to his love of the West and gratitude to the Rough Riders. Evidence does not

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19 *Abstract of the Twelfth Census of the United States, 1900*, Washington, 1904, 32.

20 Beveridge to Shaw, December 15, 1904, Beveridge Papers.

21 Quoted in the *Santa Fe New Mexican*, December 23, 1893, Dargan Papers.

22 Bowers, *Beveridge and the Progressive Era*, 198–199.

23 Miguel A. Otero, *My Nine Years as Governor of the Territory of New Mexico*, ed. Marion Dargan, Albuquerque, 1940, 218.

24 Beveridge to Shaw, October 28, 1905, Beveridge Papers.

25 *Cong. Record*, 59 Cong., 1 Sess., 105, December 5, 1905.

justify such a conclusion. In one letter the President, referring to jointure for the southwestern territories, declared: "The only reason I want them in as one State now is that I fear the alternative is having them in as two States three or four years hence."[26] Roosevelt evidently did not regard jointure as too important either. Writing to Sir George Trevelyan on January 22, 1906, he placed joint statehood fifth in a five-part list of measures he hoped to see enacted while he was president.[27]

Still the President seemed delighted when the House and Senate agreed in June of 1906 on a conference report calling for jointure. "I am particularly interested in seeing New Mexico and Arizona admitted to statehood while I am president," beamed Roosevelt. "It was these two territories which made up the major part of the rough rider regiment of which I'm so very proud."[28] The bill was signed on June 16, 1906, and during the ceremony Roosevelt reached across the table to shake the hand of Beveridge, congratulating him on a "great battle splendidly fought."[29]

It soon became evident though, that Beveridge and the President differed on the degree of support each would give the joint statehood proposal. The bill called for approval by both territories; a negative vote by either would kill the measure. Beveridge seemed far more determined than Roosevelt for both territories to accept jointure. When opposition to the proposed union began to build up in Arizona the Senator wrote that if the territories were foolish enough to reject this opportunity for statehood they might not have another for fifty years, and certainly not for twenty-five.[30]

Even before the President's jointure recommendation there was agitation against the plan in Arizona, particularly on the part of the territorial governor, J. H. Kibbey. This infuriated Beveridge and he wrote an angry letter to the President in protest. "Does it not . . . appear to you that it would be well for the governors of these territories to keep their hands off on this question which is a policy affecting the nation?"[31] Roosevelt promptly answered, "Governor Kibbey is acting entirely within his rights, and . . . the people of Arizona are acting within theirs, in transmitting any kind of respect-

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[26] Roosevelt to Benjamin I. Wheeler, January 18, 1906, Elting E. Morison, ed., *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, 8 vols., Cambridge, 1951–1954, V, 135.

[27] Roosevelt to Sir George Trevelyan, January 22, 1906, *ibid.*, 136–137.

[28] *Albuquerque Morning Journal*, June 19, 1906, Dargan Papers.

[29] Bowers, *Beveridge and the Progressive Era*, 235.

[30] Beveridge to James M. Creighton, June 19, 1906, Beveridge Papers.

[31] Beveridge to Roosevelt, March 20, 1905, *ibid.*

ful protest they wish to make." The President calmly added that Congress after receiving such protests must "act as it deems best, paying only such heed to the petition as in its judgment the needs of the nation warrant."[32] Roosevelt held true to this position. Some four months before the November referendum on jointure the President answered another protest regarding Kibbey's conduct by declaring that federal officials have as much right as other citizens to express their sentiments and vote as they please.[33] On November 6 the referendum on jointure was held. Although New Mexico voted in favor of consolidation, Arizona killed the proposal by a vote of 16,265 to 3,141.[34] Beveridge could not help but be bitter and seemed to blame Roosevelt, at least in part.

> Furthermore, Governor Kibbel [*sic*] . . . really convinced the people that while President Roosevelt had done this as a matter of policy, still in heart, he was against joint statehood, as was proved by the opposition to that measure by his appointees.[35]

With the defeat of joint statehood Beveridge continued his opposition against separate statehood for New Mexico and Arizona. But Roosevelt now felt that resistance was futile. "You will have to take them both in," he wrote Beveridge. "You can not take them both in together, and by keeping them out . . . you merely irritate the people there against the Republican party."[36] Shaw felt that Roosevelt's surrender was shocking. "You presented the case to him in terms of statesmanship," he wrote Beveridge. "He replied to you in terms of cheap politics. I do not think you would be justified in ever alluding to the question to him again, even in casual conversation."[37]

What caused the President to change his mind is not entirely clear. Perhaps it was just practical politics. Beveridge, however, believed that the presence of Captain George Curry was significant.[38] Curry was an old Rough Rider companion of the President. When a series of land and timber fraud cases resulted in the dismissal of New Mexico's governor, Herbert J. Hagerman, Curry was recalled from military duty in the Philippines to become the new governor.

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32 Roosevelt to Beveridge, March 20, 1905, *ibid.*
33 Roosevelt to Dr. Mark A. Rodgers, June 27, 1907, *ibid.*
34 Rufus Kay Wyllys, *Arizona: The History of a Frontier State,* Phoenix, 1950, 302.
35 Beveridge to Shaw, November 16, 1906, Beveridge Papers.
36 Roosevelt to Beveridge, November 19, 1908, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
37 Shaw to Beveridge, November 27, 1908, Beveridge Papers.
38 Bowers, *Beveridge and the Progressive Era,* 267.

It was a popular appointment both in the territory and in Washington. Taft, the President's capable Secretary of War, had recommended it.[39]

Exposures continued in the New Mexico scandal but apparently Roosevelt was satisfied with Curry's work for he began to move closer to a position of unqualified support of separate statehood. On August 30, 1907, an Associated Press release from Oyster Bay, New York, announced that no effort would be made by the administration to bring up joint statehood in Congress again.[40] In the summer of 1908 the Republican National Convention included for the first time an unequivocal statehood plank in the party platform.[41] Finally on December 7, 1908, Roosevelt recommended the immediate admission of Arizona and New Mexico:

> This should be done at the present session of Congress. The people of the two Territories have made it evident by their votes that they will not come in as one State. The only alternative is to admit them as two, and I trust that this will be done without delay.[42]

But time was short. The President's term would expire in March and his hand-picked successor, William Howard Taft, would take over. Taft's attitude, consequently, became increasingly important as the last days of the colorful Roosevelt Era came to a close. Curry sensed this and called upon the President-elect at Hot Springs, Virginia, to ascertain his views on separate statehood for New Mexico. Taft indicated his warm support, but because he had no official standing at that time could promise no support during the remainder of Roosevelt's term.[43]

Nevertheless, with the powerful backing of Theodore Roosevelt, a bill calling for separate statehood for New Mexico and Arizona passed the House on February 15, 1909,[44] and reached the Senate. Optimism was high with a poll showing that three-fourths of the Senators were in favor of admitting the two territories into the Union.[45] But Beveridge was still opposed despite Roosevelt's advice. Moreover, the Senator was still chairman of the Committee on Territories and intended to use this position to obstruct the statehood bill. When his committee met on February 27, he and Senator Knute

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39 *George Curry, 1861–1947: An Autobiography*, 187.
40 *Deming Headlight*, September 12, 1907, Dargan Papers.
41 Kirk H. Porter, *National Party Platforms*, New York, 1924, 309.
42 *Cong. Record*, 60 Cong., 2 Sess., 26, December 7, 1908.
43 *Washington Herald*, December 5, 1908, Dargan Papers.
44 *Cong. Record*, 60 Cong., 2 Sess., 2423, February 15, 1909.
45 *El Paso Herald*, February 5, 1909, Dargan Papers.

Nelson of Minnesota read statements which if they did not implicate territoral officials in the recent New Mexico scandal charged them with a lack of cooperation.[46] Beveridge's effort brought to a halt the statehood movement during the remaining days of Roosevelt's "lame duck" Congress. Consequently, the President's great reputation as a friend of the West did not spell admission for New Mexico and Arizona.

It was now up to Taft. Despite the known friendship of the newly inaugurated President, failure of the first session of the 61st Congress to take action prompted some to believe that Taft's professions of interest and understanding were less than sincere. Such fears were unfounded because Taft's support never wavered. The admission of New Mexico and Arizona had been a Roosevelt policy in 1908 and would be continued during his administration. Strong pressures, however, were brought to bear. Beveridge persevered, and having failed with Roosevelt tried to convince Taft that the territories were not ready for admission. His approach was frankly political. "Arizona could have one congressman and New Mexico two. Should they be democratic, they might be sufficient to make the next Congress Democratic."[47] Regardless of the Senator's plea that statehood be put off until after the 1910 census Taft remained unmoved.

Insults were hurled at the President, but they did not alter his stand. While Taft was a guest at the Alvarado Hotel in Albuquerque in October, 1909, Albert B. Fall, who was supposed to deliver an address extolling the virtues of the President, instead devoted his time of questioning his sincerity. New Mexico leaders were shocked, but the President handled the embarrassing situation with dignity. "Judge Fall," Taft remarked, "I have heard your argument and am for your cause in spite of it."[48]

Friends of statehood were concerned when Curry resigned as governor of New Mexico. This was not due to a policy difference between the President and Curry, but rather, was the result of a personality difference between the Governor and Taft's controversial Secretary of Interior, Richard A. Ballinger. Although this controversy has been largely obscured by Ballinger's feud with Gifford Pinchot, it is indicative of the President's difficulties in working with Roosevelt lieutenants during his term of office.

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[46] *Arizona Republican*, February 28, 1909, Dargan Papers.

[47] Beveridge to Taft, September 2, 1909, as quoted in Maddox, "The Statehood Policy of Albert J. Beveridge: 1901–1911," 107–108.

[48] *George Curry, 1861–1947: An Autobiography*, 245.

Curry and Ballinger first clashed while the latter was Commissioner of Public Lands in Roosevelt's administration. Curry had gone over Ballinger's head to the President in order to rescind a directive requiring homesteaders in the vicinity of Clovis to surrender their claims and take options on the public domain elsewhere.[49] Ballinger never forgot it and according to the Governor extended his vengeful attitude toward "practically everything having to do with New Mexico's welfare, including our efforts for statehood."[50] Because of this the Governor resigned giving financial difficulties as the reason. Although Taft eloquently praised Curry's "honesty and loyalty" in accepting the resignation,[51] he apparently was not alarmed over Ballinger's alleged persecution of the Governor. "I have sent the enclosed letter accepting Gov. Curry's resignation," wrote Taft to his Secretary of Interior. "I don't think it necessary to pay any attention to the charges."[52]

Notwithstanding all the pressures, insults, and intrigue, when the second session of the 61st Congress began, Andrews, New Mexico's new delegate to Congress, was able to say:

> The President is a strong advocate of the measure and his cabinet is enthusiastic. The House is absolutely for the bill . . . and an overwhelming majority of senators favor statehood for the territory.[53]

The delegate's predictions were apparently well founded, for a statehood measure to admit New Mexico and Arizona on a separate basis passed the House by a two-thirds majority[54] and was sent to the Senate where it was referred to the Committee on Territories. The *Deming Graphic,* a New Mexico paper, while praising the "indefatigable efforts" of statehood backers in Congress did warn, however, of Senate amendments which might delay final admission until 1912.[55] Sensing the growing split between Taft and Roosevelt forces this same journal later cautioned patience with the President. Bear with Taft and don't expect him to "drive his way through with the big stick" for "Taft is Taft, splendidly trained, widely experienced" and, above all, tactful. Taft's "inexorable firmness" in the Pinchot affair was then cited as an indication of his toughness.[56]

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49 *Ibid.,* 225–226.
50 *Ibid.,* 226.
51 Taft to Curry, November 15, 1909, Taft Papers.
52 Taft to Ballinger, November 15, 1909, *ibid.*
53 *Deming Graphic,* January 7, 1910, Dargan Papers.
54 *Cong. Record,* 61 Cong., 2 Sess., 714, January 17, 1910.
55 *Deming Graphic,* January 21, 1910, Dargan Papers.
56 *Deming Graphic,* January 28, 1910, *ibid.*

Although the usual delay was encountered in the Senate, Beveridge was tiring of his long campaign against statehood. The party platform, the stand of the Taft administration, and the vote on jointure all made further opposition seem quite futile. Beveridge therefore accepted the inevitable, but was determined to pass a statehood measure free of "jokers" hurting the people's interests.[57] To this end, he put the process of constitution-making under the close supervision of the federal government and slashed the generous land provisions of the House bill. The ratified constitutions of the new states were to be returned to the President and Congress for final approval.[58] Prior to this it had only been necessary to secure the approval of the President and this was usually a perfunctory matter. Beveridge's philosophy that national interests must be placed above those of territories seeking admission was thus incorporated into the bill. Reductions in the land allotment were accompanied by rigid safeguards intended to avoid further frauds and scandals in connection with the distribution of public land.[59]

When Beveridge's amendments were approved by the Senate it was evident that the Senate version must be reconciled with the original House measure. Supporters of statehood hoped that the considerable prestige of the President could accomplish this. Taft was active. In his famous letter to Roosevelt on May 26, 1910, in which he tried to halt the growing split between them, he listed as one of the chief accomplishments of his administration the statehood measure. "The Statehood bills have passed the House and will in some form pass the Senate. . . ."[60]

The President had been reported to favor the House measure with certain modifications, and had made it known through his advisers that he wanted a conference called to work out an agreement. Representative Edward L. Hamilton of Michigan, sponsor of the House version, after arranging for such a meeting, called upon the President on June 17 to discuss the matter. To his amazement and chagrin he was told that the Senate measure was preferred and that the House should accede.[61] In light of Taft's wishes

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57 Bowers, *Beveridge and the Progressive Era*, 379.

58 Senate, 61 Cong., 2 Sess., *An Act Enabling the People of New Mexico and Arizona to Form a Constitution and State Government, Etc.*, Committee on Territories, S. Rept. 454 to accompany H. R. 18166, Washington, 1910, 1–2.

59 *Ibid.*, 18.

60 Taft to Roosevelt, May 26, 1910, Taft Papers.

61 *New York World*, June 18, 1910.

the House unanimously accepted the Senate version of the statehood bill on June 18.[62]

When Taft signed the enabling act for the territories on June 20, 1910, friends in New Mexico and Arizona had only effusive praise for him. "... it has certainly made President Taft immensely popular, because we believe that it was due to his deep interest in the matter and persistent effort that statehood was finally accomplished," one prominent Arizonan was quoted as saying.[63] There was even speculation that Taft's action might help to reconcile the growing differences between him and Roosevelt. The timing of Taft's signature was significant. Roosevelt had returned from his world travels two days before and was greeted at the dock by a large contingent of wartime comrades including Curry and another New Mexican, Major W. H. H. Llewellyn.[64]

Up to the time the enabling act was signed Taft and Roosevelt saw eye to eye on the statehood question. There could be little doubt that Taft had carried out the Roosevelt program on this issue. However, when the two territories began to frame their constitutions this harmony was soon broken. The sweep of progressivism throughout the country had found the two men reacting differently; Taft disturbed, Roosevelt delighted. Direct legislation, one of the key goals of the Progressive Movement, was to produce serious conflict between the two men and involve New Mexico and Arizona. Pioneered in Wisconsin and Oregon direct legislation was making rapid headway in the West as many a state constitution underwent amendment. New Mexico and Arizona, as the last contiguous, continental territories to be admitted, had new constitutions to formulate and consequently became real battlegrounds for the political issues of the day.

Taft, hoping to stem the tide, intervened in New Mexico by urging that territory to adopt "a safe and sane constitution."[65]

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62 *Cong. Record,* 61 Cong., 2 Sess., 8487, June 18, 1910.

63 *Washington Herald,* June 19, 1910, Dargan Papers.

64 *Santa Fe New Mexican,* June 5, 1910, Dargan Papers. The paper cited the departure of the two men from New Mexico to greet their former colonel in New York.

65 *Santa Fe New Mexican,* undated, William H. Andrews Scrapbook, Special Collections Division, University of New Mexico Library. Andrews served as New Mexico's delegate to Congress from 1904 until the territory's admission; House, 62 Cong., 1 Sess., *Hearings Before the Committee on the Territories of the House of Representatives on House Resolution No. 14: Approving the Constitutions Formed by the Constitutional Conventions of the Territories of New Mexico and Arizona,* Committee on the Territories, Washington, 1911, 6. Fall testified before the House committee that he had heard Taft remark at several places that he wanted New Mexico to adopt such a constitution.

When the constitutional convention at Santa Fe adopted a constitution with a watered-down referendum measure and an almost impossible amending article,[66] Taft seemed pleased, and on February 24, 1911, recommended the constitution's approval by Congress.[67] Earlier Taft had tried to influence thinking in Arizona. During a visit in 1909 the President observed that strong labor forces under the guidance of a prominent businessman, George W. P. Hunt, had gained control of the Arizona legislature. Taft subtly warned the territory at that time to refrain from writing radical provisions in its constitution.[68] But in this case Taft's advice was ignored. Arizona adopted a constitution considered radical for its time, containing measures for initiative, referendum, and recall, and a child labor provision.[69]

Of the provisions in the new document the recall was thought to be "most dangerous." Prior to Arizona's adoption of the measure only Oregon had incorporated such a provision into her constitution. Although California was to follow shortly, the newness of this instrument of direct legislation caused lifted eyebrows.[70] The inclusion of judges in the provision only made it more unacceptable. According to the Arizona recall clause any elected officer, having been in office six months or more, was subject to a recall election upon the petition of 25 per cent of the voters who participated in the last election.[71]

Roosevelt's views on constitution-making were in sharp contrast with Taft's. While traveling through the West on the tour that he was to cap with his famous declaration at Osawatomie, he warned the people of Arizona and New Mexico against the dangers of having an "iron-clad" constitution, not easily amended. Speaking at Pueblo, Colorado, he cautioned friends who had written for his advice to be on guard against "doctrinaires" and "designing corporation lawyers" who would incorporate "jokers or impractical propositions" into the new constitutions which could not be easily

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66 Larson, "Statehood for New Mexico, 1888–1912," Chap. X.

67 Copy of President Taft's message, William H. Andrews File, Special Collections Division, University of New Mexico Library.

68 Edward H. Peplow, Jr., *History of Arizona,* 2 vols., New York, 1959, II, 17.

69 *Ibid.,* 22–25.

70 Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root,* 2 vols., New York, 1938, II, 242. Root was one of many prominent figures strongly opposed to Arizona's recall provision.

71 Arizona, *Constitution,* Art. 8, sec. 1, 5 as quoted in *Arizona Code,* compiled under supervision of the members of the Supreme Court of Arizona, Indianapolis, 1939, I, 153.

taken out.[72] Moreover, after Arizona had adopted its controversial constitution, Roosevelt assured the people of the territory that he would work for their admission into the Union.[73] As for the recall provision the former President was to shock Taft in February, 1912, by coming out flatly for an even more extreme proposal, the "recall of judicial decisions" by popular vote.[74]

The constitutional efforts of New Mexico and Arizona were to divide Congress, too. As the proposed instruments of each of the would-be states reached the Congress battle lines began to form. Democrats and progressives attacked the difficult amending clause of the New Mexico constitution, which required at least one-half the counties to comprise any majority ratifying a proposed amendment. Conservatives flayed the recall provision of the Arizona constitution which allegedly jeopardized the judiciary. Senator Elihu Root of New York warned that decisions of judicial officials would be judged according to newspaper accounts, "necessarily brief and partial." Even Senator William E. Borah of Idaho, a progressive Republican, expressed his concern over the threat to a "free and independent judiciary."[75] However, progressive Senator Miles Poindexter of Washington was not alarmed. "All these arguments against this constitution," he said, "resolve themselves into this proposition that the people of the state are given too much power." He contended that the people could be trusted with full power.[76]

Congress finally resolved the conflict by approving the so-called Flood resolution, introduced by Henry D. Flood, the new Democratic chairman of the House territorial committee. According to this resolution a substitute for New Mexico's amending article would be voted upon by the citizens of the new state at the first state election, while Arizonans would have to vote on a substitute for their recall provision. If the people of Arizona voted to retain the recall article, however, this highly controversial section of the Arizona constitution would become law.[77]

A decision regarding the Flood resolution would now be Taft's. Everyone knew the President agreed wholeheartedly with Root and

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72 Undated newspaper clipping, Andrews Scrapbook.
73 *El Paso Times,* April 21, 1911, Dargan Papers.
74 Jessup, *Elihu Root,* II, 242–243.
75 *Raton Daily Range,* August 7, 1911, Andrews Scrapbook.
76 *Ibid.*
77 *Cong. Record,* 62 Cong., 1 Sess., 3742–3743, August 8, 1911. The resolution, including Senate amendments that were later approved by the House, is contained in these pages.

Borah but would he veto the resolution and destroy New Mexico's as well as Arizona's chances for statehood? Some felt Taft would allow the bill to become law without his signature, while others predicted a veto. The latter speculation seemed most valid as the President reportedly had informed opponents of recall in the Senate that he would never stand for the provision.[78]

True to his word President Taft on August 15, 1911, vetoed the Flood resolution. Referring to the recall he declared:

> This provision of the Arizona constitution, in its application to county and State judges, seems to me so pernicious in its effect, so destructive of independence in the judiciary, so likely to subject the rights of the individual to the possible tyranny of a popular majority, and, therefore, to be so injurious to the cause of free government, that I must disapprove a constitution containing it.[79]

The reaction was explosive. Conservatives were delighted and when the message was read to the House a burst of applause rose from the Republican side while the Democrats remained silent.[80] Leading newspapers like *The Chicago Tribune* and the *New York World* supported the action.[81] The latter hailed Taft's veto as a measure which would halt the drift of unenlightened opinion being exploited by demagogic leaders.[82] But territorial papers were indignant. Because New Mexico was included in the Flood resolution, her statehood hopes were dashed too. Consequently one New Mexico journal labeled the veto an "act of wanton, without reason, without justification and without precedent."[83]

The President was quite sensitive to public reaction. Responding to a telegram sent by a group of citizens from Las Vegas, New Mexico, he stated: "The spirit with which you bear the disappointment of delayed Statehood reassures me and strengthens my con-

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78 *New York World*, August 9, 1911, Dargan Papers; Thomas J. Mabry, "New Mexico's Constitution in the Making—Reminiscence of 1910," *New Mexico Historical Review*, XIX (April, 1944), 181. Taft, the day after Congressional approval of the Flood resolution, told a delegation of New Mexico Democrats, of which Mabry was a member, that he intended to veto the resolution even though he "heartily" endorsed New Mexico's Constitution.

79 House, 62 Cong., 1 Sess., *Special Message of the President of the United States Returning Without Approval House Joint Resolution No. 14*, H. Doc. 106, Washington, 1911, 2.

80 *Rock Island Tribune*, August 17, 1911, Andrews Scrapbook.

81 Taft to Franklin MacVeagh, Secretary of the Treasury, August 16, 1911. Taft expressed relief that the *Tribune* was supporting him. "The Chicago Tribune attitude is very valuable."

82 *New York World*, August 16, 1911, Dargan Papers.

83 *Roosevelt County Herald*, August 17, 1911, as quoted in the *Portales Daily News*, January 3, 1939, Dargan Papers.

viction with respect to the performance of an unpleasant duty."[84] A look at the Taft correspondence following his veto reveals that the President was grateful for all the support he could get.[85]

There was talk in Congress of overriding the presidential veto but cooler heads prevailed. Senator William Alden Smith of Michigan, the new chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories,[86] presented a resolution on August 17 which would amend the Flood measure by requiring that the recall provision be eliminated from the Arizona constitution—such action to be voted upon by the people of the territory. New Mexico would still vote on an easier amending clause, although the vote would have no bearing upon her admission.[87] Both houses approved of the compromise resolution and President Taft signed it on August 21, 1911, allowing New Mexico and Arizona to conduct their first state elections.[88] On January 6, 1912, Taft signed the proclamation admitting New Mexico into the Union, and on February 14, 1912, he proclaimed Arizona a state. After affixing his signature to the New Mexico proclamation Taft, no doubt remembering the many years he and Roosevelt had spent wrestling with this statehood issue, remarked: "Well, it is all over. I am glad to give you life. I hope you will be healthy."[89]

Taft had achieved one aspect of his predecessor's program. Although Roosevelt had shown little initial enthusiasm for New Mexico statehood, much less Arizona's admission, by 1908 he had become thoroughly committed to separate statehood for both. Taft in this regard conscientiously pushed the Roosevelt program. It was only when the constitutions of the two territories were formulated and presented that the differing political philosophies of the two men came into conflict. Both had achieved their objective—statehood for the southwestern territories—but the differences revealed in the process proved to be irreconcilable.

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84 Taft to Secundino Romero and others, August 16, 1911, Taft Papers.
85 Box 34, Taft Papers.
86 Beveridge had lost his Senate seat in the Congressional election of 1910.
87 *Cong. Record*, 62 Cong., 1 Sess., 4061, August 17, 1911.
88 *Clovis News*, August 24, 1911, Andrews Scrapbook.
89 *George Curry, 1861–1947: An Autobiography*, 262. Curry was one of the two congressmen-elect from New Mexico who along with Andrews, the last territorial delegate, witnessed the signing of the proclamation.

New Light on the Anglo-American Reaction to the Ethiopian War, 1935-1936

Recent studies dealing with Anglo-American diplomacy and the Ethiopian war have pointed up the ambiguities and inherent contradictions which marred the efforts of the English-speaking powers to fashion an adequate response to Benito Mussolini's Ethiopian aggression. The State Department's reaction and that of its Secretary has been described as "one both of expediency and advocacy" (of peace), primarily conditioned in the crucible of Anglo-Italian disagreement. This dual approach was necessitated by domestic as well as foreign considerations and was a major step in Cordell Hull's untiring quest to restore the twin pillars of legality and morality to the tottering structure of the international state system. At first, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to circumvent the restrictive efforts of the Congressional Neutrality Resolution of August 1935 by pursuing "a bold neutrality policy," but the end result was a "disillusioning experience." The British Cabinet was also "committed to riding two horses"—unable to choose between conciliating Mussolini and shoring up an already weakened League of Nations.[1] Ultimately, the decisions taken, as these studies carefully demonstrate, were neither consistent nor well-

[1] See Henderson B. Braddick, "A New Look at American Policy during the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis, 1935–1936," *Journal of Modern History*, XXXIV, No. 1 (March, 1962), 64–73, hereafter cited as "A New Look"; Robert A. Divine, *The Illusion of Neutrality*, Chicago, 1962, 122–134; A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War*, London, 1961, 90–101. Pierre Renouvin, *Les crises du XX*e *siècle*, II, Paris, 1958, 84–90, stresses the similar French dilemma of being unable to choose between a reconstruction of the Stresa Front (and a reconciliation with Mussolini) or the implementation of a vigorous policy of sanctions. In trying to achieve both, France was effective in neither. Her support of Britain's diplomatic efforts was at best "reticent," and largely consisted of "a policy of half-measures." For a highly sympathetic treatment of the Duce's aims and actions see Georges-Roux, *Mussolini*, Paris, 1960, 213–214. On September 10, 1935, before hostilities had actually broken out, the French Premier, Pierre Laval, drew a clear distinction from the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, regarding the desirability of a sanctions policy to be directed at specific cases of aggression, as opposed to a general application of sanctions in the event of a non-aggressive violation of treaties. See the testimony of Pierre-Étienne Flandin in Assemblée Nationale, Commission d'Enquête Parlementaire, *Les événements survenus en France de 1933 A 1945*, I, Paris, 1951, 148, hereafter cited as *Les événements survenus.*

executed, though the dangers arising from Italy's new imperium were clearly recognized. Moreover, materials now available, or previously neglected, reveal in addition the significant role of certain American diplomats, especially Ambassador Breckenridge Long, in the formulation of this country's Ethiopian policy, and they further emphasize the serious divisions which had arisen within the United States and Great Britain concerning the nature of their obligations and commitments.

During the summer of 1935, while the situation in Ethiopia was undergoing a rapid deterioration, and following Anthony Eden's trip to Rome, which proved a hastily conceived attempt to persuade the *Duce* to give up his Ethiopian claims in return for a strip of British Somaliland that would provide Italy with a corridor to the Red Sea,[2] the American Ambassador in Rome held an "unauthorized conversation" with the Italian dictator. It was a disarmingly frank *tour d'horizon* and included emphatic demands by Mussolini for a free hand in Ethiopia. Apparently Ambassador Long neglected to relay this information in direct form to Washington, although he considered the *Duce's* expressed desire for an arrangement with the Western powers to share "partial responsibility in the Mediterranean" as having significance.[3] Perhaps Long realized that despite his many warnings about an impending conflict, neither Hull nor Roosevelt were showing much interest in the growing dispute, except as it affected British foreign policy and the general state of European peace. But once the war between Italy and Ethiopia had actually gotten underway, Long lost no time in writing to the President with his own analysis of the causes and likely consequences of this untoward event. His comments were both unusual and significant.

"I am unable to see any moral element in this whole war," the American diplomat complained. "To me, it is not a holy

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[2] Robert Lord Vansittart, *The Mist Procession,* London, 1958, 530–531; Pierre-Étienne Flandin, *Politique française, 1919–1940,* Paris, 1947, 178–179; Henderson B. Braddick, "The Hoare-Laval Plan: A Study in International Politics," *Review of Politics,* XXIV, No. 3 (July, 1962), 346–347; Mario Toscano, "Eden's Mission to Rome on the Eve of the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict," article in A. O. Sarkissian, ed., *Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography in Honor of G. P. Gooch,* New York, 1961, 126–152; Lord Avon [Anthony Eden], *Facing the Dictators,* London, 1962, 221–228. The projected offer stirred up little enthusiasm among the British press and much opposition within the French Cabinet.

[3] Long Diary, February 18, 1938, Container 5; Breckenridge Long Collection, The Library of Congress Manuscripts Division, hereafter cited as Long *MSS.*

war." Approving the condemnation of Italy by the League, he nevertheless singled out the "driving force" of England in securing that resolution and went on to cast grave doubts upon England's moral justification for this action. Long broadly hinted that England herself had been preparing a commerical penetration of Ethiopia and had denied to the Italians the very same economic privileges for which she was so ardently, and successfully, striving.[4]

On November 15, 1935, six weeks after the outbreak of the Ethiopian war, Secretary Hull took what happened to be a firm *démarche,* given the cautious hesitations of the European diplomats following on the heels of their initially strong reaction, and declared that American exports of oil, steel, scrap iron, trucks and other items would remain at their normal prewar levels, a declaration which the Secretary was later to call a "moral embargo." The guidelines for this policy had actually been laid down in October and at the beginning of November,[5] but the President was not entirely confident as to either the direction of American policy or to the course of Mediterranean events. Just seven days after Hull's announcement the Chief Executive wrote to Robert Bingham, American Ambassador at the Court of St. James, requesting from him the answers to three specific questions: 1. Were the British and French Governments of the conviction that the Ethiopians would be able to hold out until the coming of the spring rains? 2. Did Bingham believe that those sanctions already imposed would become so effective that Italy would "either succumb or begin to crack up within three or four months?" 3. If things did go badly for Mussolini in Ethiopia, or at home, would he then pick a quarrel with Great Britain leading to an attack upon her Mediterranean fleet?[6] These questions clearly reveal the lingering doubts and

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[4] Letter of October 30, 1935, President's Secretary's File: Breckenridge Long, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, hereafter cited as FDR. Count de Chambrun, the French Ambassador to Rome, told the American diplomat William Phillips that an agreement could have been reached between Italy and Ethiopia, if it were not for British pressure; Memorandum of October 8, 1936, Folio XXXVI, William Phillips Collection, The Houghton Library, Harvard University. Flandin, *Politique française,* 178 and 180, claims that Mussolini first thought (until Eden's visit of June 25, 1935) that he had secured tacit British approval for his Ethiopian designs, but that the fear of losing the general election of November 1935 forced the Conservative Government into a militant anti-Italian posture. France, according to Flandin, "played the role of a dupe. . . ." *Ibid.,* 192.

[5] Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull,* I, New York, 1948, 435, hereafter cited as *Memoirs.* The "sanctions" imposed by the League did not, of course, include the key commodity of oil.

[6] Letter of November 23, 1935; FDR, President's Personal File 716.

excessive caution attending the President during those critical months.

Although it appears that there was no immediate reply, Breckenridge Long gave Roosevelt all that he had asked of Bingham, and more than he had bargained for, in an extremely important and lengthy letter of November 29. Sanctions, declared the Ambassador to Rome, meant war pure and simple. Anyone who believed Mussolini to be bluffing was mistaken. "There are only two alternatives, one is for him to quit and the other is for him to fight.... I have no doubt that he will do it if the embargo is undertaken. That will mean the European war." And when war came, America was more than likely to become involved; certainly she would be affected if an embargo was imposed upon oil. "If we take the action which serves as a predicate for League action," Long warned, "then we will be morally responsible for precipitating the European war and we will suffer the consequences of it." The only policy to follow was the one that the United States had just undertaken. None the less, it was rather ironic that the Italian Foreign Office, the British Embassy in Rome, the Italian press, and practically every informed observer had full knowledge of America's intentions—except Breckenridge Long, who had been neither consulted nor informed by Washington! With the judicious use of proper restraints, the Ambassador argued, there was a chance that Mussolini might go bankrupt, or at least be forced to limit his activities. In any event, Long again urged the President "not too overstep the limits of strict propriety as regards our international conduct," and so "not be held to have gone out of our way to commit a hostile act against Italy...."[7]

There was indeed a growing belief among Western diplomats that Mussolini would react strongly to any oil embargo and that the probability of war would be greatly increased under these conditions;[8] thus, the United States continued along the cautious

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7 FDR, President's Secretary's File: Breckenridge Long.

8 See Braddick, "A New Look," *loc cit.*, 69. Georges Bonnet, French Minister of Commerce at the time of the Ethiopian crisis, states emphatically that the British delegation at Geneva during the League Council session was extremely reticent about pushing sanctions "thoroughly against Italy." Sir Samuel Hoare, then British Foreign Secretary, freely admitted to Bonnet that Britain did not desire to apply oil sanctions, fearing a Mediterranean war for which her navy was unprepared; Georges Bonnet, *Le Quai d'Orsay sous trois républiques*, Paris, 1961, 142, hereafter cited as *Le Quai d'Orsay*. On the other hand, former President Albert Lebrun testified in the French parliamentary investigations at the end of the Second World War that Premier Pierre Laval was responsible for limiting the sanctions, specifically avoiding that of oil, which France and England

course laid down by Roosevelt and Hull, and belatedly approved by Ambassador Long. Still, the Secretary's easily aroused moral indignation was once more rising due to the prolongation of the unequal conflict, and in early December, during several important conversations with the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay, Hull indicated his "disappointment" over Britain's lukewarm stand in the League of Nations. Refusing to commit the United States openly to a total embargo, Hull nevertheless had begun to turn over in his mind "the project of requesting such legislation from Congress."[9] At this decisive moment futher warnings arrived from Europe.

"The English have put themselves in the worst plight since the war," wrote the American Cassandra in Berlin, Ambassador William E. Dodd. The smaller European nations were threatening withdrawal from the League if France and England did not stand up to Italy; while on the other hand, Dodd grudgingly admitted, "there is an intense fear of war. . . ."[10] And on this very day Minister Hugh Gibson was writing the President from Switzerland, conveying a plague-on-both-your-houses attitude which strongly resembled the tone of Breckenridge Long's earlier warnings, asserting that the Italo-Ethiopian (and English) conflict was completely devoid of moral issues. "One is on the aggressive; the other on the defensive. But neither of them deserves any sympathy on moral grounds. Each of them is operating from selfish motives."[11] Revelation of the Hoare-Laval Pact in mid-December provided the clinching argument against any unilateral American action, a feeling which was shared by a suspicious Congress. Thus, on December 31, 1935, Assistant Secretary of State R. Walton

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had previously agreed to apply; *Les événements survenus*, IV, 959. Lebrun is supported by Édouard Herriot and Pierre-Étienne Flandin, both Ministers of State in the Laval Cabinet. Flandin claims that the English stand on sanctions was a disingenuous one, prompted by the pressures of the November, 1935, general election. He also makes the telling point that "closing the Suez Canal would have rendered practically impossible the position of the Italian army in Eritrea," maintaining that the concentration of the British fleet in the Mediterranean was a "theatrical" maneuver designed to cover up British military weakness; Flandin, *Politique française*, 186 and 192. Cf. Édouard Herriot, *Jadis*, II, Paris, 1952, 613. The Soviet Union, surprisingly, "never supplied Italy with more oil than during the Abyssinian conflict..."; Letter from the British Embassy in Moscow to the Foreign Office, February 20, 1939; E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds. *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, Third Series, IV, London, 1951, 611.

[9] Hull, *Memoirs*, I, 441–442.

[10] Dodd to Roosevelt, December 15, 1935; FDR, President's Secretary's File: William E. Dodd.

[11] Letter of December 15, 1935; FDR, Diplomatic Correspondence: Hugh Wilson.

Moore wrote the President: "The more the matter has been thought about here, the more we are inclined to believe that the [present neutrality] law is sufficiently flexible. . . ."[12]

One direct result of the Hoare-Laval plan and the controversy which it engendered was the promotion of Anthony Eden to the position of British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a temporary victory for the advocates of stronger sanctions. In fact the new Foreign Minister was reported to have declared shortly before his departure for Geneva in January 1936: "do not forget that the League of Nations is our first 'Capital Ship.' "[13] American policy makers, however, had settled into a mood of watchful waiting, though comparative inactivity was also marked by grave Presidential apprehensions. To the American Ambassador in Paris Roosevelt confided: "One cannot help feeling that the whole European panorama is fundamentally blacker than at any time in your lifetime or mine."[14] One week later, on February 22, 1936, the President responded to the gloomy forebodings coming from his friend in Rome: "We all watch the daily news from Europe with, I think, the feeling each day that the next will bring a major explosion."[15] And to the pessimistic Dodd, isolated in Berlin, the Chief Executive

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[12] FDR, President's Secretary's File: Neutrality. Three years later Pierre Laval confidentially told the Italian Consul General in Paris that while negotiating the Hoare-Laval agreement, he had proposed to aid Italy both financially and economically in developing the Ethiopian concessional zone. Hoare replied that he could make no final commitments, "not being the Chief of Government, but that he was of the same opinion"; Letter of Amadeo Landini to Minister of Popular Culture, Paris, December 31, 1938. Documents Captured from the Italian Archives (Microfilm), Container 475, Frame 043621, The National Archives, Washington, D. C., hereafter cited as Italian Documents. The French (both participants and historians) have taken a highly critical view of the role of the United States Senate and the declarations of Cordell Hull, implying by circuitous reasoning that much of the blame for the failure of sanctions can be attributed to their actions and attitudes; Cf Flandin's testimony in *Les événements survenus*, I, 146; Renouvin, *Les crises du XX^e siècle*, II, 86–87.

[13] Unsigned memorandum (in French) entitled "Conferenza," Italian Documents, Container 417, Frame 007937. Bonnet, *Le Quai d'Orsay*, 141, claims Eden's undisguised hostility toward Italy stemmed from the hostile reception Mussolini accorded him during his special mission of conciliation to Rome in June 1935, when Eden unsuccessfully attempted to defuse the crisis before it exploded into war. Flandin, who had become French Foreign Minister in January 1936, rejected out of hand Eden's March 2 proposal at Geneva to apply oil sanctions, arguing that they could not possibly be effective without American participation and that, given recent Italian successes, sanctions would no longer work. The only solution, therefore, lay in a return to the Stresa Front, see *Les événements survenus*, I, 146.

[14] Letter of February 13, 1936; FDR, President's Secretary's File: Strauss.

[15] Roosevelt to Long, February 22, 1936; Long *MSS.*, General Correspondence 1936, Container 117.

expressed his fears that although the "experts" were predicting that there would be no war, "they said the same thing all through July 1914. . . ."[16]

In retrospect the uneasiness of Roosevelt and his overseas confidants appears greatly exaggerated and the specter of war a mere phantom. Dodd had noted in mid-December and again on April 1 that the German people overwhelmingly, perhaps by as much as two-thirds, favored the application of sanctions, and that until the Hoare-Laval Pact even the Nazi leadership had been silent on the sanctions issue. But once the Anglo-French alliance had struck its colors, Goebbels immediately rushed to the support of Italy's "colonial needs," with the implication that Germany would soon be looking forward to the restoration of her former colonies. "If Woodrow Wilson's bones do not turn in the Cathedral grave," Dodd sadly mused, "then bones never turn in graves."[17]

Breckenridge Long, however, was still convinced that war had been "literally escaped by an eyelash." Seeking to enhance his political reputation before giving up his post in Rome, Long grimly reminded Key Pittman, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that Europe had twice been on the brink of war during the preceding six months—once in September 1935, when the British fleet suddenly appeared in the Mediterranean, an action which was announced in a strongly worded speech by Sir Samuel Hoare at the opening of the League Assembly, and once in November 1935, when the League appeared to be ready to impose an oil embargo. This made any unilateral American action with respect to applying sanctions especially dangerous.

> If we have done so, they [Britain and France] would have done so and Mussolini would have fought his way through. Of that there is not the slightest doubt in my mind. Nor is there any doubt that if we had imposed an oil embargo, we would have been responsible for precipitating the European war.

And in Long's judgment the Italian air and naval striking force, *vis-à-vis* England, was formidable.[18]

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[16] Roosevelt to Dodd, March 16, 1936; FDR, President's Personal File: 1043; Elliot Roosevelt, ed., *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928–1945*, I, New York, 1950, 571.

[17] Dodd to Roosevelt, April 1, 1936; FDR, President's Secretary's File: William E. Dodd. Even some of the most aggressive Nazi Party members boasted at this time that "they would volunteer for service in the Army of the *Negus!*" Erich Kordt, *Nicht aus den Akten*, Stuttgart 1950, 116.

[18] Long to Pittman, April 2, 1936; The Papers of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, The National Archives, Box: Sen. 75A–F9–1 (105B). Cf. the comments of Bonnet, *Le Quai d'Orsay*, 142–143.

No one, apparently, was reading the dispatches of the United States Minister to Switzerland, Hugh Wilson, who was in close contact with League affairs and the European diplomatic pulse. As early as January 27, 1936, Wilson was reporting the diminution of the threat of war. The danger of hostilities in the Mediterranean had now passed, he declared, and the situation, if not desirable, was at least one of "equilibrium."[19] But this realistic appraisal was too weak a tonic for the feverish war scare then prevailing in Washington.

Paris, too, reflected the agonizing indecision which had come to dominate the Anglo-American capitals. The ranks of the ruling Radical-Socialist Party were split wide open, and the Cabinet of Pierre Laval was itself bitterly divided over the Ethiopian issue. Within the Government Laval had found his policies vigorously opposed by Édouard Herriot, Pierre-Étienne Flandin, and the career officials of the Quai d'Orsay. Futhermore, many elements of the Radical Party showed themselves openly hostile to the Laval regime, and Herriot, the Party President, announced that even if the crisis deepened to the extent that he would be offered the premiership, he nevertheless would reject it out of hand.[20] The fall of Laval and his replacement by Albert Sarraut smoothed over French internal differences, but did not eradicate them.

In the Spring of 1936, while Mussolini's legions were pushing resolutely on through mustard gas toward their African triumph, Ambassador Long discovered, by means of an un-named but ostensibly reliable source, that Neville Chamberlain, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, was the leader of a faction desiring to bring about a *rapprochement* with Italy. When Long telegraphed this information to Washington, the State Department promptly queried: "which Chamberlain?" According to his own account, Breckenridge Long was by this time highly suspect in the eyes of his superiors due to his pro-Italian views, and his reporting generally was not credited. In fact, Hull privately admitted several years later that he twice had the Ambassador to Rome "checked on."[21]

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[19] Wilson to Hull, January 27, 1936; U. S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1936*, I, Washington, D. C., 1953, 184.

[20] Conversation with Pierre Laval, reported by Amadeo Landini, Paris, March 9, 1938; Italian Documents, Container 475, Frame 043533; cf. Herriot, *Jadis*, II, 614; Flandin, *Politique française*, 184.

[21] Long Diary, March 13, 1938; Long *MSS.*, Container 5. Cf. letter to Roosevelt, November 29, 1935, cited above. Under these circumstances the accolade granted Breckenridge Long in Hull, *Memoirs*, I, 418, is curious to say the least. On the other hand, the Ambassador's personal influence with the President and Senator Pittman remained undiminished, and two years later Long was appointed to the post of Assistant Secretary of State.

Even as the Ethiopian defenses began to crumble in the early months of 1936, Eden's ideas were winning new friends in the State Department, with the result that Washington finally determined upon a retaliatory action which had the dual advantage of being both legal and moral—the unilateral denunciation of the Italo-American Treaty of Amity and Friendship of 1871. However, this plan was no surprise to the Italians, for the stiffening attitude of Hull toward the Fascist Government was well publicized in diplomatic circles, and the United States diplomatic code *Grey* "was then an open book in every Chancellery in Europe. . . ." Nevertheless, Ambassador Long, although seriously ill, was able to argue his superiors out of a unilateral abrogation upon his return to the United States that spring, and the Treaty was ultimately terminated by mutual consent in December 1937.[22]

One small incident provided a colorful finale to this somber drama, occurring at the time of Haile Selassie's flight from Addis Ababa in early May 1936. With the abandonment of the Ethiopian capital by the Emperor, hastily accompanied by the British Minister, large-scale rioting broke out. Americans, French, and Belgians, who were endangered by violent demonstrations, retaliated in kind by shooting at remnants of the Imperial Guard. Approximately 2,000 persons belonging to the local European colony took refuge in the French Legation, and in his frantic efforts to rescue them from the Ethiopian soldiers who had run amuck, Pierre-Étienne Flandin, now French Foreign Minister, "had the humiliation of asking Mussolini to make his troops advance as rapidly as possible." The rampaging Imperial Guard was held off by a small garrison of French troops, while Italian planes dropped supplies to the besieged.[23]. A similar situation existed at the United States ministerial headquarters, but for some reason radio contact could not be established between the beleagured Americans and the well-protected British, whose Legation had been fortified by a newly arrived Punjabi contingent. An American s.o.s. was therefore sent from the Ethiopian capital to Washington, then relayed to London, and finally radioed back to the British Chargé in Addis

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[22] Long Diary, March 13, 1938; Long *MSS.*, Container 5. According to the Ambassador, some highly-placed American officers were still manifesting their bitterness toward Mussolini in 1938 as a result of the Ethiopian debacle; cf. Long Diary, February 28, 1938, Long *MSS.*, Container 5. Count Ciano unilaterally denounced the Mussolini-Laval Agreement (of January 7, 1935) on December 17, 1939, one of the last remnants of the controversy.

[23] Flandin, *Politique française*, 190–191 and 191n.

Ababa, who in turn hurriedly dispatched his Punjabi troops to save American lives, if not the Ethiopians.[24]

On May 9 the Italian victory was exultantly proclaimed and with it came the inevitable question of recognition. The President had hoped to get by with a "series of 'etc.'s' " added to King Victor Emmanuel's title in the credentials of the new American ambassador,[25] but Breckenridge Long sceptically questioned this possibility, urging instead that the President recognize the accomplished fact. Casting a jaundiced eye at British motivations throughout the entire episode, Long cautioned:

> It will only be a matter of a short time one way or another until they recognize the status [of the Italians] in Ethiopia. We might as well do it first. . . . I strongly urge that you send Billie [Phillips] with regular credentials, and not enter into any fine spun arguments on the theory of recognition. . . .[26]

Actually, the United States never recognized Mussolini's Ethiopian aggression, and England, as Long predicted, was to be the first Western power to claim that dubious distinction. By June 10, 1936, Neville Chamberlain was already referring to the policy of sanctions as "the very midsummer of madness," and with the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War the following month, recognition merely became part of the larger Mediterranean problem.[27]

Would truly effective sanctions have worked? Would a stronger American policy have brought war, as Breckenridge Long had claimed, or would it have given crucial support to a declining Britain and a faltering League? Attending a dinner given by the German delegation to the Munich Conference in September 1938, Benito Mussolini openly admitted that Italy could not have carried her

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[24] Geoffrey Thompson, *Front-Line Diplomat*, London, 1959, 111. There was, evidently, no contact with the French. In January 1937, Sir Geoffrey was personally thanked by Secretary Hull for his role in bringing the Punjabis to the Ethiopian capital.

[25] Roosevelt to Long, June 18, 1936; Long *MSS.*, General Correspondence, Container 117.

[26] Long to Roosevelt, June 23, 1936; *Ibid.*

[27] It was the British themselves who were responsible for merging the two. A "highly placed British representative" in Geneva offered, during the special Council session of August 1936, to secure renunciation of the Ethiopian Emperor's claims, if Italy would give her complete approval to the policy of non-intervention; unsigned report (in French), Italian Documents, Container 417, Frames 008783–008784. Flandin later admitted that Eden inherited "a rather delicate situation," for "there was, in fact, a constant overlapping between the Rhineland affair and the affair of sanctions in the Italo-Abyssinian conflict"; *Les événements survenus*, I, 145.

Ethiopian campaign forward for another week if Eden's proposal to add oil to the sanctions list had been accepted by the other members of the League of Nations.[28] It was a mocking epitaph for the still-born diplomacy of those unhappy years.

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[28] State Department Special Interrogation Mission, Record Group 59, Paul Otto Gustav Schmidt Testimony, Weisbaden, October 12, 1945, Part I, 14, National Archives. Nevertheless, the distinguished Italian historian, Gaetano Salvemini, has vigorously indicted the British Foreign Office, claiming "that none of these gentlemen ever thought of an immediately effective system of sanctions; that Eden participated at all times in this comedy, knowing very well he was making a comedy..."; Gaetano Salvemini, *Mussolini diplomatico, 1922–1932*, Bari, 1952, 13; cf. Flandin, *Politique française*, 189. Flandin, who became French Foreign Minister after the fall of Laval, intimates that Eden's sanctions policy was not his own. Salvemini's charge has been given further substance by Lord Vansittart, Permanent Undersecretary of the Foreign Office, who admits that the real choice was "between Austria and Abyssinia, if Mussolini stuck to his mania for fame and sand. I was already resigned to choosing Austria..."; Vansittart, *The Mist Procession*, 522. Braddick, "The Hoare-Laval Plan," 360–362, begs the issue by attributing British actions to "amateurism, debility, and indifference in high places, [plus] the willingness of politicians to use foreign policy matters as expedient tactics in domestic politics...." Erich Kordt, German Legation Secretary in London during these trying months, gives a more succinct and valid judgment, arguing that "the policy of bluff which Great Britain and the League used against Italy in the Abyssinian question, and which collapsed so pathetically," led to "the undermining of international morality..."; Erich Kordt, *Wahn und Wirklichkeit*, Stuttgart, 1948, 86. Unfortunately the Eden memoirs were not published before this article reached press, but despite Eden's carefully detailed account of his policies, no major reconsideration appears necessary. Pierre Laval has been made the villain of the Ethiopian episode and Pierre-Étienne Flandin his accessory—a not uncommon accusation for pre-Second World War British diplomats.

Book Reviews

Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise. By Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1962. Pp. xiv, 463. $10.00.

Strategy and Structure is a descriptive analysis of one of major contemporary developments in business administration, the establishment of an organization for very large, diversified firms that decentralizes operative responsibilities and centralizes policy determination. The administrative features of this form, which Professor Chandler calls its structure, are his chief concern. The long-term policy decisions, which produce the conditions necessitating administration reform, Professor Chandler calls strategy.

The book is divided into four parts. In the first, the main theoretical apparatus is established and terms are defined. A general thesis explaining the development of a decentralized, multi-divisional structure for the firm is set forth. The procedure by which the firms chosen for analysis were selected is stated. The second part is devoted to a detailed administrative history of four major firms that have adopted the structure. DuPont was a pioneer in developing the decentralized organization. Its diversification following the first World War demanded the change. General Motors found it necessary to adopt the decentralized structure as a means of coordinating the varied activities brought under the GM banner by Durant. Both GM and DuPont moved to the new administrative system on the basis of plans proposed within the organization. Standard of New Jersey, on the other hand, arrived at decentralized arrangement in an unplanned evolution over an extended period of time. Sears, Roebuck made two attempts at decentralization before a workable system was attained. This second part of the book presents the historical analysis that formed the basis for the theory presented in the first part.

In the third part of the book, the theory is tested against the administrative history of a number of other large firms. From this examination, a number of features of the theory seem to be verified and some additional insights to the advantages and to the limitations, as well as to the historical prerequisites of the structure are gained. The final part of the book summarizes and recapitulates the findings of the study.

That the book is a major contribution to the literature of business history is obvious. Professor Chandler has supplied much new material, gleaned from the files of the corporations he studied, and has elaborated a theory that explains the data. The book is also a valuable addition to the knowledge of the general historian. In treating the recent history of the United States, we now can add, with the aid of the concrete instances in Mr. Chandler's book, something more about the recent phase of American economic development in which the professional administrator has superseded the empire builder as the characteristic type of business leader. Entre-

preneurial decisions are now reached on the basis of systematic analysis and careful procedures of research and development rather than by the inspirations of a captain of industry. These changes in business organization are related in a general way to the external developments of the economy. The Sears example best illustrates this. Sears' strategy was changed during the twenties to meet the changes brought about by the automobile and the increasing urbanization of the country. As Sears established retail outlets to supplement its mail order service to its customers, the structure of the firm had to be altered.

Readers of *Strategy and Structure* will see many further possibilities for investigation. For example, Professor Chandler discerns a parallel between recent problems of the federal government and those of big business. While policy responsibilities in the firm were shared by heads of departments with operating responsibilities, decisions were frequently compromises among the interests of the several departments rather than determinations based on the welfare of the whole. Other links between business and government appear. A striking number of the leaders in this administrative movement had earlier experiences in government service during the first World War. The recent trend toward recruitment of federal administrators among high-ranking corporation officers, especially for the office of Secretary of Defense, suggests that influence may now be flowing in the other direction. Other findings of this book are equally suggestive for the study of administrative history.

The necessary concentration of the responses of businessmen on the needs of the firm has left unanswered the relation of the welfare of the economy to their decisions. Professor Chandler had no intention of grappling with this perennial problem. Insofar as his conclusions touch on this issue at all (e.g., he stresses ". . . the importance of the market in shaping corporate structure and strategy" [p. 343]), Professor Chandler seems to be extending to the present the re-evaluation of the businessman begun by Allan Nevins and Edward C. Kirkland. Whether this implication was intended or not, Professor Chandler concludes (p. 349 and *passim*) that the need of the firm to use its resources more fully was often the crucial strategic motive. In some cases, the circumstances of the firm itself, the nature of its investment, its product, and its market, limited the range of choice. The "invisible hand," this shows, is still invisible.

These considerations, of course, were incidental to the main purpose of *Strategy and Structure*. The author has described and explained a significant recent development in the history of business. The book is also a major contribution toward bridging the gap between the business historian and his colleague whose interests are more general.

Robert W. McCluggage

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Shelby M. Cullom, Prairie State Republican. By James W. Neilson. *Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences*: Vol. 51. University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1962. Pp. 328. Paper, $4.50.

This book, a political biography of Senator Shelby M. Cullom, attempts to rescue him from the obscurity to which historians have consigned him. Divided nearly equally between Cullom's role in Illinois politics and his senatorial career, it pictures him as both a wily politician and as a careful conservative legislator with a slight agrarian bent. According to Professor Neilson, Cullom's main accomplishment during his thirty-year tenure in the Senate was the sponsorship of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. As chairman of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce for sixteen years, Cullom maintained his interest in railroad regulation. Convinced, however, that the members of the committee were not interested in effective regulation; he resigned as chairman in 1901. Following this he served a lengthy, but inconspicuous tenure as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, finally losing his Senate seat at the age of 82 in the 1912 Republican primary. This defeat, Neilson suggests, was probably the result of Cullom's vote to retain William Lorimer in the Senate after Lorimer was charged with having secured his election through bribery.

Throughout the book Professor Neilson looks with sympathy upon his subject and upon Cullom's conservatism and devotion to party. This is in contrast to Neilson's critical treatment of the progressives whom he finds to be "agents of rule or ruin" and "bigots of political morality." In fact, the entire volume is marked by a conservative bias. Republican radicals during Reconstruction are accused of using a "cloak of equalitarianism and humanitarian considerations . . . to obscure the schemes they had wished to keep from public scrutiny." Granger railroad legislation (which Neilson attributes solely to "farmer dominated legislatures," ignoring recent studies on the role of urban shippers in the passage of the laws) is "unwise and unjust," reaching "ludicrous extremes." On the other hand, arch-conservative Nelson Aldrich is the "magnificant Aldrich."

Neilson weakens his biography not only by his extremes of judgement, but also by his failure to utilize fully the available source materials. Aside from the small Cullom and Fifer collections and the Cullom gubernatorial papers in the Illinois State Historical Library and the Illinois archives, the book is almost entirely based upon newspapers and printed materials. Apparently the author made no attempt to examine the pertinent collections in the Library of Congress. Even relative manuscript collections in Illinois have not been used. The Dawes papers at Northwestern University, for instance, contain a number of Cullom letters and would have added greatly to Neilson's discussion of Illinois politics from 1896 to 1906.

Also marring the book are numerous factual errors, particularly concerning secondary figures such as William Lorimer. The author has tried hard to elevate Cullom to importance, but the Senator's own limited accomplishments and the weaknesses in the biography will force historians to continue to regard him as a mediocre figure.

Joel A. Tarr

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P. Francisco María Píccolo, S.J., Informe del Estado de la Cristiandad de California, 1702, y otros documentos. Edición, Estudio y Notas por Ernest J. Burrus, S.J. Ediciones José Porrua Turanzas, Madrid, 1962. Pp. xxiv, 482. Illustrated. Limited Edition. $34.50.

When Europe discovered the New World and set out to develop its tremendous assets, it found a propitious instrument in the missionary system. Through the *hombres de Dios* the two civilizations met, much to the blessing of the American future. In that long line of mission fields, no part offered greater challenge than the Californias. Barren, separate, reputedly unfit for human living, this jagged desert scene caught the imagination of three great Blackrobes, Salvatierra, Píccolo, Ugarte. They, with a sturdy corps of assistants, made a wilderness into an almost idyllic new "West." Though the Jesuits stayed but seventy years before expulsion, their work stirred the Christian world.

The first twenty-five years of this study find a splendid documentation in the volume under review. As one follows Píccolo's letters, reports, maps —in all sixty-two are here reproduced and many for the first time—it is possible to reconstruct the whole missionary action both with exact data and with the sense of direction that animated his activities. His outstanding Report of 1702 to King Philip V, an ample and well-reasoned account of the foundations and what lay beyond, will catch the attention of any historian. The many letters to the famous Kino show the two joined in effort to further the campaigns of each in Lower California and Arizona. In a brief notice it is impossible to point out the electric shafts of power that run through most every line of Píccolo. This report properly stirred the wide empire of Spain, and it incidentally brought about the creation of the generous Pious Fund that guaranteed the material basis of life in the mission area.

Of editing one need only say that the meticulous Father Burrus was in charge. It is the fruit of search in the dozen or so best archives for this kind of material. The background laid out as introduction gives in thirteen pages the neat picture of Píccolo's life that is needed to appreciate his work and the documents. A great amount of care went into the critical notes on the individual compositions, and this is repaying to one who wants to "make the evidence talk." Three splendid maps printed in facsimile complete the volume. They follow the forty-page index that will aid the searcher in this field. A twelve-page bibliography precedes in European style the table of contents.

W. Eugene Shiels, S.J.

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Anti-Federalism in Dutchess County, New York. By Staughton Lynd. (William P. Lyons Master's Essay Award, 1961). Loyola University Press, Chicago, 1962. Pp. 126. $3.00.

Staughton Lynd suggests a return to a modified Beard-Becker interpretation of the post-Revolution period. Although his study is local, it is

apparent that the author desires to revise the revisionists, and this despite his admission that the Hudson Valley area was "unique in the United States" in its quasi-manorial land tenure.

Mr. Lynd attempts to prove that the same *economic groups* which confronted one another in the tenants' rising of 1766, and which contested over the sale of Loyalist lands during the Revolution, divided into Federalist and Anti-Federalist factions in 1788. The author's analysis of Dutchess County politics derives from the existence of three distinct "socio-economic groups." The aristocratic landlord families, with their tenants and dependents, were Federalists and were concentrated in northern Dutchess County. The Anti-Federalist political *leaders,* located in Poughkeepsie, were country gentry with "moderate incomes and immoderate ambitions." Closely related by family and economic ties, themselves land speculators, landlords or agents for landlords, the Poughkeepsie political leaders possessed interests different from those of their *constituents, i.e.,* the yeomen and tenants of the interior, who had a history of militant anti-landlordism. (Mr. Lynd's portrayal of the Poughkeepsie leaders is mildly reminiscent of the "middle class entrepreneurial" interpretation of Jacksonianism.) The common bond among *all* Anti-Federalists was their hostility to the aristocratic landlord families. To the Anti-Federalist small farmer of 1788 the promoters of the New Constitution were the hereditary enemies of years past, hence his negative conditioned response.

After examining the Federalist and Anti-Federalist leaders, Mr. Lynd devotes two brief chapters to the tenants' rising of 1766 and the struggle concerning the sale of Loyalist lands. In the former is anticipated future divisions between radicals and conservatives during the Revolution and ultimately between Federalists and Anti-Federalists in 1788 and after. Readers may reflect that the proofs of continuity rest on a rather thin body of historical evidence, and that the author raises fully as many questions as he provides answers. Most serious is the total lack of any election statistics for the county. Lacking such vital evidence, Mr. Lynd must rely on more subjective materials. He does an excellent job with the available sources, writing skillfully and, on the whole, convincingly.

In his final paragraph the author anticipates criticism of his largely circumstantial evidence and disarmingly acknowledges that ". . . precinct electon statistics are missing, the heritage of tenant troubles has not been proven relevant to 1788, the class-conscious statements in the press and at the convention can be dismissed as propaganda." Many readers will agree that the evidence presented is not sufficient to support the impressionistic conclusions. Most will concur with this reviewer that Mr. Lynd has written an impressive book as far as Dutchess County itself is concerned. All will applaud his sensible and reasoned plea for more research of this type at the local level.

Mr. Lynd's final sentence cites R. G. Collingwood's remark, in defense of circumstantial evidence, that there are people who, if they saw you on a Saturday afternoon with a fishing rod in hand and walking towards the river, would ask, "Going fishing?" Mr. Lynd, as he well knows, has been fishing in the deep and muddied waters of New York politics. The Collingwood quote is irrelevant to Mr. Lynd's study, and borders on sophistry.

The Loyola University Press is to be commended for producing a handsome and very readable volume. They will not suffer unduly from a resigned observation that the footnotes need not be grouped at the back of the book.

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The Oregon Country under the Union Jack. Postscript Edition. By B. C. Payette. Payette Radio Ltd., Montreal 3, Canada, 1962. P. 682. Illustrated.

The compiler clearly expects this to be "a reference book of historical documents for scholars and historians" interested in the Oregon Country, 1813-1818. Here are extended excerpts from John McDonald's Astoria Journal, 1913, and Alexander Henry's Astoria entries, 1813-1814, as well as Ross Cox, Gabriel Franchere, Alexander Ross, and Pierre Tabeaux's descriptions of varied Western scenes. Long lists of MacKenzie and Co., employees, 1801-1805, other rosters of fur-trade functionaries, 1813-1814, parts of F. A.. Larocque's Missouri Journal, 1804-1805, added to diverse individual letters, and a Columbia river meteorological table, April, 1814, give a fair sampling of the inclusions in this curious volume.

The book is admirable as a testimonial to the scholarly bent of its compiler. But he would have greatly improved this monument to a personal hobby by even a touch of professional organization and basic editing. The book has no helpful table of contents, no index of any kind, and the documents are printed in no detectable order, chronological or topical. Some transcriptions are properly accurate, others inexact, thus destroying all with the suspicion of unreliableness. The purpose of the compilation is difficult to deduce because some entries could be notes for a family genealogy; other passages bear directly on England's role in the Oregon country, and certain extended selections reveal a conventional interest in early Western exploration.

This well-intentioned effort will not diminish scholars' reliance upon *The Manuscript Journals of Alexander Henry Fur Trader of the Northwest Company and of David Thompson,* edited by Elliott Coues, 2 vols., (New York, 1897), *Journal de Larocque De La Rivière Assiniboine Jusqu'a La Rivière 'Aux Roches Jaunes' 1805,* L. P. Burpee, edit., (Ottawa, 1911), *Tobeau's Narrative of Loisel's Expedition to the Upper Missouri,* edited by Annie H. Abel, (Norman, 1939), and other comparable standard versions of basic source materials.

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Notes and Comments

The flood of paperbound books is ever on the rise and the indications are that the publishers are doing a land-office business. Among the thousands of titles available are those on historical subjects. There are now about 200 publishers of these in this country, though a fourth the number carry other trade names, whose total output in history is well over a thousand titles. The books are marked as original, reprints in original type, reprints in new type, revised, abbreviated, enlarged, collections of authoritative articles or chapters from books on moot points among historians, documentary readings, students' outlines, questions, or guides. The majority of publishers mail notices to busy or absent-minded professors who in time accumulate a stack of blurbs as memoranda for action in the vague by-and-by. As a service to such, some years ago 130 of the publishers banded together to underwrite the production of a special catalogue of their soft-covers so selected as best to suit the needs and purses of the ever growing ranks of collegians. The resultant catalogue is the *Annual Paperbound Book Guide for Colleges* published by R. R. Bowker Company of New York at the price of thirty-five cents. With this in hand, professors, students and other lovers of history can plan a general or particular library of their own at modest cost. Librarians will have their problems because of the pocketability of the paperbounds and their susceptibility to broken backs, but by multiplying copies of the classic authors they can calm the wails of students who are always wanting a book that is out. A progressive step will be made if all the American publishers add their selections to the present 130, and if the foreign publishers join the parade.

Samples of the reprints are the nine volumes of Toynbee's *Study of History,* published by Galaxy Press-University of Oxford at prices per volume varying from $2.25 to $2.95. Macmillan has brought out an enlarged edition of Sidney Fine's *Recent America, Conflicting Interpretations of the Great Issues,* from the Spanish-American War through the Truman-MacArthur controversy and the Eisenhower administration, 470 pages, $3.25. Publisher Holt, Rinehart and Winston is in a series of attractively covered and sewed paperbound monographs entitled American Problem Studies under the editorial direction of Oscar Handlin. The first of these are: *The Causes of*

the War of 1812: National Honor or National Interest? edited by Bradford Perkins; *Jacksonian Democracy: Myth or Reality?* edited by James L. Bugg, Jr., and *The New Deal: What Was It?* edited by Morton Keller. Footnotes in these are very rare but each has a list of additional readings in its 122 pages.

* * * *

Quite a number of hard cover books on historical characters and events aimed more at general readers appeared in the course of 1962. *Kearny the Magnificent,* by Irving Bernstein, published by The John Day Company (248 pages, $5.00), is the story of General Phil Kearny (1815–1862) who preferred to lead an army life rather than to remain in the social whirl with his millionaire advantages. He fought with the French foreign legion in Algeria, with General Winfield Scott around Mexico City, against the Indians of our West, against Austria with the French, and finally with the Army of the Potomac, in which he became Major General. After contributing to the Williamsburg victory, at Chantilly he received the reward he seemed always to covet—death in action.

Terry's Rangers, by C. C. Jeffries, came from the Vantage Press in 139 pages. The author says in his preface: "No bibliography is given as only a few close scholars would care anything about where the material came from; besides, reference marks mar the printed page." In a homespun style he tells how Terry, a Kentuckian raised in Texas, organized the cavalry regiment famed for its esprit de corps in the Civil War even after Terry was killed at Shiloh.

The Sierra, by W. Storrs Lee, published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, (354 pages, $5.95), is very well illustrated with line drawings by Edward Sanborn. Mr. Lee, native of Maine, former professor, mountain lover and climber, author of a book a year, here writes like a true Californian of the vast upheaval known as the Sierra Nevada and all that has happened in and around the mountains. The personified mountains have felt earthquakes, have seen the gold rushes and all forms of lawlessness, have heard the tall tales and familiar lore. Using many of the early travel accounts and pioneer narratives, Mr. Hill freshens up the often told tales in his own lively style.

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The School of Inter-American Studies of the University of Florida continued its publication of papers read at the annual Decem-

ber conference with *The Caribbean: Contemporary Colombia,* edited by A. Curtis Wilgus. This is Volume 12, Series One, University of Florida Press, Gainesville, 1962, 342 pages, $7.50. After the introduction by Professor Wilgus there are all told twenty papers grouped under six headings: Geography and Anthropology, History and Government, The Economy, The Culture, International Relations, and Bibliography. As in the past volumes of this series this one gives an intensive appreciation of the anatomy and mentality of its subject as scrutinized by competent scholars, and, while readable by the public in general, is invaluable for students of Latin-American history and the international relations of this hemisphere. Suitable maps, plates and tables are helpful as is especially Eleanor Mitchell's chapter on Colombia's bibliographic present and future, and the selected bibliographies for each chapter.

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Emerging Colombia, by John M. Hunter, is one of the numerous books coming from the Public Affairs Press (116 pages, $3.25). Dr. Hunter is in the department of economics of Michigan State University, to whose Office of International Programs and All University Research Funds he offers gratitude for considerable help. Since his book, he says in the prologue, cannot fall into the class of tourist book, or travel or adventure book, he categorizes it as "professional adventure." The adventure was the organization of the center for the study of the Colombian economy in the unique University of the Andes above Bogotá. In a familiar style Dr. Hunter relates his experiences and those of his family during his stay in the high Andes from 1958 to 1960. Professional economists will notice the problems of the Colombian economy and the suggested solutions, and, be it added, are working on Hunter's findings with the assistance of a number of United States universities. As was intended, the book is informative and friendly.

* * * *

Lincoln's Boyhood, A Chronicle of His Indiana Years, by Francis Marion Van Natter, published in 1963 by Public Affairs Press (224 pages, $4.50), brings us face to face with some rivalry and strife between States. Kentucky will forever boast about Lincoln's birth and life within her boundaries for his first seven years. Illinois

auto license plates have long announced the State as the Land of Lincoln. Now comes this book dedicated to the concept that Lincoln's fourteen years in Indiana contributed largely toward the formation of his character and thus toward his future greatness. Van Natter goes about proving the case for Indiana in enormous detail and produces, as Karl Detzer says in the Foreword, "a book not only for Lincoln enthusiasts, but for anyone who appreciates a good story for its own sake." Van Natter and, the indications are, a corps of helpers culled from the pages of shelves of Lincolniana, printed and manuscript, all anecdotes, descriptions, and old settlers remembrances pertaining to Lincoln and the Pigeon Creek wilderness of Indiana. His wife traveled thousands of miles gathering data. When all materials were collected they were organized into this image of Lincoln, the youth. In narrating the later deeds of Lincoln, Van Natter constantly refers back to his Indiana training for a principle behind his action. In a larger sense the book is evidence in proof of Turner's frontier hypothesis. As it is, it is very readable. It is annotated and has a source bibliography.

* * * *

Peerless Patriots, Organized Veterans and the Spirit of Americanism, by Rodney G. Minott, published last year by the Public Affairs Press (152 pages, $3.75), has on the surface the purpose of informing the public about the history and development of the various organizations of war veterans in the United States during this century, only two of which organizations have thus far found their historians. Dr. Minott, an ex-serviceman at Stanford University, chooses eight major organizations of veterans which with their committees have been of the greatest import in the national scene: the United Spanish War Veterans, the Veterans of the Foreign Wars of the United States, the American Legion, the Military Order of the World Wars, the Disabled American Veterans, the Military Order of the Purple Heart, the American Veterans Committee, and the American Veterans of World War II and Korea. The spirit and aims of each are indicated, but the common denominators of their respective constitutions are the perpetuation of and reverence for American institutions and the inculcation of patriotism and Americanism, or, more broadly, Nationalism.

Since the spirit of nationalism was the taproot of the spreading Americanism and since the term has been relative as to time and place, having different connotations for different generations, Pro-

fessor Minott presents a very stimulating and provocative Introduction on the subject. In common with his readers he finds it difficult to define nationalism, Americanism, patriotism, and the spirit or *mystique* of the organized veterans. He considers Hans Kohn "perhaps the best historian writing today on nationalism," and in this opinion seems to give no recognition to the weighty judgment propounded by Carlton J. H. Hayes in his *Nationalism, a Religion.* The Americanist writers promoting the cause of nationalism and economic imperialism are reviewed briefly: Francis Parkman, George Bancroft, John Fiske, the Social Darwinists, and Alfred Thayer Mahan; so too are the speakers who ranted against foreign elements and hyphenates; and under closer review is the McKinley-Beveridge-Roosevelt-Lodge coterie. As for the model patriot of the veterans, Teddy Roosevelt, Dr. Minott seems to share the present revised estimate of his character and achievement: "In many ways the veterans could not have selected a better symbol nor a worse one." (p. 12)

There is much more to the book. The difficulties, problems, programs, platforms and achievements of the veterans' organizations individually and collectively are recounted in the last five chapters: "What is 100 Per Cent Americanism?" "Creation of Americanism Programs," "Counter Subversion and Authoritarianism," and "The New Veterans." There is a good general "Conclusion." The page footnotes are blocked at the end of the text, and these 28 pages in smaller type form an excellent bibliography.

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MID-AMERICA

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Nationalist Progressivism and World War I

By and large, it is true that the main force of the Progressive movement was dissipated by the coming of World War I and its consequences. As a result of adverse conditions created by the war and by the Wilson Administration, progressivism was steadily weakened as an effective political and intellectual force.[1]

But this was not the whole story. Reform as fact and as idea was not dead for the duration of hostilities. America at war was not the scene of unrelieved reaction, nor was *all* the moral fervor of reform drained by the venture to make the world safe for democracy.

A clue to a better assessment of American progressivism in the war and, indeed, of the whole war-time experience lies in the generally neglected views of a small group of progressives, for whom the hopes of the previous decade did not come to an end in April, 1917. On the contrary, they were certain that war and the preparations for war were advancing their cause and that reforms were indispensable for the winning of the war. For them, the domestic war measures of the Wilson Administration were, in large part, a realization of the Progressive program and an earnest of a glowing future for American democracy. There was, in short, all during the war a steady intellectual current of reform, reflecting a measure of real political achievement. And only

1 William E. Leuchtenburg, *The Perils of Prosperity, 1914–32* in *The Chicago History of American Civilization*, Daniel J. Boorstin, ed., Chicago, 1958, 120–121; Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.*, New York, 1955, 273; Eric F. Goldman, *Rendezvous with Destiny: A History of Modern American Reform*, New York, 1952, 254; George E. Mowry, "The First World War and American Democracy," in Jesse D. Clarkson and Thomas Cochran, eds., *War as a Social Institution*, New York, 1941, 182.

after the war was over did disillusion and abiding despair blanket the Progressive movement.[2]

Clearly, these reformers were too optimistic and allowed their hopes, and perhaps their fears, to blind them to many unpleasant realities. But there was enough substance in their views, enough correspondence with political and economic reality to justify their optimism and to suggest that the commonly accepted negative judgments of the war-time experience are equally wide of the mark. Their positive reaction thus serves to call the historian's attention to those aspects of the war adminstration that were indeed progressive and, more generally, to the ambiguous effects of war in modern industrial America.

At the core of this group of progressives were such men as Herbert Croly, Walter Lippmann, John Dewey, and others writing in the *New Republic* and elsewhere. But the ideas of more politically engaged progressives like Theodore Roosevelt, Albert J. Beveridge, and William Allen White were in some respect similar to those of the *New Republic* coterie. Leading American Socialists of the moderate variety also took a position almost identical with that of the progressive editors.

Though not numerous, these intellectual exponents of reform were influential in shaping the policies of the Wilson Administration from 1915 on. And from the vantage of the New Deal, Fair Deal, Progressive Republicanism, and New Frontier of the last thirty years, their views were clearly in the mainstream of modern American reform: what they urged and approved in 1917-1918 has been called the prototype of the welfare-state measures of recent years.[3]

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[2] Some historians have recently begun to pay attention to the war-time optimism of progressives; see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919–1933* (*The Age of Roosevelt,* vol. I), Boston, 1957, 37–51; David W. Noble, "The *New Republic* and the Idea of Progress, 1914–1920," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* XXXVIII (1951), 396–398; Professor Noble mistakenly concludes that the hopes of the *New Republic* progressives were dashed soon after the declaration of war. In the light of Professor Walter I. Trattner's re-appraisal, "Progressivism and World War I: A Re-appraisal," MID-AMERICA, XLIV (1962), 131–145, which appeared after this article was completed, it must be pointed out that my concern is with the thought of the nationalist progressives who supported preparedness and war not only before America's entry but also all *during* hostilities, and for *domestic* as well as international reasons. My feeling is, moreover, that such a progressive rationale was not shared by most Americans at the time.

[3] Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era,* New York, 1954, 18–19; Robert E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations,* Chicago, 1953, 275; Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters,* 8 vols., Garden City, 1927–1939, VI, 380, n. 1; Hofstadter, *Age of Reform,* 304, n. 2.

It is important to note that their brand of progressivism differed basically and consciously from the older tradition of reform, from what Professor Tugwell has called "orthodox progressivism." These neo-liberals, as they may properly be called, were nationalists and collectivists, who called for the creation of a centralized state and socialized economy, administered with efficiency and strong leadership and dedicated to advancing the welfare of the American people, especially labor. At the same time, they advocated a realistic pursuit of national interest abroad, identifying that interest with peace and democrary in the world. They rejected the "anti-national liberalism" of the Populist and New Freedom programs, which favored government action merely to restore the balance of the old order. Calling themselves "progressive democrats," or "constructive national democrats," or "constructive nationalists," they were careful to distinguish their views from those of "the old school of democratic 'liberal.'"[4]

From the beginning of the war in Europe, the neo-liberals' reaction to it differed from that of most reformers. They were not "dogmatic" pacifists who recoiled in horror from the conflict. They did not cry out in despair as Jane Addams did when she heard the news from abroad, "This will set progress back for a generation." Or fear darkly with Senator La Follette that war would destroy the Progressive movement.[5] They viewed the war, rather, as a challenge to the United States to take positive action in its national interest to secure peace, even by going to war, if necessary. Such a policy would, in effect, be the application of the spirit of reform to international problems.[6] The neo-liberals actually saw a positive correlation between the war and American reform. Croly, in an editorial in the first issue of

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[4] Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., *The Decline of American Liberalism*, New York, 1955, ch. XI, "The Progressives as Nationalists"; Herbert Croly, *The Promise of American Life*, New York, 1914, first published in 1909, 153, 157, 235, 259; Croly's memorandum of 1914, cited in Groff Conklin, ed., *The New Republic Anthology 1915–1935*, New York, 1936, p. xxxiv; Walter Lippmann, "The Case for Wilson," *New Republic*, VIII (1916), 263.

[5] John Chamberlain, *Farewell to Reform: The Rise, Life and Decay of the Progressive Mind in America*, 2nd edition, New York, 1933, 260; Belle C. La Follette and Fola La Follette, *Robert M. La Follette*, New York, 1953, I, 502, 647, 649; Goldman, *Rendezvous with Destiny*, 236, 240.

[6] See the collection of editorials on American foreign policy from 1914 to March, 1917, reprinted in "The Evolution of National Policy in Relation to the Great War," *New Republic*, X (March 10, 1917), pt. II. See also *New Republic*, VI (1916), 143; VII (1916), 52; VIII (1916), 129; Walter Lippmann, *The Stakes of Diplomacy*, 1st edition, New York, 1915, 211, 217. Croly took the same position earlier in *The Promise of American Life*, 312.

the *New Republic,* explained that the war, by forcing the American people to work out its role in the embattled world, would stimulate its sense of nationalism and thus bring closer its democratic goals.[7]

As time went on, the editors of the *New Republic* came to believe that the experience of the belligerents supported their view of the relation between war and reform. At first they were torn between admiration for the socialized efficiency of the European war economies and distrust for their coercive aspects. Observing "The Landslide into Collectivism" in Europe, they would have none of it. It was autocratic in method, evil in purpose, and destructive of liberty: it was "collectivism introduced by command . . . a very different thing from the collectivism of a radical democracy. . . ." As "far-seeing social democrats," they rejected it. In the end, however, the lure of a nationalized economy proved too much for these collectivists. With some caveats against compulsion, they urged the United States to follow the example of Europe and socialize its economy and strengthen the state. On the eve of American entry into the war, the *New Republic* was certain that in Europe, "on its administrative side socialism [had] won a victory that [was] superb and compelling." This collectivism was grim and autocratic, but Americans could establish the same machinery for democratic purposes.[8]

At bottom, the neo-liberals had come to believe that "the war spirit" was a positive good, for it meant "the substitution of national and social and organic forces for the more or less mechanical private forces operative in peace. . . ." The purpose of war might be different from that of reformers, but "they are both purposes, and luckily for mankind a social organization which is efficient is as useful for the one as for the other." Realistic pragmatic instinct had—with somewhat shaky logic—conquered idealistic qualms.[9]

Lippmann, who had had reservations about war, summed up the

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[7] *New Republic* (hereinafter *NR*), I (November 7, 1914), 10; the style is Croly's: for an earlier statement of these principles, see Croly, *The Promise,* 212, 263, 264, 289.

[8] *NR,* II (1915), 249–250, 255; III (1915), 98, 215–216; IV (1915), 3, 322, 323, 328–330; V (1915), 83; VI (1916), 85; IX (1916), 173; X (1917), 124; Randolph Bourne, "American Use for German Ideals," *NR,* IV (1915), 118; Frederick C. Howe, *Socialized Germany,* New York, 1915, pp. v, 1, 2, 6, 84, 327, 335; William Hard, "What the War Has Done to England," *Metropolitan,* XLV (April, 1917), 72.

[9] *NR,* III (1915), 83–84; V (1915), 6–7.

reversal of the neo-liberals as the country faced war. Taking off from a text of H. G. Wells, he declared that the war had revolutionized liberal thinking and rendered obsolete the old ideals about democracy, socialism, and internationalism. "The collectivism," he concluded, "which was to make a people pacific has proved to be the greatest fighting engine man ever devised. War, which was to swallow up industrial reconstruction, has been partially swallowed in its turn." Liberals must face up squarely to this "national collectivism . . . so deadly in war, so full of benign possibilities for peace, so capable of being used for a war after the war. . . ."[10]

Some of Lippmann's erstwhile Socialist Party colleagues shared this hopeful view of war-time developments abroad. Such moderate socialist leaders as Morris Hillquit, John Spargo, William English Walling, and Harry W. Laidler welcomed the "startling progress in collectivism" in England and Germany. Despite its shortcomings,—it was merely a form of state socialism,—it was to some degree "revolutionary" and it offered socialists an opportunity "to advance [their] program of democratic collectivism" once the war was over.[11]

That self confessed "near-Socialist," Theodore Roosevelt, and his Progressive friend, ex-Senator Beveridge, also greatly admired "the extraordinary German achievement" of war-time socialized efficiency and hoped America would emulate it. For Roosevelt, the necessary ingredients of that achievement, in England as well as Germany, were social and industrial justice *and* military preparedness, "two sides of a common program." With acumen, he

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[10] Lippmann's review of H. G. Wells, *Italy, France and Britain at War*, in *NR*, X (1917), 201–202.

[11] Morris Hillquit, "Some Probable Effects of the War," *Metropolitan*, XLII (May, 1915), 44–46. (*The Metropolitan* was a slick-paper mass-circulation monthly with progressive-socialist views.) William English Walling, *The Socialists and the War*, New York, 1915, 479, 480, 485, and "Nationalism and State Socialism," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, X (1916), 82–92; Walling and Harry W. Laidler, eds., *State Socialism Pro and Con . . .*, New York, 1917, vii-xi, xxiv-xxvii; articles by Laidler: "War Collectivism and Wealth Conscription," *Intercollegiate Socialist*, V (1917), 4–5, 10; "The Trend toward Public Ownership," *American Labor Year Book 1916*, 344; "War Time Collectivism," *American Labor Year Book 1917–1918*, 28–29, 40, 41; "The Collapse of War-Time Collectivism," *American Labor Year Book 1919–1920*, 26; John Spargo, *Americanism and Social Democracy*, New York, 1918, 199, 204, 205, 211, 293; Spargo's Minority Report on War of the Socialist Party, April 1917, cited in Nathan Fine, *Labor and Farmer Parties in the United States 1828–1928*, New York, 1928, 315; David Shannon, *The Socialist Party of America*, New York, 1955, 84.

hailed Lloyd George as an "imperialistic radical"; he could well have applied the epithet to himself and Beveridge.[12]

Roosevelt, of course, put security first and was the first big gun of the preparedness campaign in this country. Yet, while his progressivism could hardly be discerned through the clouds of his perfervid patriotism, it was there nonetheless, insistent and real. In his preparedness philippics, he always demanded, within the context of his "larger Americanism," social justice for all as well as adequate military defense. We could not, he argued, have a sound foreign policy "unless there is also a sound relationship among our own citizens within our own ranks." Reform and national strength thus went together in the context of international crisis and war—an equation also accepted by Roosevelt's admirers among the leaders of the foundering Progressive Party in 1916.[13]

The *New Republic* at first supported Roosevelt's general formula of preparedness *cum* reform and hailed it as "The Newer Nationalism." But as the election of 1916 approached, it rejected his intemperate leadership and his "nebulous nationalism" which relied on "morally cathartic explosions" for fulfillment. Worst of all, Croly concluded, Roosevelt's reliance on universal military service to achieve his goals would subordinate his noble purpose "to the overwhelming authority of the existing establishment" and produce only a limited static nationalism. And so, after some pulling and hauling, the editors came out for Wilson, whose pro-

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[12] *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, ed., Elting E. Morison, 8 vols., Cambridge, 1951–1954, VIII, 936, 940, 952, 962, 985, 1020, 1162; Roosevelt, *America and the World War*, New York, 1915, 151–152; *Fear God and Take Your Own Part*, first published in 1916 (*Works of Theodore Roosevelt*, Memorial Edition, vol. XX), 295, 387, 518; "The Duty of the United States to Its Own People," *Metropolitan*, XLIII (November, 1915), 79; speech in Philadelphia, *New York Times*, January 21, 1916. For Beveridge, see Claude Bowers, *Beveridge and the Progressive Era*, Boston, 1932, 408, 410; editorial, *Outlook*, CIX (1915), 899.

[13] *Letters*, VIII, 1000, 1143, 1144, 1147. It was in a letter to be read at a preparedness meeting of the National Security League that Roosevelt made his famous statement in favor of "cooperative ownership and management" where "the tool users may, so far as possible, become the tool owners." Roosevelt, *America and the World War*, 163; *Fear God*, 231, 232, 261, 262, 279, 295, 296, 298–300; *Americanism and Preparedness*, New York, 1916, 118–120; *The Foes of Our Own Household*, New York, 1917, 111; *National Strength and International Duty*, Princeton, 1917, 99–100, 103. For the Progressive Party, see *Letters*, VIII, 1000, n. 1.; Leuchtenburg, "Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898–1916," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXXIX (1952), 494; William Allen White, *Autobiography*, New York, 1946, 516, 517; Walter Johnson, *William Allen White's America*, New York, 1947, 254–255.

gressive policies had assimilated to their own and were now attuned to the nationalist progressive ideal.[14]

The neo-liberals were not against preparedness as such. They insisted rather on using it to implement a positive foreign policy and, at the same time, effect a thoroughgoing reform of American society. As Lippmann sententiously put it, "If we are to be prepared, we must be prepared not merely to defend our house, but to put it in order."[15]

Measures of adequate security would, in fact, pave the way for a democratic collective order better than the usual legislative program. For it was obvious from the experience of Europe that preparedness, under modern conditions of warfare, required "a thoroughgoing centralized control of the resources of the country in industries and men. . . ." Specifically, the neo-liberals urged nationalization of the railroads and other utilities; regulation of basic industries, agriculture, and finance; recognition of the right of organized labor to collective bargaining; and social welfare measures to put an end to the waste of unemployment, child labor, overwork, and poverty. Only thus could an "integrated America" be created which would be efficiently prepared for "the exacting part which . . . [it] will have to play in a more dangerous world." The international crisis was driving the country toward the realization of reform as they conceived it.[16]

With the country in the shadow of war, the neo-liberals were as insistent as ever on the need of creating "a democratic collectivism" as a prerequisite for its effective prosecution. The war, in any case, was certain to bring greatly increased government controls, and their hopes were high that such "revolutionary changes" promised "immense gains in national efficiency and happiness."

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[14] *NR*, III (1915), 4, 5; IV (1915), 110, 111, 248–249, 323–324; V (1916), 210–211, 319, 320–321; VI (1916), 30, 53–54, 56, 57; VII (1916), 158, 160; IX (1916), 3–5; Lippmann, "Integrated America," *NR*, VI (1916), 62–67, and "A Progressive's View of the Election," *Yale Review*, VI (1917), 226; Croly, "Unregenerate Democracy," *NR*, VI (1916), 19, and "The Two Parties in 1916," *NR*, VIII (1916), 288, 289.

[15] *NR*, II (1915), 84; III (1915), 188–190, 215–219; IV (1915), 83, 293–294, 323–324; V (1915-16), 55, 263–264; VII (1916), 75, 53–55, 290; Lippmann, "A Cure for Militarism," *Metropolitan*, XLI (February, 1915), 26, and "Toward Real Preparedness," *ibid.*, XLII (September, 1915), 38, 44; Croly, "The Effect on American Institutions of a Powerful Military and Naval Establishment," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, LXVI (July, 1916), 160–172. See also Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest*, 210.

[16] *NR*, IV (1915), 83; V (1915), 6; VI (1916), 56, 101, 158, 330; VII (1916), 53, 75; IX (1916), 173; Lippmann, "The Issues of 1916," *NR*, VII (1916), 108.

Unlike the pacifist reformers, they did not scurry around in last-ditch attempts to keep the country out of war nor fill the air with prophecies of doom. They coolly outlined a specific "war program for liberals" which included all their favorite reforms. Though some of the items of the program reflected nervousness about the fate of civil liberties and the resurgence of jingoism, their hopes outreached their fears.[17]

Once war was declared, the editors of the *New Republic* in a flush of triumph claimed the lion's share of the credit for the decision. Not the bankers nor the capitalists, but the intellectuals had willed American participation. President Wilson had been the skillful voice and instrument of "the ideas and aspirations of the more thoughtful Americans," namely, themselves. And his success increased their confidence in the role they as "men of intelligence" could play in "the fulfillment of the better American national purposes." Pragmatism, the union of action and intelligence informed by the democratic ideal, had won the day.[18]

With a buoyancy that outran their sense of the gravity of the situation, the editors demanded that the war be used as "an aggressive tool of democracy." Why should not the war serve," one of them asked, "as a pretext to foist innovations upon the country?" Here was the golden opportunity for reformers, indeed their inescapable duty to remake American society, to take the lead in abolishing "the typical evils of the sprawling half-educated competitive capitalism." Especially since the war was for America at this stage more of an economic than a military one, it was "literally true that at the present moment we can fight Germany only by reconstructing the United States." In such circumstances, what was needed was "the morale of a cooperative commonwealth rather than of a nation in arms."[19]

The mighty forces unleashed by the war were threatening the very existence of capitalism. Bankers and industrialists may have favored American entry, but little had they realized they were digging their own graves. For the revolution inevitably brewed by the war would topple business from its throne and "shake the foundations of economic as well as those of political minority rule."[20]

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[17] *NR*, X (1917), 124, 243, 249, 252.
[18] *NR*, X (1917), 308–310.
[19] *NR*, X (1917), 335, 337, 338; C.(harles) M.(erz), "War as Pretext," *NR*, XI (1917), 130.
[20] *NR*, X (1917), 308, 336; XI (1917), 70, 123, 124, 145.

Lippmann drove home these points in ringing words in a public address in the first month of the war. Enthusiastically accepting Wilson's international war aims, he imperiously warned the economic rulers of the country:

> We who have gone to war to insure democracy in the world will have raised an aspiration here that will not end with the overthrow of the Prussian autocracy. We shall turn with fresh interests to our own tyrannies—to our Colorado mines, our autocratic steel industries, our sweatshops, and our slums. . . . A force is loose in America. . . . Our own reactionaries will not assuage it with their Billy Sundays or control it through lawyers and politicians of the Old Guard. . . . We shall know how to deal with them.[21]

These radicals were, however, far from being revolutionary socialists. Their goal was an efficient, humane social order making for a national unity above "internal class struggle." Their methods were moderate. While urging progressive labor and tax measures, they were ready to accept the unpleasant consequences of the violent and autocratic logic of war. They had no desire to use reforms to obstruct the prosecution of the war and thereby commit what they, as pragmatists, considered a cardinal sin—cutting themselves off "from the forward liberal movement in American national life."[22]

For all their high and determined hope, they were not free from gnawing fears that the forces of reaction would use the occasion for their own illiberal purposes. Like Wilson, they feared for freedom and reform amidst the hysteria of war. And the events of the first year of the war seemed to bear out their worst fears.[23]

When the tide of repression was loosed on the nation in the summer of 1917, their optimism was badly shaken. They were afraid that the country might lose its "democratic soul." They strongly protested the violations of civil liberties and pleaded for tolerance and fair play. But the force of their protests and pleading was weakened by the hostages of support they had given the Administration. Their realism enabled them all too easily to understand and even condone the evils they so bitterly attacked. In the end they remained to justify and praise. The effects of the

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[21] Lippmann, "The World Conflict in its Relation to American Democracy," *Annals of the American Academy*, LXXII (1917), 1–10. The last sentence is transposed from an earlier paragraph.

[22] *NR*, X (1917), 252, 284, 335, 336; XI (1917), 5, 8, 229.

[23] *NR*, X (1917), 284, 308, 335; Lippmann, "The World Conflict," 7. For Wilson's fears, see Baker, *Woodrow Wilson*, VI, 506–507.

war on public opinion, Croly concluded, had been "wholesome and significant." American participation had been brilliantly vindicated, for if the country had not entered the war, it would have been saddled with fear and militarism that would have left the democratic movement defenseless.[24]

The administrative fumbling of the first six months of the war also dimmed the bright hopes of the neo-liberals. Their positive "war program for liberals" was sheared to a defensive formula of preventing the emergency from being used to destroy social gains and political liberty and of working for a minimum administrative reorganization. Calling themselves "social re-makers," as though to avoid the stigma of "reformers," they advocated such measures as the elimination of the middleman between the farmer and the consumer and the formation of a commission to facilitate the marketing of food.[25]

The whole splendid structure of their dreams was shaken. The nation, they felt, was losing the war on the home front, what with the hysteria, inflation, runaway profits, and indecisive tax and labor policies. They now noted with apprehension the potential tyranny in the network of federal controls unchecked by popular consent.[26]

But there was no general debacle, no foundering of reform in the sea of war and reaction. As the organization of the war economy advanced to its peak in the summer of 1918, the hopes of these progressives soared once more. The pages of the *New Republic* glowed again with the faith that the course of events was leading to a more humane, intelligent, and democratic America. Each new war measure was hailed as a step toward the consummation of their dreams. And with an almost insatiable determination, they asked for more.[27]

The nationalization of the railroads and shipping, the operations of the priorities system, the Food Administration, and even the draft were taken as evidence of democracy's power to plan in a truly functional way for the general welfare. The Revenue Bill

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[24] *NR*, XI (1917), 119, 230; XII (1917), 256, 257; XIII (1917), 3; XIV (1918), 249, 311–312; XV (1918), 35, 36, 65–66, 221; XVI (1918), 5–7, 88, 89; John Dewey, "In Explanation of Our Lapse," *NR*, XIII (1917), 18.

[25] *NR*, XI (1917), 349; XII (1917), 8.

[26] *NR*, XI (1917), 37, 231, 293; XII (1917), 8, 27, 32.

[27] *NR*, XIII (1917), 84; XIV (1918), 310; XV (1918), 165; XVI (1918), 33, 183.

of 1918 with its high taxes on profits, incomes, estates, and luxuries proved that American war policy was democratic and that "the enemies of democracy [were] terrorized." Crucial for the advance of the progressive ideal, in the opinion of the neo-liberals, was the evolution of the government's policy toward labor. The first step was Wilson's trip to Buffalo in 1917 to address the convention of the American Federation of Labor, the first time an American president had done so. Wilson, by his action in thus recognizing the interests of labor, had done more than had been done in fifty years for the "future democratization of American industry." The appointment of a union official as Director of Labor in the Railroad Administration was greeted as a "real step in the direction of the democratic control of the basic industries." By the middle of 1918, it seemed that all the evils of the "old industrial anarchy" had been "radically modified and abated."[28]

The trend was overwhelming. A revolution was taking place in America, a revolution led by the Wilson Administration and backed by the democratic forces of the country. All the measures reformers had advocated seemed to have been realized. As the war moved to its close, the *New Republic* confidently judged that "America is more of a nation today than she has ever been in the past and her nationality is more firmly attached than ever to democratic domestic and foreign policy." On the morrow of the Armistice, it surveyed the land and found it good: "we revolutionized our society."[29]

Nor were the neo-liberals ever really satisfied. As each new measure of control was fastened on the economy, their hopes and demands rose in contrapuntal force. Spurred on by the Russian revolutions and the radicalism of British labor, they made increasingly bold proposals for a labor-oriented collectivism on the model of the "economic constitutionalism" of war-time Britain. They urged the American unions to plan for independent political action, as the Non-Partisan League was doing. So impressed were they with the forward strides already taken and, even more, by the

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[28] Alvin Johnson, "What Priority Means," *NR*, XI (1917), 237, 238; George Soule, "Instead of Revolution," *NR*, XIV (1918), 143, 144, and "Selecting for Service," *NR*, XII (1917), 296; *NR*, XIII (1917), 84, 85; XIV (1918), 163; XV (1918), 41, 165; XVI (1918), 157, 183–185.

[29] *NR*, XIII (1918), 331; XV (1918), 220–221; XVI (1918), 7; XVII (1918), 5, 60; C. M.(erz), "Policy in Government Control," *NR*, XII (1917), 78; R. L. Duffus, "The Twilight of Natural Rights," *NR*, XIV (1918), 139–140.

radical ferment at the end of the war, that they felt the time had come for calling a constitutional convention to reorganize the framework of American government.[30]

John Dewey, having overcome his pacifist inhibitions, was swept along on this wave of optimism. By 1918, he was certain that the war had brought about "an awakened and altered sense for human affairs," had weakened "the intellectual supports of reactionary conservatism," and made possible the use of intelligence in the management of social problems. This revolution in social thought and practice was destroying the old order and had brought into existence the basis of a new order of "democratic integrated control." Such features of positive democracy as the increased power of labor, "the social mobilization of science," and the socialization of industry by massive governmental controls, these, Dewey proclaimed, were what we were fighting for.[31] The war experience also moved Thorstein Veblen to dismiss with unprecedented frankness the predominant industrial system and to urge public ownership of the means of production.[32]

Millenial hope spread far beyond the *New Republic* circle in 1918. Progressives, labor leaders, socialists, and reformers of whatever stripe or color shared the war-time enthusiasm. At one end of the spectrum, Brooks Adams, with his peculiarly inverted radicalism, denounced plutocracy and individualism and called for a coercive and collective reorganization of American society along the lines of state socialism, if democracy were to be saved. Roosevelt, calling himself "a very radical democrat," demanded reforms that would produce his own carefully balanced brand of nationalist collectivism. His progressive followers, William Allen White and Gifford Pinchot, outdid their hero in proposals for government control and ownership for the sake of the welfare of the people. Even cautious Sam Gompers and, far to the left, Sidney Hillman,

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[30] *NR*, XII (1917), 123; XIII (1917–18), 166, 267–268; XIV (February 16, 1918), "Supplement"; XIV (1918), 41, 129, 144; XV (1918), 32, 68, 166, 274–275, 307, 308; XVI (1918), 183, 305, 359.

[31] John Dewey, "Conscience and Compulsion," *NR*, XI (1917), 297, 298; "The Future of Pacifism," *NR*, XI (1917), 358, 359; "A New Social Science," *NR*, XIV (1918), 292–294; "Internal Social Reorganization after the War," *Journal of Race Development*, April, 1918, reprinted in Dewey, *Characters and Events*, ed., J. Ratner, (New York, 1929), II, 754–759; "What Are We Fighting For?" *Independent*, XCIV (1918), 474, 481–483.

[32] Thorstein Veblen, "A Policy of Reconstruction," *NR*, XIV (1918), 320, reprinted in *The Vested Interests and the State of the Industrial Arts*, New York, 1919.

succumbed and were hopefully proclaiming the advent of "a new social era" based on the principle of social democracy in industry.[33]

Socialist intellectuals, in and out of the party, combined support of the war with demands for a nationalist program of democratic collectivism. Such pro-war socialists, together with the remnants of the Progressive Party, founded the abortive National Party toward the end of 1917, with a platform calling for government ownership of railroads and utilities and welfare measures for labor. Even the Socialist Party leaders formally opposed to the war came to accept in 1918 the Wilsonian war aims and a domestic program of collectivism very similar to that of the *New Republic*. War, the socialists now thought, was not purely destructive; it was, on the contrary, bringing a new, democratic, collectivist order into being and thus forwarding the cause of social revolution.[34]

At this point, one must ask were not all these neo-liberals merely engaged in an elaborate, thinly disguised rationalization, as Randolph Bourne with hot contempt accused them of doing? Was not their optimism the result of self-deception in the face of overwhelming realities? Or, as the *New Republic* itself phrased its critics' charges, were not all their liberal notions about the ideal possiblities of war "amiably repulsive hypocrisies, under which middle class intellectuals cloak their surrender to militarism?"[35]

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[33] *Debates in the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention*, Boston, 1919, I, 571, 586, 591, 666, 667, 735, 738, 859, 1036; II, 499–500, 502; III, 378, 965, 968–970; Brooks Adams, "The American Democratic Ideal," *Yale Review*, V (1916), 231–233; *Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, VIII, 1215, 1253–1254, 1294, n. 2, 1306, 1315, 1367, 1402; Roosevelt, *The Great Adventure: Present-day Studies in American Nationalism*, first published in 1918, (*Works*, Memorial Edition, vol. XXI), 274, 275, 280, 281, 400, 401; *New York Times*, March 29, 1918; Schlesinger, *The Crisis of the Old Order*, 35; William Allen White, *The Martial Adventures of Henry and Me*, New York, 1919, 315, 316, and *Autobiography*, 530, 532; *Selected Letters of William Allen White*, ed. Walter Johnson, New York, 1947, 177, 185–186, 193; Johnson, *William Allen White's America*, 274, 282; Gifford Pinchot, "An Agricultural Policy for the United States," *Annals*, LXXIV (1917), 181, 182; Samuel Gompers, *American Labor and the War*, New York, 1919, 173; Matthew Josephson, *Sidney Hillman: Statesman of American Labor*, New York, 1952, 190.

[34] The pro-war socialists included Spargo, Walling, Algie Simons, William J. Ghent, Charles Edward Russell, and Upton Sinclair; *NR*, X (1917), 262–263; XV (1918), 3; XVI (1918), 182–183; *Nation*, CVII (1918), 163; *Metropolitan*, XLVI (November, 1917), 3; Algie M. Simons, "Pacifism versus Revolution," *NR*, X (1917), 220–221; Spargo, *Americanism and Social Democracy*, 47ff, ch. II, "Nationalism: The New Social Democracy," 199, 204, 205, 292–293, 295; Charles Edward Russell, *After the Whirlwind . . .*, New York, 1919, 220ff; Algie M. Simons, *The Vision for Which We Fought*, New York, 1919, preface and *passim;* Fine, *Labor and Farmer Parties*, 315, 316, 322; Shannon, *The Socialist Party of America*, 103, 119–120.

[35] *NR*, XII (1917), 170; Randolph Bourne, *Untimely Papers*, New York, 1919, 32, 33, 41, 42, 94–98.

Surely, they were to some extent deceiving themselves. For, as Wilson said, it was impossible "for men to go through the dark night of this terrible struggle if it were not that they believed they were standing . . . for some eternal principles of right." But there are hints that they knew what they were doing.

In 1917, Dewey, paying tribute to Wilson's skill in creating a belief that the ideals of peace could only be realized by going to war, observed, "That was a bridge on which many a conscience crossed with no greater dexterity in balancing than conscience frequently finds necessary." The note of cynicism was franker in an editorial in the *New Republic* in 1918; the editors defended their stand by explaining that the support of conservatives for a national war could be secured readily enough, but that it was much more difficult to line up radicals and internationalists for the same purpose. "Therein," the editorial blandly concluded, "lies the value of liberal and radical statements of aims." As though the bright neo-liberals had persuaded themselves that they alone were realists who understood the needs of the situation and offered this idealistic pap for the consumption of the well-meaning but less acute idealists who made up the body of reformers.[36]

But rather than Machiavellian deceit and self-deception, the arguments of these progressives were part of a broad pragmatic rationale inspired by Dewey and lucidly voiced by Lippmann. Dewey's pragmatism had indeed become, as Professor Morris Cohen saw in 1916, "the popular philosophy of our progressive democracy . . . ," and a leading socialist did not hesitate to equate it with socialism. By 1915, Dewey's opposition to " 'immutable principles' waiting ready-made to be fastened upon the situation" had grown into a war against the old absolute idealism, so conveniently German in origin and so narrowly pragmatic in its operation. "The time has arrived," he announced in January, 1917, "for a pragmatism which shall be empirically idealistic, proclaimng the essential connection of intelligence with the unachieved future—with possibilties involving a transfiguration." Was this not precisely what the neo-liberals were doing in harnessing their support of the war to reform ideals, domestic as well as international?[37]

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[36] Dewey, "Conscience and Compulsion," *NR*, XI (1917), 297; *NR*, XVI (1918), 340.

[37] *NR*, IV (1915), 236; VIII (1916), 118; William English Walling, *The Larger Aspects of Socialism*, New York, 1913, 111, 112; Dewey, et al., *Creative Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude*, New York, 1917, 29, cited in Morton G. White, *Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism*, New York, 1949, 136.

Lippmann pleaded more pointedly that the time had come to abandon the old utopian ideals of peace and enlightened progress which had been shattered by the war. Progressives must choose, he asserted, "between an old immutable idealism and a new experimental idealism." They must give up the pure visions of dreamers, bring their ideals down to earth, and seek to shape them in the context of the social process. Not to do so was to remain the dilettante "who would rather dream ten dreams than realize one. . . , [or] mistakes a discussion in a cafe for an artistic movement, or a committee meeting for a social revolution." As pragmatic idealists, however, who would not isolate themselves from hard and ugly reality, Lippmann and his fellow progressives could with easy conscience support the war for the sake of guiding it to desirable ends.[38]

This shift in views cannot be dismissed as vapid or cowardly rationalization, for the neo-liberals were not so far off in their estimate of the war-time realities. From their point of view, and even objectively speaking, there was good reason for claiming that many aspects of the war administration, especially by 1918, were indeed in the progressive tradition.

From 1914 on, Wilson's policies had come closer to the neo-liberal nationalist view of reform, and his absorption with the problems of preparedness and neutrality had not weakened his progressive leanings. Actually, the two facets had coalesced under the press of events, so that the progressive measures of 1914-1916 went beyond the necessities of securing his reelection and became part of a program to unite and strengthen the nation in the face of the possibility of war. Nor did Wilson shed his progressivism once war was declared. His program of federal controls and planning, of recognition and support of organized labor, and of taxation, though prompted by the necessities of war, was also permeated by progressive ideals. By 1918, he was voicing radical ideas of political and economic democracy that thrilled the editors of the *New Republic.* He was convinced that radical changes were bound to come, particularly government ownership of great natural resources,—which opinion he was certain would bring down on his head charges of socialism.[39]

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[38] Lippmann, "Mental Unpreparedness," *NR,* IV (1915), 143–144, and "The White Passion," *NR,* VIII (1916), 294, 295.

[39] Link, *Wilson and the Progressive Era,* 70, 224–230; Henry Jones Ford, *Woodrow Wilson, The Man and His Work,* New York, 1916, 301ff; Baker, *Wilson,* VII, 52, 100, 111, 247–249, 301, 313, 318, 458; VIII, 241–242; R. S. Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson,* 3 vols., New York, 1925–1927, II, 425–426; III, 193–195.

Wilson's close advisers and aides, McAdoo and Creel, shared his advanced progressive sympathies and succeeded in bringing them to bear on the enactment and administration of the war measures. Baruch, the linchpin of the industrial mobilization program, considered himself a disciple of Theodore Roosevelt, fought for collective bargaining and the eight-hour day, and gloried in Wall Street's charges that he was a socialist. The President's private secretary, Tumulty, daringly projected the Administration's reform hopes in a draft of the 1918 campaign platform called "The Revolt of the Underdog," in which he advocated government ownership of "basic needs" and a broad welfare program for industrial workers.[40]

If the views of the conservatives are any indication, the war administration was indeed progressive, engaged, it was charged, in wild-eyed radical schemes that would foist socialism on the country. During the war, Senators Lodge and Sherman attacked Wilson for carrying on "a war against American business," while Republican Chairman Will Hays charged that the president's real purpose was to reconstruct American society "in unimpeded conformity with whatever Socialistic doctrines, whatever unlimited government-ownership notions . . . may happen to possess him at the time. . . ." To J. P. Morgan and Charles Schwab, it seemed that America was perilously close to the condition of Bolshevik Russia, with the workers soon to be running the country.[41]

The subsequent judgment of scholars has borne out the neoliberals' estimate of the war administration. Economists have called the war labor and taxation policies landmarks "in the annals of democratic progress." Historians of American labor have recorded the great gains of the trade unions during the war. From the vantage of 1939, Professor Tugwell, an advanced New Dealer, looked back to the "war-time socialism" as an ideal and a model for progressive planners in the age of Roosevelt. George Soule, the economic historian, was convinced that "the war organization was . . . on

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[40] William Gibbs McAdoo, *Crowded Years: The Reminiscences of . . .*, Boston, 1931, 408, 411, 496–498; Link, *Wilson: The New Freedom*, Princeton, 1956, 115; Schlesinger, *The Crisis of the Old Order*, 28–29, 40; George Creel, *Rebel at Large*, New York, 1947, 159, 268, 269; James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, *Words That Won the War*, Princeton, 1939, 18, 89; Bernard Baruch, *Baruch: My Own Story*, New York, 1957, 233, 308; Margaret L. Coit, *Mr. Baruch*, Boston, 1957, 175, 305; John M. Blum, *Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era*, Boston, 1951, 150.

[41] *NR*, XVI (1918), 34; *Nation*, CVI (1918), 521; Baker, *Wilson: Life and Letters*, VII, 486, 511, and *American Chronicle*, New York, 1945, 361; John A. Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, New York, 1953, 337; John B. Andrews, "National Effectiveness and Health Insurance," *Annals*, LXXVIII (July, 1918), 50; Schlesinger, *The Crisis*, 39.

the whole [a] successful attempt to use planning and economic management for a national purpose." Professor Schlesinger has affirmed that the war made Wilson "the best New Nationalist of them all." Most recently, the scholarly consensus, as stated by Professor Link, has been that "the progressive coalition of 1916 . . . functioned for the most part successfully during the war, in providing the necessary support for a program of heavy taxation, relatively stringent controls over business and industry, and extensive new benefits to labor."[42]

One might counter that, historically viewed, the war also strengthened conservative and even reactionary forces in the United States at the expense of the Progressive movement, and that the reforms themselves were ambiguous in their operation and their consequences. There was, in short, no necessary congruence of a centralized planned economy with a democratic order.

Moreover, the disillusionment of the neo-liberals themselves, *once the war was over,* might be taken as a confession of error. Croly, Lippmann, and Dewey, like abashed adolescents, began to talk of how they were swept off their feet by the excitement of war and let wishful thinking and mindless effort and "the cant of idealism" blind them to the promptings of intelligence and the realities of the situation. In retrospect, they saw clearly that Wilson's "autocratic and coercive" methods had created only an artificial unity and enthusiasm. But this was, perhaps, only the *mea culpa* of hindsight: the post-war crash of ideals had led to feelings of guilt that colored the past with the black hues of disaster.[43]

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[42] Edwin R. A. Seligman, "The War Revenue Act," *Political Science Quarterly,* XXXIII (1918), 31, 32; Gordon S. Watkins, *Labor Problems and Labor Administration in the United States during the World War,* University of Illinois *Studies in the Social Sciences,* VIII, nos. 3, 4, Urbana, 1920, 172; Selig Perlman, *History of Trade Unionism in the United States,* New York, 1922, 233–241; Foster R. Dulles, *Labor in America: A History,* New York, 1949, 228; Rexford G. Tugwell, "America's War-Time Socialism," *Nation,* CXXIV (1927), 364–366, and "After the New Deal," *NR,* XCIX (1939), 324; George Soule, *Prosperity Decade: From War to Depression, 1917–1929, (The Economic History of the United States,* vol. VIII), New York, 1947, 5, 62–63, and "Hard-Boiled Radicalism," *NR,* LXV (1931), 262; Schlesinger, 37; Link, "What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920's," *American Historical Review,* LXVI (1959), 838, and *American Epoch,* New York, 1955, 205–207.

[43] *NR,* XVII (1918), 113; Dewey, "The Post-War Mind," *NR,* XVII (1918), 157–159, and "The Discrediting of Idealism," *NR,* XX (1919), 285; Lippmann, "The Basic Problem of Democracy: 1. What Modern Liberty Means," *Atlantic Monthly,* CXXIV (1919), 624–625; Croly, "The Eclipse of Progressivism," *NR,* XXIV (1920), 211–215, and "Liberalism versus War," *NR,* XXV (1920), 35–39; Ekirch, *The Decline of American Liberalism,* 231–232.

Actually, the character of the war polity was neither black nor white. It was another example of that peculiar convergence of liberalism and conservatism that has been so characteristic of American political development. Progressive movements in the United States have always had their conservative aspects, and the reforms themselves have never been in their operations clear-cut gains for the democratic ideal. The Wilsonian war measures, taken in the total context of the war-time developments, were far from being clearly progressive. That the neo-liberals ignored the anomalies of the situation in 1917-1918 shows that they were short-sighted, somewhat naive, characteristically American, and totally human, but not hypocrites or cowards.

Be that as it may, it seems fairly well established that American progressivism did not come to a dead stop when the United States entered the war. For some progressives of the nationalist school, there was even a necessary, positive, and reciprocal relationship between reform and war. Fusing the voluntarist idealism of the pragmatic approach with the realism of their views on foreign policy, they grasped the thunderbolt of war to make their dreams come true. They were certain that only in so far as the country was united by nationalist progressive measures could it be strong enough to play its required part in international affairs and serve its national interest. Conversely, only as the country truly served its national interest in the war-torn world would the necessary conditions for such reforms at home be created. And events seemed to bear them out.

These views suggest a broader interpretation of the course of American reform in the twentieth century. The political and economic developments of World War I as well as the reactions of the neo-liberals to them may be seen as a significant phase of America's adaptation to the situation in which it has moved in world politics since 1890. In this view, war and international crisis have not necessarily been the nemesis of reform but also to some extent a condition making for reform as the neo-liberals conceived it. The development of American progressivism may thus have been the result not only of internal problems, but also of the country's emergence as a world power involved in the clash of international ideals and interests.

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Experiments in Industrial Mobilization: WIB and NRA

One of the most pressing problems that faced Franklin D. Roosevelt when he assumed the Presidency in 1933 was to close the gap between national production and consumption through some form of industrial mobilization. The precedents for such economic regimentation on a countrywide scale were few indeed. While the President was confronted with the need for experimentation during the First Hundred Days, Roosevelt relied, to a large extent, on his World War I experience with mobilization of the domestic economy. Roosevelt's letters and speeches during 1932-1933 leave little doubt that he was seeking to model his policies on Woodrow Wilson's war leadership during 1917-1918, and that he was attempting similar programs to meet another current crisis, the depression. As he noted in 1932:

> Those who are human beings despite their fortune, who are unostentatiously meeting the emerency with practical generosity and public service should be more appreciated than ever in our history. But there are still many in this State, as well as elsewhere, who do not realize that we are at a crisis in our national life comparable to war. The same sort of unselfishness and the same simplicity of purpose is required that we showed in 1917–1918.
>
> A state of economic war has been declared by New York. We are the first to open the engagement by attacking the problem of unemployment relief by specific and helpful legislation. Any lack of cooperation with our relief organization just created, any personal or political interference, I shall consider and treat as in times of war, as treachery to the people.

After he became a candidate for the Democratic Presidential nomination, and enlarged his sphere of interest from state to national affairs, this attitude became even more pronounced, and colored his approach to depression problems. In his first nationwide radio address as an aspirant for the Democratic nomination, he noted:

> Fifteen years ago my public duty called me to an active part in a great national emergency—the World War. Success then was due to a leadership whose vision carried beyond the timorous and futile gesture of sending a tiny army . . . to the aid of our Allies.

> The generalship of that moment conceived of the whole Nation mobilized for war, economic, industrial, social, and military resources gathered into a vast unit, capable of and actually in the process of throwing into the scales, 10,000,000 men equipped with physical needs, and sustained by the realization that behind them were the united effort of 110 million human beings. It was a great plan because it was built from bottom to top, and not from top to bottom.
>
> In my calm judgment, the nation faces today a more grave emergency than in 1917.
>
> These unhappy times call for the building of plans that rest upon the forgotten, the unorganized, but the indispensible units of economic power, for plans like those of 1917 that build from the bottom up, not from the top down. . . .
>
> It is high time to get back to fundamentals. It is high time to admit with courage that we are in the midst of an emergency at least equal to that of war. Let us mobilize to meet it.[1]

In few spheres was this resemblance more apparent than in attempts to mobilize industry, for the NRA was modeled on the War Industries Board created during World War I. The early depression policies of Franklin Roosevelt, therefore, were not based on sheer improvisation, but primarily on Woodrow Wilson's war emergency program. The main purpose of this paper is to point out some of these relevant institutional relationships in industrial mobilization during the two crises.

* * * *

American entrance into the World War brought longstanding problems concerning government's role in economy to the surface. One of these was the imbalance between supply and demand in the United States, without direction on the part of Federal agencies. Another was the general lack of coordination between various officials concerned with some phase of the promotion or regulation of economic life. The sudden crisis brought on by the war necessitated the rapid development of techniques to deal with these problems. Within the short period of eighteen months, administrators worked out procedures through which the production and distribution of goods was channeled into avenues most conducive to the war effort. Many men, including F. D. Roosevelt, were actively seeking means whereby unity in public policy might be secured.

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[1] "Treachery to the People," reprinted in F. D. Roosevelt, *Government—Not Politics*, New York, 1932, 31–32; Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, New York, 1938, I, 624–625.

Various conditions led to a disruption of the peace-time balance between the supply and demand of goods. One was the Allied purchasing program which turned the United States into a creditor nation. Within three years, from 1914 to 1917, the total exports of the country more than tripled.[2] After April, 1917, an increased domestic demand was added to the pressure which foreign purchases were already exerting upon American production. Moreover, the whole problem of equating the demand for goods with the available supply was aggravated by the fact that in 1917 the total national product of the United States did not increase. Consequently, greater demand for war material could be met only by shifts in the production of some goods, to the detriment of others.[3] The Wilson Administration was faced with the difficult task, therefore, of coordinating supply and demand to such a degree as to maximize wartime production.

Another difficulty grew out of the uncoordinated purchasing activities of public agencies engaged in some phase of the war effort. Many of the purchasing units of the Federal government were actively in competition with each other. In the buying of leather, for example, the Army's Quartermaster Corps, Medical Corps, and Ordnance Department were competing, not only with each other, but with the American Red Cross as well. Sub-divisions of one agency often bid for the same supplies. The Signal Corps and the Medical Corps of the Army both scoured the domestic market in search of blankets. Moreover, U. S. Government purchases were being made in competition with those of the Allies. Especially in the search for foodstuffs, the Quartermaster Corps of the Army and Marines were vigorously bidding against the Allied Purchasing Commission.[4] There was no central clearing office to prevent such conflicts, and each agency acted as an independent unit.

When Wilson and his policymakers gradually recognized the seriousness of these problems, they experimented with various

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[2] From $1,094,419,000 in 1915 to $3,630,481,000 in 1917; see Paul W. Garrett, *Government Control Over Prices*, War Industries Board Price Bulletin No. 3, Washington, 1920, 30; John M. Clark, *The Costs of the World War to the American People*, New Haven, 1931, 21, 24; Bernard Baruch, *American Industry in the War*, New York, 1921, 6, 11–13.

[3] Simon J. Kuznets, *National Income: A Summary of Findings*, New York, 1946, 102; F. C. Mills, *Economic Tendencies in the United States*, New York, 1932, 186–190; Frank W. Taussig, "Is Market Price Determinate?", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 35 (May, 1921), 410.

[4] G. P. Adams, *Government Control of Prices*, Washington, 1940, 5; Baruch, *American Industry*, 31; Grosvenor Clarkson, *Industrial America in the World War*, New York, 1921, 111.

solutions. In fact, plans for a Council of National Defense, to balance the supply and demand for war material, had been discussed for more than a decade before 1916, and had engaged the attention of many public figures. As early as 1902, General Crozier, chief of the Army Ordnance Bureau, had suggested the need for such an institution. A few years later, in 1910, the General Staff made a similar recommendation. While a bill embodying its proposals was introduced in Congress by Representative R. P. Hobson, despite lengthy hearings, no further action was taken. Yet the matter continued to be discussed in newspapers and magazines. Among the individuals who took up the cause, Hollis Godfrey, President of Drexel Institute, was outstanding. Godfrey, an advocate of scientific management, had gotten the idea of a council from Winston Churchill whom he had visited in England in 1906. During May, 1916, American preparedness became a more vital issue, and he presented his views to General Leonard Wood, Secretary of War Lindley Garrison, and Commerce Secretary Redfield. After securing the approval of these men to his proposals, Drexel left the actual task of drafting specific legislation to Elihu Root, who prepared a bill that was only slightly modified by William McAdoo and General Enoch Crowder. In Congress, this measure attracted the support of Representative James Hay and Senator George E. Chamberlain, who succeeded in securing its enactment.[5]

Among those who took an active interest in devising an appropriate administrative mechanism to deal with industrial mobilization was Assistant Secretary of the Navy, F. D. Roosevelt. His correspondence on this question was conducted with A. L. P. Dennis, then a Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin. Dennis was mainly interested in the constitutional and legal aspects of the proposed council. He felt that it should be small and should consist only of the Secretaries to State, War, and Navy, representatives from the Federal Trade Commission, and the Fed-

[5] *Cong. Record*, 62 Cong., 2d sess., p. 5162; 62 Cong., 2d sess., *House Report* No. 584; see also remarks of Hollis Godfrey on Origins of Council of National Defense in U. S. Senate, 68 Cong., 1 sess., Select Committee on Expenditures in War Department, *Testimany*, October 20, 1919, Washington, 1920, 880–882; Clarkson, *Industrial America* 11–12, 19. Among others, see J. R. Procter, "Council of National Defense," *Harper's Weekly*, 57 (March 8, 1913), 24–25; "Need of a Council of National Defense," *Scientific American*, 110 (April 25, 1914), 343–345; *Outlook*, 112 (February 23, 1916), 425–427; *New York Times*, January 6, 8, 21, April 16, 1916; Godfrey, in *Testimony*, 882; *Cong. Record*, 64 Cong., 1 sess., 127, 11, 563–564.

eral Reserve Board, and chairmen of Congressional Committees of Military Affairs, Navy, and Ways and Means. Roosevelt agreed with Dennis' plan in most details. He felt strongly that a council composed of Cabinet members only would not be effective. Since these men would be occupied also with other duties, he favored the creation of an advisory committee to perform much of the actual work. Members of this body, Roosevelt noted, should be given regular salary and tenure, lest they be made greatly inferior to the council members, as the Hay-Chamberlain bill provided.[6]

But his views had no direct influence on the measure that actually became a law. On April 29, 1916, a modified version of the Congressional bill was enacted, creating a Council of National Defense, composed of six Cabinet members. At the same time, an advisory board was established, with consultative powers only. It was this body which was to undertake the actual work of securing coordination of industries and resources and the development of techniques to facilitate the process. Charged primarily with the duty of making investigations, it was to recommend the best means for synchronizing transportation and production facilities.[7]

For several months, the Council floundered in its effort to deal with the tremendous task before it. After its organization on October 11, 1916, the Advisory Committee cautiously tried out various procedures. Each of its members was put in charge of investigating a special phase of war production, and for several months, nothing more than discussions between committee personnel and representatives from industries took place. Meanwhile, Bernard Baruch, a member of the Advisory Committee, was working out a series of contacts with industry by meeting with committees composed of business executives. At the very same time, the Council of National Defense was trying out a similar procedure. To gauge the available supply of war material, it appointed special committees as the need arose. These bodies were made up of representatives from the most important producers in particular fields of production. Their function was to advise government purchasing agencies of the availability of goods, while the representatives of business secured reliable information concerning government require-

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[6] *Who's Who in America, 1916–1917*, Chicago, [1916], 645. Dennis' ideas are summarized in his letter to the *New York Times*, April 24, 1916; see also F. D. Roosevelt, hereafter cited as F. D. R., to A. L. P. Dennis, April 27, 1916, approving of letter, Dennis to F. D. R., April 3, 1916, April 25, 1916; F. D. R. to Dennis, June 9, 1916, in Roosevelt Papers, Hyde Park.

[7] 1916 Statutes at Large, 649.

ments. By the winter of 1916, however, great dissatisfaction with this system had developed. Understandably, industries not represented on the committees grew resentful. Even more important, their anomalous position aroused criticism, for they were advising public agencies on the very same purchases for which they were acting as suppliers.[8]

The problem of coordinating purchases by Federal governmental units was at first approached in a limited field only, with the creation of the Munitions Standards Board during February of 1917. Composed of voluntary technical experts, its task was to secure standardization of munitions manufactured for the Army and Navy. From the very beginning, however, it functioned ineffectively, even though in March of 1917 representatives from the War and Navy Departments were added to the board to prevent the continuing competition in arms purchases. But, despite the limited scope of its operations, the board was not able in succeeding months to cope successfully with the problem.

Dissatisfaction with the work of the Munitions Standards Board and the Council of National Defense led to the creation of a new agency, the War Industries Board, in July of 1917. The Munitions Standards Board was now abolished and its duties transferred to the new body. At the same time, the War Industries Board was charged with the reorganization of the government-industry committees that had been fostered by the Council of National Defense, so as to eliminate their questionable dual character.[9]

The wide scope of the War Industries Board's jurisdiction demanded equally far-reaching powers. Yet, for the first six months of its existence, the new war agency found itself quite unable to carry its objectives for want of adequate jurisdiction. As it could not control the purchases of other government agencies, as late as February, 1918, for example, various bureaus within the War Department still had not coordinated their purchasing activities. Meanwhile, the demand for a centralized Ministry of Munitions was becoming more widespread. Finally, on March 4, 1918, President Wilson issued an Executive Order in which he granted the War Industries Board necessary and sweeping powers. Presidential authority to coordinate industry and resources was delegated to

[8] Baruch, *American Industry*, 18–19; Council of National Defense, *First Annual Report, 1917*, Washington, 1917, 54–55; Chamber of Commerce of the United States, *Annual Report, 1918*, 5–8.

[9] Clarkson, *Industrial America*, 35–36; Baruch, *American Industry*, 19–20; Council of National Defense, *Annual Report, 1918*, Washington, 1918, 117–118.

the chairman of the board, who himself could delegate as he chose. The board was further instructed to coordinate purchasing of all government agencies, and to adjust supply and demand of goods through such techniques as priority systems and reconversion of production facilities.[10]

By the middle of 1918, therefore, the War Industries Board had developed an organization that was reasonably well-adapted to the execution of its avowed objectives. In addition to the chairman, the board consisted of eight members appointed by the President, each of whom was in charge of one or more of eleven divisions. Operating directly under these divisions were sixty Commodity Sections, composed of purchasing agents representing Federal agencies and representatives from affected industries. A similar organization structure was duplicated at the lower levels. The Resources and Reconversion Section, for example, appointed regional advisors who, in turn, appointed chairmen for sub-regions. Committees of local industrial leaders then met with representatives of these sub-regional chairmen to conclude agreements on the reconversion of existing facilities.[11] Through a process of trial and error, the board developed a workable equilibrium between centralization and decentralization of its functions.

The most important administrative technique developed by the War Industries Board was the creation of joint government-industry committees. These boards were the means through which public and private efforts to solve war-time problems were directed. While originally created to serve as contact centers, they also answered a demand of the business interests for a relaxation of the anti-trust laws. The U. S. Chamber of Commerce, especially, made such a plea, and took the lead in organizing businessmen on an industry-wide scale. Already, in March of 1917, the Chamber offered its services to the Council of National Defense in the selection of appropriate industry representatives to advise government agencies on their purchases. Several months after the creation of the War Industries Board, the Chamber called a "War Conference of American Businessmen," at which formal principles

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[10] Baruch, *American Industry*, 20–28; War Industries Board, *An Outline of the Board's Origin, Functions, and Organization*, Washington, 1918.

[11] Baruch, *American Industry*, 29; see the organization chart in *ibid.*, 14; U. S. Office of Production Management, Office of the Historical Advisor, "Field Organization of the War Industries Board, 1918," December 20, 1941, processed; Chamber of Commerce, *Annual Report, 1918*, 7–8; *Nation's Business*, VI (August, 1918), 9–10.

were laid down for the organization of war service committees, to be composed of representatives of trade associations. To assure equitable representation for all segments of a particular industry, the Chamber also called a conference of the war service committee chairmen in December. Here, a formal procedure of accreditation was worked out, whereby industries, if organized into trade associations, would be eligible to choose members. It was through these committees, which met with the Commodity Sections of the War Industries Board, that such matters as production and price control, reconversion of production facilities, and conservation practices were determined.[12]

Another technique through which the War Industries Board sought to carry out its functions was an ambitious public relations program. Particularly on behalf of its conservation and priority policies, it issued special explanatory pamphlets, and gave out innumerable press releases to explain its purposes. Stores that were observing recommended conservation practices also received special display signs and insignia.[13] Certainly, the propaganda devices of the War Industries Board aided materially in the administration of its various policies.

Thus, by the middle of 1918, the War Industries Board had evolved an organizational structure, as well as administrative techniques, that enabled it to carry out its functions. Through its system of priorities, it was able to control demand so as to redress the uneven balance with the available supply. Through its conservation and reconversion programs, it was able to control supply. Through the elaborate, but efficient, system of government-industry committees, the coordination of governmental purchasing was greatly improved, though not perfected. The publicity program, too, achieved some of its limited objectives, such as the conservation of materials needed for war production. In judging the success of the War Industries Board, it must be remembered that it was only towards the end of 1918 that the organization which had been

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[12] Chamber of Commerce, *Annual Report, 1918*, 8–10; *New York Times*, September 18, 19, December 3, 13, 1917; *Nation's Business*, V (October, 1917), 9–11, 86–88; Joseph Foth, *Trade Associations, Their Services to Industry*, New York, 1930, 27–29, 35–36.

[13] See files of following War Industries Board Records: "Press Releases Concerning Activities of the War Industries Board," issued by Council of National Defense, and the Committee on Public Information, October, 1917–November, 1918; Weekly Review of the War Industries Board, October–November, 1918; Priorities Division, Priority Circulars and Bulletins No. 1–59; Conservation Division, Conservation Schedules, No. 1–357, all in National Archives, Washington, D. C.

painfully evolved through trial and error began to function smoothly. Yet, even during the period of experimentation, the accomplishments of the board, when measured against the magnitude of its task, were most notable.

Despite various obstacles, the trade association movement which the War Industries Board had fostered thrived in the years from 1919 to 1933. Organization of war service committees had given a great impetus to the formation of business associations. While, in 1914, there had been only 800 trade associations in the United States, by 1919, the number had increased to 4000. In the years following the Armistice, these groups continued certain practices, such as maintenance of open price systems, which, while tolerated during the war, were clearly illegal under the anti-trust laws. Under the administration of Secretary Hoover, however, the Department of Commerce gave encouragement to these activities, as well as to the organization of new trade associations. But strong opposition to this policy came from various quarters. In two decisions rendered in 1921 and 1923, the U. S. Supreme Court effectively hampered the formation of trade groups. The Federal Trade Commission, too, during 1921-1925, conducted investigations into their policies with a view towards discouraging clear violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Throughout 1923, opposition also came from an unexpected source. Attorney-General Harry Daugherty, to the very great anger and dismay of Herbert Hoover, began a series of prosecutions of trade associations for violating the anti-trust laws. All of these factors tended to cast doubt on the legitimate sphere of association activities, and impeded the growth of the movement. After 1925, however, it was again encouraged. In the famous "Cement Case," the U. S. Supreme Court clarified the status of the organizations, and removed legal impediments to their formation. Then, with the accession of W. E. Humphrey to the chairmanship of the Federal Trade Commission, its investigations of business groups were discontinued. And Harry Daugherty resigned his office on March 28, 1924.[14] Thereafter, the

[14] National Industrial Conference Board, *Trade Associations: Their Economic Significance and Legal Status*, New York, 1925, 324; E. H. Naylor, "History of Trade Associations in America," Appendix A in Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, *Trade Association Activities*, Washington, 1923, 301–307; for a list, see Emmet Hay, *Trade Associations: Their Organization and Management*, New York, 1921, 345–379; *New York Times*, July 16, 1923; for Hoover's views, see U. S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, *Trade Association Activities*, 1–8; Foth, *Trade Associations*, 356; 257 U. S. 377; 262 U. S. 371; Federal Trade Commission, *Annual Report, 1922*, Washington, 1922,

growth of trade associations met few obstacles from Federal officials.

The economic conditions that confronted the Roosevelt Administration in 1933 were not unlike those that had led to the creation of the War Industries Board in 1917. To be sure, there were significant differences—instead of war and prosperity, the country found itself in a period of peace and depression; instead of shortages of goods, there now was an apparent surplus. Yet these differences should not obscure some very real similarities. As in 1918, the President found a country plagued with the problem of what seemed a great imbalance between production and comsumption. If, during World War I, requirements had out-run supplies, now the reverse seemed to be the case. Then, too, while in 1917-1918 public agencies that had been groping with the problem were working at cross-purposes, now also, there was little coordination between the various governmental bodies that were seeking to deal with the depression. Granted some essential differences in the two situations, yet it cannot be denied that there was some similarity in the basic economic problem which faced the Federal government.

Just as in World War I, there was a need for coordinating the supply and demand for agricultural and industrial products. Just as in World War I, there was a need to coordinate the activities of the various public agencies working on some phase of the general recovery program. Indeed, in its larger aspects, the situation in 1933 presented many parallels to the earlier crisis.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that F. D. Roosevelt's speeches and writings during this period indicate that he was in a frame of mind in which he conceived of the national emergency as analagous to that of 1917, as no less grave than war conditions. He envisioned his role as President in terms of the image created by Wilson's war leadership. Speaking of the efforts of the Hoover Administration to deal with the depression, he noted indignantly:

> Compare this panic-stricken policy of delay and improvisation with that devised to meet the emergency of war fifteen years ago.
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> We met specific situations with considered, relevant measures of con-

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51–52; *New York Times*, January 5, April 19, July 25, 26, 27, 1923, March 29, 1924; for references to correspondence between Hoover and Daugherty, see National Industrial Conference Board, *Trade Associations*, 28–29; 268 U. S. 563, 588; National Industrial Conference Board, *The Scope of Trade Association Activities in the Light of Recent Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States*, New York, 1925, pamphlet; Donald C. Blaisdell, *The Federal Trade Commission*, New York, 1932, 80, 82.

structive value. There were the War Industries Board, the Food and Fuel Administrations, the War Trade Board, the Shipping Board, and many others.

I am not speaking of an economic life completely planned and regimented. I am speaking of the necessity, however, in those imperative interferences with the economic life of the Nation that there be a real community of interest.[15]

It is within this context, also, that he uttered one of the famous phraces in his Inaugural when he said:

I shall ask the Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis-board Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.[16]

These were not vague, sonorous phrases, but reflected the program with which the new President at first sought to attack the problems with which he was confronted.

Consequently, Roosevelt's approach to many of the issues facing him in the spring of 1933 was guided by his experiences as a war-time planner and administrator. Certainly this was true of his actions concerning finance and transportation as it was in the realm of labor, and industrial, organization. In thinking about ways and means to take the country off the gold standard, for example, he asked an economist friend, Renee Leon, in January, 1933, to make a list of pertinent war-time statutes which were still in force. Leon sent him a copy of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, under which Wilson had embargoed gold exports during the war. It was under this law that Roosevelt took the first step towards abandoning the gold standard on March 10, 1933. Similarly, the office of Coordinator of Transportation, established in June, 1933, was modeled on the Railroad Administration of World War I. Yet, if different in certain of its functions,

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[15] Rosenman (ed.), *Public Papers of F. D. R.*, I, 631–632.

[16] *Ibid.*, II, 15; Samuel Rosenman, *Working With Roosevelt*, New York, 1952, 62; at his first press conference as President, F. D. R. reflected his frame of mind when he told the assembled newspapermen: "I see no reason why I should not talk to you ladies and gentlemen off the record in just the way . . . I used to do in the Navy Department down here. Quite a number of you, I am glad to see, date back to the days of the previous existence which I led in Washington." Rosenman (ed.), *Public Papers*, II, 30. As Press Secretary, F. D. R. chose Stephen Early, a member of *Stars and Stripes*' editorial staff in World War I, while Marvin McIntire, who had been Secretary of the Naval Information Committee in 1917–1918, became Appointments Secretary; see George Michael, *Handout*, New York, 1935, 10; Ernest K. Lindley, *The Roosevelt Revolution*, New York, 1933, 78.

its organizational structure almost duplicated its predecessor.[17] In the sphere of Federal policy towards business, too, the early New Deal policies relied heavily on the institutional forms and techniques developed by Wilson's War Administration.

For several years after the crash of 1929, many individuals and groups had worked on plans to provide for the establishment of a public agency to coordinate industrial production. As early as 1931, Wilson's Secretary of the Treasury, William MacAdoo, speaking before the Economic Conservation Committee of America in San Francisco on June 4, advocated the creation of a Peace Industries Board. Such a national economic council, on the model of the War Industries Board, was to stabilize conditions in industry and agriculture by balancing consumption and production. A similar proposal was made in 1932 by a writer on depression problems. After the election of 1932, a veritable rash of plans for industrial mobilization appeared. Among the most notable were those being drafted by Senators La Follette, Costigan, and Cutting, by Senator Wagner and a sub-committee of Roosevelt's new Cabinet, headed by Assistant Secretary of Commerce Dickinson, by a group affiliated with the Brookings Institution, by Bernard Baruch and Gerard Swope, as well as by Roosevelt's Brain Trust.[18]

It was the Brain Trust who finally drafted a specific measure. Most of the plans then in preparation were being filtered through Raymond Moley, who kept a file of them for future reference. Soon after the Inauguration, Moley turned the file over to James Warburg, and asked him to digest, and sort out, significant ideas. A month later, Warburg presented a memorandum on the subject to Moley, who felt that the time was not yet ripe for such schemes, and told Roosevelt so on April 4. He also suggested, however, that the President assemble a committee to draw up a specific program. Roosevelt was spurred to action two days later when the Senate passed the Black Bill, designed to establish a national 30-hour work week. This action caused much alarm and unfavorable

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17 Walker D. Hines, *War History of American Railroads*, New Haven, 1928, 24–25, 250–252; Federal Coordinator of Transportation, *Report, 1933*, Washington, 1934, 42–71, in 73 Cong. 2d sess., Senate Doc. 119; Federal Coordinator of Transportation, "An Outline of Functions and Organization of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation," (Mimeo.), *Press Release*, April 3, 1934, 6–21; *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 5, 1931; *New York Times*, June 5, 1931; Benjamin A. Javits, *Business and the Public Interest*, New York, 1932, p. x.

18 *New York Times*, April 15, 1933; Donald R. Richberg, *The Rainbow*, Garden City, 1936, 106–107; Frances Perkins, *The Roosevelt I Knew*, New York, 1946, 195–200; Charles F. Roos, *NRA Economic Planning*, Bloomington, 1937, 18, 36–39.

comment. To allay this discontent, on April 6, the President appointed a Cabinet Committee, headed by Frances Perkins, to draft an alternative plan. By April 18, Perkins was able to submit to the House Committee on Labor a scheme which provided for a maximum 40-hour work week, and for the appointment of Fair Wage Boards by the Secretary of Labor, who was to be empowered to relax the anti-trust laws. Meanwhile, reactions to this suggestion were no less violent than to the Black Bill a few days earlier. Thus, as early as April 11, Roosevelt asked Moley to get in touch with the various groups who were preparing industrial mobilization plans, and to solicit their views, in order to formulate a concrete measure.[19]

But Moley found himself unable to carry out the task. It is true that in the two days following his conversation with the President, he contacted the various planners, as suggested. Yet these were hectic days for Moley, and with so many other duties, he simply could not find the time to draft the outline of a bill himself. He was beginning to feel rather uneasy about his neglect of the subject when, on April 25, he walked into the arms of Hugh Johnson in the lobby of the Carlton Hotel in Washington D. C. After telling him of his predicament, Moley asked Johnson to take over the responsibility of working up a bill to provide for the Federal regulation of industry, inasmuch as he was familiar with the only similar experiment that had been tried, the War Industries Board.[20]

With his characteristic energy, Johnson immediately set to work. Since he was not too well-informed in regard to labor relations, he called in Donald Richberg, one of the leading labor lawyers in the country, who was recommended to him for this aspect of the work. By the time that the two had worked out a preliminary draft, though, the Cabinet sub-committee had one ready, too. The President then called a White House conference

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[19] Raymond Moley, *After Seven Years*, New York, 1939, 185–187; *New York Times*, April 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 1933.

[20] Moley, *After Seven Years*, 188; Hugh S. Johnson, *The Blue Eagle—From Egg to Earth*, Garden City, 1935, 193; Johnson had been Army representative on the War Industries Board; Clarkson, *Industrial America*, 93, 126–127, 131, 518; For Johnson's Report to the War Industries Board, December, 1918, advocating an industrial council, see U. S. Senate, 73 Cong., Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry, Part 17, *Hearings*, Washington, 1935, 4292. Tugwell and the Brain Trusters resented and distrusted his appearance in their midst; Rexford G. Tugwell, "The Preparation of a President," *Western Political Quarterly*, I (June, 1948), 143–144.

of the various industrial planners, at which he expected them to iron out their differences. When they had gathered, Roosevelt ordered them to agree on a brief bill, and appointed a committee of those assembled to undertake its preparation. The final draft was worked out by Johnson and Richberg, along with Wagner and Lewis Douglas. Their handiwork was introduced in Congress on May 9, 1933, and became law a few weeks later, on July 16.[21]

Even while the legislation was still pending in Congress, Johnson was already drafting plans for its administration. In calling Roosevelt's attention to the need for an effective enforcement agency, both he and Douglas made concrete suggestions. The President, in turn, urged Johnson to work out plans for a tentative organization. Thus, by the time that Congress enacted the National Industrial Recovery Act, Johnson had already assembled a skeletal administrative framework to put it into immediate operation.[22]

The President's statement on the creation of the National Recovery Administration indicates that he conceived of it in terms of his war-time experiences. As noted, in 1916, he had already concerned himself with drawing up specific plans for a national economic council. According to Hugh Johnson, the idea for the NRA Act in 1933 also was entirely Roosevelt's own. Consequently, it is not surprising that in his official statement the President said:

> Many good men voted for this charter with misgivings. I do not share these doubts. I had part in the great cooperation of 1917 and 1918, and it is my faith that we can count on our industry once more to lift this new threat, and to do it without taking any advantage of the public trust that has this day been reposed without stint in the good faith, and high purpose, of American business. . . . As in the great crisis of the World War, it puts a whole people to the simple but vital test: "Must we go on in many groping and disorganized, separate units to defeat, or shall we move as one great team to victory?"

And, just a month later, in inaugurating the Blue Eagle campaign, Roosevelt again drew the parallel when he noted:

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[21] Richberg had also prepared the labor provisions for the industrial organization plan being prepared by the La Follette group; Johnson, *The Blue Eagle*, 193; Richberg, *The Rainbow*, 52–53, 108–109; *New York Times*, May 19, 1933; Moley, *After Seven Years*, 189; 1933–1934 Statutes at Large, 195; defenders of the NIRA bill in Congress cited the experience of the War Industries Board to still criticism; *Cong. Record*, 73 Cong., 1 sess., 4338–4339; Leverett S. Lyon, *et al.*, *The National Recovery Administration*, Washington, 1935, 3.

[22] Johnson, *The Blue Eagle*, 206–208; Lindley, *The Roosevelt Revolution*, 230–231.

> In war . . . soldiers wear a bright badge on their shoulders to be sure that comrades do not fire on comrades. . . . That is why we have provided a badge of honor for this purpose.

Moreover, as he stated repeatedly during this period, he felt that there was a unity in the country such as he had not seen since the days of the First World War.[23] Establishment of the NRA thus was not conceived as a novel and untried experiment in industrial self-rule, but as a resuscitation of a tried and proven remedy, developed only after much experimentation, the old War Industries Board.

In fact, the functions assigned to the new agency, as well as its early administrative structure, were not very different from those of the earlier institution. As stated in the preamble of the organic law, it was to promote the organization of industry for cooperative action among trade groups, to foster the conservation of resources, and to promote the fullest utilization of the productive capacity of the Nation's industries. To carry out these responsibilities, the law provided for an administrator to whom wide Presidential powers were delegated, very much the same as in the case of the War Industries Board. Assisting him was a Special Industrial Recovery Board, composed of five Cabinet members, the Director of the Budget, and the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. This body corresponded to the former Council of National Defense. With the exception of a proviso for a Division of Public Relations, development of administrative structure was otherwise left to the discretion of the administrator. It was expected, however, that he would delegate some of his functions to deputy administrators, each concerned with a special group of industries, in a manner similar to that in which these functions had been divided among the members of the War Industries Board.[24]

At the very beginning, the National Recovery Administration sought to carry out its objectives with some of the same techniques that had proved so eminently workable in 1917. Foremost, perhaps, was the decision to make use once again of the joint government-industry committees. If originally formed quietly and unobtrusively, yet these had been the most significant administrative mechanism through which government and industry were effec-

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[23] In National Recovery Administration, *Press Release* No. 281; F. D. R. statement in *New York Times*, July 25, 1933; Rosenman (ed.), *Public Papers*, II, 252, 256, 301; speech on NRA, August 26, 1933, in *ibid.*, II, 345; F. D. R. to Harry Brocas, October 27, 1933, Roosevelt Papers.

[24] 1933–1934 Statutes at Large 195; for a concise survey of NRA structure, see Lyon, *National Recovery Administration*, 29–79.

tively brought together. The NRA also sought to base the execution of its program on this device, and in its first directive outlined a code-making procedure. When a particular trade association had prepared a code of fair competition, it was to apply to the NRA's Control Division. If the applicant was deemed representative of the industry, preliminary hearings were held on the provisions of a draft code. Thereafter, the deputy administrator in charge of the particular industry was to be consulted about possible changes, and then he and his staff would hold public hearings on the proposed code. Should they reflect favorably upon it, the code would be presented for approval to the administrator, and finally, to the President.[25] This procedure was the same as under the War Industries Board. Representatives of trade associations met with those of the National Recovery Administration, each industry dealing with a particular division of the NRA. While the deliberations between government and industry had taken place behind closed doors in the War Industries Board's Commodity Sections of 1918, now, in 1933, the very same process was carried on, but, theoretically, in public hearings. It was here that such matters as production controls and conservation policies were ironed out.

While the World War agency had retained ultimate power over the enforcement of agreements made in the joint committees, its successor, however, left this responsibility entirely to the trade associations themselves. Administration of the codes was entrusted to local code authorities which were dominated by the trade groups. Shortly before the creation of the NRA, Bernard Baruch had warned that while his war experience showed that voluntary cooperation might produce good results, nevertheless, he felt that the use of force must hover in the background if, under prevailing conditions, the new experiment was to be successful. Until December, 1933, however, the NRA did not concern itself at all with enforcement of agreements made under its direction. While removal of the Blue Eagle was moderately effective as a penalty during the summer of 1933, it became increasingly less so towards the end of the year when much of the enthusiasm that had sustained the first efforts of the NRA was rapidly waning.[26]

For its publicity techniques, the NRA relied almost wholly on World War I experience. In fact, most of the key officials in

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[25] Procedure is outlined in NRA, *Press Release* No. 2; but see, also, NRA, *Press Release* No. 9, 1–2, for Johnson's discussion of some changes; Lyon, *et al.*, *National Recovery Administration*, 83–140.

[26] *Ibid.*, 58–59, 162, 166, 169ff; *New York Times*, May 21, 1933; parts of the speech are also quoted in Johnson, *The Blue Eagle*, 154.

the Publicity Division had taken part in the propaganda activities of 1917-1918. The first Director of Publicity, Boaz Long, lacked such experience, and was removed within less than a month as a failure. Johnson thereupon asked William MacAdoo just how he had organized the very successful Liberty Loan drives during World War I. Wilson's former Secretary of the Treasury replied that it had all been done for him by Charles H. Horner, former Director of the Treasury Department's Speaker's Bureau. Johnson immediately called on Horner, then a newspaperman in Kansas City, to come to Washington temporarily to serve as NRA Director of Publicity. Horner responded and brought some of his ablest World War associates with him. One of these was Louis J. Alber, a veteran of the Liberty Loan drives, who became head of the NRA Speaker's Bureau. Another was Labert St. Clair, in 1918 the Treasury Department's Press contact man during Liberty Loan drives, who now became head of the Press Section of the NRA. He was succeeded by his old war-time colleague, Frank R. Wilson, Director of Publicity for three bond campaigns.[27]

It was not surprising, therefore, that many of the publicity devices which were utilized by the NRA during the summer of 1933 were based primarily on the war experience. If the Blue Eagle campaign during the summer of 1933 bore great resemblance to the Liberty Loan drives of a decade and a half earlier, the relationship was more than just accidental. Indeed, Johnson derived the idea of the Blue Eagle emblem itself from a practice of the War Industries Board, of distributing placards to retail merchants who were cooperating with its conservation programs. Other NRA techniques, such as press releases, special bulletins, and public speakers, were also based on the propaganda experience of the earlier emergency.[28]

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Thus, the institutional structure of the NRA was modeled closely on the WIB of World War I. Especially in its use of representative

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[27] "Press Agents of the New Deal," *New Outlook*, 163 (July, 1934), 23, 27; *Editor and Publisher*, 66 (July 29, 1933), 8; *ibid.*, 66 (August 5, 1933), 16; Johnson, *The Blue Eagle*, 259; Horner's General Correspondence in National Archives, *passim*.

[28] Johnson, *The Blue Eagle*, 250; Baruch, *American Industry*, 63; for discussion of NRA insignia, see NRA, Division of Review, *Work Materials*, No. 22; the origins of Blue Eagle emblem are discussed in *Editor and Publisher*, 66 (August 12, 1933), 36. That the borrowing was conscious is revealed directly in NRA, *Press Release* No. 92; see also, NRA, Public Relations Division, Records, Poems and Slogans, August, 1933, to January, 1934, in National Archives.

industry committees and in dependence on a far flung publicity campaign did the New Deal agency try to imitate its predecessor. Yet, while the WIB was a success, the NRA was a failure. The well-known reasons for the debacle were two-fold. In the first place, the WIB was able to increase production because of the large and immediate government loans and expenditures extended principally by the War Finance Corporation. In 1933, on the other hand, the primary aim of the NRA was to restrict production, and its activities were not accompained by a large and sudden influx of new capital to increase purchasing power. The Public Works Administration spent its funds slowly and with care. Moreover, during 1918 the WIB had authority to use the President's absolute war emergency powers which Congress had granted in the Lever Act, to ensure enforcement of its directives. But the NRA relied on Code Authorities for the execution of its program, agencies which were manned by the same individuals who had themselves participated in the code-drafting process. Despite a similar institutional structure, therefore, the two agencies differed markedly in attainment of their goals.

Nevertheless, the experiment in industrial mobilization revealed the New Deal's link with the past. During the first year of his presidency, Roosevelt frequently fell back on his World War I experiences and sought to fashion his leadership in Woodrow Wilson's image. The early New Deal programs in the realm of business were composed of more than mere momentary improvisation. Based on institutions developed under the strain of the earlier crisis, they derived from the hard and concrete experience of the First World War.

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Andrew Johnson: His Historiographical Rise and Fall

Andrew Johnson could scarcely have escaped being one of the most controversial figures in American History. He headed the nation at a time of revolutionary crisis. His policies and actions aroused strong passions and produced bitter conflicts. What he did or failed to do profoundly affected issues still vital and unresolved to this day. And his enigmatic personality made him peculiarly liable to diverse interpretations of his purposes and motives.

Johnson's immediate contemporaries generally rendered an unfavorable verdict on him both as man and statesman. Partisan opponents such as James Russell Lowell, Henry Wilson, and James G. Blaine portrayed him as an obstinate, conceited, boorish character who wilfully defied Congress and Northern public opinion in a vain effort to carry out an inadequate and pro-Southern reconstruction policy.[1] The only Republicans to defend him were members of his cabinet, namely Gideon Welles and Hugh McCulloch; and while an occasional Southerner or Democrat had a good word for him, even they tended to be rather lukewarm in their praise.[2]

Not until the turn of the century did some truly historical evaluations of Johnson appear. The most influential of these was contained in the sixth volume of James Ford Rhodes' *United States from the Compromise of 1850,* published in 1906. Rhodes, who had been a young Northern businessman and Repulican at the time of Reconstruction, found no reason to alter the prevailing view of Johnson's character. "Of all men in public life," he wrote, "it is difficult to conceive of one so ill-fitted for this delicate

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[1] James R. Lowell, *Works of James Russell Lowell,* 10 vols., Boston, 1893, V, 289–326; Henry Wilson, *History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America,* 3 vols., Boston and New York, 1877, III, 595–597; James G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress: From Lincoln to Garfield,* 2 vols., Norwich, Conn., 1884, I, 241, 263, 267, 306. See also John L. Motley, *Four Questions for the People,* Boston, 1868, 31–32.

[2] Gideon Welles, "Lincoln and Johnson," *Galaxy,* XIII (February, 1872), 663ff; Hugh McCulloch, *Men and Measures,* New York, 1888, 403–407; Alexander H. Stephens, *A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States,* 2 vols., Philadelphia, 1870, II, 646–649; Richard Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction,* New York, 1877, 236; John S. Wise, *Recollections of Thirteen Presidents,* New York, 1906, 108–112. Wise, interestingly enough, portrays Johnson as a drunkard during the last years of his life; his evidence is first-hand and circumstancial, yet not a single biographer of Johnson has ever referred to it.

work [of Reconstruction] as was Andrew Johnson."[3] In his opinion Johnson's main defects were conceit and obstinacy, the same conclusion expressed by Blaine, and while he admitted that Johnson possessed "intellectual force" and "strict integrity," he declared that these qualities were cancelled out by inflexibility and "lack of political sense." In addition, he accepted as true the charge that Johnson drank to excess, and he quoted Lowell's statement that the Swing Around the Circle was an "indecent orgy."[4]

Rhodes also strongly criticized Johnson's dealings with Congress, in particular his vetoes of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill and the Civil Rights Bill, and his opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment. By these acts, he asserted, Johnson destroyed any chance of co-operation between the executive and legislative, and opened the way for Radical domination.[5] This last he considered unfortunate, as it led to an immoral, unconstitutional, and impractical attempt to reconstruct the South on the basis of military force and Negro suffrage. In general he concluded that "No one else was so instrumental in defeating Johnson's own aims as was Johnson himself."[6]

Rhodes' essentially Northern interpretation was more supplemented than modified by the writings of his contemporaries, John Burgess, Woodrow Wilson, and William Dunning, all of whom were Southerners. Burgess declared that "Mr. Johnson was an unfit person to be President of the United States," and that "he was low-born and low-bred, violent in temper, obstinate, coarse, vindictive, and lacking in the sense of propriety. . . ."[7] Wilson characterized Lincoln's successor as "self-willed, imperious, implacable," a man who "saw to it . . . that nobody should relish or trust him whom bad temper could alienate."[8] Only Dunning, leader of the pro-Southern school of Reconstruction historiography, tended toward a sympathetic view of Johnson's personal character, describ-

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[3] James Ford Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, Volume VI, New York, 1906, 1–2.

[4] *Ibid.*, 4–5, 60–62, 72–75, 102–105, 122. Rhodes (p. 5) apparently based his charge of drunkenness (". . . at some time during his occupancy of this office [Military Governor of Tennessee] he began to drink to excess.") on a conversation with Hannibal Hamlin, who was involved in Johnson's intoxication at the 1865 inaugural.

[5] *Ibid.*, 34–57, 68–71, 82–94, 115–116.

[6] *Ibid.*, 59.

[7] John W. Burgess, *Reconstruction and the Constitution, 1866–1876*, New York, 1902, 191–192.

[8] Woodrow Wilson, "The Reconstruction of the Southern States," *Atlantic Monthly*, LXXXVII (January, 1901), 3–4,

ing him as a man of "integrity of purpose, force of will, and rude intellectual force." However, he followed Rhodes in condemning the vetoes of the Freedmen's Bureau and Civil Rights bills (both of which he criticized as such), and he believed that the Swing Around the Circle "again demonstrated that Andrew Johnson was not a statesman of national size in such a crisis as existed in 1866." In addition, by revealing that the historian George Bancroft was the real author of the much-admired Presidential Message of December, 1865, Dunning actually produced a further down-grading of Johnson's historical reputation.[9]

On the other hand, all of these turn-of-the-century historians more or less agreed that Johnson tried to put into effect Lincoln's Reconstruction plan, and that in the words of Burgess he was "nearer right" than the Radicals.[10] And they were unanimous in denouncing the Tenure of Office Act, Stanton's conduct, and the impeachment proceedings. Their main complaint against Johnson was not so much what he tried to do, but how he went about doing it. Both explicitly and implicitly they made it clear that they believed that if Lincoln had lived affairs would have turned out much better.

The first historian to attempt a full-scale upward revision of Johnson's reputation was James Schouler, in his *History of the Reconstruction Period,* published in 1913. Schouler based his work upon an extensive use of Johnson's papers, made available in 1904, and also relied heavily on Gideon Welles' *Diary,* published in 1911.[11] He criticized Rhodes for having been "quite unjust to Johnson," exonerated the seventeenth President of the drunkenness charge, and defended his use of ghost writers. Moreover, his account of Johnson's struggle with Congress was highly sympathetic to the former, and he assigned a greater share of the blame to the Radicals, whom he stigmatized as "revengeful and visionary." However, despite finding many qualities to praise in Johnson, his basic conclusion was actually much the same as Rhodes': "... this President created difficulties for himself at every step, while trying to carry out ideas often of themselves sound and useful."[12]

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[9] William A. Dunning, *Reconstruction Political and Economic 1865–1877,* New York and London, 1907, 19, 72, 82.

[10] Burgess, *Reconstruction and the Constitution,* 191–192.

[11] Dunning, of course, had consulted these sources, and even Rhodes had examined them, but Schouler apparently was the first to make a systematic use of them.

[12] James Schouler, *History of the Reconstruction Period 1865–1877,* New York, 1913, 142.

World War I and the years immediately following saw no significant additions to Johnsonography, and the Rhodes interpretation, albeit somewhat modified by Schouler and Dunning, still held sway among American historians. Thus neither E. P. Oberholtzer, in the first volume of his *History of the United States Since the Civil War,* published in 1917, nor Walter L. Fleming, in his *The Sequel of Appomattox,* published in 1919, departed in any essential from the Rhodes-Burgess-Dunning view, in fact, they were if anything more harsh on Johnson than Dunning had been, with Fleming, a student of Dunning and a Southerner, describing the seventeenth President as an "ill-educated, narrow, vindictive . . . stubborn, irrascible, and undignified man," who "never sloughed off his backwoods crudeness."[13] The only important historical work which had a favorable word for Johnson during this period was Benjamin F. Kendrick's *The Journal of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction* (New York, 1914), which by apparently proving that the Radicals did not really intend the Fourteenth Amendment to be the final terms of Reconstruction in 1866, implied that Johnson was not guilty, as was customarily claimed, of an egregious blunder in advising the South to reject it.

Then, at the end of the 1920's, an historiographical revolution took place. In the brief span of three years five widely-read books, all extremely favorable to Johnson, appeared. First, in 1928, was Robert W. Winston's *Andrew Johnson: Plebeian and Patriot.* Next, in 1929, there was Lloyd Paul Stryker's *Andrew Johnson: A Study in Courage* and Claude G. Bowers' *The Tragic Era.* And finally, in 1930, there came Howard K. Beale's *The Critical Year* and George Fort Milton's *The Age of Hate.* Not all of these works were of equal merit. Some were more influential than others. And they differed in approach and interpretation. But they all combined to raise Johnson's reputation to a height which would have been inconceivable to James Ford Rhodes.

No longer was Lincoln's successor deemed a stubborn, egotistical, ill-tempered demagogue whose maladroit policies and vulgar conduct needlessly antagonized Congress and led to the regrettable excesses of Radical Reconstruction. Now he was a humane, enlightened, and liberal statesman who waged a courageous battle in defense of the Constitution, the Union, and democracy against the scheming and unscrupulous Radicals, who for their part were motivated by a vindictive hatred of the South, partisan ambition, and (in

[13] Walter L. Fleming, *The Sequel of Appomattox,* New Haven, 1919, 71–72, 137.

the eyes of Beale in particular) a desire to establish the national supremacy of Northern "Big Business." In short, rather than a boor, Johnson was a martyr; instead of a villain, a hero.

From a scholarly standpoint the most significant of these books was Beale's *The Critical Year.* Beale was a disciple of Charles Beard's economic determinism, and his book was an elaboration of that historian's "Second American Revolution" thesis. In addition, Beale openly proclaimed his purpose of dethroning Rhodes and Dunning as the standard authorities on Reconstruction.[14] These historians, he asserted, had failed to see "the larger economic and social aspects." In his opinion, "the future has vindicated" Johnson on "reconstruction and constitutional interpretation." The main reason Johnson lost to the Radicals was his failure to exploit economic issues during the election of 1866. The Radicals, on the other hand, triumphed through a clever campaign of villification and demagogic "claptrap." In general, Beale felt that "in spite of obvious mistakes and shortcomings, Johnson becomes more worthy of respect."[15]

The pro-Johnson historiographical revolution was as successful as it was sudden.[16] It even led to a movie, *Johnson of Tennessee,* starring Van Hefflin, which protrayed the ex-tailor as a heroic leader in the cause of sectional unity. Until very recently probably the majority of historians would have felt themselves safe in saying that the once maligned Johnson had been elevated permanently to a position of respectability, almost prestige, among American Presidents.[17] One

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[14] Howard K. Beale, *The Critical Year: A Study of Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction,* New York, 1930, 3–4.

[15] *Ibid.,* 4–29, 398–399.

[16] For examples of the favorable reception given the revisionist works, see the review of Stryker's *Johnson* by Thomas P. Abernathy, *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* XVI (December, 1929), 414–416; the review of Beale's *Critical Year* by Homer C. Hockett, *ibid.,* XVII (March, 1931), 635–637; and the review of Milton's *Age of Hate* by Avery Craven, *ibid.,* XVIII (December, 1931), 413–414. The pro-Johnson point of view was incorporated into such widely read books as Robert Selph Henry's *The Story of Reconstruction,* Indianapolis and New York, 1938; Matthew Josephson, *The Politicos, 1865–1896,* New York, 1938; Richard N. Current, *Old Thad Stevens, A Story of Ambition,* Madison, 1942; William E. Woodward, *Years of Madness,* New York, 1951; and any number of textbooks, including the extremely influential *Civil War and Reconstruction* by James G. Randall, New York, 1937, and *The Growth of the American Republic,* New York, first edition 1930, by Samuel E. Morison and Henry Steele Commager. Only a few Negro historians, historians of the Negro, and biographers of Thad Stevens (excepting Current) went counter to this attitude.

[17] A poll of fifty-five American historians conducted by Arthur M. Schlesinger shortly after World War II resulted in Johnson being rated as an "average" President; Arthur M. Schlesinger, *Paths to the Present,* New York, 1948, 96, 98.

hopes, however, that no historian made such a statement, or if he did, published it. For during the past several years a counter-revolution in Johnsonography has gotten underway, with some impressive results. Perhaps the first noteworthy manifestation of this new wave was David Donald's article in the December, 1956, issue of *American Heritage,* entitled "Why They Impeached Andrew Johnson."

Donald, who can be accused neither of Northern bias nor of obsolete historical ideas, wrote of Johnson in words amazingly reminiscent of Rhodes. Johnson, he contended, suffered from "chronic lack of discretion"; "he lacked political sagacity"; and "his mind was immovably closed, and he defended his course with all the obstinacy of a weak man." Donald, furthermore, arrived at almost exactly the same overall judgment as Rhodes: Johnson, who "played into his enemies' hands" by his rude personal conduct, "sacrificed all influence with the party which had elected him and . . . turned over its control to the Radicals. . . ."[18]

Other articles, plus several monographs, have added fuel to the flames now licking at the pedestal constructed for Johnson in 1930.[19] But by far the major work which seeks to revise the revisionists is Eric L. McKitrick's *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction,* published in 1960. Space forbids a detailed description and analysis of this most stimulating book. Suffice it to say that in it McKitrick at-

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[18] David Donald, "Why They Impeached Andrew Johnson," *American Heritage,* VIII (December, 1956), 23–25, 103.

[19] For examples, see the following: Robert P. Sharkey, *Money, Class, and Party: An Economic Study in Civil War and Reconstruction;* Fawn M. Brodie, *Thaddeus Stevens: Scourge of the South,* New York, 1959; Stanley Cohen, "Northeastern Business and Radical Reconstruction: A Re-examination," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* XLVI (June, 1959), 67–90; Ralph T. Roske, "The Seven Martyrs?" *American Historical Review,* LXIV (January, 1959) 323–330; Harold M. Hyman, "Johnson, Stanton, and Grant: A Reconsideration of the Army's Role in the Events Leading to Impeachment," *ibid.,* LXVI (October, 1960), 85–100; Jack B. Scroggs, "Southern Reconstruction: A Radical View," *Journal of Southern History,* XXIV (November, 1958), 417–439. Some of the more recent textbooks show the influence of the new revisionism. However, Hodding Carter in the *Angry Scar: The Story of Reconstruction,* New York, 1959, while attempting earnestly to achieve objectivity about Reconstruction in the South itself, follows in a general way Beale in his interpretation of Reconstruction nationally, and is decidedly pro-Johnson. And Milton Lomack's *Andrew Johnson: President on Trial,* New York, 1960, essentially follows Beale, Bowers, and Milton. The first general history of Reconstruction to incorporate in large measure the new revisionism is John Hope Franklin's *Reconstruction After the Civil War,* Chicago, 1961. In addition, David Donald in his recent revision of Randall's *Civil War and Reconstruction,* New York, 1961, presents much of the new view; a comparison of Randall's original text and Donald's revision makes a very interesting and revealing study.

tempts to do to Beale what Beale supposedly did to Rhodes. As for his appraisal of Johnson, McKitrick agrees substantially with Rhodes. Indeed, he admits to "an unusual rapport" with not only Rhodes, but even James G. Blaine! Both of these writers, he states,

> had a highly developed appreciation of the conflicting political requirements . . . a sense of limits, and an understanding of the possible, all adding up to an attitude of mind which I found very helpful in my efforts to understand why the men of the time behaved as they did.[20]

An indirect but powerful second to McKitrick's study is Harold M. Hyman's *Stanton: The Life and Times of Lincoln's Secretary of War,* written in collaboration with the late Benjamin Thomas.[21] Hyman, in relating Stanton's role in Reconstruction, of necessity deals with the character and actions of Johnson. The portrait that emerges is that of a devious, cunning, and even unscrupulous President who stubbornly pursued a program that was as foolish as it was fallacious. On the other hand, Stanton, who is second only to Thad Stevens as one of the traditional villains of Reconstruction, is presented as a dedicated, patriotic official who sacrificed his financial interests and physical health in order to protect what he considered to be the achievments of the war and the integrity of the army from Johnson's pro-Southern meddling. Indeed, Hyman's account of the conflict between Johnson and Stanton departs so far from the standard version that it is no exaggeration to say that he has practically re-written the entire history of Reconstruction as it occurred in Washington between 1865 and 1868.

It would be premature to declare that the new revisionism, championed by McKitrick, has completely superseded the old one, headed by Beale: Quite obviously some scholars have nothing but contempt for it.[22] However, few would deny that Johnson's his-

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[20] Eric L. McKitrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction,* Chicago, 1960, 521.

[21] This work, published by Alfred Knopf in the spring of 1962, was originally instituted by Thomas, then after his death taken over by Hyman. Most of the research and interpretations presented in it are Hyman's.

[22] For examples, see review of McKitrick's book by William B. Hesseltine in *Journal of Southern History,* XXVII (February, 1961), 110–111; and review of Franklin's *Reconstruction After the Civil War* by Avery Craven, *ibid.,* XXVIII (May, 1962), 255–256. A recent repeat of Arthur Schlesinger's Presidential rating poll, this time involving seventy-five historians, resulted in Johnson remaining in the "average" category, although at the very bottom of it; Arthur M. Schlesinger, "Our Presidents: A Rating by 75 Historians," *New York Times Magazine,* July 29, 1962, 12–13. Just how the only President in our history to be impeached can be rated "average" is beyond this writer.

torical stock, after rising from the bottom in 1930, is on the way down again some thirty years later. A number of factors, I believe, account in the main for the oscillation:

First. *Professional Ambition.* Without disparaging the motives of the historians it would seem that professional ambition most likely played a part in Beale's onslaught against Rhodes, and probably holds true of McKitrick in respect to Beale. Such professional rivalry is natural, even desirable. In fact, a historian whom somebody aspires to supplant should consider himself as marked with distinction!

Second. *The discovery of new evidence or the more intensive use of old.* This is illustrated, in the case of the upward reestimation of Johnson, by the influence of the publication of Gideon Welles' diary in 1911. As for his recent downward revision, one need only point to the enormous body of new work that has been done in the field of Reconstruction history since 1930.[23] Much of this work, it should be added, was inspired by Beale's 1940 article on the "Rewriting of Reconstruction History" in the *American Historical Review.*

Third. *Changes in historical fashion.* Since 1900 three main types of historical outlook have each in their turn prevailed in this country. Rhodes, Burgess, and their generation stressed the ethical in their judgment of men and events, and were primarily interested in the political-constitutional aspects of history. Beard and Beale, on the other hand, achieved their fame and influence through an iconoclastic application of economic interpretation. Most young historians between 1925 and 1945 followed their lead. Today, however, psychological interpretation appears to be the most popular approach, along with the cultural, sociological, and even anthropological. The psychological gambit is especially notable in McKitrick's work, with its concept of Johnson as an "outsider," and its thesis that the North required that the South provide it with "symbolic" assurances of victory.[24]

Fourth. *Changing attitudes toward the Negro.* Here, in my opinion, is the touchstone to all writing about Reconstruction. Rhodes and his contemporaries either overtly or covertly assumed

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[23] A stimulating survey of this new work by a new-revisionist historian is Bernard A. Weisberger's "The Dark and Bloody Ground of Reconstruction Historiography," *Journal of Southern History,* XXV (November, 1959), 427–447.

[24] McKitrick, *Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction,* 21–41, 90–91.

the inherent inferiority of the Negro.[25] To them the great mistake, or rather crime, of Reconstruction was the attempt to give the Negro social and political equality—something which went counter to the "facts of race." They believed, to be sure, that the newly-freed slave should have been safeguarded in his basic human rights, but they questioned the wisdom of making him a citizen so soon, and they utterly condemned granting him the vote. To the degree they found good in Johnson, it was to the degree he stood in the way of the above; and one of the main reasons they criticized him so severely was because they felt that his shortcomings made it possible for the Radicals to impose, even for a short time, the horrors of "negro rule" on the white people of the South.

However, Rhodes and his fellow historians at least did not lose sight of the central role of the Negro in the story of Reconstruction.[26] Beale and his followers, on the other hand, in effect ignored the Negro. They did so not because of anti-Negro prejudice (it would be absurd to accuse Beale of that!) but simply because they were preoccupied with what they deemed to be the "real" issues, e.g., the economic ones. Approaching Reconstruction from this angle, they dismissed the Radical concern over Negro rights as mere self-serving propaganda.

Not so the new revisionists. Like Rhodes they regard the Negro as fundamental to the history of the Civil War and Reconstruction Era. Unlike him, however, they totally reject the concept of racial inferiority, discount the alleged evils of "Black Reconstruction," and strongly sympathize with the efforts of Sumner and Stevens in behalf of Negro rights. Moreover, one of the main reasons they condemn Johnson is because of what they feel were his callousness and even hostility toward the Negro. Thus John and LaWanda Cox, in a recent article in the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* analyzing the vetoes of the Freedmen's Bureau and Civil Rights bills, refer explicitly to Johnson's "racist attitudes," criticize his lack of "sensitivity to Republican racial attitudes," and declare that he deprived the nation of "an opportunity to establish a firm foundation for equal citizenship with moderation and a minimum of rancor."[27]

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[25] Rhodes, 41, 148–149; Burgess, 45, 53, 133; Dunning, 57–58, 63, 112; Fleming, 21, 42, 52, 89, 91–93, 185–186, 214, 254–256; Schouler, 105. There is no trace of racism in Woodrow Wilson's *A History of the American People, Volume V*, New York, 1901, which deals with Reconstruction.

[26] See, for instance, Rhodes, 153.

[27] John H. and LaWanda Cox, "Andrew Johnson and His Ghost Writers: An Analysis of the Freedmen's Bureau and Civil Rights Veto Messages," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLVIII (December, 1961), 460–479.

Or in other words, whereas Rhodes and his school found fault with Johnson because his mistakes opened the way for what they considered to have been misguided efforts to elevate the Negro, the Coxes and the school they represent castigate him for standing in the way of what they deem to have been progressive attempts to better the Negroes' lot. It is, all in all, an interesting example of scholars widely separated in time and ideology arriving at basically the same conclusion about a historical figure for diametrically opposed reasons.

Undoubtedly the Coxes, McKitrick, Donald, and most of the other recent critics of Johnson are reflecting, in their concern over Negro rights, the modern-day interest in the same subject.[28] These historians see the Negro nearly one-hundred years after the abolition of slavery being denied certain fundamental rights. They are inclined, therefore, to believe that had not these rights been given at least on paper to the Negro immediately following the Civil War, they would perhaps never have been granted. They feel, too, that the revolutionary turbulence which accompanied Radical Reconstruction was probably inevitable under the circumstances, and that to have avoided it in the 1860's would have been merely to postpone it to a later and possibly less auspicious time. And, finally, they are aware of the significant fact that no Negro in modern times has ever joined the critics of the Radicals and the advocates of Johnson in maintaining that his race received citizenship and suffrage "prematurely."

The radical attitudes of Rhodes and Dunning were typical of their day, while the economic preoccupation of Beard and Beale well-suited the Age of the Great Boom and the Great Bust. In short, we have in the case of Andrew Johnson's historical reputation another illustration of the trite but true axiom that historians tend to write of the past in terms of the present. Also, the historiographical rise and fall of Johnson provides a fresh reminder that no history is the last word—that at most it is merely the latest, and that even the latest sometimes has a striking resemblance to the very earliest!

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[28] Two notable manifestations of this, among many, are Kenneth M. Stampp's *The Peculiar Institution*, New York, 1956, and C. Vann Woodward's *The Strange Career of Jim Crow*, New York, 1955. See also Fawn M. Brodie, "Who Won the Civil War, Anyway?" *New York Times Book Review*, August 5, 1962, 1, 22–23.

The Historian, Presidential Elections, and 1896

Electioneering has long been a favorite pastime of the American people.[1] In his "immortal" study, *Democracy in America,* Alexis De Tocqueville noted that the frequency of elections kept American society "in a perpetual state of feverish excitement."[2] No sooner is one election over than the next one begins. Presidential elections in particular, have always been one of the most important and engrossing topics of conversation in the land. "As the election draws near, it is the daily theme of the public papers, the subject of private conversation, the end of every thought and every action, the sole interest of the present"—an observation hardly less true for our own day than De Tocqueville's.[3]

Despite the fact that they have occasionally provoked a great deal of conflict, presidential elections have generally served as a unifying factor in American history. Presidential campaigns have helped to contain the centrifugal forces which have constantly threatened to tear American society asunder. In the age before radio and television, this was especially true as presidential elections were one of the few events in which most Americans could participate simultaneously.

Because of the tremendous amount of time and energy Americans have expended on their elections, it is somewhat understandable that historians have devoted so much attention to the study of presidential campaigns. As the President has easily been the most powerful and influential person in our pluralistic and decentralized society, historians have quite naturally been interested in explaining why and how he was elected. The result of such curiosity measured quantitatively has been astounding: theses, dissertations, articles, and monographs number into the hundreds.

Despite the uniqueness of each presidential election, the literature has much in common. After focusing on the pre-convention maneuvering of potential candidates, the historian generally de-

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[1] A somewhat different version of this paper was read at the Mississippi Valley Historical Association's meeting in Detroit on April 21, 1961, at which time the author was the commentator at a session on nineteenth century depression politics.

[2] Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, New York, 1897, 221.

[3] *Ibid.*, 141.

scribes the nominating conventions and campaign, analyzes the percentage of the vote which each candidate received, and offers hypotheses to explain the outcome of the election.

Obviously, such studies are highly useful. They tell us much about the techniques of campaigning, the seriousness with which the American people participate in national elections, and the quality of the men who are elected. Nevertheless, these studies have serious shortcomings, as they do not reveal very much about voting behavior. They do not demonstrate the changes in voting patterns which take place over an extended period of time. As a result, historical forces are minimized as factors in voting behavior while the personalities of candidates assume major importance.

History which focuses its attention on nominating conventions and presidential campaigns is a formal type of study which provides very little insight into the ebb and flow of activities lying beneath outward or surface events. As Thomas C. Cochran has pointed out, such an approach has an artificial character to it, as it follows the accidental fact of four year presidential terms rather than conforming to major movements or significant changes in American society.[4]

Rather than continuing to study a single election as an isolated phenomenon, historians could contribute more to our understanding of American politics if they would undertake comparative studies of elections. To demonstrate this point, I will use the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as an example.

With the exception of the presidential election of 1860, no election has received more attention than that of 1896. Obviously it is desirable to know what happened during that campaign. But in order to understand why events occurred as they did, it is necessary to relate the returns of 1896 to those of other elections in order to discover if any major groups shifted their allegiance from one party to another.[5] Fortunately, we now have a study comparing the

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[4] Thomas C. Cochran, "The Presidential Synthesis in American History" *American Historical Review,* LIII (July, 1948), 748–759. Also see Samuel P. Hays, "History as Human Behavior," *Iowa Journal of History,* LVIII (July, 1960), 193–206.

[5] The two best studies which deal with the election of 1896 are Marian Silveus, "The Antecedents of the Campaign of 1896" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of Wisconsin, 1932) and Joseph Schafer, Jr., "The Presidential Election of 1896" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of Wisconsin, 1941). For other studies which use essentially the same approach to the election, see the following: James A. Barnes, "Myths of the Bryan Campaign," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* XXXIV (December, 1947), 376–382; William Diamond, "Urban and Rural Voting in 1896," *American Historical*

presidential election of 1896 with that of 1892.[6] But because the scope of the study is limited, it is characterized by the usual shortcomings of our studies on presidential elections.

When the vote which William Jennings Bryan received in 1896 is compared with that which Grover Cleveland received four years earlier, one cannot help being impressed by the widespread loss in Democratic strength. But such a comparison distorts the meaning of the election of 1896. It is true that in comparison to their success of 1892, the Democrats in 1896 suffered heavy losses. But the major decline in Democratic strength started not in 1896, but with the fall elections of 1893.[7] Beginning in that year, not only did the Populists make in-roads into the traditionally Democratic vote in the Mid-west and the South, but the Democrats lost heavily in areas of industrial employment, as voting wards of urban labor began to veer toward the Republicans. This erosion was but the beginning of a landslide of losses.

The political repercussions of the depression, Cleveland's unpopular policies on silver, and the Pullman strike caused dramatic shifts in voting behavior. The state and local elections of 1894 brought about one of the most widespread political realignments in the nation's history. Though the Democrats maintained technical control of the Senate, their losses were so heavy in the House of Representatives that when all the votes were counted, the Republicans had a majority of one hundred and forty—the largest gain in a congressional election in American history. In New England, only one Democratic representative survived the elections of 1894. The two Democratic governors elected in 1892 fell by the wayside, while in all New England states the Democratic share of the

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Review, XLVI (January, 1941), 281–305; Elmer Ellis, "The Silver Republicans in the Election of 1896," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* XVIII (March, 1932), 519–534; John E. Pixton, "Charles G. Dawes and the McKinley Campaign," *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society,* XLVIII (Autumn, 1955), 283–306; Allen Moger, "The Rift in Virginia Democracy in 1896," *Journal of Southern History,* IV (August, 1938), 295–317; S. K. Stevens, "The Election of 1896 in Pennsylvania," *Pennsylvania History,* IV (April, 1937), 56–87; J. Chal Vinson, "Hoke Smith and the Battle of Standards in Georgia, 1895–1896," *Georgia Historical Quarterly,* XXXVI (September, 1952), 201–219; Harvey Wish, "John Peter Altegeld and the Background of the Campaign of 1896," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* XXIV (March, 1938), 503–518; Eugene H. Roseboom, *A History of Presidential Elections,* New York, 1957, 313–320; Harold U. Faulkner, *Politics, Reform and Expansion, 1890–1900,* New York, 1959, 187–211.

[6] Lee Benson, "Research Problems in American Political Historiography," in Mirra Komarovsky, ed., *Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences,* Glencoe, Illinois, 1957, 155–171.

[7] *Tribune Almanac for 1894,* New York, 1894, 304–393.

gubernatorial vote fell sharply in 1894. In twenty-four states over the entire nation, the Democrats failed to elect a single man to the House. Meanwhile, only one Democrat was elected in each of six other states.[8] Such well-known House Democrats as William L. Wilson, William M. Springer, William S. Helman, and Richard Bland were denied re-election. Captured by the Democrats in 1892, Wisconsin, Illinois, and New York returned to the Republican camp. The Republicans even carried West Virginia, Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware.

Because scholars have compared voting returns in only presidential elections, they have missed the importance of the local elections of 1893, 1894, 1895. Studies in comparative voting would be more useful if historians would take into consideration not only presidential elections but all elections. By focusing attention only on presidential elections, historians have usually exaggerated the significance of the election of 1896, while they have permitted the new trends in voting behavior which started in 1893 to go unnoticed. In contrast to the previous eighteen years, when the Democrats and Republicans demonstrated relatively equal strength in the nation as a whole,[9] the years between 1894 and 1910 were ones of Republican rule. Thus, it appears that William Jennings Bryan and the free silver heresy of 1896 were less important factors in bringing about a break-up of the Democratic Party than historians have generally implied. With this in mind, historians would be well advised to begin revising their estimates of the roles which the depression, Grover Cleveland, and William Jennings Bryan played in the fortunes of the Democratic Party in the late nineteenth century.

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[8] The Democrats lost fourteen congressional seats in New York, six in New Jersey, three in Connecticut, three in Massachusetts, two in Rhode Island, three in Maryland, eight in Pennsylvania, nine in Ohio, five in Michigan, eleven in Indiana, nine in Illinois, six in Wisconsin, and four in West Virginia. Most striking of all were the Republican victories in virtually every major city in the North—an occurrence without precedent in American history.

[9] Historians have not always pointed out the strong position of both parties during these years. For example, Samuel Lubell argues that between 1860 and 1932 the Republican Party was the majority party in this nation; see Lubell, *The Future of American Politics,* New York, 1952, 28–31. Though the Republicans generally controlled the Senate between 1876 and 1894, historians should not overlook the fact that the Democrats dominated the House for sixteen of those years. In the five presidential elections during those years, the winner's margin in the popular vote was only paper thin. In two presidential elections, the victor had no margin at all. New York was probably the best example of the strong position of each party during these years, as Tilden carried the state in 1876, Garfield in 1880, Cleveland in 1884, Harrison in 1888, and Cleveland again in 1892.

The election of 1896 should be viewed within the same framework as the elections of 1893, 1894, 1895. Though many voters were repelled by Bryan's campaign, that is not why he lost the election. Nor did he lose the election because of the massed opposition of respectability and pulpit, nor because of the coercion of workers and farmers by employers and mortgagors. A majority of the nation's voters had rejected Cleveland's Democracy during the depression. Now, the "toiling masses" continued to reject the Democratic Party because they perceived in its platform few benefits and some dangers to their position. Despite Bryan's split with the Cleveland Administration, the Democratic Party was labeled as the party of depression. The Republicans, with their "educational program" aimed at the nation's large cities, were able to convince the majority of urban voters that the Republican Party represented the full dinner pail.[10] While most of the political bosses maintained a thinly disguised hostility toward Bryan, "trusted sources" were busy warning the public that a Democratic victory would mean misery, a Republican victory the opening of the factories and improved conditions. Confused and hungry, a majority of the nation's voters cast their votes for McKinley and prosperity.

Because the Republicans were able to construct the most elaborate party organization in the nation's history, it is somewhat surprising that Bryan received as many votes as he did. Even in losing, he received more votes than any previous presidential candidate. Though he failed to capture the urban vote in 1896, he did receive a higher percentage of votes in many cities than had most Democratic candidates in the elections in 1894 and 1895.[11]

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[10] For a description of the Republican campaign literature, see Gilbert C. Fite, "Republican Strategy and the Farm Vote in the Presidential Campaign of 1896," *American Historical Review*, LXV (July, 1960), 787–806; John E. Pixton, Jr., *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society*, XLVIII, 283–306; Thomas Beer, *Marcus Alonzo Hanna*, New York, 1929, 151–166; Margaret Leech, *In the Days of McKinley*, New York, 1959, 85–89; *Yale Review*, V (November, 1896), 237; *Review of Reviews*, XIV (October, 1896), 551–554; *New York Tribune*, August 18, November 1, 1896; *Springfield Republican*, October 8, 1896; *New York Journal*, August 5, 1896; George H. Baker to William McKinley, October 3, 1896, McKinley MSS., Library of Congress; Republican Congressional Committee to John C. Spooner, July 9, 1896, Spooner MSS., Library of Congress. Also, there is an excellent collection of campaign pamphlets in Widener Library, Harvard University.

[11] However, this statement does not hold true for all localities examined. The Democrats in 1896 were more consistent in increasing their share of the popular vote over 1894–1895 in cities of the Mid-west than they were in cities of the East. For additional information, see J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "A Study in Party Division: the Democratic Party, 1893–1900," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of Chicago, 1960); Geoffrey Thomas Blodgett, "Massachusetts Democrats

Moreover, the Democrats recaptured congressional seats in a belt extending from Illinois eastward through Pennsylvania, as temporarily alienated voters began to resume their normal voting habits.

Writers have long been impressed by the extreme state of flux prevading American politics in 1896. Unfortunately, they missed some significant aspects of that campaign. They have failed to observe that many voters who had been alienated by the depression and the policies of the Cleveland Administration were beginning to resume their traditional voting habits. While scholars have studied the bolt of the Gold Democrats and other old-stock Bourbons,[12] they have failed to point out that such defections accelerated the rise of the Irish in the party hierarchies. Rather than continuing to focus attention only on how certain social groups voted during the election of 1896, historians should re-define the problems before them and take a broader view of the 1890's in an effort to find out what socio-economic groups changed their traditional voting patterns, why they shifted their sentiments, and how permanent their changes were.

Unfortunately, such studies are exceedingly difficult to complete, as evidence is not easy to obtain. Modifications in election districts occasionally preclude a precise analysis. For control purposes, it is difficult to find voting precincts which are homogeneous in terms of social and economic make-up. Though census reports at the beginning of every decade have provided useful materials for this type of study, census materials are far from complete. Moreover, the available materials are frequently not very reliable for analyzing precincts during the periods between census reports.[13] One of the most important things we have learned about the 1890's

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in the Cleveland Era," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Harvard University, 1960), 211–212; and the excellent paper by Samuel T. McSeveney, "The Politics of Depression: Popular Voting Behavior, 1893–1896," (unpublished paper, read before the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, April 21, 1961). Professor McSeveney is currently working on what promises to be a definitive study of voting behavior in Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey for the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

[12] James A. Barnes, "The Gold Standard Democrats and Party Conflict," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXIV (December, 1930), 422–450.

[13] For an excellent statement of some of the methodological problems involved in studying voting behavior, see Edward H. Litchfield, *Voting Behavior in a Metropolitan Area*, Michigan Governmental Studies, No. 7, Ann Arbor, 1941, 71–88. Also see Samuel J. Eldersveld, "Theory and Method in Voting Behavior Research," *Journal of Politics*, XIII (February, 1951), 70–87; Herbert Tingsten, *Political Behavior*, London, 1937; James Kerr Pollock, *Voting Behavior: A Case Study*, Ann Arbor, 1939.

from some of our recent studies in urban history is that the social characteristics of neighborhoods changed with surprising rapidity.

Despite the many obstacles and handicaps which confront the scholar who attempts to isolate the voting patterns of specific social groups, efforts to study voting patterns can be very useful—if all available sources are used and allowances are made for slight error. There is, however, no single method to be employed in the study of voting behavior, as the type of available evidence will vary from locality to locality. Fortunately, there are census reports besides those provided by the federal government. If historians will only make imaginative use of them and the many social and economic reports which many states and cities issued, much can be learned about the voting behavior of specific groups.

Obviously, some problem will be more difficult to study than others. The problem of distinguishing the voting districts of labor from those of other groups will be less difficult than that of dissecting the vote of a particular class in terms of ethnic background.

Yet, we very much need a study of ethnic voting during the 1890's. To understand the elections of the late nineteenth century, one must remember that there was no such thing as a united foreign vote. The Germans, Italians, Greeks, Slavs, Scandanavians, Turks, Irish, and Jews did not vote together, although within the various national groups there was a tendency for bloc voting to occur. Nowhere is this more adequately revealed than in voting statistics and in the foreign language newspapers published in this country. For example, Bryan ran a better race in the traditionally Democratic Irish and Polish precincts than he did in the Italian, German, and Scandanavian precincts, which more frequently than not voted Republican.[14]

In studying the ethnic composition of precincts, the historian will always be confronted with the problem that in some precincts there were groups which were too insignificant numerically or too scattered geographically to predominate. But in spite of these difficulties, the largest ethnic groups can usually be segregated in their own quarters.[15] Thus with the use of census reports,

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[14] These statements are made on the basis of a number of unpublished charts and graphs which I have compiled and which deal with voting behavior during the late nineteenth century. Also see J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "A Study in Party Division: the Democratic Party, 1893–1900," 123–129.

[15] Perhaps one example of how such a study can be conducted will suffice. To study ethnic voting in Chicago during the 1890's, I have relied heavily on the *Chicago School Census of 1896*, Chicago, 1897. In the preparation of this census, a count was taken of each individual in every precinct in Chicago's thirty-four wards. The count classified each

native as well as foreign language newspapers,[16] and election statistics as reported in newspapers and almanacs, one can assess the reactions of social groups to matters affecting public policy.[17]

Only with the completion of an intensive analysis of such political problems will the period of Republican dominance (1894–1910) be comprehensible. Hopefully, similar studies will be undertaken for other periods. Isolated studies of political campaigns are useful, but they tell us very little about voting behavior. We can understand why people voted as they did only after voting patterns have been examined over an extended period of time.

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individual according to whether he was (1) foreign born (2) born of one American-born parent, or (3) born of foreign parents. A careful sifting of these census figures revealed that in certain precincts selected ethnic groups predominated. Generally, the six largest ethnic groups could be segregated in their own neighborhood. While detailed figures are available for the ethnic background of the population through the school census, election statistics for each of Chicago's precincts are available in the *Chicago Daily News Almanac*. Thus, from the school census, the federal census, and voting records, one can assess the reactions of various ethnic groups to both political parties. There are also comparable census reports for other cities which can reveal much information about ethnic voting patterns during the 1890's.

[16] In addition to the original foreign language newspapers, there are translations of a number of foreign language newspapers which the Works Projects Administration completed during the 1930's. Unfortunately, historians have made little use of them. The translations are indexed under a variety of subjects and provide excellent leads to the immigrant mind. The most valuable translations are the newspapers of Chicago, which are on deposit at the Chicago Public Library and those of Cleveland, Ohio, which are at the Cleveland Public Library.

[17] While W. Dean Burnham, *Presidential Ballots, 1836–1892*, Baltimore, 1955, and E. E. Robinson, *The Presidential Vote, 1896–1932*, Stanford, California, are useful compilations of presidential voting, they unfortunately do not report returns for districts smaller than the county. During the past decade, however, the publication of election statistics has improved considerably for offices other than president. Kansas and Montana have recently published county returns, complete since their admission as states, for the offices of governor and United States senator and representative. Complete series for the offices of governor and United States senator have also recently been published in Indiana and Wisconsin. States that have published very useful data for geographical units smaller than the county are Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. For information on the problems involved in relating the voting habits of specific social groups to published statistics, see Sam B. Warner, Jr., *Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870–1900*, Cambridge, Mass., 1962, Appendix A. A valuable discussion of the possibilities of error in using the United States Census as well as other published statistics is contained in Simon Kuznets and Dorothy S. Thomas, *Population Redistribution and Economic Growth, United States, 1870–1950*, Philadelphia, 1957.

Mr. Webster's Dictionary: A Personal Document of the Age of Benevolence

Noah Webster's monumental *American Dictionary* published in 1828, marked a new high in American scholarship and cultural nationalism.[1] The two, thick quarto volumes climaxed a quarter of a century of disciplined labor and tireless study by an extraordinarily gifted and resolute scholar. The seventy-year-old compiler had already impressed his name on generations of grammar school children with his widely used and oft-reprinted readers and spellers. The *American Dictionary,* like all of Webster's works, proclaimed Webster's personal convictions regarding God, man, government, and society, which he intertwined with definitions, illustrations, and usages. Not merely a skillful and useful compilation of words, meanings, and etymologies, Webster's great dictionary was a personal document expressing social values and views that Webster fervently hoped to impress on the minds of future generations of Americans.

In form and arrangement, Webster's work owed much to Samuel Johnson's dictionary, published in 1755, and Henry John Todd's 1818 revision of Johnson.[2] Webster adopted Johnson's general format, using three close columns instead of Johnson's two and heading each column with three-letter guides in place of pagination. Webster improved on Johnson's etymology, offered Americanized spellings and words of North American origin, added new

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[1] Noah Webster, *An American Dictionary of the English Language: Intended to Exhibit, I. The Origin, Affinities and Primary Signification of English Words, as Far as They have Been Ascertained. II. The Genuine Orthography and Pronounciation of Words, According to General Usage, or to Just Principles of Analogy. III. Accurate and Discriminating Definitions, with Numerous Authorities and Illustrations. To Which Are Prefixed, an Introductory Dissertation on the Origin, History and Connection of the Languages of Western Asia and of Europe, and a Concise Grammar of the English Language,* two volumes, New York, 1828.

[2] Samuel Johnson, *A Dictionary of the English Language, in which the words are deduced from their originals, and illustrated in their different significations by examples from the best writers. To which are prefixed a history of the language, and an English grammar,* two volumes, London, 1755.

words used in the sciences, and excluded Johnson's wry definitions, such as the British pundit's definition of a lexicographer as "a harmless drudge."

Noah Webster never fancied himself a harmless drudge. A tough-minded son of Connecticut and descendant of Massachusetts Pilgrims and Puritans, Webster devoted most of his long life to performing deeds he deemed beneficial to his country. He saw in his dictionary an opportunity to strike a blow for cultural independence from Great Britain, arbiter of the English language, and a way to strengthen national unity. His preface proclaimed his zeal for domesticating the English languages and making it American, and it also expressed Webster's hope that his dictionary would bolster North American usage against criticisms by English purists. More important, he wanted his pronunciations, spellings, and usages to become national standards, believing that political and social solidarity would follow language uniformity and that regional divisions would rise with regional dialects and vocal variants. In short, his dictionary was more than an attempt to standardize definitions or to impose curious orthographical innovations, such as *nusance*, *bridegoom*, *melasses*, or *chimistry*, for these were incidental to Webster's larger goal.

The form of nationalism Webster hoped to cultivate in the United States was a reflection of his own inflexible convictions and faith. From his youth, Webster was an ardent friend of centralized power, the doctrines of the Federalist party, and all schemes to weld the United States into a single nation. As a young man he labored for the adoption of the federal Constitution, defended Washington's administration against partisan criticism, attacked Jefferson's Republican party and principles in the public press, and helped to call the Hartford Convention of 1814 in an attempt to secure drastic constitutional revisions revoking Jeffersonian policies.[3] Closely linked with his political ideas was Webster's devotion to his New England heritage, which he usually confused with his concept of nationalism. In 1808 he became a fervent trinitarian Congregationalist and an admirer of orthodoxy's stern spokes-

[3] Portions of Webster's diaries, letters, and other writings covering aspects of his varied careers may be found in his granddaughter's useful compilation, Emily Ellsworth Fowler Ford, comp., *Notes on the Life of Noah Webster*, two volumes, New York, 1912; the principal modern studies of Webster are Ervin C. Shoemaker, *Noah Webster, Pioneer of Learning*, New York, 1936, and Harry R. Warfel, *Noah Webster, Schoolmaster to America*, New York, 1936.

man and conscience, Timothy Dwight, President of Yale College and Webster's neighbor. Obedient to his ancestoral heritage, Webster celebrated and observed the virtues of thrift, frugality, and industry, and he respected the wonders of Providence in guiding the daily lives of men and nations.

Webster's dictionary came from the press at a time when the recently formed benevolent and religious societies were increasing their tempo of activity and extending their organizations, agents, and publications into all parts of the United States. The numerous benevolent and religious societies were fighting pauperism, intemperance, religious infidelity, ignorance of Bible doctrines, and the dangers of a new western region unlettered in Bible teachings.[4] Webster's dictionary, considered as a social document, was a one-man equivalent of the American Bible Society, the American Tract Society, the American Sunday School Union, the American Society for the Promotion of Temperance, or the American Home Missionary Society—the great, national, meliorative associations that had arisen since the War of 1812 to improve or "reform" the condition of American society. In the 1820's and 1830's the evangelical crusade against deism, unitarianism, Catholicism, and other challenges to the orthodoxy of New England and the eastern states spread throughout the republic. In his definitions and word illustrations Webster joined the evangelical reformers in preaching against social, religious, and political "evils" that trinitarians denounced as impediments to the coming of the millennium of social perfection. Like scores of western missionaries, colporteurs, Sunday school organizers, and urban moral reform advocates, Webster inveighed against pauperism, deism, the slave trade, indebtedness, dueling, gambling, and immorality, and he used his word illustrations to convey his moral and political lessons. Every copy of the *American Dictionary* carried the evangelical crusade into the classroom, library, and college, and Webster hoped that his dictionary would hold in every American home a place of honor beside the Bible.

Though controversy raged over Webster's etymological system and his spelling reforms, most critics agreed that Webster's definitions were peerless. None questioned his illustrations or objected

[4] The better recent accounts of the benevolent and religious societies are Clifford S. Griffin, *Their Brothers' Keepers; Moral Stewardship in the United States, 1800–1865,* New Brunswick, 1960, and Charles I. Foster, *An Errand of Mercy, the Evangelical United Front, 1790–1837,* Chapel Hill, 1960.

to the messages they carried.[5] Under "deism" Webster tartly remarked that "*deism* implies infidelity or a disbelief in the divine origins of the scriptures," and he illustrated its use with a quotation attributed to Patrick Henry: "The view which the rising greatness of our country presents to my eyes, is greatly tarnished by the general prevalence of *deism*, which, with me, is but another name for vice and depravity."[6] Under "pauperism" he provided his own illustration: "The increase of *pauperism* is an alarming evil." His entry under "slave-trade" expressed an equally direct and vigorous point of view: "The barbarous and wicked business of purchasing men and women, transporting them to a distant country and selling them for slaves." Webster was far more gentle with slavery, noting only that "Slavery no longer exists in Great Britain, nor in the northern states of America." He illustrated the word "debt" with the unassigned statement that "It is a common misfortune or vice to be in debt." He rode a Federalist maxim when defining "public credit" under "credit." "Cherish *public credit*," attributed to Washington, and "When the *public credit* is questionable, it raises the premium on loans," presumably Webster's own aphorism, both illustrated his definition. Another Webster-invented illustration condemned the duelist. "The *duelist* values his honor above the life of his antagonist, his own life, and the happiness of his family." His condemnation of gambling was sharper: "*Gamblers*," Webster charged, "often or usually become cheats and knaves."

Webster used his dictionary as a weapon to battle vice, vanity, war, and assorted social "evils." "All wickedness, all crimes, all violations of law and right are *moral evils*," he asserted under "evil," adding that "Diseases are *natural evils*, but they often proceed from moral evils." For the vain there was small hope, for

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[5] The *North American Review*, n.s. XXIX (April, 1829), 479, praised the work, saying "We hope the author will go forward to improve his work; and he need not fear, that his labors will not finally be judged to have been practical, useful, and patriotic." The reviewer for the *Southern Review*, V (May, 1830), 338–340, was sharply critical of Webster's etymology, saying he found errors in Webster's Danish and German "so conspicuous as to leave no doubt that he had not studied even their elementary principles." William Gifford, in an unsigned review for the British *Quarterly Review*, LIV (September, 1835), 304–309, declared that Webster's methods of tracing word radicals was "too ludicrous to deserve a serious refutation" and concluded with the assertion that "On the whole, Dr. Webster's quartos were hardly worthy of being reprinted in England."

[6] Webster's dictionary is not paginated, but the following quotations from that work can be found under the italicized words. All italics are Webster's.

Webster declared that "Fops cannot be cured of their *vanity*." He used "vice" to preach a sermon on temperance. "The excessive indulgence of passions and appetites which in themselves are innocent, is a *vice*. The smoking of tobacco and the taking of snuff may in certain cases be innocent and even useful, but these practices may be carried to such an excess as to become *vices*." He warned that "*Vice* is rarely a solitary invader; it usually brings with it a frightful train of followers." He further exemplified the word with a prim quotation attributed to Joseph Addison:

> When *vice* prevails, and impious men bear sway,
> The post of honor is a private station.

Citing Samuel Johnson's *Rambler*, Webster warned that "Those who pass their *youth* in vice, are justly condemned to spend their age in folly."

As to wickedness generally, Webster again quoted approvingly from *Rambler*: "No man was ever *wicked* without secret discontent." He roundly denounced seducers, saying "The *seducer* of a female is little less criminal than the murderer," and in Franklinian terms he advised the fair sex that "A woman who is above flattery, is least liable to *seduction*," adding the un-Franklin-like adjuration "but the best safeguard is principle, the love of purity and holiness, the fear of God and reverence for his commands." Webster was no less adamant about bigamy, which he bluntly defined as "The crime of having two wives at once."

In matters pertaining to religion and theology, Webster's inflexible beliefs gleamed behind his definitions and exemplifications and revealed his attitude toward God and the nature of man. "The *love* of God is the first duty of man," he asserted, "and this springs from just views of his attributes or excellences of character, which afford the highest delight to the sanctified heart." Under "faith" he defined or rather hailed evangelical, justifying, or saving faith as

> the assent of the mind to the truth of divine revelation, on the authority of God's testimony, accompanied with a cordial assent of the will or approbation of the heart; an entire confidence or trust in God's character and declarations, and in the character and doctrines of Christ, with an unreserved surrender of the will to his guidance, and dependence on his merits for salvation.

Toward the faithless Webster was curt and impatient. To illustrate "atheism" he chose a sentence from Robert Hall, British

clergyman and author of *Modern Infidelity Considered with Respect to its Influence on Society* (1800). "*Atheism* is a ferocious system that leaves nothing above us to excite awe, nor around us to awaken tenderness." From Psalm 14 he selected the familiar passage, "The *fool* hath said in his heart, there is no God." Under the noun "confidence" Webster inserted a quotation from Psalm 118: "It is better to trust the Lord, then to put *confidence* in man." And from Proverbs 29 came the further lesson that "He that putteth his *trust* in the Lord shall be safe." He demonstrated one use of the word "religion" with a reassuring passage from the Reverend Joseph Buckminster, orthodox pastor of North Church, Portsmouth, New Hampshire: "*Religion* will attend you—as a pleasant and useful companion, in every proper place and every temperate occupation of life." Webster displayed greater impatience with pre-Christian philosophers, quoting Jonathan Swift to establish his point: "The system of *morality* to be gathered from the ancient sages, falls very short of that delivered in the gospels."

Webster made no attempt to conceal his own commitment to the doctrine of predestination, which he illustrated with his own unqualified statement: "*Predestination* is a part of the unchangeable plan of the divine government; or in other words, the unchangeable purpose of an unchangeable God." Under "providence" he delivered another brief sermon. "He that acknowledges a creation and denies a *providence*, involves himself in a palpable contradiction; for the same power which caused a thing to exist is necessary to continue its existence. Some persons admit a *general providence*," he noted, "but deny a *particular providence,* not considering that a *general providence* consists of particulars." He concluded his exhortation with the avowal that "A belief in divine *providence*, is a source of great consolation to good men."

The word "benevolence" was closely linked in theology with the doctrines of Jonathan Edwards and Samuel Hopkins who taught that benevolence was the disposition to do good and that a man's desire to do good reflected God's love. Webster summarized the Hopkinsian definition and added his own reflection: "The *benevolence* of God is one of his moral attributes; that attribute which delights in the happiness of intelligent beings." Conversely, selfishness was ungodly. "*Selfishness*, in its worst or unqualified sense," Webster wrote paraphrasing Hopkins, "is the very essence of human depravity, and stands in direct opposition to benevolence, which is the essence of the divine character. As God is love, so man, in his natural state, is *selfishness*."

Webster sprinkled religious and theological admonitions throughout his dictionary. An inoffensive word like "torpid" carried the grim warning, attributed to the British lawyer and religious writer, John Shute Barrington, that "Impenitent sinners remain in a state of *torpid* security," and "temporal" became the vehicle for the compiler's imperative: "Let not *temporal* affairs or employments divert the mind from spiritual concerns, which are far more important." Of the lowly potato Webster could grandly declare "it has proved one of the greatest blessings bestowed on many by the Creator."

To parents Webster preached the responsibility for educating their offspring. "To give children a good *education* in manner, arts and sciences, is important; to give them a religious *education* is indispensable; and an immense responsibility rests on parents and guardians who neglect these duties." Such good lessons needed reiteration, and under "duty" he asserted unequivocally that "the government and religious instruction of children are *duties* of parents which they cannot neglect without guilt."

In matters pertaining to society, government, and law, Webster's personal convictions were just as adamant and evident as his religious and theological beliefs. Sir William Blackstone's dictum that "The true and natural foundations of *society*, are the wants and fears of individuals" illustrated one meaning of "society." Webster traced the origins of property to the Creator who "gave to man dominion over the earth, over the fish of the sea and the fowls of the air, and over every living thing." This was, he declared, "the foundation of man's *property* in the earth and in all its productions." He added gratefully that "It is one of the greatest blessings of civil society that *property* of citizens is well secured." The question of literary property, as a subhead under "property," evoked Webster's strong feelings about the need for strong federal laws protecting copyrights, a matter of special interest to him. He objected to distinctions that deprived literary property of full protection. "No right or title to a thing can be so perfect as that which is created by a man's own labor and invention," he asserted. "The exclusive right of a man to his literary productions, and to the use of them for his own profit, is entire and perfect, as the faculties employed and labor bestowed are entirely and perfectly his own." He subjoined a plea for laws protecting productions of the intellect as well as those of the hand, and a few years later he helped to lobby a copyright bill through the Congress.

The good citizen received Webster's encomiums on many pages of his dictionary. "*Patriotism* is the characteristic of a good citizen, the noblest passion that animates a man in the character of a citizen," he wrote. "Obedience to princes, magistrates and the laws is the *duty* of every citizen and subject," he said elsewhere. George Washington, Webster's greatest hero, received credit for saying "The name *American* must always exalt the pride of patriotism." So great was Webster's own national pride in the American Revolution that he wished the same blessing on other nations. "We shall rejoice to hear that the Greeks have effected a *revolution*," he averred. Like all good Federalists, Webster admired Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and John Marshall. He ranked their words with those of Milton, Spenser, Shakespeare, Pope, and the books of the Bible. Webster underscored Marshall's findings in *Marbury v. Madison.* "The judges of the supreme court of the United States," Webster noted, "have the power of determining the *constitutionality* of laws." Another Federalist hero, Alexander Hamilton, received credit under "privilege" for the statement that "A nation despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the *privilege* of being neutral." John Jay's metaphysical use of "good" appeared in the sentence: "The *good* of the whole community can be promoted only by advancing the *good* of each of the members composing it."

Webster worried over the twin danger that seemed to threaten a republic—demagoguery and war. Under "popularity" he remarked that "The most valuable trait in a patriot's character is to forbear all improper compliances for gaining *popularity*." He further illustrated his meaning with Patrick Henry's disdainful remark that "I have long since learned the little value which is to be placed in *popularity,* acquired by any other way than virtue; I have also learned that it is often obtained by other means." He quoted his friend and neighbor, the Reverend Joel Hawes of Hartford, Connecticut, who remarked: "The man whose ruling principle is duty—is never perplexed with anxious corroding calculations of interest and *popularity*." Webster's own antipathy toward the War of 1812, in contrast with his support of the Revolutionary War, may have influenced his general statement that

> Very few of the *wars* that have desolated nations and deluged the earth with blood, have been justifiable. Happy would it be for mankind, if the prevalence of christian principles might ultimately extinguish the spirit of *war,* and if the ambition to be great, might yield to the ambition of being good.

He added the anonymous but enduring aphorism that "Preparation for *war* is sometimes the best security for peace."

In dealing with tens of thousands of English words, Webster had to define and illustrate words expressive of abstract thought. His lifelong dedication to certain principles of religion, politics, and society simplified his task of defining and illustrating such complex ideas as "society," "law," or "providence." Though modern editions of Webster's magnificent work have revised and modified his vigorously asserted beliefs, Webster performed a task that matched his era and expressed its values. Even for historians Webster had an admonitory word. "What," he asked rhetorically, "is the *history* of nations, but a narrative of the follies, crimes and miseries of man?" And more pointedly he observed: "We rely on history, when we have confidence in the *veracity* and industry of the historian."

P. J. STAUDENRAUS

University of California, Davis

Book Reviews

Progressives and the Slums, Tenement House Reform in New York City 1890–1917. By Roy Lubove, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962. Pp. xvi, 284. $6.00.

Roy Lubove has contributed substantially to the wholesome trend towards study of the Progressive movement on the local level. His work on housing reform in New York City bears out the contention of Samuel P. Hays, in a Foreward, that local history, when done with competence and imagination, "adds a dimension unobtainable through an emphasis on top-level, nationwide personalities and events."

Lubove's book will be linked with Hays' own *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency,* in that both stress the influence of the professional expert rather than the mass movement. The author argues pursuasively, that the real leader in the housing reform movement was not Jacob Riis but the less famous Lawrence Veiller. The contributions of Riis, Alfred T. White and others are acknowledged, but it was Veiller, "America's first professional housing reformer," a young man trained and well-informed, who organized the sustained political pressure for restrictive legislation and lent, above all, "a mastery of his subject which awed even his most bitter adversaries."

Though the topic is local, the perspective is broad. Veiller's emphasis on knowledge and centralized organization is seen as part of a more general efficiency movement; his idealism is part of a wave of sentiment in the Progressive era. The movement for housing reform in New York is presented as springing from problems dating back to the early nineteenth century, from the social and economic crisis of the nineties, and from the transformed public health movement emerging after 1890. The impact of the movement is seen not simply in improved safety and sanitation standards for the tenements of New York City, but in national housing reform, with Veiller again taking the lead in forming and guiding local organizations as well as the National Housing Association.

Lubove makes clear his preference for Veiller's idea of restrictive legislation to the more sentimental doctrines of those non-professional reformers who advocated model tenements and enlightened tenement management. But the author does not give way to hero-worship. He is critical of all the reformers, including Veiller, for assuming that housing reform would not only improve health but effect social control, that is, lessen crime, immorality and the like and hasten the assimilation of slum-dwelling immigrants. In fact, Veiller offended more than men like Riis, who advocated the social reconstruction of the neighborhood along with improved housing.

The book springs from a 1960 doctoral dissertation and bears the literary scars, honorable and otherwise, of such documents.

HERBERT F. MARGULIES

University of Hawaii

Generalization in the Writing of History: A Report of the Committee on Historical Analysis of the Social Science Research Council. Edited by Louis Gottschalk. Pp. xiii, 255. The University of Chicago Press, 1963. $5.00.

Six years in the making, this report is cast in the form of essays by eleven mature American historians addressed to many ubiquitous problems of historiographical generalization. The organization falls into two parts, the first of which has three subdivisions. Opening articles by Professors Chester G. Starr and M. I. Finley examine problems of generalization in the classical periods of ancient history. The second subdivision deals with Chinese history, an area remote in space for western historians rather than in time, and one in which the sparseness of information rivals that of the classical periods, if for somewhat different reasons. Professor Arthur F. Wright and Professor Derk Bodde in an answering paper both enter severe indictments of the immaturity of Chinese historiography. The latter, however, takes a more liberal view than the former on the wisdom of applying Western-derived generalizations to Chinese civilization if they are safeguarded with adequate testing and refinements.

Subdivision three moves into modern Western history, with emphasis on both present and past applicability of classificatory generalizations like revolution, national character, and social role. Professor Robert R. Palmer's paper on problems of generalization that he encountered in writing his *The Age of the Democratic Revolution, 1760–1800,* and his ensuing correspondence with committee members, form an interesting spectrum of viewpoints, dominated by Professor Palmer's refusal to recede from his skepticism regarding the historian's capacity to prove his generalizations. Seeking to improve the definition and control of the elusive components of national character, Walter P. Metzler's analytical essay draws on conceptual and dramaturgical models from other social sciences as well as on the sociologist's technique of matched comparisons. Dealt with briefly by Metzler, "The Historian's Use of Social Role" receives extensive development in the skilled hands of Professor Thomas C. Cochran.

The four contributors to Part Two are all committee members and their essays all treat the abstract problem of generalization. Chairman Louis Gottschalk leads off with an article "Categories of Historiographical Generalization." Selected categories then are perceptively examined by Professors Roy F. Nichols, David M. Potter, and William O. Aydelotte. A third and concluding section consists of a selective bibliography of writings on historiography and the philosophy of history since 1946, compiled by Martin Klein.

As Chairman Gottschalk points out in his summary (p. 208), all contributors agree that the historian uses many kinds of generalizations and at different levels. They agree too that when he does so worthwhile purposes are served, if only to present a thesis for debate. Division arises, however, whether the historian's generalizations need be borrowed ones; some authors think he might construct modest ones independently. A few think he might be able to test his generalizations convincingly, whether borrowed or independently derived. Despite these and other differences,

however, all essays lend persuasive support to the Committee's conclusion that at the very least "the professional training of historians ought to include systematic instruction in how to deal with the otherwise stultifying ubiquity of generalization in the writing of history."

ARNOLD R. DAUM

Loyola University, Chicago

El Gran Capitán, José De la Guerra. By Joseph A. Thompson, O.F.M. Franciscan Fathers of California, Los Angeles, 1962. Pp. 244. $5.00.

The appearance of Joseph Thompson's *El Gran Capitán* deserves to be chronicled high among this decade's significant contributions to the ecclesiastical annals of California. Written by his great-grandson, this intimate historical biography presents José De la Guerra "as an example worthy of imitation by all persons who would live a long, useful and pious life." Known among his contemporaries as "El Capitán," he sprang from "a race that founded empires, and that had been cradled amidst Castile's vast stretches of silence and solitude where the blood of celt and Iberian had mingled to form a proud and unconquered race." Born on March 6, 1779, in Spain, José came to California at an early age and in later decades played a unique role in the mission history of California as an "exemplary Catholic, irreproachable caballero, and gallant officer in the forces of the Spanish crown."

De la Guerra's decision to become a soldier was reached early in life and seems to have been motivated by a zeal to spread the Catholic faith. He chose California as the land of his destiny, for he saw himself as an instrumental cause in extending Christian civilization to a barbarous people. One source characterizes De la Guerra as one who "did not hesitate for the sake of participating in so great an enterprise to sacrifice his interests, health, his comfort and even his life." Arriving at Monterey in 1801, he occupied various posts before becoming *comandante* at Santa Barbara. But it was in the "Channel City" that he sunk his roots and did his greatest work.

After serving at Santa Barbara's praesidio for twenty-four years, he resigned his position and in the years from 1829 onwards he lived quietly with his family in the city where he was known and loved by the populace. His benefactions extended widely to persons of all classes and he was daily observed at Holy Mass and other religious functions. Referring to himself as a "Catholic by the grace of God, a lover of humanity and loyal to the monarch to whom I have sworn obedience," De la Guerra was not overly friendly to the United States but he prudently avoided any friction during the change of sovereignty and, as one authority notes, continued to be "perhaps the most influential and talented person throughout California."

Always a close friend to the Franciscan Friars at Santa Barbara, "El Justo," as he was known to them, was "the consoler of the poor and aided to give a religious cast to the people." Father Gonzales Rubio thought it

difficult to describe "even by abridgement, how much he accomplished, how much he labored during extensive years, cooperating with the missionaries in order to uphold in this land the Catholic religion, the territory's peace, its civilization and progress." At his death on February 11, 1858, the whole of Santa Barbara turned out to pay respects to the noble "patriarch." Bishop Thaddeus Amat sang the Pontifical Mass of requiem and afterwards read the absolution over a catafalque draped with a ten-line stanza of sorrow from the seminarians at Santa Ines. With his passing the end of an era was noted, for this great Catholic layman was of such stature that even Hubert Howe Bancroft, a man not given to idle flattery, was compelled to say that "none of the pioneers . . . exerted for so long a period so wide and good an influence as Captain De la Guerra."

The chief virtue of this volume is its making available, for the first time, many of the highly valuable De la Guerra papers. It goes without saying, however, that this collection of over 2,000 documents remains to be fully exploited. Father Thompson has brought into focus the person of José De la Guerra—and this was, after all, his primary purpose. Now there remains the additional challenge of following up the interesting tangents alluded to in *El Gran Capitán.*

Rev. Francis J. Weber

Queen of Angels Seminary
San Fernando, California

The Agrarian Movement in Illinois, 1880–1896. By Roy V. Scott. Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences: Vol. 52. University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1962. Pp. 153. Paper, $3.00.

Roy V. Scott has produced a well-documented study of the alliance movement in Illinois. It is limited in scope since related topics such as the Granger movement and the Populist party are treated only incidentally. The monograph is a welcome addition to Illinois agricultural history, which has suffered somewhat from neglect.

The writer introduces his subject by presenting the causes of discontent among Illinois farmers during the 1870's and 1880's. Next he considers the contributions of the National Farmers' Alliance and of its founder, Milton George, editor of the *Western Rural.* In chapter three Scott describes the organizational base of the alliance movement, which was somewhat complex since it consisted of five distinct organizations occupying different sections of the state. From organization the writer proceeds to objectives and methods. The question of whether farmers should abandon the nonpartisan method of political activity is discussed in chapter five. Scott concluded that when agrarian leaders failed in the legislature to get a farm program enacted and to get a United States Senator of their choice elected they decided "that agricultural organizations should never participate in politics but should limit their political role to education so that members, while exercising their right of suffrage as individuals, could vote intel-

ligently." The last chapter deals with the decline and disappearance of the alliance movement.

The bibliography is well organized, and though consisting only of materials used, is somewhat lengthy. Footnotes indicate the use of a wide variety of materials, but newspapers and the publications of farmers organizations are cited most often. The University of Illinois Press is to be commended for placing the footnotes at the bottom of the page and for including a usable though not very detailed index.

JOHN H. KRENKEL

Arizona State University

Notes and Comments

Sam Houston: American Giant, by M. K. Wisehart, was published at the end of 1962 by Robert B. Luce, Inc., Washington. It required considerable courage on the part of the author to present this life of a subject whose last important biographer won a Pulitzer prize. In 1930 Marquis James brought out his prize-winning *The Raven: A Biography of Sam Houston* after seven years of research, and thereafter won his plagiarism suit against a moving picture company which had produced a movie, "The Raven," using James' research, as was proved to the court by his attorney Louis Nizer, who summarizes the case in his *My Life in Court.* Ten years later Mr. Wisehart's interest in Houston was aroused and for twenty years he has been collecting his materials and writing his book, with the assistance of many whom he thanks in his preface. He considered the time ripe for a new interpretation of Houston in the light of more complete records and more recent research studies of men and events in the Houstonian orbit, though he gives all due credit to Marquis James and earlier biographers.

Mr. Wisehart fashions his narrative along epic lines in ten Books each recounting a major phase of Houston's life. With a journalist's perception of the value of tiny details and high dramatic moments he indeed brings to life a new Houston—in the image of Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln. In contrast with the characters and motives of his many contemporaries, Steve Austin, Burnet, Santa Anna, Clay, Calhoun, Douglas and others, Houston stands heroic. The author's interpretation seems entirely sympathetic to his subject. Since Houston as Commander in Chief and President of Texas, as Governor, and as United States Senator, wrote much and spoke much, Mr. Wisehart incorporates innumerable of his writings and sayings throughout his pages. There is little criticism of Houston's instability in private life; his divorces, his baptism in the Catholic Church in order to become a property owner under Mexican law, and his subsequent entrance into the Baptist Church.

Mr. Wisehart has presented a very interesting biography and scholars will thank him for bringing up to date the historiography of Houston in his bibliography. The printers have done well, though the few footnotes are put at the end of the text. The

volume is aptly illustrated and runs to 712 pages, including a suitable index. The price is ten dollars.

* * * *

It will be of interest to students of Latin American history to learn of the progress of The Library and Institute of Ibero-American Studies of the Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm, Sweden. Possibilities for research in Swedish relations with Latin American countries were indicated in 1961 by Magnus Mörner in his *Estudios y Documentos Suecos Relativos al Movimiento Emancipador de Hispanoamerica,* which first appeared as one of the studies prepared for the Round Table of the Commission on History of the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History held in Caracas in 1961, and now comes as a brochure of the Stockholm Library and Institute. The competent Director, Dr. Mörner, gave the background of the Swedish-Hispanic American relations, Sweden and the Hispanic American emancipation, the Swedish reaction to the emancipation, and a bibliography of Swedish archival and secondary materials. In 1962 the Library and Institute published *Carl August Gosselman, Informes Sobre los Estados Sudamericanos en los Años de 1837 y 1838,* edited with introduction and notes by Magnus Mörner, translated from the Swedish by Ernesto Dethorey. Gosselman, commissioned by the King of Sweden to investigate trade possibilities with Latin America, visited all countries except Paraguay. He wrote detailed reports and gathered statistics on all items pertaining to commerce. These were published in Swedish in 1840, and now in Spanish. Dr. Mörner has done well in his introduction and in selecting the reports most valuable to researchers. The book is paperbound in 172 pages including a name index.

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MID-AMERICA
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The Campaign for the Industrial Relations Commission, 1911-1913

Historians have written many words to describe the Progressive movement and the social welfare legislation passed during the progressive era, but they have paid only scant attention to the actual methods used to initiate and support legislation and less to the important roles played by the social workers in this process.[1] More than most progressives the social workers combined an almost naive faith in progress and reform, with a realistic understanding of the workings of the American political system. The campaign for the Industrial Relations Commission is an illustration of their realistic reform tactics, while the failure of the commission to live up to the social workers' expectations, and their own disillusionment with reform in the face of World War I, helps to define some of the limitations and frustrations of reform in the progressive era.

An explosion on the morning of October 1, 1910, which wrecked the building of the *Los Angeles Times* killing twenty and injuring many more, provided the stimulus that eventually led to the crea-

[1] The best account of the social welfare legislation in the Progressive era, and the role of the social workers in the Progressive Movement is Robert Bremner, *From the Depths: The Discovery of Poverty in the United States,* New York, 1956. Bremner sketches the role of social workers in changing attitudes and promoting legislation in many different areas, but never details the actual tactics used to win legislation. Several other books, among them Eric Goldman, *Rendezvous With Destiny,* New York, 1953, George Mowry, *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt* and Arthur Link, *Wilson: The New Freedom,* Princeton, 1956, and *Woodrow Wilson and The Progressive Era,* New York, 1954, 1958, make passing reference to a few social workers but never discuss them as a group nor make any attempt to show in detail how they affected the passage of legislation. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Crisis of the Old Order: 1919–1933,* Boston, 1957, 23–25, has a brief but sympathetic account of the social workers and their importance in promoting social legislation.

tion of the Industrial Relations Commission. The dynamiting of the Times building was the climax to a long, bitter war between union and management in the structual iron and bridge industry on the West Coast. The bombing, which was not unprovoked, increased tensions already present between organized labor and employees, not only in California, but all over the country. The bitterness was magnified a few months later when John J. McNamara, the Secretary-Treasurer of the National Association of Bridge and Structual Iron Workers, was arrested in Indianapolis, charged with conspiracy in the Los Angeles explosion, and with very dubious legal authority, removed to California for trial.[2]

Organized labor, and the friends of the labor movement, were aroused and angered by the virtual kidnapping of a union officer; it seemed proof enough of his innocence. Samuel Gompers and the American Federation of Labor issued a ringing protest against the arrest and called for contributions to help defend McNamara and his brother (who had been arrested a few days earlier). They hired Clarence Darrow as chief attorney for the defense and prepared to go to any extreme to defend the McNamaras, and by implication the labor movement, from the charge of violence and murder. But the labor movement and its friends were shocked when the McNamaras changed their plea to guilty as the trial began on December 1, 1911. On December 15 the court sentenced John J. McNamara to 15 years and his brother to life imprisonment. To many people the American Federation of Labor and the rest of the labor movement seemed equally guilty of plotting violence and murder.[3]

The outcome of the McNamara case was a damaging blow to the labor movement, and it came almost as a personal tragedy to a large group of social workers and reformers who had been struggling for many years to re-establish communications between the workingmen and the employers and to bring at least a minimum of health, safety and decency into the mushrooming urban centers of America.[4] This group of young men and women, some of them

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[2] John Commons and Associates, *History of Labor in the United States, 1896–1932*, New York, 1935, IV, 318–321.

[3] There seems to be little doubt of the actual guilt of the McNamaras, and Darrow apparently changed their plea of guilty to save their lives. See Commons and Associates, *History of Labor*, IV, 321–325; Lincoln Steffens, *The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens*, New York, 1931, 658–669; Clarence Darrow, *The Story of My Life*, New York, 1932, 172–191.

[4] See for example, Mary E. Dreier, *Margaret Dreier Robins: Her Life, Letters and Work*, New York, 1950, 85.

ministers or writers, some of them employed by charity organization societies, more of them residents of social settlements, had been crusading for the abolition of child labor, for the limitation of work for women, for tenement house reform and for more parks and playgrounds and better schools. They were the leaders in, what one historian has called, the "social justice movement."[5] The journal that best represented what they stood for and believed in was *The Survey,* which had been founded a few years before by the merger of a Chicago settlement periodical, *The Commons,* with the publication of the New York Charity Organization Society.[6] *The Survey* had a circulation of about 20,000 in 1912, and for many reformers around the country it represented a philosophy of reform and a record of accomplishments and battles not yet won in the fight to humanize the industrial city. *The Survey* offices in New York served as a meeting place for a variety of social justice reformers and it was here that a small group of friends met in December, 1911, a few days before the McNamaras were sentenced, to discuss what might be done to counteract the damage caused by the McNamara case. Jane Addams, who happened to be in New York, and who had always been a stubborn and eloquent defender of the workingman and his right to organize and bargain collectively, presided at the informal meeting.[7] Also present were Paul Kellogg, director of the Pittsburgh Survey and managing editor of *The Survey;* Lillian Wald, the head resident of Henry Street Settlement; Florence Kelley, the impatient organizer of child labor reform; Samuel McCune Lindsay, Director of the New York School of Philanthropy; Rabbi Stephen Wise of the Free Synagogue of

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5 Arthur Link, *The American Epoch,* New York, 1955, 69–72.

6 *The Commons,* begun in 1895 and edited since 1900 by Graham Taylor, merged in November, 1905, with *Charities,* begun in 1897 and edited by Edward T. Devine. Four months later *Jewish Charity* also merged with the new publication, which was called *Charities and The Commons.* The new magazine had offices in both Chicago and New York for a time and in April, 1909, changed its name to *The Survey* in honor of the Pittsburgh Survey carried out by the Charities Publication Committee. See "To Change the Name of *Charities and the Commons,*" *Charities and The Commons,* XXI (April 27, 1909), 1251–1253. For a discussion of the various mergers and changes that helped to create *The Survey* see Edward T. Devine, *When Social Work Was Young,* New York, 1939, 103–113.

7 Devine, *When Social Work Was Young,* 117; Stephen Wise, *The Autobiography of Stephen Wise,* New York, 1949, 59–60; Paul Kellogg to Jane Addams, September 11, 1914, Addams MSS, Peace Collection, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Penn.: Telegram, Mrs. Emmons Blaine to Paul Kellogg, December 17, 1911, Blaine MSS, McCormick Collection, Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison.

New York and Rev. John Haynes Holmes, Unitarian clergyman and minister of the Church of the Messiah in New York.[8]

This small group of social workers and reformers feared that the important problems of wages, working conditions, child labor and the daily problems of the ordinary laborer would be overshadowed by the sensational beadlines about strikes and violence. They saw the *Los Angeles Times* explosion and the McNamara case not as an isolated incident, but as one of a long series of labor disputes and difficulties. They sympathized with organized labor although they deplored violence, and thought of themselves as mediators and interpreters in the industrial struggle. Like so many others of their generation, they believed that action should be based on complete information, and they came perilously close to believing that if one could only learn the facts, the solution would follow naturally. They believed that one of the great barriers to solving the problems of industrial unrest was a lack of accurate knowledge about the real causes of disagreements and disputes, of strikes and violence.[9]

In the last two weeks of December, 1911, the social workers gathered for additional meetings, sometimes at *The Survey* offices, sometimes at Henry Street Settlement. Other reformers joined the discussions: Mary Kingsbury Simkhovitch, head resident of Greenwich House; Edward T. Devine, the editor of *The Survey;* John Glenn, the Director of the Russell Sage Foundation; Owen Lovejoy, Secretary of the National Child Labor Committee; John Kingsbury, Director of the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor; James B. Reynolds, for many years the head resident of University Settlement, now Assistant District Attorney for New York County; Henry Moskowitz, the head resident of Madison House and several others.[10] Out of these meetings came a symposium on "The Larger Bearings of the McNamara Case," published in *The Survey;* out of these meetings came the idea for the Industrial Relations Commission.[11]

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[8] Wise, *Challenging Years,* 59–60; "To Survey Readers and Survey Associates," *Survey,* XXIX (November 23, 1912), 1–8.

[9] "The Larger Bearings of the McNamara Case: A Symposium." *Survey,* XXVII (December 30, 1911), 141–149. Graham Taylor, "The McNamara Confessions," *Survey,* XXVII (December 9, 1911), 1339–1340.

[10] "A Communication to The Hon. William Howard Taft," printed pamphlet with "Note," Blaine MSS.

[11] "The Larger Bearings," *loc. cit.* Among the contributors to this symposium were Mrs. Emmons Blaine, Edward Filene, John Glenn, Florence Kelley, Mary McDowell, J. Howard Melish, James B. Reynolds, Edward Ross, and Robert Woods.

It was natural that this group of social workers should think in terms of a federal investigating commission. Their faith in facts and research had been strengthened by their experience with the Pittsburgh Survey and with many lesser investigations.[12] As settlement workers many of them had gained first hand experience with social research, and an exaggerated impression of its usefulness. Jane Addams and Lillian Wald had been leaders in the agitation that led to the federal investigation of the conditions of work among women and children, which had not been completed in 1911.[13] Samuel McCune Lindsay had published a summary of the work of the last previous Congressional investigation of industry (The United States Industrial Commission, 1898–1901).[14] Almost all of the industrial relations committee, as they came to call themselves, had had experience in national organizations through the Women's Trade Union League, The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, The National Playground Association, The National Consumers' League, The National Child Labor Committee, the National Federation of Settlements, or the National Conference on Charities and Corrections. In the first decade and a half of the twentieth century, the various threads of local reform movements were being drawn together; progressive reform, after many defeats and a few local advances, was being organized on the national level. The campaign for the Industrial Relations Commission was part of this general movement.

The actual campaign began with the drafting of a communication, which a delegation of social workers presented to President Taft on December 30, 1911. "The case of the State of California *vs.* the McNamaras is legally closed," the communication began, "but what happens from now on to the McNamaras in San Quentin prison does not concern the American people so pro-

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[12] For a brief description of the Pittsburgh Survey see, Paul Kellogg, "The Pittsburgh Survey," *Charities and The Commons*, XXI (January 2, 1909), 517–526. For the entire report see, Paul Kellogg, *The Pittsburgh Survey*, 6 vols., New York, 1909–1914. The social workers had also reported on two other pioneer investigations in their magazine. See "The Negro in the Cities of the North, *Charities* XV (October 7, 1904), 1–96; "Next Door To Congress," *Charities and The Commons*, XV (March 3, 1906), 759–841.

[13] Mary McDowell, "The Need of a National Investigation," *Charities and The Commons*, XVII (January 5, 1907), 634.

[14] Samuel McCune Lindsay, "A Colossal Inquiry Completed: The Three Years Work of the United States Industrial Commission," *American Monthly Review of Reviews*, XXIV (December, 1901), 711–718. For a description of the work of this commission see Mark Perlman, *Labor Union Theories in America*, Evanston, 1958, 264–279.

foundly as what happened, is happening and may happen to workmen who did not and would not use dynamite as a method to secure their ends. . . ." The social workers went on to describe some of the unsafe and unsanitary working conditions still existing in the United States and warned that if the workingmen were not given better wages, better working conditions and a chance to bargain collectively the nation could expect more violence and more dynamite. But one way to prevent this was to create a commission, "with as great scientific competence, staff resources and power to compel testimony as the Interstate Commerce Commission," to investigate the causes of strike, the conditions of labor, the role of trade unions and employer associations in a number of key industries.[15] The social workers wanted government investigation and government action in the area of industrial relations. They made their point as clear as possible and they strengthened it by adding the signatures of some prominent economists and sociologists to those already supporting the proposal. Edward Ross of Wisconsin, W. F. Wilcox of Cornell, Edwin R. A. Seligman of Columbia, Ernest Freund of Chicago and Simon Patten of Pennsylvania, who happened to be attending the joint meetings of the American Economic and Sociological Associations in Washington, were among those who added their names to the communication before it was presented to President Taft.[16]

Taft was impressed with the social workers' request and in a message to Congress, February 2, 1912, he paraphrased their words. "The extraordinary growth of industry in the past ten decades and its revolutionary changes have raised new and vital questions as to the relations between employers and wage earners, which have become matters of pressing public concern," he announced, and went on to urge that Congress pass a bill providing for a Federal Commission on Industrial Relations.[17]

Taft's message to Congress was the signal for the social workers to go into action. They had seen too many bills defeated or

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[15] "A Communication to the Hon. William Howard Taft," (December 30, 1911) pamphlet, Blaine MSS, also printed in *Survey*, XXVII (December 30, 1911), 1430–1431. John Haynes Holmes, Lillian Wald, Henry Moskowitz, J. Howard Mellish and Paul Kellogg were the committee that drafted the communication. See "The Constructive Work Before the Industrial Relations Commission," *Survey*, XXX (August 21, 1913), 571-574.

[16] "A Communication to the Hon. William Howard Taft"; Federal Commission on Industrial Relations, *Survey*, XXVII (January 13, 1912), 1563.

[17] Memo from Graham R. Taylor, n. d., Blaine MSS; "The Need for a Federal Commission on Industrial Relations," *Survey*, XXVII (February 17, 1912), 1776–1777; *U. S. Congressional Record*, 62nd Cong. 2 Sess. XIVIII, 1661–1662.

quietly tabled in committee to be overconfident. They were particularly concerned that nearly six years had passed since they had sponsored a bill to create a Children's Bureau and nothing had yet happened. They were determined to organize a vigorous campaign to follow up their suggestion for an Industrial Relations Commission.[18] The social workers chose New York and the offices of *The Survey* as the headquarters of the campaign and a meeting of the various interested reformers selected Edward T. Devine as chairman, Adolph Lewisohn (a businessman who had given $5,000 to help with the campaign), as vice chairman, and Lillian Wald, as treasurer of the industrial relations committee.[19]

In Chicago, Jane Addams called a meeting of social workers and other reformers to enlist support for the campaign. Among those who attended were: Mary McDowell, the head resident of the University of Chicago Settlement; Graham Taylor, the founder of Chicago Commons, and his son Graham Romeyn Taylor; Harriet Vittum, the head resident at Northwestern University Settlement; Mrs. Margaret Dreier Robins, President of the National Women's Trade Union League; Sophonisba P. Breckinridge, Hull House resident and professor at the University of Chicago; Julius Rosenwald of Sears Roebuck and Company; a young lawyer named Harold Ickes; and Mrs. Emmons Blaine, daughter of Cyrus McCormick, widow of the son of James G. Blaine, close friend of the social workers in Chicago and an active participant in a wide variety of reforms.[20] Jane Addams briefed the group on the communication sent to President Taft and outlined the campaign just getting under way for an Industrial Relations Commission. They discussed the ways they might help the group of social workers in New York and suggested that the commission ought to be completely divorced in the public mind from the McNamara case. They appointed a sub-committee to help draft a bill that might be introduced in Congress, and they wired their suggestions and the offer of their support to the committee in New York.[21]

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18 "To Survey Readers and Survey Associates" (annual report), *Survey* XXIX (November 23, 1912), 5. The Children's Bureau finally became a reality in 1912 during the campaign for the Industrial Relations Commission.

19 "Movement Under Way For Industrial Commission," *Survey*, XXVII (March 2, 1912), 1821–1822. See also Justin Wise Polier and James Waterman Wise, editors, *The Personal Letters of Stephen Wise*, Boston, 1956, 136. Edward T. Devine, *Organized Charity and Industry*, New York, 1915, 4.

20 Memo from Graham R. Taylor, n. d., Blaine MSS.

21 Memo from Graham R. Taylor, n. d., Blaine MSS; notes taken by Mrs. Blaine at City Club Meeting, February 3, 1912, Blaine MSS; Mrs. Blaine to Graham R. Taylor, February 12, 1912, Blaine MSS.

Devine, who realized that the task of coordinating the committee, marshalling information and influence and getting the bill through Congress would be a full time job, enlisted the support of two young social workers—Graham Romeyn Taylor and Allen T. Burns. Taylor was a young man of thirty-two who had grown up at Chicago Commons. After graduating from Harvard he worked for a newspaper for a year before returning to Chicago to work on the staff of *The Commons*, and its successors, *Charities and the Commons* and *The Survey*. Through his father he had met most of the men and women who now called themselves the industrial relations committee, and thus he was a good choice for the role of secretary to the committee with the task of keeping close contact with the scattered members.[22]

The industrial relations committee borrowed Allen T. Burns, a young man of thirty-six, from his duties as Secretary of the Pittsburgh Civic Commission and gave him the task of lobbying for the bill in Washington. Burns was a graduate of the University of Chicago, where he had remained to do graduate work in sociology and theology. In Chicago he had been a resident of Hull House, assistant warden of Chicago Commons, active in industrial Y. M. C. A. work and a leading campaigner for John Harlan in the mayoralty election of 1905. In Pittsburgh he had served as a liaison between the politicians and the social workers engaged in the Pittsburgh Survey. He had been successful in promoting an intensive study of transportation and land allotment, as well as cooperating in changing the housing laws and tax structure. His wide range of experience in Chicago and Pittsburgh had brought him into contact with politicians as well as social workers and labor leaders. In effect, he had been a lobbyist for reform on the municipal level; now he transferred his operation to Washington on behalf of the Industrial Relations Commission.[23]

Before going to Washington, Burns, along with Devine and Commissioner of Labor, Charles Neill, using the recommendations

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[22] Graham Taylor, *Pioneering on Social Frontiers*, Chicago, 1930, 423 *et passim*, Graham R. Taylor, obituary, *New York Times*, August 31, 1942.

[23] "Movement Under Way For Industrial Commission," *Survey*, XXVII (March 2, 1912), 1821–1822; "Allen T. Burns' New Appointment," *Survey*, XXII (April 10, 1909), 89–90; "Personals," *Survey*, XXXII (July 18, 1914), 421; Burns to Raymond Robins, March 18, 1905, Robins MSS, Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison; Allen T. Burns, obituary, *New York Times*, March 10, 1953.

of the Chicago and New York committees, prepared a draft bill, which Burns carried to Washington and gave to two friends of labor—William Borah of Idaho in the Senate, and William Hughes of New Jersey in the House.[24] Early in March Borah introduced the social workers' draft with few changes, as Senate Bill 5546, and it was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor (of which Borah was chairman). In the House the memorandum became House Bill 21094, and was referred to the House Committee on Labor (with William Wilson of Pennsylvania as Chairman).

All signs indicated that the two Congressional committees would report the bill favorably, Graham Romeyn Taylor advised the committee members, but he warned that it was an election year and the docket was full. He urged the social workers in Chicago and New York to write or wire all members of both Congressional committees to explain the need for an Industrial Relations Commission.[25] Edward Devine encouraged all the readers of *The Survey* who were interested in promoting better labor-management relations to ask their Congressmen to support the Hughes-Borah Bill.[26] The editors of *The Survey* also began a special series of articles on industrial relations and the need of a commission. These articles appeared once a week for ten weeks in fifty of the leading newspapers in the country.[27] Samuel Gompers offered the support of the American Federation of Labor, and the National Civic Federation endorsed the bill at their meeting in Washington, March 5-7.[28] In Chicago Graham Taylor, Sr. contacted men like W. D. Allen, President of the Allen Manufacturing Company, Julius Rosenwald of Sears Roebuck and Company and Cyrus and Harold McCormick, the type of big businessmen whose support would show that the manufacturers, as well as the labor leaders and the social workers, wanted an Industrial Relations Commission.[29]

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[24] Graham R. Taylor to Mrs. Blaine, February 16, 1912, Blaine MSS.

[25] Graham R. Taylor to All Members of the Chicago Committee on Federal Commission for Industrial Relations, March 29, 1912, Blaine MSS.

[26] Devine, "Hughes-Borah Bill," *Survey,* XXVII (March 9, 1912), 1898–1899.

[27] "To Survey Readers and Survey Associates," (Annual Report) *Survey,* XXIX (November 23, 1912), 8. The articles syndicated included Edward T. Devine, "Federal Commission on Industrial Relations"; Walter Weyl, "What's Under the Lid At Lawrence"; Shelby Harrison, "Our Haphazard Ways of Settling Strikes"; Allen T. Burns, "A Promising Basis for Industrial Peace."

[28] "Industrial Relations Commission," *The American Federationist,* XX (January, 1913), 47; Allen T. Burns, "For a Just Industrial Peace," *Survey,* XXVII (March 16, 1912), 1925.

[29] Graham Taylor to Graham R. Taylor, March 10, 1912, Taylor MSS.

In Washington, Burns marshalled his forces for the first test. At a hearing before the House Labor Committee, March 22, 1912, labor leaders, manufacturers, and social workers from all over the country testified in favor of an Industrial Relations Commission.[30] Late in April, when the bill came up for final consideration in the House Committee of Labor, Burns advised Graham Romeyn Taylor that several strong letters to members of the committee from prominent men and women in Chicago and New York would help. Taylor quickly asked a few people to write pointed letters. The efforts of the social workers paid dividends; on May 16, 1912, the bill was reported favorably out of the House Committee on Labor with an appropriation of $500,000.[31]

Early in June several members of the Industrial relations committee were in Cleveland for the National Conference of Charities and Corrections. It was an exciting time; interest in the presidential campaign was mounting, and some of the members of the industrial relations committee were also involved in drafting a platform of industrial minimums, which would later be incorporated into the platform of the Progressive Party. Graham Taylor, Jane Addams, Edward T. Devine, Paul Kellogg, and Samuel McCune Lindsay met informally during the meetings to discuss the Industrial Relations Commission.[32] Despite the progress of the Hughes-Borah Bill, there was still much to do. Lindsay, who replaced Devine as chairman of the general committee, began by asking the members of the Conference of Charities and Correction to write or telegraph their Congressmen, as well as the chairman of the appropriation committee, urging them to speed the passage of the Hughes-Borah Bill.[33]

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30 *Hearing Before the Committee On Labor of the House of Representatives On the Bill H. R. 21094 to create an Industrial Relations Commission, March 22, 1912* (Washington, 1912). Edward T. Devine, Henry Moskowitz, and Owen Lovejoy represented the social workers at the hearing. John Mitchell spoke for organized labor; F. R. Nunemacher, for the Association of Manufacturers. Dr. William Jay Schieffelin, Chairman of the general board of sanitary control in the cloak, suit and shirt industry of New York, Charles Neill, Louis Brandeis and Washington Gladden, also testified. There was some disagreement over the areas the commission should investigate, but all agreed that the Industrial Relations Commission should be established.

31 Graham R. Taylor to Mrs. Blaine, April 27, 1912 and May 14, 1912, Blaine MSS; House of Representatives Reports 6132, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess. IV, Report 726 (May 16, 1912).

32 Paul Kellogg to Robert De Forest, July 3, 1912, copy Addams MSS.

33 Mrs. Blaine to Lindsay, June 15, 1912; Lindsay, "The Commission on Industrial Relations," *Proceedings of the National Conference on Charities and Correction, 1912*, 409–410; "The Constructive Work Before the Industrial Relations Commission," *Survey*, XXX (August 2, 1913), 571.

It was relatively easy and inexpensive to enlist support for the Industrial Relations Commission at the Conference of Charities and Correction, but the Committee discovered that an effective lobby took money and the cost of postage and telegrams had nearly exhausted the funds originally collected to carry on the campaign. Jane Addams, a master fund raiser, agreed to collect enough money to continue the fight. When she returned to Chicago she called a meeting of the local committee to explain the need for more funds. Julius Rosenwald and Mrs. Emmons Blaine responded with subscriptions of five hundred dollars each, and made possible the continuation of the campaign for an Industrial Relations Commission.[34]

A shortage of time, however, rather than a shortage of money seemed a more serious barrier to the passage of the Hughes-Borah Bill in the summer of 1912. Lindsay spent five days in Washington during the first part of July. He conferred with Burns and also with Borah, Wilson, Hughes and other members of Congress, and he reported to the committee that it seemed doubtful that the bill could be brought to a vote before Congress adjourned for the summer.[35]

Despite Lindsay's pessimism and the excitement of the presidential campaign, Burns, Taylor, and many of the others continued to work for the passage of the bill. They secured the cooperation of William Wilson of Pennsylvania and on July 17, largely through his efforts, the bill was brought up for debate in the House.[36] The same day, after being amended slightly, it was passed by the House. The next day the bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Education and Labor. On July 26 the bill was reported out of Borah's committee and finally on August 15, with Borah pushing for its consideration, the bill was passed in the Senate. After minor differences between the Senate and House versions of the Hughes-Borah Bill were worked out, the bill was presented to the President and signed by him on August 23,

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[34] Mrs. Blaine to Julius Rosenwald, June 12, 1912, Blaine MSS; Graham R. Taylor to Chicago Committee, June 19, 1912, Blaine MSS.

[35] Graham R. Taylor to Committee, July 12, 1912, Blaine MSS.

[36] William B. Wilson was born in Scotland, but grew up in Pennsylvania where he became a coal miner at the age of nine. After more than twenty-five years in the coal mines he became International Secretary-Treasurer of the United Mine Workers of America. He served three terms in the House of Representatives (as a Democrat from Penn.) before Woodrow Wilson made him Secretary of Labor in 1913. *Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774–1929*, Washington, 1928, 177; *U. S. Congressional Record.* 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., XLVIII, 9190–9207.

1912 (three days before Congress adjourned.)[37] Without the constant pressure applied by the social workers' lobby it seems very doubtful that the bill would have come up for vote during the Second Session of the Sixty-Second Congress.

The actual passage of the Hughes-Borah Bill providing for an Industrial Relations Commission did not end the work of the committee. President Taft suggested that a group from the committee meet him at his home in Beverly, Massachusetts, to discuss the personnel of the Commission.[38] Lindsay called a meeting of the committee in New York to discuss nominations to be made to Taft. The bill provided that three of the nine members be from organized labor and three from the ranks of the employers. The three remaining members would presumably represent the public. Jane Addams felt that there ought to be at least one woman on the commission and she made several suggestions.[39] Rabbi Wise believed that men like Julius Rosenwald and Adolph Lewisohn should represent the employers. All agreed that a well-known sociologist or economist must be on the commission. The members of the committee from the beginning had made it clear that they did not want to serve on the Industrial Relations Commission, themselves. They were interested only in getting competent, sympathetic, and representative men and women to serve.[40]

Edward T. Devine, Samuel McCune Lindsay, and Rabbi Wise journeyed to Beverly, armed with suggestions and slightly embarrassed because almost all the people who had signed the original petition were now opposing Taft for re-election. They were not embarrassed long, however, for Taft himself suggested Jane Addams (then campaigning for Roosevelt) as one of the members of the commission. The delegates left Beverly "after a

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[37] *U. S. Congressional Record.* 62nd Cong. 2nd Sess., XLVIII, 9230–9675, 1072–1073.

[38] Stephen Wise to Jane Addams, September 3, 1912, Sophonisba P. Breckinridge MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; Lindsay to Committee, September 3, 1912, Addams MSS.

[39] Lindsay to Committee, September 3, 1912, with Jane Addams' penciled note, Addams MSS; Wise to Addams, September 3, 1912, Jane Addams penciled note, Breckinridge MSS. Harriet Vittum, S. P. Breckinridge, Mrs. Raymond Robins, Anna Nichols, and Grace Abbott were among the women whom Jane Addams suggested for the commission.

[40] Stephen Wise to Jane Addams, September 3, 1912, Breckinridge MSS; Lindsay to Committee, December 23, 1912, Blaine MSS. "Movement Underway For Industrial Commission," *Survey,* XXVII (March 2, 1912), 1821.

long and very satisfactory interview," confident of the nominations Taft would make.[41]

While the delegates were conferring with Taft, however, an event occurred that cast some doubt as to the nominations Taft would make. Graham Taylor, Sr., received a confidential telegram from Ethelbert Stewart, special agent of the Bureau of Labor, revealing that certain manufacturing interests were putting a great deal of pressure on Taft and on Charles Nagel, Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor, to appoint John Mack Glenn, Secretary of the Illinois Manufacturing Association, as one of the employers' representatives on the Industrial Relations Commission. Glenn was distrusted by the social workers because he had been active in Illinois in lobbying against the passage of employers' liability and workmen's compensation laws and had fought a verbal battle with Taylor on these points in the spring of 1910.[42] Taylor immediately went into action to counter the pressure favoring Glenn. He wired Jane Addams and Mrs. Emmons Blaine, asking them to wire both Taft and Nagel. He contacted Allen Pond (an architect), T. K. Webster (an industrialist), Julius Rosenwald, and Harold McCormick and urged them to write or wire both Taft and Nagel to give the reasons for opposing Glenn. Taylor reminded Harold McCormick that representatives of the Harvester Company had appeared in behalf of legislation that Glenn had opposed. He dug in his files and came up with some very damaging evidence against Glenn, including some indications of his outspoken criticism of Taft. Taylor made sure this material reached Taft, and he also wrote to Secretary of the Interior, Walter Fisher, whom he had known through work in Municipal Voters League, asking him to use his influence with Taft. He referred Secretary Nagel to Julia Lathrop, recently appointed head of the Children's Bureau, for more information. He forwarded all the evidence against Glenn to the New York committee, and Lindsay also conferred with Taft. Glenn was not appointed to the Industrial Relations Commission.[43]

Even without J. Mack Glenn, however, the social workers

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[41] Wise to Lillian Wald, August 24, 1912, Lillian Wald MSS, New York Public Library; Wise to Jane Addams, September 3, 1912, Breckinridge MSS; Devine to Addams, September 11, 1912, Addams MSS.

[42] Telegram, n. d. Graham R. Taylor to Jane Addams (1912); Graham Taylor to Ethelbert Stewart, September 7, 1912; Graham Taylor to Edward T. Devine, April 20, 1910, Graham Taylor MSS, Newberry Library, Chicago. Graham Taylor, "Industrial Survey of the Month," *Survey*, XXIII (March 5, 1910), 896.

[43] Telegram, n. d. Graham R. Taylor to Jane Addams (1912); Graham Taylor to Ethelbert Stewart, September 7, 1912; Taylor to Walter

found much to criticize in the nominations that Taft made for the industrial Relations Commission on December 17, 1912.[44] On December 18 when many members of the committee met in New York, they were unanimous in their disappointment and disgust. In a statement released to the press the same day, the committee spelled out its disapproval. The members of the committee felt that although there were "men of ability and distinction" among the nominations, as a group the commission was undistinguished. Specifically, they attacked Taft's nominations because there was no woman and no well-known sociologist or economist in the group.[45] Paul Kellogg, writing in *The Survey,* complained that there was no one in the employers' group who stood head and shoulders above his fellow employers in the matter of democracy in industry, no one in labor group to represent the new unionism, and most of all there were no names like Freund, Brandeis, or Commons.[46] Samuel Gompers, however, took a different view of the situation. Completely satisfied with the labor representatives that Taft had nominated (two were officers of the AFL), Gompers felt that the social workers, in criticizing Taft's nominations, demonstrated a "spirit of superior intelligence," and an "assumption of superior information and ability," which betrayed their desire to be on the commission themselves.[47]

The social workers had no real desire to be on the commission themselves, but they were determined that nearly a year of hard work would not be lost. They met in New York and drafted a protest; they also selected five delegates to confer with Borah, Hughes and William Wilson in Washington to lay plans for a

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Fisher, September 9, 1912; Taylor to Charles Nagel, September 12, 1912, Taylor to Stewart, September 12, 1912, Taylor MSS; Taylor to Mrs. Blaine, September 10, 1912, Blaine MSS; Stephen Wise to Jane Addams, September 16, 1912, Addams MSS.

[44] Taft nominees: Representing the public; George Sutherland (U. S. Senator from Utah), George B. Chandler (member of the Connecticut State Legislature), Charles Simon Barrett of Georgia (president of a farmers' union); Representing capital; Frederick A. Delano (President of the Wabash Railroad), Adolph Lewisohn (President of the United Metals Selling Company, Ferdinand C. Schwedtman (Vice President of the National Association of Manufacturers); Representing labor; Austin B. Garretson (President of the Railroad Conductors' Association), John B. Lennon (Treasurer of the American Federation of Labor), James O'Connell (Vice President of the American Federation of Labor).

[45] "Statement adopted unanimously at the meeting of the committee on Industrial Relations, New York City, December 18, 1912," copy Blaine MSS; Lindsay to committee, December 23, 1912, Blaine MSS.

[46] Paul Kellogg, "The Industrial Relations Commission," *Survey,* XXIX (December 28, 1912), 385–386.

[47] "They Don't Suit the 'Intellectuals,'" *The American Federationist,* XX (February, 1913), 128–132.

delaying action in order that president-elect Woodrow Wilson might appoint a new commission after he took office. Chairman Lindsay urged all members of the committee, both in New York and Chicago to do everything in their power "through local publicity channels and by personal conference or letters and telegrams to your senators . . . to make our protest effective."[48] As soon as word was received from New York Jane Addams called a meeting in Chicago to support the action taken by the New York Committee. She felt the major protest should be launched against the representatives of the public. She felt it would be "questionable wisdom" to attack the representatives of capital and labor.[49]

The social workers' protest was effective; Taft's nominations never came before the Senate for ratification during the "lame-duck" congress and on June 26, 1913, Woodrow Wilson nominated his selections for the Industrial Relations Commission. Wilson kept the three labor representatives named by Taft, altered the three public representatives and kept one of the employers.[50] Although he did appoint a woman, Mrs. Florence J. Harriman, his choice did not please the social workers.[51] Wilson named John R. Commons, however, and that fact alone seemed to restore the social workers' faith in their Industrial Relations Commission. Commons was a close friend of many of the social workers and often spent his summers in a social settlement.[52] In the words of Paul Kellogg, Commons was "the one man in America, who, as economist and investigator, has thought out industrial reforms, as statesman has drafted them into laws . . . and as administrator has practically enforced those laws. . . ."[53]

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48 Lindsay to committee, December 23, 1912, Blaine MSS.

49 Graham R. Taylor to Mrs. Blaine, December 19, 1912, Blaine MSS.

50 "Industrial Relations Commission," *Survey*, XXX (July 5, 1913), 452–453; Frances Kellor to Paul Kellogg, July 17, 1913, Addams Mss. Wilson's nominees: representing the public; Frank Walsh (Attorney for the Board of Public Welfare), John R. Commons (Professor of Political Economy at the University of Wisconsin), Mrs. J. Borden Harriman (Vice President of the Association for Tuberculosis Prevention for Children); representing capital; Frederick Delano (President of the Wabash Railroad), Harris Weinstock (San Francisco merchant), S. Thurston Ballard (Louisville flour miller); representing labor; Austin B. Garretson (President of the Railroad Conductors Association), James B. Lennon (Treasurer of the American Federation of Labor), James O'Connell (Vice President of the American Federation of Labor.

51 Florence J. Harriman, *From Pinafores to Politics*, New York, 1923, 133. Mrs. Harriman remarks that Florence Kelley regarded her as too much of an amateur to accomplish anything constructive in the complicated area of labor investigation.

52 Jane Addams, *The Second Twenty Years at Hull House*, New York, 1930, 11; John R. Commons, *Myself*, New York, 1934, 68, 165–177.

53 "Industrial Relations Commission," *Survey*, XXX (July 5, 1913), 452–453.

The Survey published a symposium on what the Industrial Commission should actually do. Most of the twenty-three contributors were optimistic, but there were many different ideas about the methods and subjects for investigations.[54] The differences of opinions expressed by the contributors to *The Survey's* symposium were only a prelude to the major disagreements and dissensions that plagued the work of the Industrial Relations Commission. Disagreements, of course, were inevitable in a commission drawn from such diverse backgrounds, but they were exaggerated by the flamboyant and headline-seeking tactics of Frank Walsh.

The commission used two approaches to its job of studying the underlying causes of industrial conflict—the public hearing and research by experts. Frank Walsh, who was chairman of the Commission, directed most of the money toward the expenses of a long series of public hearings held in cities from Boston and Patterson to Butte and San Francisco. Many of the public hearings resulted in a great deal of publicity. Among other things, Walsh and his aides tried to establish the responsibility of the Rockefeller Interests (and John D. Rockefeller, Jr., personally) for the "Ludlow Massacre" during the 1914 Colorado mine workers' strike, and accused many educational and philanthropic foundations of being allied with the big-business interests.[55]

The research side of the Commission's work received little publicity and little support but, if the commission achieved anything of permanent value, it was in this area. Commons persuaded Charles McCarthy, Director of the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Library, to coordinate the research, and McCarthy set up headquarters in Chicago with a well-trained staff. Social workers, Crystal Eastman and Gertrude Barnum, were among the research experts that included Selig Perlman and Basil Manly. Disagreements with Walsh, however, caused the dismissal of McCarthy and the sudden abandonment of most of the research begun by his staff.[56] The disagreement within the Commission was so great that

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54 "The Constructive Work Before the Industrial Relations Commission", *Survey*, XXX (August 2, 1913), 571–588.

55 Perlman, *Labor Union Theories*, 284–290: "Industrial Relations: Statistics or a Program?" *Survey*, XXXI (November 8, 1913), 152–153. John A. Fitch, "Field Investigations of the Industrial Relations Commission," *Survey*, XXXIII (February 27, 1915), 578–582.

56 Perlman, *Labor Union Theories*, 284–492; "Changes in the Industrial Relations Commission," *Survey*, XXXIII (March 27, 1912), 686. Most of the studies done under the auspices of the Industrial Relations Commission were never published, although some of the material collected by the research experts was published under private auspices. See Perlman, *Labor Union Theories*, 286–287.

when its work was completed in 1916 and its findings were published in eleven volumes, there were three reports of recommendations instead of one.[57]

By 1916, however, most of the social workers who had fought so hard to create the Industrial Relations Commission, had lost interest in their brainchild. They were disturbed by the disagreements and dissensions within the Commission, and there was a natural slacking of interest once the exciting work of lobbying was completed,[58] but it was the outbreak of war in Europe that was primarily responsible for their dwindling concern with the Commission and with industrial relations. The first reaction of the social workers to the war was one of shock, of horror and disillusionment. It meant the end of reform, the collapse of the "social movement." John Haynes Holmes, one of the original members of the industrial relations committee, summed up some of their questioning despair in the fall of 1914:

> We are three thousand miles away from the smoke and flames of combat, and have not a single regiment or battleship involved, and yet who in the United States is thinking about recreation centers, improved housing or the minimum wage? Who is going to fight the battle for widows pensions, push the campaign against child labor, or study exhaustively the problem of unemployment? Where is the strike in Colorado and the Industrial Relations Commission? . . . The *Survey*, to me the most fascinating magazine now being published is at this moment about as thrilling as last years' almanac. . . .[59]

The disillusionment remained, but as the shock wore off Devine, Kellogg and the others were urging that new energy be directed toward social reform lest the hysteria of war wipe out all the gains of twenty years.[60] In any case the social workers were too committed to action to stand by and wring their hands in despair, and let *The Survey* become as irrelevant as last years'

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[57] United States Commission on Industrial Relations, *Industrial Relations Final Report and Testimony*, 11 vols., Washington, 1916. There were 255 pages of recommendations; the rest was made up of transcripts of testimony. The "Major Report" (written by Basil M. Manly) was signed by Walsh, Lennon, O'Connell and Garretson; The "Common Report" was signed in whole or in part by Commons, Harriman, Weinstock, Ballard, and Richard Aishton (who replaced Delano in 1915). "The Employers' Report" spelled out the specific disagreements of the employers with the "Commons Report."

[58] "Editorial," *Survey*, XXXIII (October 10, 1914), 52–55.

[59] John Haynes Holmes, "War and the Social Movement," *Survey*, XXXII (September 26, 1914), 629–630.

[60] See "Editorial," *Survey*, XXXIII (October 3, 1914), 29; Edward T. Devine, "Civilization's Peril," *Survey*, XXXIII (February 6, 1915), 518–519.

almanac. A few weeks after the war broke out in Europe Jane Addams presided at another meeting in New York, very much like the one she had presided at three years before. The same men and women were there—Paul Kellogg, Edward T. Devine, Lillian Wald, Graham Taylor—but this time the talk was not about labor violence or an Industrial Relations Commission, but about promoting peace, the need to defend basic civil liberties, to oppose preparedness and to aid the victims of war.[61]

The war did not end the movement for social reform, but it did internationalize the reform impulse. Social workers had been concerned before 1914 with international organizations and problems, but the outbreak of war seemed to shift their emphasis from the domestic to the international scene.[62] After August, 1914 the struggle for peace, the fight to help the victims of war seemed much more important, much more pressing than the investigation of industrial relations. The war did not suddenly end the social workers' interest in reform, but it changed the nature of that reform and convinced them, at least for the time, that the domestic reform movement was over, that the best they could hope to do was to hold the line.[63] The war and the internal dissensions and difficulties of the Industrial Relations Commission made the final report in 1916 of little concern to the social workers who had been responsible for its creation. The social workers' campaign, however, remains an important illustration of the realistic tactics of a group of idealistic progressives who had their idealism altered by the outbreak of World War I.

ALLEN F. DAVIS

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[61] Lillian Wald to William D. Howells, September 22, 1914; Wald MSS; Paul Kellogg to Jane Addams, September 11, 1914, September 15, 1915, Addams MSS.

[62] A study of *Survey* from 1914–1917 compared with the earlier period, 1909–1913 makes this shift in interest among the social workers from domestic reform to international problems obvious. The shift can also be seen in the Wald, Addams, and Taylor MSS.

[63] Recently several historians have made the point that some of the Progressive movement survived into the 1920's. See especially, Arthur S. Link, "What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920's?" *American Historical Review* LXIV (July, 1959), 833–851; Clarke A. Chambers, "Creative Effort in An Age of Normalcy," *The Social Welfare Forum, 1961*, 252–271. Link and Chambers are right, of course, but the fact that some of Progressivism survived in the 1920's does not alter the fact that the outbreak of World War I in 1914 came as a great shock to most reformers and altered, if it did not destroy, the Progressive movement.

Jacksonian Democracy and the Rise of the Nominating Convention

Through most of the nineteenth century and part of the twentieth the organizational structure of the major American political parties could be easily described by reference to the convention system. Delegates to county, district, state and national conventions, presumably chosen by the grass roots membership of the sponsoring party, met shortly before each election to nominate candidates for the office under their particular jurisdiction. They also performed the important tasks of appointing the party's central committees, which in turn controlled the electioneering machinery, and passed resolutions defining the party's position on public questions. Thus, during much of our history, the party could be equated roughly, and absolutely from the standpoint of the law, with the convention. And even though today local and state conventions have given way to the party primary for nominating candidates they still retain in many states their function of choosing the state and county central committees and enunciating the platform. Of course the greatest hold-over of the system is the national convention which continues effectively to reduce the voters' choice for president to two names. In view of the past and present importance of the convention system an investigation of the causes responsible for its initial adoption would, hopefully, shed considerable light on party development in the United States.

Although the nominating convention was by no means the creation of the age of Jackson, since the first one of record had been held by the Pennsylvania Antifederalists in 1788, it was during the ten years from 1822 to 1832 that the ascendency of the convention over other nominating methods was fully established.[1] Significantly,

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[1] There is no adequate study of the application of the convention. Useful monographs and articles include the following: Thomas Perkins Abernathy, *Formative Period in Alabama, 1815–1828,* Montgomery, 1922; Frederick W. Dallinger, *Nominations for Elective Office in the United States,* New York, 1897; Walter R. Fee, *The Transition from Aristocracy to Democracy in New Jersey, 1789–1829,* Somerville, N. J., 1933; William S. Hoffman, *Andrew Jackson and North Carolina Politics,* Chapel Hill, 1958; Philip Shriver Klein, *Pennsylvania Politics, 1817–1832,* Philadelphia, 1940; George D. Luetscher, *Early Political Machinery in the United States,* Philadelphia, privately printed, 1903; Edwin Arthur Miles, *Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi,* Chapel Hill, 1960; Paul Murray, *The Whig Party in Georgia, 1825–1853,* Chapel Hill, 1948; Harry R. Stevens, *The*

the same period also witnessed the final break-up of the old Republican Party and the emergence of a revitalized two party system. Lacking an unquestioned favorite to succeed James Monroe or a viable opposition party, the superficial national solidarity of the Republicans shattered under the impact of personal and sectional rivalries prior to the election of 1824. The bitter factionalism of state politics in the Era of Good Feelings became the regimen for the nation as was indicated by the presence of four major contenders to replace Monroe, all carrying valid Republican credentials. John Quincy Adams' election by the House of Representatives in 1825 began the slow but steady polarization of politics around the standards of the new President and his principal opponent, Andrew Jackson. This dualism, re-enforced after 1828 by Henry Clay's taking over the defeated Adams party, was seemingly marred by the rise of the Antimasons, but they functioned in national politics more as an anti-Clay faction within the larger force opposed to Jackson than as an independent third party.

Revival of organized competition for the presidency and lesser offices greatly stimulated the spread of the convention because of its superior ability, as will be shown, to concentrate large numbers of voters behind a single candidate or slate of candidates. No party can successfully vie for power unless it can prevent the fragmentation of its own supporters and this elementary fact was not lost on the rising class of professional politicians faced with conducting campaigns among a numerous and geographically diffused citizenry who were empowered to fill a incomprehensibly large number of

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Early Jackson Party in Ohio, Durham, N. C., 1957; Homer J. Webster, *History of the Democratic Party Organization in the Northwest*, Columbus, Ohio, 1915; Neil Andrews, Jr., "The Development of the Nominating Convention in Rhode Island," *Publications of the Rhode Island Historical Society*, I (New series, 1893), 258–269; Logan Esarey, "The Organization of the Jacksonian Party in Indiana," *Proceedings of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association for the Year 1913–1914*, VII, 220–243; Paul Murray, "Party Organization in Georgia Politics, 1825–1853," *The Georgia Historical Quarterly*, XXXIX (December, 1945), 195–210; Leota Newhard, "The Beginning of the Whig Party in Missouri, 1824–1840," *The Missouri Historical Review*, XXV (January, 1931), 254–280; Charles Manfred Thompson, "Attitude of the Western Whigs Toward the Convention System," *The Proceedings of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association*, V (1911–1912), 167–189; and "Elections and Election Machinery in Illinois, 1818–1848," *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society*, VII (January, 1915), 379–388; Joseph S. Walton, "Nominating Conventions in Pennsylvania," *American Historical Review*, II (January, 1897), 262–278; Frank Hayden Miller, "The Nominating System in Pennsylvania" (unpublished master's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1894). The best overall analysis (despite its many deficiencies) is in my study of "The Emergence of the National Nominating Convention" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1962), 39–75.

public offices. In the interval between the elections of 1824 and 1832 the parties and their factions used the convention with increasing frequency at the state and local levels. When the Antimasons, National Republicans and Democrats nominated their presidential and vice-presidential candidates in national conventions before the 1832 election, it signaled the predominance of the system in a majority of the states. The switch from self-announcement, mass meetings and legislative caucuses took place gradually and unevenly. Different parties adopted the convention at different times for a variety of reasons, and its first use in a county, city, district or state often depended on a number of unique circumstances.

But in spite of the complexities of such glacial change, the maze of electoral divisions and the welter of competing groups which obscure the transition process, two relatively comprehensive reasons for the convention's growng popularity stand out. The convention prevailed over other nominating methods because it best satisfied the ideological demands of the Jacksonian era that government should be responsive to the people's direction. It also solved the technical difficulties of conducting politics in a democracy. In the nominating convention, idea and experience harmonized; a popular theory created an institution which passed the pragmatic test imposed by politicians.

The convention's appeal to the democratic instincts of the age is rooted in the historical significance of the word itself. The convention concept derived from the English constitutional struggles of the seventeenth century when two irregularly appointed parliamentary bodies (in 1660 and 1689) settled the government of the kingdom by pretending to express the will of the whole nation. During and immediately after the American Revolution this usage proved invaluable as both the former colonies and the nation needed a means compatible with the natural rights philosophy of government for writing and ratifying their new constitutions.[2] Implicit in the convention was the idea that its delegates incarnated the sovereignty of the people; its sessions enacted the social compact. Private associations, such as the great religious denominations, whose large and scattered memberships made primary meetings impracticable, also employed the convention after 1776 as the supreme governing body of their organizations. These conventions possessed, on a more modest scale, the same sovereign

[2] J. Franklin Jameson, "The Early Political Uses of the Word Convention," *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society,* XII (new series, 1899), 183–185.

functions as the state constitutional conventions and the delegates proceeded on the assumption that their authority sprang directly from the rank and file.

Another user of the convention, one particularly active in the age of Jackson, was the pressure group engaged in securing the passage of a favored bill through Congress or a state legislature. Often representing narrow special interests, the lobbyist endeavored through the holding of conventions to give the appearance of speaking for a majority of the voters. The *Richmond Compiler* observed in 1831 that "This seems to be the age of Conventions—not for forming Constitutions, but for shaping the measures of the People."[3] To marshal the support of "the People" and impress legislators, public meetings appointed delegates to conventions where, obedient to their instructions, they endorsed resolutions requesting the people's legal representatives to build some internal improvement, raise the tariff (or lower it), encourage observance of the Sabbath, promote temperance, stimulate trade or revise the militia laws.[4] In 1827, well before the Antimasons held the first national nominating convention, friends of domestic manufactures met in a national convention and in 1831 both protectionists and free traders convoked similar assemblies.[5] By the time party warfare was sufficiently developed to warrant its use, convention theory and practice were well known and the politicians had an instrument fashioned to their needs.

The convention satisfied the great political touchstone of Jacksonian democracy—popular sovereignty. Every public question was to be decided by the people acting through their chosen agents; elected officials were considered, even by themselves, mere agents reflecting the voters' desires. Any other course constituted a dangerous tendency toward aristocracy, or even monarchy, and many legislative careers were ruined by the exercise of independent judgment. The defeat of the Western congressmen who voted for Adams in 1825 was an object lesson to legislators who thought of flouting their constituents' instructions. "The cry of aristocracy takes with certain folks," wrote John C. Spencer to a fellow

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[3] Quoted in the *Daily National Intelligencer*, August 6, 1831.

[4] *Daily National Intelligencer*, November 3, 1823; December 21, 1825; December 6, 1826; *Buffalo Republican*, December 17, 1831; *Richmond Enquirer*, July 18, 1828; *The Rochester Telegraph*, January 12, 1827; April 3; *The Anti-Masonic Enquirer* [Rochester], September 22, 1829; January 25, 1831.

[5] *Daily National Intelligencer*, June 26, 1827; June 28, June 30, July 9, July 28, 1827; July 22, August 2, August 18, September 10, October 29, 1831.

Antimason, Thurlow Weed, in 1831, "and there is no way to meet it but to clamor louder than our adversaries. . . ."[6] Few remarks typify the demands of Jacksonian politics with greater precision, for in their efforts to prove their devotion to democracy politicians were forever clamoring louder than their adversaries. Belief in democracy was the price of being allowed to compete for office, and the convention, composed of delegates directly commissioned by the entire membership to make a nomination for a particular office, certified that the party met this requirement. In a day when polls of steamboat passengers, grand juries and militia musters were accepted as indices of public opinion the ability to stage conventions was the best available evidence that the party's nominee enjoyed wide approval.

Party conventions, in keeping with the intrinsic meaning of their underlying concept, usually affected to speak for all the voters, not just a segment of them. After 1816, when the Federalist party had all but vanished, the Republican nomination was ordinarily the equivalent of election and as long as this situation lasted party conventions could reasonably claim to speak for the whole community. If the Republicans split each faction declared its nominee the people's choice. After a regular Republican district convention in New York failed to renominate Represenative John W. Taylor in 1824, the delegates supporting him withdrew and "proceeded to nominate and form a ticket to suit *themselves the sovereign people*."[7] In 1830 Clay's Kentucky friends, calling themselves National Republicans, decided to nominate him for president in a state convention called solely for that purpose. They solemnly announced that the proposed convention would speak for all the state's citizens:

> Issuing directly from the people, it will bear and proclaim their genuine sentiments. Essentially popular in its character and composition, it will command respect and secure confidence by its plain straightforward movement, without intrigue, without the corrupt agency of caucus management, without any other motive of origin but the spontaneous impulse of the people themselves.[8]

Opponents' conventions, on the other hand, were notoriously unrepresentative, consisting of office holders, drunks, lawyers or,

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[6] Spencer to Weed, September 21, 1832, in Thurlow Barnes Weed, *Memoir of Thurlow Weed*, Boston, 1884, 44.

[7] Handbill of meeting held on April 5 [1824], in the John W. Taylor Papers, New York Historical Society.

[8] *Kentucky Reporter*, September 22, 1830.

worst of all, Federalists.[9] The Working Men's party of Boston broke with the Republican organization in that city because, it contended, the regular nominating conventions while "assuming to be the organs of public opinion" were notorious for the fact "that the mass of the people were neither consulted nor represented. . . ."[10] But except when making odious comparisons convention participants seldom indulged in theorizing. The revival of the two party system after 1825, spurred by the rivalry between Adams and Jackson, caused the convention to be accepted more and more as the voice of the party only, although the casual nature of party membership meant that a careful distinction was not always observed. The convention was democracy applied to party government.

Homage to popular sovereignty made it necessary to determine the people's choice of candidates, but the consultation did more than implement a theory; it paid off in the mundane task of winning elections. The convention not only united large numbers of voters in support of a candidate but it created an organization capable of waging a successful campaign in his behalf. For this reason it had a special appeal to the new breed of managers generated by the rise of national parties in a period of increasing political participation by the masses. These were men vitally interested in ways of holding amorphous groups together within a single organization which they could wield to hoist themselves into power.

To nominate a candidate for Congress in the Middle Atlantic states, where the convention system was first and most fully developed, necessitated mass meetings in each township for the election of delegates to a county convention. The delegates from the townships met and appointed delegates to a district convention which nominated the candidate. All of the not inconsiderable number of persons who participated in these meetings and conventions, or who identified themselves with the sponsoring party, were expected to abide by the decision of the majority and support the nominee.[11] The observation made by the politician-

[9] *United States Telegraph,* November 1, 1827; February 19, June 25, 1828; *Daily National Journal,* June 24, 1829; October 24, 1831; *Richmond Enquirer,* September 25, 1827.

[10] Circular enclosed in a letter by Sam Whitcomb to John McLean, January 10, 1831, John McLean Papers, Library of Congress.

[11] Ordinarily, conventions were called in the name of a particular party (e.g., Republican). When the Republican title became too inclusive and rifts of a more or less permanent nature occurred they were differentiated as "friendly to the present state administration" or some equivalent phrase. After 1826 there was a tendency for all conventions,

historian Jabez D. Hammond on the binding nature of the caucus applied with equal force to the convention:

> If you suspect [he wrote] that the determination will be so preposterous that you cannot in conscience support it, then you ought on no account to become one of its members. To try your chance in a caucus, and then because your wishes are not gratified, to attempt to defeat the result of the deliberations of your friends, strikes me as a palpable violation of honor and good faith.[12]

The convention's democratic form reduced the chances of intra-party competition for the same office even more than the caucus since, unlike the caucus, every geographic and electoral division of government was directly consulted in the choice of nominees. Unless some clear infraction of the democratic process had transpired in the election of delegates there could be little justification (other than thwarted ambition) for a losing aspirant to declare himself an independent candidate.

Even if the disappointed candidate for the nomination were insensitive to the moral obligation of abiding by the majority's decision, the fact that the convention nominee wore the tag of the "regular" candidate discouraged revolt, because the party's label exerted a powerful influence over the voters. An independent candidate favorable to Jackson stood little chance of winning although he might siphon enough votes from the regular nominee to elect the Adams man. Certainly, the greatest threat to victory at the polls lay in the possibility that the party's vote would be split among several candidates while the opposing forces were solidly behind one man or ticket. By providing a device whereby the full weight of the party could be brought to bear in an election, yet one which allowed for a democratic selection and gave scope to individual ambition, the convention helped perpetuate the two party system.

The convention's efficacy in concentrating the support of a party was not lost on office seekers. One New York politician wrote in 1823:

> I am one of six candidates in this District to fill Mr. Rochesters [sic.] place in Congress, if I succeed in getting the nomination by the District convention (which will shortly take place) I will be elected, but should

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even those nominating county or town officials, to attach themselves to one of the two prominent candidates for the presidency.

[12] Jabez D. Hammond, *The History of Political Parties in the State of New York*, Albany: n. p., n. d., II, 192–193.

I fail in geting [sic.] the nomination, I shall in all probability be a member of our next [state] legislature. . . .[13]

In the West, where the convention developed slowly, the lack of party cohesion was a severe handicap, particularly to the anti-Jackson forces. Henry Clay in 1829 wrote to a congressional candidate in Kentucky that he

should be most happy to learn that any mode had been adopted to concentrate on yourself, or any other friend, the votes of those who concur in their political principles. Can no such mode be fallen upon? Is it not yet practicable to convene persons from all parts of the district?[14]

A Clay newspaper, noting the disastrous results of plural nominations against an undivided enemy, denounced self-nomination as "anti-republican."[15] An easterner in 1832 asked Clay plaintively if

our Western brethren [could] be sufficiently innoculated with the caucus [i.e., convention] virus to enforce a wholesome political action among them at future elections. In New York the most jarring personal feelings are made to yield to the furtherance of a great publick purpose.[16]

Another advantage enjoyed by the convention nominee over his independent rivals was the campaign organization incidental to the system. Every township meeting, held to elect county convention delegates, appointed a committee of correspondence which, in turn, provided for committees of vigilance for the school districts and polling places. Each county, district and state convention also appointed similar committees and on this network, reaching down to the smallest subdivision of government, rested the burden of winning the battle on election day. Whatever their official duties these committees operated as command posts, coordinating operations against the adversary. They distributed campaign literature, printed ballots, won over the undecided voter, conducted friends to the place of election and compiled lists of the voters within their jurisdiction, indicating how each would vote, and forwarded them on to the state committee.[17] No mav-

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[13] George McClure to Henry Clay, July 23, 1823, Henry Clay Papers, Library of Congress.

[14] Clay to Adam Beatty, July 9, 1829, in Calvin Colton (ed.), *Private Correspondence of Henry Clay*, New York, 1855, 238.

[15] *The Kentucky Reporter* as quoted in the *Daily National Intelligencer*, August 9, 1830.

[16] John E. Lawrence to Clay, August 30, 1832, Clay MSS.

[17] See, for instance, *Richmond Enquirer*, October 7, 1828; *The Albany Argus*, July 12, 1831; New York Central Corresponding Committee to Luther Bradish, October 16, 1828, Luther Bradish Papers, New York Historical Society; Circular, in the *Proceedings of the Anti-Masonic Re-*

erick could possibly match this organization produced as a by-product of the convention and placed at the disposal of its nominee.

The propaganda value of the convention was immense. Meetings of county and district conventions were reported not only in the local papers but in friendly sheets throughout the state. A state convention for the nomination of governor and lieutenant governor provided copy for several months. The state central committee issued the call to arms, inviting the counties to send delegates to a state convention. Township meetings then chose delegates to county conventions which appointed delegations to the state convention and, if state senators or congressmen were to be elected, also appointed delegates to a district convention. Invariably, each of these meetings adopted resolutions and sometimes an address expressing the delegates' opinions on local state and national issues, all duly reported in the newspapers. Legislators were instructed how to vote, complimented or censured for past behavior, and the delegates might even recommend persons to the governor or president as fit for appointive office.[18] Finally, after the preliminary conventions had run their course the state convention met. The importance of its task made it an object of great interest and even opposition newspapers took notice, if only to scorn and ridicule.

Almost without exception the proceedings and the address of state conventions were published as pamphlets for dissemination as campaign literature. Ten thousand was an average issue and in Pennsylvania many copies were printed in German while in Louisiana a large portion were ordered in French. Publication of the proceedings and the address, in addition to their duplication in newspaper columns, put them into the hands of voters who might never attend a partisan rally. Although these closely printed documents would not be considered effective propaganda

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publican Convention of the County of Cayuga, Held at Auburn, January 1, 1830, Auburn, N. Y., 1830; Circular of the National Republican State Convention of Vermont, July 16, 1832. The Vermont circular prescribes in great detail the procedure for electing town committees ("at two o'clock P.M., at some convenient place near the centre of the town. . . .") which are to appoint poll committees "to sit near the ballot box and to oppose all illegal voters, and to support our friends when their right to vote is unjustly challenged."

[18] John M. Camp to Peter B. Porter, January 22, 1828, Peter A. Porter Papers, Buffalo Historical Society, N. Y.; David Henshaw, *et al.,* to Levi Woodbury, January 1, 1829, and Resolutions of the Connecticut State Convention of January 8, 1829, in the Levi Woodbury Papers, Library of Congress. As neither Massachusetts nor Connecticut were represented by Senators friendly to the Jackson Administration, the Jacksonians in those states were anxious to have patronage distributed by congenial hands, in this case, Senator Woodbury of New Hampshire.

today, campaign managers in the 1820's eagerly sought them for distribution.[19]

Apart from the benefits of unity, organization and propaganda, the bringing together of like-minded men from scattered communities, many meeting one another for the first time, kindled enthusiasm and fortified party morale. A correspondent of the Rochester *Anti-Masonic Enquirer* exultingly reported his party's state convention:

> It is a *glorious* Convention. Lobbies, galleries, and all, are overflowing. I am proud of Anti-Masonry. What principles beyond all estimation brings honest plain farmers from the extreme bounds of the State, at the dead of winter. The masons and the Regency look pale, at the view, and in the anticipation, with which such a Convention must present to their minds.[20]

A discouraged Adams supporter in New York looked forward to the state convention in hopes that "An exhibition such as might and I trust will be made at the convention will create a new feeling among us—and provide the happiest results in the River Counties."[21] In the meetings of delegates, as Alexis de Tocqueville observed in 1831, "men have the opportunity of seeing one another; means of execution are combined; and opinions are maintained with a warmth and energy that written language can never attain."[22] Every convention was a party rally whose enthusiasm was transmitted to the faithful back home.

The convention's advantages become quite clear when the meeting of the Adams state convention of Virginia in 1828 is examined closely. Called for the purpose of designating presidential electors, it was the first state convention held in the Old Dominion and its influence extended far beyond the Commonwealth's boundaries.

Despite Adams' efforts at reconciling Virginia to his election by appointing its citizens to important positions, a preponderant majority of the old Republican party, under the leadership of the so-called Richmond Junto, showed unmistakable Jackson proclivi-

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[19] Isaac Hill to Levi Woodbury, August 4, 1828, Woodbury MSS; R. K. Lansing to Thurlow Weed, February 27 and March 12, 1829, Thurlow Weed Papers, University of Rochester; Elisha Dorr, John Yates to Luther Bradish, July 5, 1831, Bradish MSS.

[20] February 22, 1831.

[21] A. Bruyn Hasbrouch to J. W. Taylor, March 10, 1828, Taylor MSS.

[22] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, New York, 1959, I, 199.

ties. So hopeless did the President's prospects for carrying Virginia appear that for two and one-half years following his inauguration in 1825 his partisans made no serious effort to organize a state-wide party in his behalf. Somewhat tardily, in the summer of 1827, important administration leaders attempted to give the President at least a fighting chance to carry the state. The critical feature of their plan was a scheme for holding a state convention.[23] The proposal was publicly unveiled in James H. Pleasants' *Richmond Whig* and through its columns popularized among the demoralized friends of the administration who enthusiastically endorsed it as a means of rallying their forces.[24]

Virginians in 1827 bitterly debated the question of revising the state constitution. For years the large, western counties had been complaining about discrimination in favor of the slaveholding eastern counties in the apportionment of legislative seats. A nominating convention would identify the Adams party with the cause of constitutional reform by emphasizing the reliance of the Junto on a legislative caucus to nominate Jackson electors. Like the legislature, the caucus, the Junto's traditional method for nominating its candidates, was controlled by the planter class. A convention would proclaim the democracy of the Adams party while capitalizing on the general unpopularity of caucus nominations, particularly keen in the underrepresented counties.[25] "The plan of a Convention of Anti-Jackson delegates at Richmond," wrote an Adams supporter, would be "a strong political weapon, which the opposite party will dread exceedingly. It will give confidence at home and abroad, and neutralize the influence of the small counties in the Legislature."[26] Once the convention was proposed newspapers friendly to Adams began denouncing the caucus as "an absolute despotism," "an unclean thing" and "a self-constituted body . . . undertaking to dictate the choice of a

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[23] Hugh Mercer to Henry Clay, August 18, 1827, Clay MSS.

[24] *Richmond Constitutional Whig,* August 29, September 1, September 15, September 19, 1827.

[25] Clay to Francis Brooke, September 24, 1827, Colton, *Private Correspondence,* 179.

[26] Joseph C. Cabell to Francis Brooke, October 8, 1827, Clay MSS. See, also, George Webb to J. W. Taylor, November 6, 1827, Taylor MSS. Technically, the convention encompassed all those opposed to Jackson rather than just the partisans of Adams. While this may have reflected Adam's unpopularity in Virginia it was also intended to entice supporters of De Witt Clinton, popular in western Virginia, into joining the anti-Jackson ranks; *Richmond Constitutional Whig,* November 21, and December 1, 1827.

President. . . ."[27] Through a convention the people of Virginia "for the first time" would be "given an opportunity to form their *own* Ticket, and thus practically to vote for the President of their choice. . . ."[28]

With Clay's blessing a public meeting in September at Fredericksburg, presided over by the Secretary of State's good friend, Francis T. Brooke, officially invited those opposed to Jackson to participate in a convention at Richmond in early January, 1828. The invitation stressed the contrast between a convention, emanating from the people, and the caucus, imposing its will upon the voters.[29] Dozens of counties subsequently appointed delegates at special public meetings which also passed resolutions praising the administration (condemning Jackson and the caucus), and appointed committees of correspondence.[30] For the first time Adams had a local organization in Virginia, created by the necessity of choosing delegates to a central convention "which like the throbbing of the heart" communicated "its pulsations to the distant extremities."[31]

Foe, as well as friend, felt the effects of the scheduled meeting. Congressman William C. Rives tried to minimize its impact by reassurng a New York colleague, Guilian C. Verplanck, that the Adamsites "may, no doubt, have a convention, (as indeed what party is so poor as not to have it's [sic.] convention, in these times), but Virginia will be Virginia no more, if she can ever be propitiated towards Adams & Clay. Fear not, then, for us."[32] The *Richmond Enquirer,* joined by a chorus of other Jackson papers, attacked the convention by pointing out the small percentage of voters who attended the county meetings.[33] Simultaneously, it defended caucus nominations as far more representative of the people's thinking since the Adams convention acted on

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[27] *Ibid.*, September 1, and October 6, 1827.

[28] From the [Lynchburg] *Virginia Herald* as quoted in the *Daily National Intelligencer,* September 26, 1827. In 1824 electors pledged to Jackson and Adams were nominated by self-styled state conventions, but they were actually nothing more than public meetings attended by persons from several counties.

[29] Clay to Brooke, September 24, 1827, Colton, *Private Correspondence,* 179; *Richmond Constitutional Whig,* October 6, 1827.

[30] *Richmond Constitutional Whig,* October-November, 1827.

[31] *Ibid.*, September 19, 1827.

[32] Rives to Verplanck, October 19, 1827, Guilian C. Verplanck Papers, New York Historical Society.

[33] *Richmond Enquirer,* September 25, October 16, October 19, October 27, 1827; *United States Telegraph,* November 1, November 3, November 27, 1827.

dictation from Washington while the legislators mirrored the opinion of their constituents.[34]

Nevertheless, it became clear that the Adams maneuver was operating effectively on the public mind. Several Jacksonian meetings, "aware that strong objections exist on the part of many persons" to caucus nominations, specifically authorized their legislators to nominate electors.[35] One meeting even suggested the caucus be abandoned entirely in deference to popular prejudice.[36] When the caucus met in December it delayed nominating electors so that special delegates could be chosen in those counties whose legislators were not members of the Jackson party. This call for a mixed caucus, a transitional step from the pure legislative caucus to the delegated convention, was the Junto's first cognizance of the inequities of caucus nominations. By allowing the counties represented in the legislature by Adams men to elect delegates the Jackson managers invested the caucus with the appearance of greater democracy, a reaction to the appeal of the Adams convention. In setting a date for a subsequent meeting the December caucus nervously avoided convening on the same day as their adversaries "lest it might by possibility be misinterpreted into the slightest alarm about the result of the Adams Convention." Instead, it would meet a week later, on January 14, "so that the antidote should be administered so soon after the poison as possible. . . . By assembling on the 14th, we shall meet at once this Mammouth convention, which is now agglomerating itself and threatening like an Avelanche, to fall upon our heads."[37]

Beginning on January 8, the anti-Jackson delegates met for four days in the state capitol building. The *Enquirer* admitted that the list of delegates "embraced some of the ablest men in Virginia. . . ."[38] An electoral ticket headed by James Madison and James Monroe was nominated which the *Whig* understandably called "the most powerful ever formed by any state of this union."[39] A state central committee was appointed. The conven-

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[34] *Richmond Enquirer*, September 5, October 5, October 12, October 19, October 25, 1827.

[35] *Ibid.*, October 30, 1827; also issues in November and December.

[36] *Ibid.*, November 23, 1827.

[37] *Ibid.*, December 13, 1827.

[38] *Ibid.*, January 17, 1828.

[39] *Richmond Constitutional Whig*, January 12, 1828. Neither of the former presidents gave prior consent to their nomination and both eventually withdrew their names from the contest. The purpose of nominating

tion address, written by Chapman Johnson, received lavish praise and 30,000 copies were ordered printed; each member of a county committee was allotted a portion.[40] Other copies of the address were apparently printed outside Virginia and found effective use throughout the nation.[41] Congressman Henry Storrs of New York thought the convention had a decidedly good effect on the whole Adams campaign.[42] The Jackson press, including the *Albany Argus,* conspired to ridicule the convention address, but William L. Marcy wrote with some concern to Azariah C. Flagg (both members of the Jackson-oriented Albany Regency) that Silas Wright's district was flooded with it.[43] From faraway Missouri came news that "the ingenious, and persuasive ability of the address, of the Virginia administration convention, has done some good here."[44]

The fact that Virginia, reputed to be overwhelmingly opposed to the nationalist administration, could muster such a formidable convention heartened the Adams party everywhere. Within Virginia it briefly revived the spirits of the flagging cause. Unquestionably, the convention gave Adams what he previously lacked in the Old Dominion—an organization capable of waging a campaign, one extending into almost every county, but responding to central direction. It also united the party behind a single slate of electors. The convention's effect was hardly less important for members of the Junto, since it compelled them to abandon the pure legislative caucus for the mixed variety and thus move one step closer to the adoption of the convention.

The caucus was best suited for nominating candidates to state offices although occasionally used for local ones. The conven-

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them was to create the impression they favored Adams whether or not they ran. James Barbour to Francis Brooke and Hugh Mercer, January 2, 1828, Clay MSS; *Richmond Constitutional Whig,* January 19, March 1, 1828; *Daily National Intelligencer,* March 13, 1828.

[40] *Richmond Constitutional Whig,* January 16, January 23, February 2, February 16, March 8, March 12, 1828; *Proceedings of the Anti-Jackson Convention; Held at the Capitol, in the City of Richmond: With Their Address to the People of Virginia,* Richmond, 1828.

[41] *The Virginia Address,* n.p., n.d.

[42] Entry of January 12, 1828, in the Journal of Henry R. Storrs, Buffalo Historical Society.

[43] *Albany Argus,* January 23, 1828; *United States Telegraph,* February 1, 1828; *Richmond Enquirer,* January 28, February 7, February 14, February 16, February 21, February 26, March 7, March 16, April 1, 1828; Marcy to Flagg, February 18, 1828, Azariah C. Flagg Papers, New York Public Library.

[44] William Russell to J. W. Taylor, February 21, 1828, Taylor MSS.

tion, however, was easily adaptable to the smallest unit of government, provided there were subordinate divisions which could elect delegates. State conventions were usually composed of representatives from the counties, but congressional districts were sometimes used.[45] District conventions, for the nomination of congressmen or state senators, also relied upon the counties. Township public meetings elected delegates to county conventions in the Northern and Northwestern states while election districts (within each county) in Maryland and the hundreds in Delaware served the purpose in those two states. The South had no such convenient county subdivision, accounting at least in part for that section's slowness in developing a full-fledged convention system, and a countywide public meeting substituted for a county convention in selecting the delegates to infrequent state conventions.

Where the system was well established procedural rules governing the entire convention process were developed to regulate personal and factional struggles for control of the organization thereby assuring the competitors of fair play. The most important consideration was the size of the delegations from each subordinate unit. A recognized standard of apportionment prevented the partisans of one candidate from packing the convention and negated the advantage a few towns or counties derived from their proximity to the meeting site. For state conventions the apportionment prescribed for representation in the lower house of the legislature was the general rule; for the county conventions each township ordinarily elected an equal number of delegates. However, these provisions were not always rigidly enforced and this lack of form reflected the convention's role as a party rally when observance of quotas seemed less important than a full house. Each party bragged about its "numerously attended" conventions, deriding the sparse numbers their opponents mustered, and turned nomination meetings into a numbers game. "I think if we can get a meeting to nominate our County Ticket of 400 or 500 Persons," one New York politician wrote, "it will have a good effect upon the election. It will do more to stimulate our Friends to activity than anything else. . . ."[46] The advantages of sheer bulk over adherence to a quota were succinctly stated in a letter to Congressman Taylor in 1828:

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[45] In Connecticut and Rhode Island the town rather than the county was the important unit of local government and hence was represented in state conventions.

[46] John Stewart to J. W. Taylor, September 28, 1832, Taylor MSS.

On reflection I think we have erred in confining the number of Delegates to our county convention to 3 from a town—1st Because we should endeavor to make our convention as numerous & respectable as possible 2nd Because we cannot by thus restricting the number gratify all who might be ambitious of acting in the convention. However numerous the meeting, order & a judicious selection of candidates may be secured by appointing a subcommittee—Would it not be well therefore to leave the towns free to choose as many on their Delegations as they please & for the central committee to request the attendance of as many (whether Delegates or not) as may find it convenient to be present.[47]

Authority to call a convention could be vested in a number of agents. The most common was the central committee appointed by the last convention and explicitly authorized to call its successor.[48] Sometimes a convention set the date for a future meeting and legislative caucuses might summon the state convention, but any instrumentality could serve—public meetings, newspapers, self-appointed individuals or anonymous circulars. Taverns and churches housed most county conventions although a private home might suffice. State conventions frequently convened in the state capitol and sat in a legislative chamber, but if called for a town other than the capitol a court house, town hall, church, or privately owned hall fulfilled the need. County or district conventions normally required one day to dispatch their business while state conventions, often involving considerable travel for the delegates, usually lasted longer and as many as five days might expire, but two or three days was general.

No matter what the type of convention, the organization and agenda were essentially the same; yet no two were exactly alike, for the parts of the convention mechanism were interchangeable. Its basic form was that of a public meeting: a group of citizens assembled to express their opinions on public questions by adopting

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[47] R. M. Livingston to J. W. Taylor, September 12, 1828, Taylor MSS.

[48] A typical announcement placed in the local party newspaper by a New York county central committee read:

NOTICE

The *Republican Electors* of the several towns in the county of Monroe, friendly to the national and state administrations, are requested to meet at the places where the last town meetings were respectively held on Thursday, the 28th day of September at 3 o'clock in the afternoon to appoint four delegates to attend a convention of the said county on Saturday, the 30th day of September inst. at one o'clock P.M. at Leonard's Tavern in Rochester, to elect delegates to the Senatorial and Congressional conventions and to transact such other business as shall be thought proper. September 15th, 1826. *The Rochester Telegraph,* September 19, 1826.

resolutions. To this simple formula the convention added refinements in keeping with its representative character.

A temporary chairman, usually a member of the central committee, opened the convention. Permanent officers, at least a president and secretary and frequently plural vice presidents and secretaries (up to four of each), were elected followed by an invocation, after which the delegates submitted their certificates of election to a credentials committee for approval. Honorary members, including distinguished guests or visitors from other states, next gained admission. Occasionally, spectators were absorbed as delegates, although this privilege might be restricted to persons from places not represented by regularly elected delegates. A delegate would then move that a committee to draft resolutions and an address "expressive of the sentiments of this convention" be appointed. Following a recess the resolutions committee reported the nomination of candidates more than likely included among the resolutions. Possibly, the nominees were selected by a separate committee composed of one or more delegates from each unit represented. Naming a candidate by having the delegates ballot occurred only rarely. Sometimes the business and agenda were prescribed by a special committee appointed after the election of permanent officers. The work of the convention might be divided among half a dozen or more special committees on finance, local organization, publication of the proceedings, candidate notification and the like. Convention sessions were consumed in debating committee reports sandwiched between endless orations.

That important decisions, including the selection of the nominee, were made by committees rather than by all the delegates perhaps indicates the convention was not truly democratic in its operation. The large number of delegates made a deliberative assembly virtually impossible and any attempt to make it into one would have invited chaos and encouraged personal and geographic rivalries. Party leaders dreaded an eruption into violence and newspaper accounts of convention proceedings emphasized their "respectable" character. The delegates were only asked to approve a choice made by the inner circle of party leaders. This power elite, if they held any official position in the party at all, were members of the corresponding committee. Thurlow Weed, a member of the Antimasonic state central committee of New York, alleged that

during the five or six years following the organization of a party opposed to Freemasonry, what was known as the Morgan Committee . . . enjoyed its full and uninterrupted confidence. Candidates for all important offices were indicated by our committee, neither of whom would accept office themselves.[49]

The process of candidate selection could be, as Weed recalled, disarmingly simple. When the man he selected as the nominee of an Antimasonic congressional convention declined the honor a substitute was required on short notice:

The difficulty of this task was not diminished by the circumstance that I was compelled to leave Buffalo in the stage at nine o'clock the next morning to attend a senatorial convention in Batavia. Rising at daylight, and on my way to another hotel to find the Chautauqua and Niagara delegates, I encountered Ebenezer F. Norton in the street, and inquired whether he would accept an Anti-Masonic nomination for Congress. His reply was, "I cannot afford to decline any nomination for Congress. . . ." I found Colonel Flemming and Mr. Boughton, of Niagara, and Messers. Mixer and Plumb of Chautauqua, and hastily arranged with them the nomination of Mr. Norton. . . .[50]

The power of decision was not always formalized in a committee; anyone possessing the confidence of the party might exercise it. In New York and Virginia where the Regency and Junto, the most notorious examples of centralized management, held sway control was not restricted to the central committee.[51] The Albany Regency took a keen interest in local nominations, its members making trips over the state to effect the arrangements.[52] Azariah C. Flagg earned the sobriquet of "the Traveling Regency" for his efforts.[53] When the Regency decided to support Jackson for the presidency in 1828 it was able surreptitiously to arrange for the nomination of Jackson men to the legislature, much to the alarm

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[49] Harriet A. Weed (ed.), *Autobiography of Thurlow Weed*, Boston, 1883, 336. Letters written to Weed make it clear that this was no empty boast. Before a convention to nominate a candidate for lieutenant governor the Albany editor was informed that "we shall look to you entirely to settle that matter before 11 August." James R. Livingston to Weed, July 12, 1830, Weed MSS.

[50] Weed, *Autobiography*, 338–339.

[51] Harry Ammon, "The Richmond Junto, 1800–1824," *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, LXI (October, 1953), 395–418; Robert V. Remini, "The Albany Regency," *New York History*, XXXIX (October, 1958), 341–355.

[52] Silas Wright, Jr. to A. C. Flagg, August 1, 1830; John A. Dix to Flagg, July 21, 1831; J. B. Skinner to Flagg, July 31, 1830, Flagg MSS.

[53] It was bestowed by John C. Spencer. Edwin Croswell to A. C. Flagg, June 27, 1830, Flagg MSS.

of the Adams men within the Regency-dominated party.[54] But this type of influence was not unique and its presence may be assumed even though the evidence for it seems slight.[55] Elections were too important to leave to chance. "I have neither the time nor inclination at present," penned a disgusted observer, "to give you a detail of all the paltry intrigues & machinations, which were resorted to, to effect the nomination of some Gentlemen."[56]

The belief that politicians are bent on personal gain at the public's expense persisted throughout the history of the early republic. Whether or not the convention system masked an undemocratic contrivance to carry office-seekers with greater ease to the public trough cannot be answered categorically. Some viewed the convention as a retreat rather than an advance toward greater democracy. A holder of this position unburdened himself to Congressman Taylor:

> I most heartily congratulate you on your triumph over the caucus [i.e., convention] candidate (Mr. Palmer). Not that I have anything personal against Mr. P. but I think it all important that *this taking out of the hands of the people* the choice of their rulers should have an end. At last fall's election in the State of Ohio several of the Congressional districts had 6 candidates some 5 and some 4, but few that had only 2. The choices were completely the people's without any forestalling or attempt at it. Many important reforms that we need can never take place until choices of our legislators shall come direct from the people.[57]

An affirmative answer assumes that talk of programs and principles are humbug to win over guileless voters. The organization provided by the convention could be, and often was, used for narrow and selfish ends, but the system at least allowed for popular participation in the choice of candidates. The convention was effective only if it reflected public opinion, only if its nominee won elections. If "order & a judicious selection of candidates" were usually achieved by a few professionals, the delegates

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[54] John Sergeant to Henry Clay, October 24, 1827; George McClure to Clay, October 22, 1827; Peter B. Porter to Clay, October 26; November 6, 1827, Clay MSS.

[55] Lemuel C. Paine to J. W. Taylor, October 12, 1828, Taylor MSS; Henry Bradley to W. H. Seward, August 11, 1831, William Henry Seward Papers, University of Rochester Library; Martin Van Buren to ———— (draft), August 31, 1822; Mordecai M. Noah to Van Buren, December 19, 1819, Martin Van Buren Papers, Library of Congress; Klein, *Pennsylvania Politics, 1817–1832*, 216.

[56] James Campbell to G. C. Verplanck, October 18, 1822, Verplanck MSS.

[57] J. Geddes to J. W. Taylor, February 22, 1823, Taylor MSS.

could, and occasionally did, reject the designated nominee.[58] It cannot be assumed that the delegates or the rank and file disagreed with their leaders simply because the vast majority of conventions accepted decisions handed down from above. The price of party victory, desired by leader and led, was discipline.

It is not clear though that the convention was more democratic than the legislative caucus, public meeting, or self-announcement which it replaced, as none of them operated in an opinion vacuum. Congressmen and state legislators were elected directly by the people and were answerable to them if their nomination proved unpopular. Furthermore, caucus members were guided in making their nominations by all the devices for measuring public opinion available to convention delegates—letters, newspapers and public meetings.[59] Conventions could be manipulated no less than caucuses. Legislators were presumed corruptible because they stood to gain patronage and influence if their candidate succeeded, but was this less true of convention delegates? Admittedly, most of them could not expect great rewards if only because they were so numerous, yet this did not necessarily prevent them from being bought. Only the price may have been cheaper. The greatest test for all nominating methods came on election day when the voters registered their approval or disapproval of the candidates preselected for their suffrage.

The triumph of the convention was achieved without a protracted struggle between its advocates and those of other techniques. Self-announcement continued as an acceptable way of running for office, albeit unsuccessfully, and the public meeting, incorporated into the convention system, lost none of its significance. Even the conflict between the convention and the caucus has been overdrawn. Whether anti-caucus rhetoric ever won many votes for convention nominated candidates is doubtful. In no election does the legislative or congressional caucus appear to have been the deciding issue.[60] The caucus did not disappear after it ceased making

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[58] For instance, a candidate for lieutenant governor of Kentucky handed down by a committee in the Jackson state convention of 1828 met stiff resistance from the floor and withdrew his name; Leonard R. Curry, "Election Year—Kentucky, 1828," *Register of the Kentucky Historical Society*, LVI (July, 1959), 200; *Niles' Weekly Register*, XXXIII (January 26, 1828), 357.

[59] Charles S. Sydnor, "The One-Party Period in American History," *American Historical Review*, LI (April, 1946), 439–451.

[60] The one possible exception is the New York gubernatorial and legislative elections in 1824 in which the Regency, supporting caucus-

nominations, and it remained an important institution for formulating party policy. Ironically, the first National Republican and Democratic national conventions were both called by legislative caucuses.[61] The convention owed its ascendancy to its superior ability to meet the theoretical and practical requirements of democratic politics: candidates nominated by conventions, wrapped in the mantle of popular sovereignty and backed by an organization no independent could equal, were likely to be elected.

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nominated candidates for president and governor, lost the governorship and control of the Assembly. Yet other factors were perhaps of greater importance than the caucus issue: the refusal of the Regency to allow the popular election of presidential electors, Crawford's lack of personal popularity and De Witt Clinton's removal from the canal board; C. H. Rammelkamp, "The Campaign of 1824 in New York," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the year 1904*, Washington, 1905, 175–201; Hammond, II, 157–166, 169–174; Dixon Ryan Fox, *The Decline of Aristocracy in the Politics of New York*, New York, 1919, 91–98; *The Albany Argus*, April 6, April 9, 1824; *Albany Daily Advertiser*, July 31, August 16, August 24, 1824.

[61] *Niles' Weekly Register*, XI (March 12, 1831), 28–29; *New Hampshire Patriot and State Gazette*, July 11, 1831.

Recent Opinion on the Decline of the Progressive Movement

Many historians have commented on the reasons for the decline of the Progressive movement, but as yet no full scale study has emerged. A preliminary step in that direction is a survey of current historical opinion on the subject. What factors have been emphasized, what measure of agreement has been achieved, what remains to be done? These are some of the questions with which this article is concerned.

The scope of this survey is limited in several ways. Though attention is focused on the opinion of historians, this is not an excercise in historiography. The writer is interested in the decline of the Progressive movement, not in how historical opinion on the subject has developed or why interpretations have changed as they have. Thus, attention is directed with but few exceptions to the views of our contemporaries, on the assumption that in most instances earlier works have contributed to the making of more recent accounts. Also, this is a preliminary survey of conclusions about the decline of the movement, not an original exploration in depth of any of the alleged factors. A great body of literature that would take us deep into the subject is therefore reluctantly but deliberately ignored.

Since the literature directed specifically and exclusively to the decline of the Progressive movement is severely limited in quantity, most of the relevant conclusions and arguments appear as parts of studies centered on other topics. In many instances, I must impute to historians views which in fact are only implied, or, are but a part of a more complete set of opinions. Seeming contrasts in view, then, often are due merely to the perspective of the viewer or to differences in subject matter or approach. The makings of a good dispute may be present, but few of the heavier intellectual blows have yet been struck. Indeed, it may even prove possible to effect a synthesis of the views of many historians without doing violence to the positions on particular aspects of the subject taken by any of them.

Few historians would deny the adverse effect of external events like World War One or the Bolshevik Revolution on the Progressive movement. The variation in emphasis on such factors is con-

siderable, however. While some comments seem to ascribe to the war full blame, greater stress has been placed on the erosion of the movement from internal causes. From this perspective, the war was at most only an accelerating agent in the process of dying, but the death of progressivism was nevertheless natural, not inflicted from outside. An extreme form of this view has progressivism dead before the war began.

Emphasis on internal factors occurs in many ways, one of which is the cyclical theory. Thus, George Mowry, noting that the progressive spirit was flagging before the war, explains that "The political pendulum with its almost rhythmic movement in American history was already swinging to the right."[1] Charles Forcey also endorses the cyclical view.[2]

The fullest statement of the cyclical approach to the decline of the Progressive movement remains that of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., who in 1922 outlined the general theory as well as its specific application.[3] "Every movement of radical tendency has developed through certain clearly defined stages, as if in obedience to some immutable law of social dynamics," Schlesinger wrote. "Epochs of radicalism and conservatism have followed each other in alternating order." Reform movements have three stages.

> The third and final stage of the reform is reached when the new doctrines, having lost their air of strangeness and demonstrated either their utility or harmlessness, become imbedded in the conscience and philosophy of the people at large.... The cycle of reform has about completed itself; for public opinion hardens into a new conservatism and forms a crust that toughly resists any further efforts for change....

Applying the general view to the Progressive movement, Schlesinger wrote:

> When the United States entered the World War in 1917 the signs of the times indicated that the generation had about run its course. Its program of domestic refom had been enacted; Roosevelt passed away in 1919, Wilson, La Follette and other vigorous reformers of an earlier day were beginning to show signs of physical decline....[4]

Various opinions stressing specific internal factors involved in the pre-war decline of the movement seem entirely compatible with

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[1] George E. Mowry, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement*, Madison, 1946, 378.

[2] Charles Forcey, *The Crossroads of Liberalism*, New York, 1961, xv, xvi.

[3] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., *New Viewpoints in American History*, New York, 1922.

[4] *Ibid.*, 110, 123, 112, 121.

the cyclical view. One major body of historical opinion of this sort probes the decline of the movement with reference to the progressives' own thought.

A number of historians stress the limitations implicit in the Wilsonian ideology. John Blum writes of Wilson that after the Clayton Anti-trust Act had been passed, "so far as domestic legislation is concerned, he had exhausted the stock of ideas he had brought to his office."[5] And Wilson, Blum feels, reflected the mainstream of progressive thought. The progressives had accomplished their purpose, "the purpose of their generation," before the entry of the United States into the war.[6] Arthur Mann expresses much the same idea: "... A humanitarian generation ran out of ideas by the second Wilson administration."[7] Richard Hofstadter notes that progressives had little appeal for immigrants and concludes that this "reduced the social range and the radical drive of his program and kept him genteel, proper, and safe." In the same vein, Hofstadter points out, as have other historians, that progressivism took place in a context of prosperity. The movement sprang from "mass sentiments of responsibility, indignation, and guilt." But in such an economic climate, "Hardly anyone intended that these sentiments should result in action drastic enough to transform American society."[8] Discussing the California progressives, Mowry writes: "Like many of their fellow ideologues elsewhere, California progressives had no more issues by 1914 and could not bring themselves to take that long, and to them radical, jump onto the new ground of socioeconomic legislation and direct cooperation with labor."[9]

If the Jeffersonian promise of the New Freedom had been fulfilled by 1916, the same cannot be said for the New Nationalism of Theodore Roosevelt and Herbert Croly. Yet some historians have focused attention on the ideology most fully expressed by progressives of this persuasion in explaining the decline of the Progressive movement. William Leuchtenburg, writing about the Insurgent Republicans and the Bull Moosers, points to

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[5] John M. Blum, *Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality*, Boston, 1956, 79.

[6] John M. Blum, *Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era*, Boston, 1951, 257. For a similar view, see Walter I. Trattner, "Progressivism and World War I: A Re-appraisal," MID-AMERICA, 44 (July, 1962), 131–145, 134.

[7] Arthur Mann, "The Progressive Tradition," in John Higham, ed., *The Reconstruction of American History*, New York, 1962, 162,

[8] Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform*, New York, 1956, 184, 195.

[9] George E. Mowry, *The California Progressives*, Berkeley, 1951, 297.

nationalism as the Achilles heel. Using Senator Beveridge as an example of the imperialistic-minded progressive, Leuchtenburg writes that "Beveridge's imperialism ultimately proved his undoing as a Progressive."[10] Despite the fact that Wilson pushed through reforms dear to him, differences on Mexican policy and the Panama Canal tolls questions caused Beveridge, by 1914, to be "bitterly opposed to him." Nationalistic feelings so eroded Beveridge's progressivism, Leuchtenburg argues, that "By 1920 he was crying against 'Organized labor's assault on American institutions,' interspersing speeches against the League of Nations with demands for the repeal of the excess profits tax. Inflation was caused by the drawing of money to Europe through foreign propaganda and the unreasonable demands of labor unions for higher wages. Once more Beveridge's views on domestic and foreign policy had merged, and this new outlook persisted until his death."[11]

The story of Beveridge is, in an exaggerated form, the story of the Progressive Party, Leuchtenburg maintains. Embarrassed by Wilson's record on domestic affairs, progressives had to choose between joining him, presenting more radical domestic alternatives, or fighting him on foreign policy grounds. Largely nationalistic and imperialistic since 1898, it was not difficult for them to choose the last of these. "For the first time in the history of the Progressive movement foreign affairs determined the line of direction, and by 1916 the Progressives were completely absorbed with foreign policy issues and their movement was moribund."[12] Significantly, as of 1915 "Not only had foreign policy become a key issue, but it had been linked by now with the need for high tariff walls, a prophecy of the economic policy of Warren G. Harding and Herbert Hoover." The fault, Leuchtenburg finds, is hardly accidental, but characterized much of western thought.

> In the final analysis the Progressive movement suffered from a contradiction between humanistic values and nationalistic aspirations, which, if not inherent, had certainly beset other democracies from the time of the wars of the French Revolution. In arguing for a positive national government, the followers of Croly ultimately lost sight of the distinction between the state as an instrument and the state as an end. The consequences were not only the endorsement of an imperalistic foreign policy but the death of the Progressive Party in the interest of their national zeal.[12]

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[10] William Leuchtenburg, "Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898–1916," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXXIX (December, 1952), 484.

[11] *Ibid.*, 485.

[12] *Ibid.*, 492, 494, 503.

Leuchtenburg's view is another that tends to see at least a substantial part of progressivism's decline rooted in its own pre-war days. It is, however, a highly controversial argument. Mowry describes Theodore Roosevelt drifting away from his Progressive Party associates in 1915 and 1916 partly because he found so many of the progressives insufficiently belligerent. By contrast, Roosevelt found himself again allied with his erstwhile conservative enemies on the common ground of nationalism. Walter Trattner argues that progressivism had virtually achieved consensus status by 1912 and that the progressives were therefore as divided on foreign policy as were the American people generally. Howard Allen, moreover, finds no pattern in the voting of progressive Republican Senators between 1913 and 1917 to confirm Leuchtenburg's thesis.[13]

A different aspect of the thinking especially evident among some of the New Nationalist intellectuals has received much more attention from historians explaining the decline of the Progressive movement. I refer to the outlook called relativism. While the evil effects attributed by some historians to relativism occurred during the war, the roots of the new way of thought are viewed as developing prior to American involvement. Moreover, relativism, the by-product of Darwinism and pragmatism as many historians view it, is seen as a major causal factor in progressivism's acceptance of the war and all that war entailed. From this perspective, the war was not an external factor that came and destroyed progressivism. Rather, pre-war progressivism moved at least half-way to meet the war. Progressivism made its own fate. In this indictment of relativism, scholars like Morton White, Daniel Aaron, Eric Goldman and Charles Forcey seem now to accept the views of the anti-war progressives Randolph Bourne and Harold Stearns.[14] As Aaron views it, the philosophy of adaptation or adjustment leads to preoccupation with techniques to the exclusion of ends, and doesn't even achieve the adjustment desired.[15] The view is familiar and needs no elaboration.

David Noble, while agreeing that relativism had a corrosive effect on progressivism, causing for Carl Becker a "numbing,

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[13] Mowry, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement*, 321; Trattner, *loc. cit.*, 144; Howard W. Allen, "Republican Reformers and Foreign Policy, 1913–1917," MID-AMERICA, 44 (October, 1962, 222–229.

[14] Morton G. White, *Social Thought in America*, New York, 1949; Daniel Aaron, *Men of Good Hope*, New York, 1951; Eric Goldman, *Rendezvous With Destiny*, New York, 1956; Charles Forcey, *Crossroads of Liberalism;* White has subsequently modified his opinions considerably; see the preface and epilogue to the 1961 edition.

[15] Aaron, *Men of Good Hope*, 285–286.

debilitating stage of self-doubt," offers a different explanation for the rise of relativism, also based on pre-war thought. The new relativism sprang not from the gradual impact of evolutionary theory, but from the loss of faith in progress. Noble writes:[16]

> Men, suggested Becker, will always . . . live in unreal worlds which have no solid foundation in truth when they do not follow the scientific method to its logical extreme. In retrospect, this was the error of Becker and his progressive contemporaries before 1914. More sophisticated than the Enlightenment thinkers, they had openly confessed that science could not create positive values. But no more sophisticated than the philosophes, they followed the same Goddess of Progress and believed that men could find universally verifiable standards for progress in a past that he created himself. Suddenly it had become obvious to Becker that when man knows only specific nonvaluational facts through science and creates his own subjective definition of progress through his personal creation of a history that does have values, there is no real progress.

Noble goes on to ask:

> Is this, then, the true history of the dramatic breakdown of liberal morale after 1914? The liberal generation did not lose all of the past through abstract education in the implications of Darwinian evolution, but rather it lost a past, a past of inevitable progress imposed on history by a blind faith in progress—so that it can be argued that relativism came not by the route of philosophy, but the end of a belief which had previously ordered the world.[17]

Perhaps the most thorough study of progressive thought in transition is Henry May's *The End of American Innocence.*[18] May details not only the roots and development of new outlooks, but the nature of the older view, seemingly dominant as of 1912, and the interaction between new and old. Thus May writes:

> Suppose . . . that people were to ask whether corruption really mattered, or whether good government made men happier, or whether a future of ordered peace and prosperity really satisfied human needs. If such questions were to be asked seriously and often, the whole progressive movement might collapse.

"Though most Americans did not know it, such questions had actually been raised."[19] The three great bastions of the older progressive thought were Moralism, Progress and Culture. By 1917, attacked from within the ramparts of progressivism and from

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[16] David Noble, *The Paradox of Progressive Thought,* Minneapolis, 1958, 28–29.
[17] *Ibid.,* 33.
[18] Henry May, *The End of American Innocence,* New York, 1959.
[19] *Ibid.,* 28.

without, the old views had been, if not destroyed, a least rendered aggressively defensive. Relativism, generated by William James and John Dewey, among others, led the way, the more effectively for being part of the Progressive movement at the outset and therefore heard. But many other bodies of thought together with certain social developments enter into the argument as well, ranging from the rise of W. C. Handy's jazz through the preaching of Billy Sunday to the poetry of Baudelaire.

Those who discuss the rise of relativism and of a new body of thought generally find that if the war didn't begin the decline of progressivism, it certainly accelerated it. In May's view, the war brought the intellectual and social conflict of the pre-war years to a climax. The old thought, the Wilsonian ideology, after a last gasp counter-attack, was toppled, but the newer varieties of progressive thought, as expressed in the pre-war Liberation, likewise lost force. The conflict is best described in May's own words:

> Most of the custodians of culture, beset already by intellectual attack and worried by signs of sexual, racial and other kinds of insurrection, linked the Allied Cause with the defense of all they valued, and thereby added the last element needed to produce a really big explosion.[20]

To most historians, it has seemed a paradox that during a war for freedom and democracy, civil liberties should have been the victim of what Goldman calls a "contagion of suppression." May would explain the seeming paradox in terms of pre-existing tensions. The war was for the defenders of Moralism, Progress and Culture an opportunity to strike at the enemies of the dominant civilization, the radicals, foreigners, believers in new ideas; it was a last chance to restore idealism, true religion and morality, and promote a new and nobler national literature.[21]

Many of those in the middle between the old culture and the new, progressives of a new view, such as Croly, Lippmann, Dewey, Beard and La Guardia, embraced the idealism and nationalism of the wartime Wilson. For these, the effect of war was not so much suppression as disillusionment.

Hofstadter presents a view that dovetails with May's: "Participation in the war put an end to the Progressive movement. . . . And yet the wartime frenzy of idealism and self-sacrifice marked the apotheosis as well as the liquidation of the Progressive spirit."[22]

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[20] *Ibid.*, 254.
[21] *Ibid.*, 388.
[22] Hofstadter, *Age of Reform*, 273.

Post-war reaction was inevitable in any case, he argues, but "by linking the foreign crusade as intimately as possible to the Progressive values and the Progressive language, he [Wilson] was unintentionally insuring that the reaction against Progressivism and moral idealism would be as intense as it could be."[23] Yet that linking was no accident, in May's view, but a result of the tensions and conflicts within progressive thought.

Eric Goldman finds in progressive thought an explanation for the disillusionment that greeted the Versailles Treaty. The Treaty, he argues, was especially disillusioning to progressives because it sprang from premises which they themselves had endorsed. The Wilsonian phrases, self-determination, democracy and international law and order were applications on the international level of a laissez faire liberalism characteristic of Schurz and Tilden but long since repudiated by progressives. "Could it be," Goldman asks rhetorically, "that progressives had proclaimed an essentially conservative peace program and then were indignant when they got an essentially conservative peace?"[24] The sub-conscious knowledge of their own complicity, due in part to the pragmatic frame of mind, sent progressives in search of a scapegoat. Lord Keynes' book *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* came along at the opportune time to meet the need of an intelligensia already "desperately anxious to deny Wilson."[25]

Our focus of attention on intellectual factors allegedly involved in the decline of the Progressive movement has carried us not only into the war period but beyond it. A considerable measure of reconciliation can be effected, however, between the arguments stressing the pre-war decline of the movement and those that take the story into the wartime and postwar years. Leaving aside the cyclical theory, the argument for the pre-war decline of the movement is essentially that progressivism in its Wilsonian mainstream involved a rather limited set of goals and once they were achieved in the first Wilson administration, there was no more reason for existence. Hofstadter, who seems to put forth this view, is not repudiating it entirely but only amending it somewhat when he argues that the Wilsonians did find in foreign affairs a new avenue for the expression of the same general principles. May seems to agree, viewing the Great Crusade as not simply an expres-

[23] *Ibid.*, 276.
[24] Goldman, *Rendezvous With Destiny*, 209.
[25] *Ibid.*, 208.

sion of Wilsonian progressive ideals on the level of international policy but a defense of the very limitations of the older progressivism against innovators. And the anti-relativists imply that progressive thought as formulated prior to 1917 was as much responsible as were external factors for the decline of progressivism in the war and Reconstruction years.

The whole subject has been regarded from an entirely different perspective by a number of historians, including John Blum, Arthur Link and George Mowry. While using intellectual factors in their analyses, these men have viewed the decline of the movement primarily from the standpoint of politics. They too, though, seem to see the decline of progressivism more in terms of internal limitations than of external blows.

Link establishes the ground rules for this type of analysis when he writes: "Since national progressivism was never an organized or independent movement (except imperfectly and then only temporarily in 1912), it could succeed only when its constituent elements formed a coalition strong enough to control one of the major parties."[26] From this perspective, the decline of the Progressive movement sprang from the failure of progressives to control or successfully utilize the Republican, Democratic or Progressive Parties.

Prominent Bull Moose Party leaders such as Amos Pinchot and Harold Ickes laid much of the blame for the demise of their party on George Perkins. Perkins, they claimed, financed the party in order to control it for the ends of J. P. Morgan and Company, U. S. Steel and International Harvester.[27] Contemporary historians disagree. Perkins' biographer, John A. Garraty, describes Perkins as sincere in his political efforts;[28] Helene Hooker, in her introduction to Amos Pinchot's history of the party, demurs from Pinchot's charge by offering a more fundamental alternative: "How far or how effectively," she asks, "could the Progressives have fought in view of the gains created by the Democratic reform and the additional crisis of a world war?"[29] Mowry, who traces the decline of the party in some detail, does so in terms both of

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[26] Arthur S. Link, "What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920's?" *American Historical Review*, LXIV (July, 1959), 833–851, 838.

[27] Harold L. Ickes, "Who Killed the Progressive Party?", *American Historical Review*, XLVI (1941), 306; Amos R. E. Pinchot, *History of the Progressive Party, 1912–1916*, ed. by Helene M. Hooker, New York, 1958.

[28] John A. Garraty, *Right-Hand Man: The Life of George W. Perkins*, New York, 1960.

[29] Helene M. Hooker, in Pinchot, *History of the Progressive Party*, 59.

Theodore Roosevelt's shifting sentiments and the inherent difficulties of the situation.[30] John Blum agrees with Mowry that Roosevelt helped to kill the party, but emphasizes the inherent weaknesses that doomed the party from the start:

> It was a party with only three assets, all transitory, enthusiasm, money and a Presidential candidate. The enthusiasm and the money vanished with defeat. The candidate understood political organization too well to expect a group of ardent amateurs—even wealthy amateurs—running an incomplete ticket, to provide the stuff of victory in 1912 or continuity thereafter. After the election of Woodrow Wilson, Roosevelt was prepared to dissolve the party he had made as soon as it suited his convenience.[31]

The creation of the Progressive Party looms, then, as a major factor in the overall demise of the progressive movement, for, as Mowry puts it: "... with the Roosevelt secession radicalism as a potent force within the Republican party was dead for at least thirty years."[32] The baleful effects of this secession caused Mowry to write that "... in the end Roosevelt was to be largely responsible for the destruction of progressivism in the Republican Party."[33] To be sure, the argument runs, progressives such as La Follette, Cummins, Hadley, Borah and others remained in the Republican party after the split, but the position of progressives was far weaker than it had been in early 1912, when, with the momentum of Insurgency behind them, they were on the verge of capturing the party. Even the renomination of Taft in 1912 was tolerable, from this perspective, for only their own departure could have prevented the progressives from controlling the party following the inevitable defeat of the President.

Progressive Republican ranks were of course augmented when the Progressive party broke up and the majority of its members returned to the G. O. P. But the terms of reunion established by the Republican leaders were inauspicious for the future of progressive Republicanism. "From all except Roosevelt unconditional surrender was expected," Mowry writes.[34] Garraty tells us that Perkins continued his strenuous efforts in behalf of the ex-Progressives into 1917, but being objectionable to both sides he served only to make an acceptable rapprochement the more difficult.[35]

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30 Mowry, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement*, 284–366.
31 John M. Blum, *The Republican Roosevelt*, Cambridge, 1961.
32 Mowry, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement*, 252.
33 *Ibid.*, 208.
34 *Ibid.*, 367.
35 Garraty, *Right-Hand Man*, 361.

If the breakup of the Republican Party in 1912 was, as Mowry, Blum and others claim, the fatal blow to progressive Republicanism, then the causes of that breakup become significant factors in the decline of the Progressive movement. Roosevelt's decision to bolt the party following Taft's nomination was the crucial one. Many factors were involved, as Mowry explains it. The pre-convention and convention battling had been extraordinarily bitter, bringing emotions to a boil; Roosevelt and his supporters believed that the nomination had been stolen; Roosevelt was a god to many of his followers, adding to the passion of those who pressed him to lead a new party; while 107 delegates, chiefly office holders, were unwilling to bolt, and remained in the convention and voted for Roosevelt, the majority of Roosevelt delegates, 344, favored a third party and refused to vote on the nomination; sufficient financial support for a third party campaign was promised by Perkins and Munsey; above all, something in Roosevelt's character made him persist—he couldn't be a quitter, he was sincere about his New Nationalism, and he perhaps secretly hoped for victory.[36] Blum agrees with most of Mowry's analysis, but feels that Roosevelt was moved more by desire to salvage his pride than by hope of victory.[37]

The impossibility of the Progressive Party and loss of the Republican Party to progressivism put the whole burden on the Democratic Party. It proved unequal to the task, historians like Link and Blum tell us, and they advance some explanations for the failure.

The relatively limited ends of the New Freedom of course come into the account. The Wilson described by Link and Blum was, as of 1913 and 1914, a skilled political leader, unsophisticated in economic theory and relatively conservative in the views to which he adhered. This conservatism, moreover, was characteristic of liberals generally, not just Wilson, in the opinion of these historians. "Americans, even liberal Americans, could not agree upon how to discipline their burgeoning economy without inhibiting its productivity," Blum writes.[38] Link notes that ". . . a general reaction against further excursions into reform set in around the beginning of 1914, gradually permeated the administration and the majority membership of Congress, and gained momentum during the summer and early autumn. . . ." The primary cause of "this

[36] Mowry, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement*, 237–255.
[37] Blum, *The Republican Roosevelt*, 149.
[38] Blum, *Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality*, 79.

ebbing of the reform impulse in 1914" was the business slump that had set in late in 1913.[39]

The demands and thinking of the New Nationalism remained, however, and in 1916 Wilson reversed himself and appointed Brandeis to the Supreme Court, supported a rural credits bill, a child labor law, and the Adamson Act, together with other measures advocated by "advanced" progressives. The motive for the switch was largely or wholly political, both Blum and Link indicate, an effort to fashion a new coalition for the 1916 campaign.[40] The effort succeeded, with the building of a progressive coalition made up of "southern and western farmers, organized labor, the social justice elements, and a large part of the independent radicals who had heretofore voted the Socialist ticket."[41] Link, more than Blum, Goldman and other historians, remarks on the continued functioning of this new progressive coalition through the war, giving support for "heavy taxation, relatively stringent controls over business and industry, and extensive new benefits to labor." Indeed, the coalition even survived the Armistice "in a crippled way," putting across

> a program that constituted a sizeable triumph for the progressive movement—continued heavy taxation, the Transportation Act of 1920, the long fight for railroad regulation, a new child labor law, amendments for prohibition and woman suffrage, immigration restriction, and water power and conservation legislation.[42]

Link admits, however, that despite these measures, the coalition fell apart between 1917 and 1920, making way for the rout of the Democrats in the election of 1920 and the continued weakness of that party as a national organization through the twenties. He joins other historians in search of explanations for the disintegration of the Democratic Party.

The war has been seen by some historians as creating a situation inherently ruinous to progressivism. Russel Nye writes: "Nothing constructive could be done in wartime. . . ."[43] It inevitably brought, some have felt, a shift in the issues away from those of the progressives, what Mowry has called "The disinte-

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39 Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: The New Freedom*, Princeton, 1956, 445.

40 Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Movement*, New York, 1954, 223–241.

41 Link, "What Happened to the Progressive Movement," *loc. cit.*, 838.

42 *Ibid.*

43 Russel B. Nye, *Midwestern Progressive Politics*, East Lansing, 1959, 287.

grating effects of the great new national issues which came out of the war. . . ."[44] Hofstadter sees the war as breeding an inevitable reaction, not only to itself but to the Progressive movement that preceded it.[45] Forcey and Goldman see a significant shift in power away from the progressive element, and Forcey at least implies that this too was an inevitable concomitant of war. "Though Croly and Lippmann spoke for the ideals and interests of the great liberal middle class, that class no longer had much power in a world ruled by the hard and secret decisions of admirals and generals, diplomats and heads of state."[46] On this last point Hofstadter demurs, arguing that no significant shift in power to the interests the progressives had been fighting could have taken place, "for only on limited issues and in superficial respects had the management of affairs ever been very far out of those hands."[47]

Link, however, is not willing to accept the argument of inevitability.

> The national progressive movement, which had found its most effective embodiment in the coalition of forces that reelected Woodrow Wilson in 1916, was shattered by certain policies that the administration pursued from 1917 to 1920, and by some developments over which the administration had no or only slight control. The collapse that occurred in 1920 was not inevitable and cannot be explained by merely saying that "The war killed the progressive movement."[48]

Link has drawn up a more specific bill of particulars:[49]

> First, the independent radicals and antiwar agrarians were alienated by the war declaration and the government's suppression of dissent and civil liberties during the war and the Red scare. Organized labor was disaffected by the administration's coercion of the coal miners in 1919, its lukewarm if not hostile attitude during the great strikes of 1919 and 1920, and its failure to support the Plumb Plan for nationalization of the railroads. Isolationists and idealists were outraged by what they thought was the President's betrayal of American traditions or the liberal peace program at Paris. These tensions were strong enough to disrupt the coalition, but a final one would have been fatal even if the others had never existed. This was the alienation of farmers in the Plains and western states produced by the administration's refusal to impose price controls on cotton while it maintained ceilings on the prices of other

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[44] Mowry, *The California Progressives*, 278.
[45] Hofstadter, *Age of Reform*, 276.
[46] Forcey, *Crossroads of Liberalism*, 275; see also Goldman, *Rendezvous With Destiny*, 196.
[47] Hofstadter, *Age of Reform*, 279.
[48] Link, "What Happened to the Progressive Movement, *loc. cit.*, 850.
[49] *Ibid.*, 838.

agricultural commodities, and especially by the administration's failure to do anything decisive to stem the downward plunge of farm prices that began in the summer of 1920. Under the impact of all these stresses, the Wilsonian coalition gradually disintegrated from 1917 to 1920 and disappeared entirely during the campaign of 1920.

Blum agrees in stressing the disaffection of the western farmer. The disproportionate power that Wilson permitted to the southern segment of the party caused, he claims, the politically ruinous farm policy. It was also in part responsible for wartime prohibition, which was anathema to urban workers and the city machines, "whose captains never forgave the rural evangelicals."[50] Blum, like Link and others, notes also the alienation of the intellectual on civil liberties issues.

Much of the blame for the wartime and postwar breakup of the progressive coalition within the Democratic party has been placed on Woodrow Wilson. "The attention Wilson gave to his splendid international purpose was needed equally at home," Blum writes. But "It was not in Wilson's power to provide it. He lost himself, as he had at times before, in a transcendent faith so dear to him he could not think that others did not partake of it. . . ."[51]

The analysis of progressive thought reenters the political analysis at this point, as at many others. Wilson was not alone at fault. Progressives generally had been reluctant from the first to embrace the demands of labor and the social welfare advocates. Amidst the heightened fear of radicalism in 1919 and 1920, such coalitions were doubly difficult. Writing of the California progressives, but generalizing also about the national movement, Mowry writes:

> When witch-hunters and reactionaries sought to stamp out all deviations from their creed they inevitably attacked Progressives and progressive principles. But even more disastrous to the reform movement was the tendency of progressive leaders to fall prey to the same spirit themselves.[52]

David Burner stresses another factor: ". . . after 1918 Wilson could not satisfactorily direct his own administration." The 1918 election had not been ruinous, Burner argues. The loss of twenty-three House seats to the Republicans was less than the average loss sustained by the party in power in an off-year election. The election did not, moreover, signal any national disaffection but only

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50 Blum, *Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality*, 152.
51 *Ibid.*, 155–156.
52 Mowry, *The California Progressives*, 293.

the alienation of many in the Midwest. But, to a party that had become habituated to strong Presidential leadership in domestic and political affairs, the loss of Wilson's firm hand, first to the Versailles conference, then to the League of Nations fight, and finally to a near-fatal stroke, was disastrous.[53]

A final factor relating to the failure of the Democratic party as a vehicle for progressivism is suggested by Link, among others, when he writes: "When the progressive coalition of 1916 was destroyed in 1920, progressives reverted to their traditional voting habits."[54] We are reminded that since the Civil War the Democratic Party had been the minority party. Only the Republican schism of 1912, healed by 1920, had permitted the Democrats to regain the Presidency after a twenty year drought. The burden of championing progressivism might have rested more lightly on the Republican Party.

In addition to commentary on the fate of each of the three parties discussed above, historians have offered opinions on the progressive decline from an overall political perspective. They are agreed that progressivism involved a coalition of diverse elements. It is natural, therefore, that they should account for its decline partly in terms of schismatization. Progressives were divided between at least three parties (some would include the Socialist party and say four), and divided also on occupational, social and ideological lines. Such a loose coalition was inherently unstable, it has been suggested, and there was little that could be done about it.

Attention has also focused, however, on the failings of individuals like Roosevelt and Wilson and La Follette. They are blamed for augmenting the natural disunity of the movement through their personal animosities, jealousies and drives for power.[55] Implied in such analysis is the notion that the leaders of the Progressive movement might have been of a different character, and had they been something other than what they were, the ultimate fate of progressivism might have been different.

Mowry questions the accidental character of what might be called the personality factor:

> In California, as in the nation, one of the more potent reasons for the decline of progressivism was the sharp personal conflicts among its

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53 David Burner, "The Breakup of the Wilson Coalition of 1916," MID-AMERICA, 45 (January, 1963) 18–35, 18–24.

54 Arthur S. Link, *American Epoch*, New York, 1956, 255.

55 With respect to La Follette, see Robert S. Maxwell, *La Follette and the Rise of the Progressives in Wisconsin*, Madison, 1956, 173–194.

leaders. If an average can be struck on such elusive matters, the national Progressive leader was extraordinarily individualistic and his character was marked by a pronounced ambitious and competitive strain. He was usually highly intolerant of opposition either within or without his own ranks. After he had held his first important office he seemed to demand a fealty from his supporters which they were often unable or unwilling to give. . . .[56]

It was then, from this viewpoint, perhaps not inevitable that potent leaders of progressivism should have been highly individualistic and prone to schismatizing actions, but statistically highly probable that any given one of them should have been of such a character.

Mowry offers another general factor applicable especially to the years 1916 to 1920—the self-perpetuating properties of failure and defeat. Discouragement led progressives to abandon the pattern of thought and action that had characterized their progressivism. Thus, "many progressives lost all hope of concerted action and were ready to withdraw from the reform crusade. . . ." And,

As despair succeeded hope in the progressives, their fine progressive rationale of a decade earlier eroded. Gone was their firm belief in the ultimate success of moral values. Gone was their complete faith in democracy, and thus their confidence in politics. Gone was their once tenaciously held conviction of the essential goodness of man and his capacity to improve.[57]

Whatever the explanation emphasized, historians seem to be generally agreed that the Progressive movement was over by 1920. The view is not unanimous, however. Again, it is Link who issues a sharp dissent. Progressivism had declined, to be sure, but it had by no means disappeared. It's apparent demise, he argues, was due to the fact that the several elements could no longer coalesce into a national majority capable of electing a President. One of the weaknesses referred to above concealed tenacious strength.

When the progressive coalition of 1916 was destroyed in 1920, progressives reverted to their traditional voting habits in the national elections of 1920, 1924, and 1928 and were never able to combine to capture the presidency. On the other hand, they combined in Congress to control the legislative branch during practically all of the 1920's, to thwart the conservative executive leadership, and to push through a remarkable progressive legislative program, the most advanced parts of which were nullified by presidential vetoes.[58]

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56 Mowry, *The California Progressives*, 291–292.
57 *Ibid.*, 299, 301.
58 Link, *American Epoch*, 255.

Kenneth C. MacKay lends support to this view in his book *The Progressive Movement of 1924.* "One purpose of this history," MacKay writes, "is to demonstrate that—far from being dead—the progressive movement, supported by agrarian malcontents, militant labor forces, and far-visioned socialists and intellectuals, remained alive and energetic throughout the Twenties." MacKay develops this view by describing La Follette's campaign as springing from groups and ideas prominent in the earlier progressive movement.[59]

Samuel Lubell disagrees with MacKay.

> The 4,800,000 votes which La Follette got in 1924 were often described loosely as the irreducible minimum of liberal strength in America. Much of that vote, representing approval of La Follette's opposition to war with Germany actually had nothing to do with liberalism.

Ethnic origin, for Lubell, has been the key factor in American politics from the outbreak of World War One.[60] Hofstadter sides with Lubell on the specific issue of the meaning of La Follette's 1924 vote and disputes Link's emphasis on progressive continuity in the 1920's. He points to the progressive consensus in 1912, when Taft, the lone candidate regarded as a conservative, did so poorly, and says that "It is the disappearance of this progressive consensus of 1912 that seems most significant." The Congressional progressives of the twenties, with the exception of Norris, he puts down as "a fake." The nub of the matter, for Hofstadter as for others, is this: Progressivism had been founded on a mood, and with the reaction that followed the war that mood was dissipated."[61]

While some difference of opinion continues as to whether progressivism was alive or dead during the 1920's, historians agree that the movement had declined significantly by 1920. A wide variety of explanations have been offered for its decline, but certain broad themes have received special emphasis.

It has been argued that the Progressive movement suffered certain grave blows from the outside, chiefly the advent of World War One. The war inevitably diverted attention, raised new and divisive issues, and shifted power into non-progressive hands.

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[59] Kenneth Campbell MacKay, *The Progressive Movement of 1924,* New York, 1947, 12–13; 22–91.

[60] Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics,* second ed., revised, Garden City, 1956, 149, 137–167.

[61] Hofstadter, *Age of Reform,* 281, 283, 280.

While by no means disparaging the importance of war, most recent history emphasizes the character of the Progressive movement itself. Schlesinger's cyclical theory retains adherents who see decline as inherent in any reform movement. A good deal of attention has been devoted to the intellectual content of progressivism, resulting in several different, though not always incompatible, explanations for the decline of the movement. Stress has been laid on the limited goals of the dominant strain of the movement, which is generally seen as the Wilsonian. The effect alleged was, among other things, to cause progressives to run out of issues and to draw away from reform when challenged by more radical elements from within and without. Attention has been directed also to a new mode and body of thought arising in pre-war years, including relativism. Some have indicted relativism for promoting a philosophy and psychology of acquiescence. May, especially, focuses attention on the ruinous conflict between the old ideology reflected in Wilson's New Freedom and the varied body of new thought which at first was largely within the shelter of the Progressive movement.

For the most part, arguments relating to the intellectual content of progressivism depict the movement declining in the war and postwar period. The war is seen, nevertheless, as simply accelerating a decline that was already underway due to internal intellectual factors.

A related block of opinion, similarly focusing mainly on internal weaknesses, traces the decline in political terms. Failure of progressives to control a major political party is the fundamental weakness pointed to and explained. The Progressive Party is not seen as a major one, however. Though Leuchtenburg discusses a shift within the Progressive Party away from domestic progressive issues, the majority view is one of unconcern about the internal functioning of the party. The failure of the Progressive Party was virtually unavoidable, Blum and others argue, hence the basic fault was creation of it. The schism of the Republican party in 1912, giving birth to the Bull Moose effort, has been seen as the big event in the decline of progressive Republicanism. With respect to the Democratic Party, decline came in the years 1917 to 1920, it is widely asserted. Internal diversity and disharmony, worsened by the rise of new problems with the war, a discriminatory farm policy, and other failures of leadership are especially blamed.

Certainly the views available are sufficient for creation of one or several comprehensive syntheses on the subject of the decline of the Progressive movement. But would such a view stand the test of empirical inquiry? As this writer has not undertaken a thorough bibliographical study, but only a survey of prominent contemporary historical opinion, it would be presumptious to suggest that more monographic study is needed within the general area of the decline of progressivism. Certain needs are, however, apparent even at this point.

Above all, study of progressivism on the state and local level needs to be not only fuller in quantity, but broader in scope. Are the intellectual factors really evident? Were progressive Republicans really materially weaker after the 1912 schism? Are there additional factors in the decline of progressive Democracy, such as the long run effects of Wilson's conservative patronage policy? Does the election of 1916 in its non-presidential aspects reveal anything about progressive strength prior to American involvement in the war? Is it true that progressivism had little appeal for the immigrant?

National questions that need further exploration include the following: What was the background, political and otherwise, of the men brought into government during the war? (Was there really a significant influx of conservatives?) Just how heterogeneous was the Progressive movement? For example, just how different were the economic views of Brandeis and Perkins, Wilson and Roosevelt? Were the progressives more nationalistic than conservatives in the period 1898-1916? Did nationalism divert progressives from reform, or did the two dovetail?

Pending completion of a large number of monographic studies, especially on the state and local level, no truly definitive history of the decline of progressivism can be written. Certainly, however, a large number of potentially fruitful and not entirely unrelated hypotheses are now available as a guiding framework within which such efforts of detailed inquiry may be pursued.

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MID-AMERICA

VOLUME XLV

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